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In the years that immediately preceded the 
beginning of the Second World War and dur­
ing the initial phase of the conflict itself, Po­
land was to play a central role in the tense 
drama of international affairs. Uncertain diplo­
mats speculated on the policies the beleaguered 
nation would likely adopt once the full pressure 
of Hitler's Germany had been felt in Warsaw, 
where an ambivalent government was seen to 
vacillate between allegiance to the Western 
democracies and an apparent disposition to 
enter into partnership with the Third Reich. 
Alarmed political observers in Europe and 
elsewhere expressed deep concern and grave 
misgiving over the ability of the Polish political 
system, economy, and social structure to with­
stand the tremendous stress of supporting a 
major war effort. 
The selection of Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, 
Jr., as the ambassador of the United States to 
Poland signaled a significant increase in official 
American concern over the impending crisis. 
Although he was not a career diplomat, Biddle 
had been an extremely successful businessman, 
a leading personality in high social circles, and 
a close personal friend and political ally of the 
president. He served in Warsaw from the 
summer of 1937 until the outbreak of the war 
between Germany and Poland, when he ac­
companied the government on its flight into 
exile through Romania into France and finally 
to London. 
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FOREWORD 
One of the last telegrams sent by American Ambassador A. J. 
Drexel Biddle, Jr. from Poland during that fateful September, 
1939, was composed on my portable typewriter placed upon a 
tree stump in the park at Zaleszczyki. The ambassador and his 
reduced staff had just arrived by motorcade at Zaleszczyki on 
the Romanian frontier. Together with key personnel of the Pol­
ish Foreign Office and other members of the diplomatic corps 
we had fled from Krzemieniec, which had been ruthlessly 
bombed and strafed by the German Luftwaffe. 
While I do not remember the details of that telegram nor do 
I know whether it ever reached the State Department, its con­
cluding sentence has remained clearly imprinted in my mind. 
Ambassador Biddle asked, "Why do England and France con­
tinue to drop propaganda leaflets when it has been shown 
what havoc can be wrought by dropping bombs?" 
The question was rhetorical. The introductory essay and the 
documents published in this book reveal that Ambassador Bid­
dle knew the answer: England and France were simply not 
prepared for armed conflict despite their declaration of war on 
September 3, 1939. 
Zaleszczyki represented, so to speak, "the end of the line" 
for me in Poland. We crossed the bridge over the Dniester Riv­
er on Friday, September 15, into neutral Romania. As a Kos­
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ciuszko Foundation scholar, I had been in Poland since July, 
1938, doing research on a doctoral dissertation in history. Dur­
ing the fifteen months of my sojourn in Poland I had witnessed 
the numerous international crises that preceded the outbreak 
of World War II. Munich occurred in the fall of 1938 and 
Czechoslovakia surrendered the Sudentenland to the Nazis. In 
Warsaw, the atmosphere was tense as the Poles demonstrated 
for Teschen Silesia and appeared ready to make war upon the 
Czechs if their demands were not met. In the spring of 1939 
Nazi Germany overran the whole of Czechoslovakia and an­
nexed the Lithuanian city of Memel; Poland reacted by calling 
up certain age groups for military service and by rushing 
troops to the frontiers. 
The summer of 1939, when I joined the staff of the Ameri­
can Embassy in Warsaw, was the deceptive calm before the 
storm. Then suddenly on August 23, 1939, came the explosion 
of a diplomatic bombshell: the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact. We all knew war was close at hand. 
As a resident scholar in Poland and then a staff member in 
the American Embassy, I was merely an observer of those 
momentous events. The American ambassador, on the other 
hand, was in close personal contact with Polish political lead­
ers who played a major role in them. That is why his "Report" 
and communiques to Washington are so revealing and so valu­
able to the historian. Our government was indeed fortunate to 
be represented in Poland by a person of Ambassador Biddle's 
caliber. Probably no other foreign official had such intimate re­
lations with Polish government leaders. He and Mrs. Biddle 
entertained frequently and lavishly. He often played tennis and 
golf with Polish dignitaries. He spent many weekends on the 
Potocki estate at Lancut (a member of the Potocki family was 
the Polish ambassador in Washington). Thus he had more than 
the ordinary number of opportunities to engage in confidential 
conversations with the highest Polish authorities. 
The Poles did not hesitate to confide in the American ambas­
sador. His engaging personality, his frankness and honesty, his 
concern for Poland's problems and its difficult international po­
sition—all served to convince the Poles that he was a sincere 
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friend of their homeland. Moreover, he represented a friendly 
nation that had assisted in the reestablishment of Poland, that 
had given generous economic support to the new state, and 
that included within its borders millions of citizens of Polish 
descent. Through the ambassador, the Poles hoped to inform 
America of their plight and their needs. 
Tony Biddle, as he was known to his intimates, was certainly 
the right man at the right time and place. He possessed an 
uncanny understanding of international diplomacy and mili­
tary strategy. Thanks to his simple, cogent literary style, his 
eyewitness account of Poland's fateful days is an absorbing 
and exciting narrative. Readers of this volume will be grateful 
to its editors for making his "Report" on the fall of Poland 
available to them. 
Charles Morley 
Columbus, Ohio 
November, 1974 

PREFACE 
In the final years prior to the Second World War and during 
the initial phase of the conflict itself, Poland occupied a lead­
ing role in the tension-filled drama unfolding in international 
affairs. Diplomats were preoccupied with speculation regard­
ing the posture Poland would actually adopt once the pressure 
of Hitler's Germany was applied fully to Warsaw, which 
seemed to vacillate between allegiance to the Western democ­
racies and an apparent partnership with the Reich. Moreover, 
interested observers voiced concern about the strength of the 
Polish internal political system, economy, and social struc­
ture, and wondered about the state's ability to support a major 
war effort. Simultaneously, pointed questions were raised 
about the domestic political position of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and the directions that he would select for United 
States foreign policy, especially regarding the danger zone of 
East Central Europe. 
The diplomatic papers of the last American ambassador to 
interwar Poland provide important new contributions to both 
discussions. A. J. Drexel "Tony" Biddle, Jr. served in Warsaw 
from the summer of 1937 until the outbreak of war, and then 
accompanied the Polish government on its flight from Poland 
through Romania to France and, ultimately. London. During 
his prewar tenure, Biddle supplied Washington regularly with 
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detailed, perceptive analytical reports; then, while serving in 
France, he wrote a lengthy involved account of the final days 
of peace and the first phase of war, drawing upon his own 
notes, recollections, and private papers as well as his official 
documents. Not only are these materials of great interest per 
se but, considered in the context of the time in which they were 
written, they shed significant light on the attitude and role of 
the United States in the events that led to the Second World 
War. The Biddle reports furnished the American government 
with indisputable evidence of the nature, intent, and tactics of 
Nazi aggression in Europe. It is clear from these documents 
that Roosevelt and his foreign policy advisers were given a 
clear assessment of the crucial circumstances surrounding the 
fall of Poland, as well as a remarkably accurate judgment on 
Hitler's long-range goals and ambitions. Moreover, Biddle's 
dispatches to Washington also kept the administration abreast 
of domestic political and economic developments inside Po­
land, and of the entire range of extremely difficult external pres­
sures under which Poland struggled for survival. 
For purposes of clarity and cohesion, the book is divided into 
three main parts. The first contains an introductory essay, 
based on Polish as well as Western sources, that discusses 
Biddle's role and the atmosphere in which he worked. Next 
follows the lengthy report that Biddle began writing shortly 
after his arrival in Paris in October, 1939. This document is of 
particular interest, since it not only provides the most authori­
tative eyewitness account of the collapse of the Polish Repub­
lic, but also draws definite conclusions about the lessons to be 
learned for Western defense and foreign policies. In fact, 
Biddle apparently intended the report to have a pedagogical 
value, and accordingly wrote it as an official diplomatic docu­
ment, with a subjective summary part. Thus, it is more than a 
mere memoir of his personal involvement in events of histori­
cal significance. 
The materials presented in this book were originally written 
under trying circumstances without regard for the fine points 
of literary style; moreover, they were intended for a highly se­
lect group of key American political figures, and not for mass 
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public consumption. Therefore, in preparing them for a general 
audience nearly forty years after their production, the editors 
have followed generally accepted editorial procedure, in an ef­
fort to make the account more comprehensible and readable 
without altering Biddle's own words or meanings. The num­
bers at the beginning of each paragraph have been eliminated, 
and many of the short paragraphs have been consolidated to 
give ideas and descriptions greater unity. The titles for each 
chapter are those of the original. Those occasional vague or 
confusing references made by Biddle have been clarified in 
editorial footnotes. In instances where Biddle misspelled Pol­
ish personal or geographical names, the editors have corrected 
the errors in line with accepted Polish usage by noting the 
proper forms in footnotes at their first appearance. Finally, 
where a word or phrase has been added for clarity, the editorial 
insertions have been placed within brackets. Otherwise, all 
spellings and punctuation forms, as well as grammatical and 
stylistic nuances, are exactly as Biddle wrote them in those 
tempestuous years. 
The same observations apply to the third section of the book, 
which contains a selective yet representative collection of Bid-
die's important diplomatic correspondence with both the 
United States Department of State and President Roosevelt 
himself prior to the war. The report and his dispatches all re­
veal Biddle as an extremely perceptive observer with broad, 
varied contacts in Polish diplomatic and political circles, and 
the keen understanding essential to a correct analysis of the 
events and personalities on which he reported. 
The editors gratefully acknowledge the cooperation and as­
sistance of several individuals and institutions in the prepara­
tion of this book. The directors and staff of the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, where the unpub­
lished materials are deposited; The Historical Society of Penn­
sylvania, which houses the private papers of Biddle; and the 
libraries of Warsaw University, Florida State University, and 
Columbia University all greatly facilitated the research for this 
project. Mr. Nicholas Biddle, son of the late ambassador, kind­
ly provided the editors with much useful information, as well 
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as permission to consult his father's private papers. Several 
colleagues were extremely helpful during the preparation of 
the manuscript. Professors George Alexander Lensen and 
Ralph V. Turner of Florida State University, and John C. Rule 
of Ohio State University, offered considerable encouragement 
in undertaking this project, while Professors Thomas Campbell 
of Florida State University and W. W. Kulski of Duke Univer­
sity read the manuscript and contributed many valuable sug­
gestions. A special word of gratitude belongs to Professor 
Charles Morley of Ohio State University, who accompanied 
the Biddies out of Poland and thus participated in the events 
described herein. He not only offered numerous helpful com­
ments on the manuscript but also kindly consented to write the 
foreword to the book. Thanks also to Mr. William Johnson for 
drawing the excellent map of Poland printed in this volume, 
and to Mrs. Kathy Wynot and Mr. Charles C. Moore, Jr., who 
devoted considerable time and effort to preparing the manu­
script for finished publication. Finally, the authors would like 
to express their appreciation for the superb editorial work per­
formed upon the manuscript by the staff of the Ohio State Uni­
versity Press, especially Assistant Editor Sarah T. Millett. 
Just as whatever merits the editorial contributions possess 
are due in large part to the above-named individuals, we alone 
are completely responsible for any deficiencies in this regard. 
Of course, the opinions and conclusions expressed herein are 
totally those of A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 
P V. C. 
E. D. W. 
T. P. K. 
Tallahassee, Florida 
November, 1974 
PART ONE

Introduction


Introduction 
Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle, Jr. was appointed United 
States Ambassador to the Republic of Poland in May, 1937. 
Biddle's credentials for the post were exceptionally good; for 
in addition to close personal and political ties to the Roosevelt 
administration, which afforded him the full confidence of the 
president, Biddle was equipped with a first-rate diplomatic 
mind and an engaging personality. His ability to gather and 
absorb detailed information, as well as to grasp the broad im­
plications of complex diplomatic maneuvers, provided Roose­
velt and the Department of State with a clear, accurate, and 
uncompromising analysis of the course of European diploma­
cy.1 The selection of Biddle to represent the American govern­
ment in a crucial and sensitive diplomatic center like Warsaw, 
suggested a significant increase in American interest in East 
Central Europe on the eve of the European crisis. 
Biddle's excellent record as ambassador to Poland was es­
pecially remarkable since he had no professional training in the 
foreign service. Yet, his background, personality, and social 
position reinforced his innate talent for formal and informal 
diplomacy. He was born on December 17, 1896, in Philadel­
phia, the son of Anthony Drexel Biddle and Cornelia Rundell 
Bradley. The future diplomat was descended from a prominent 
and wealthy Pennsylvania family; his father had been a well­
4 INTRODUCTION 
known lecturer, author, and explorer, who once had taught for 
the Bureau of Investigation at the Department of Justice 
Training School. 
Biddle was educated at St. Paul's School in Concord, New 
Hampshire, but never attended college. At the age of twenty 
he enlisted in the United States Army and fought in France 
from 1917 to 1918, rising to the rank of captain. With the end of 
the First World War, Biddle entered private business and 
quickly became involved in a wide range of interests. Between 
1922 and 1934 he was, among other pursuits, director of a 
realty company, shipping line executive, an officer in the Acou­
stic Products Corporation, chairman of the De Forest Radio 
Corporation, and member of a South African mining company. 
Biddle married Mary L. Duke, heiress to the Duke tobacco 
fortune, and became a prominent social figure admired for his 
trim, well-dressed appearance and personal charm, his athletic 
skill, and a genuine capacity for human compassion. More­
over, he was equally known in European social and political 
circles, where he spent considerable time, and kept a house in 
Austria. In 1931 Biddle was divorced and married Margaret 
Thompson Schulze.2 
Returning to the United States after a tour of Germany in 
the fall of 1930, Biddle threw himself into domestic politics as 
an early and active participant in Franklin D. Roosevelt's cam­
paign. He contributed heavily in money and support to the 
Pennsylvania Democratic Party during the 1932 presidential 
election, and in 1934 campaigned extensively for George H. 
Earle, the first Democratic governor of Pennsylvania elected in 
more than one hundred years. In January, 1935, Governor 
Earle (who had been American minister to Austria in 1933) 
introduced Biddle to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and in 
July Roosevelt appointed Biddle ambassador to Norway, 
where he remained until his transfer to Warsaw in 1937. 
Biddle assumed his first diplomatic post at a tense moment 
in European history. Hitler, who had already startled the world 
by his brutal consolidation of power in Germany and his at­
tempted coup against Austria in the summer of 1934, had re­
cently announced the rearmament of the Reich, and Mussolini 
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was preparing his final plans for the invasion of Ethiopia. In 
the two years preceding Biddle's appointment to Warsaw, the 
Italo-Ethiopian War would be fought and won by Mussolini, 
the Rhineland reoccupied by Nazi troops, and Spain would 
become the battlefield of a bloody civil war. As a result, both 
the League of Nations and the principle of collective security 
were wrecked by the success of Fascist and Nazi aggression. 
Throughout this critical period, the United States stood stead­
fastly behind its isolationist shield, responding to European 
events by passing neutrality legislation designed to keep Amer­
ica out of foreign entanglements. Despite the efforts from 
many quarters to make Roosevelt aware of the dangers that 
threatened world peace, he took no decisive action. This lethar­
gy resulted not only from his fear of domestic political reper­
cussions but also from his own personal isolationism. Conse­
quently, the foreign policy of the United States lapsed into 
"amoral drift."3 In the face of this abandonment of responsibil­
ity, Europeans began to call upon the United States to exercise 
its leadership as a world power in order to counterbalance the 
actions of the aggressors. One French observer noted that de­
spite his rigorous domestic programs, Roosevelt lacked a clear 
policy toward Europe and that "in these troubled times 
which may lead to imminent catastrophe, the action of the 
United States may be decisive."4 
By 1937, Roosevelt's attitude toward the rapidly deteriorat­
ing situation in Europe had matured and the administration be­
gan to assume a more decisive stance in foreign affairs. The 
1936 election victory had given the president a renewed confi­
dence in his leadership, whereas his defeat over the Supreme 
Court and other domestic issues in 1937 and 1938 led Roose­
velt to subordinate questions of internal reform to the problem 
of foreign policy.5 Moreover, alarming reports on Hitler's prep­
arations for war were being sent to Washington from Ameri­
can diplomatic representatives abroad, so that both Roosevelt 
and Hull should have been more than ever convinced of the 
dangers of inaction. Ambassador William E. Dodd's dispatches 
from Berlin revealed the extent of Hitler's efforts to prepare 
Germany for war and clearly informed the State Department 
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of Nazi designs in Central and Eastern Europe.6 Similar opin­
ions were expressed and driven home by John Cudahy, United 
States ambassador to Poland, whose optimistic views had 
undergone a sharp reversal since his arrival in Warsaw in 1933. 
In March, 1936, at the time of the Rhineland crisis, Cudahy 
wrote to the White House that "the past week has demon­
strated very clearly that the League of Nations and col­
lective action are all illusory. If the Hitler Government 
is not overthrown, a war in Europe is as certain as the rising 
sun. This certainty of war we must recognize and accept as an 
established fact."7 In December Cudahy told Roosevelt flatly 
that "Germany is the outstanding threat. The whole impulse of 
the country is war preparation," and he warned that Hitler's 
plans inevitably would include Czechoslovakia and Danzig.8 
Nonetheless, in his letters to Roosevelt and in public speeches 
Cudahy argued strongly for a reinforcement of American neu­
trality in the impending conflict. 
Biddle, closely in touch with European diplomacy from his 
post in Oslo, wrote to Roosevelt in equally urgent terms. In a 
letter of February, 1936, Biddle gave a brief but cogent anal­
ysis of Poland's position in the rapidly changing power shifts: 
General Picture. Realignment of major Powers taking place. 
At the present moment, the scene on this side of the Atlantic 
may be described as a mad scramble for position, in view of the 
major regroupings. In order to forestall further ambitious at­
tempts on the part of the expansionists, Germany, Japan, and 
Italy, it would appear, for the time being at any rate, that En­
gland and France might look to Russia for the balance of pow­
er. Pending such re-groupings taking definite form, Poland 
is on the fence as regards definite position. In her desire to 
take a position in the realignments from which she can derive 
the greatest advantages, she has remained, to date, noncom­
mittal. It is considered that, so far she has been able to main­
tain, so-to-speak, an even balance between Russia and Ger­
many. Though it is felt by foes of the Soviet here that Poland 
would naturally join the Italo-German group, were it to take 
definite form, nevertheless, the keenest, and less prejudiced 
observers believe that Poland must eventually fall in line with 
the British-French-Soviet combination.9 
Although Biddle's dispatches from Norway were cognizant of 
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the dangers of war, they were always marked by a careful 
analysis of conditions and events that was the product of calm 
and controlled study rather than bleak despair. To Biddle's 
portrayal of the European situation Roosevelt replied in April 
that "the general situation on the other side seems not only 
chaotic but much in need of some new plan and new leader­
ship. Perhaps the time is not ripe but it is at least worthwhile 
pointing towards it."10 
In April, 1937, on the eve of the congressional debates over 
the extension of the Neutrality Act, Roosevelt announced Bid-
die's appointment as ambassador to Poland." After confirma­
tion by the Senate, Biddle and his wife arrived in Warsaw on 
June 2, having left a most favorable impression on official circles 
in Oslo. On his departure from Norway the important labor 
daily Arbeider Bladet had high praise for Biddle, character­
izing him as an example of the "younger and more attractive 
type of diplomat," conscientious and lacking in the "stiff for­
mality of the older generation."12 Biddle's transfer to Poland 
was not a sudden decision. As early as April, 1935, Cudahy had 
let it be known to William C. Bullitt, then ambassador in Mos­
cow, that he was "anxious to get out of Poland as he has had 
enough of the physical disorder of Eastern Europe." Bullitt 
cautioned the president that "the man you send to War­
saw should also be very much of a gentleman and acutely 
intelligent," and he immediately proposed Biddle for the post, 
although Cudahy could not be transferred to Dublin for anoth­
er two years. It is clear, however, that Biddle's appointment to 
Norway was meant only as a temporary measure until a more 
important position could be found for him.13 
Cudahy's pessimism over events in Central Europe and Po­
land must have contributed to Roosevelt's decision to send Bid­
dle to Warsaw. Shortly before the latter's appointment, Cuda­
hy wrote a despairing letter to the president in which he 
concluded that "Poland is the poorest country in Europe and I 
must tell you very confidentially that I will be surprised if it can 
survive economically another ten years. The country is without 
natural resources, is over-populated, [and] has no definite eco­
nomic or political policy."14 On the other hand, Biddle was en­
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thusiastic about his move to Warsaw, where he felt important 
diplomatic events were rapidly converging, and he quickly set 
about "acquiring a clear picture of Poland in terms both of 
domestic and foreign policy."15 He rapidly won the confidence 
and friendship of Polish leaders, particularly of Foreign Minis­
ter Jozef Beck and President Ignacy Moscicki. Indeed, Biddle 
was so successful in obtaining the trust and confidence of key 
Polish and foreign diplomatic, political, and economic officials 
that his opinions and views were highly prized by Polish lead­
ers as well; Jan Szembek, the Polish under-secretary of foreign 
affairs, praised Biddle as being "customarily well-informed."16 
The impact of the change in ambassadors became evident 
within a few months after Biddle's arrival. His appraisals of 
the Polish scene drew high praise from Roosevelt, who, after 
being informed by the State Department that Biddle had be­
gun immediately to send Washington first-rate and highly in­
teresting reports, paid particular attention to them.17 
The Polish government, equally delighted with the new am­
bassador, welcomed Biddle warmly and impressed upon him 
their "utmost interest" in Roosevelt's efforts to preserve world 
peace.18 Taking Biddle's arrival as a sign of renewed American 
concern for European affairs, the Polish ambassador in Wash­
ington, Jerzy Potocki, told Hull that "Poland is looking 
to the United States for leadership in Europe as well as 
throughout the world." The Polish statesman also expressed 
his confidence that "such leadership with a program will be 
forthcoming when the time is ripe."19 
Biddle brought a fresh perspective to the American view of 
Poland as a result both of his intensive energy and a genuine 
sense of compassion for the Poles. Sincerely convinced of the 
need to foster closer ties between America and Poland, Biddle 
immediately immersed himself in efforts to remove any obsta­
cles to the attainment of that positive relationship. He there­
fore devoted considerable attention to the less glamorous but 
equally vital area of financial affairs, and was largely respon­
sible for the relative ease with which Polish-American rela­
tions were regulated. His efforts were particularly evident in 
such delicate matters as arranging loans and debt cancella­
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tion.20 He also moved swiftly to avoid any embarrassment that 
might arise from occasional incidents involving illegal or in­
discreet actions by American citizens visiting the country.21 His 
diligent and concerned involvement with such mundane affairs, 
together with his record of overall success, earned Biddle the 
respect and gratitude of Polish officials. 
This proved to be extremely fortunate, for Biddle arrived 
in Warsaw at a time when the country was undergoing a funda­
mental political transformation from within and experiencing 
mounting pressure from Nazi Germany. The death of Marshal 
Jozef Ptfsudski in May, 1935, deprived Poland of the only 
source of effective leadership it had known since 1926. The pow­
er vacuum was all the more serious because of the widespread 
domestic unrest over worsening economic conditions and the 
rising protest of antigovernment German and Ukrainian 
minorities. In the power struggle that erupted in 1935, Ptf­
sudski's self-appointed heirs formed a supraparty coalition, 
known as the Camp of National Unity, whose structure and 
ideology were designed to forge an authoritarian regime ca­
pable of rallying all sections of the population around the slo­
gan of "National Defense." The regime rested on Marshal Ed­
ward Smigfy-Rydz as inspector general of the armed forces, 
Ignacy Moscicki as president, and Jozef Beck as foreign minis­
ter. Although Poland was technically still a constitutional 
republic with a parliament {Sejm) representing a wide range of 
socioeconomic interests and ideologies, the leaders of the 
camp appeared intent on pushing the country rapidly toward a 
fascist-like dictatorship. They argued that this was necessary to 
consolidate internal authority and bolster national strength in 
the face of increasing domestic and foreign difficulties.22 
Cudahy's appraisal of the domestic situation five months 
after Pi/sudski's death revealed little comprehension of the 
basic forces at work. "Here in Poland," he told Roosevelt, 
"there are no radical changes to record and the government 
continues under President Moscicki much as it did under Mar­
shal Ptfsudski."23 Biddle, on the other hand, quickly grasped 
the real trend in Polish politics and its relationship to the 
country's foreign policy problems. In his first lengthy report 
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from Warsaw, he advised Roosevelt that the new leadership 
"appreciates the importance of maintaining a democratic 
facade during this still formative period of Poland's regenera­
tion. Accordingly, they recognize the importance of maintain­
ing a Parliament despite the decidedly centralized character of 
the present Government. The keynote of Government policy, 
therefore, is: "a conducted democracy'—that is to say, "a democ­
racy conducted under an authority* Moreover, the Gov­
ernment feels that until the masses become more enlightened 
they will continue to be subject to the sway of subversive in­
fluences of the 3rd Internationale as well as the continued 
existence of cross currents and the play of other externally in­
spired forces. I now look for Government inner circles to 
exert a quiet but definite effort to strengthen in every way pos­
sible the Government front [the Camp of National Unity] in 
their aim to exercise a firm check against communistic and 
other disturbances."24 
Biddle's assessment of internal Polish politics was consider­
ably more optimistic and tolerant than that held by other ele­
ments of American opinion—a fact that was not lost upon 
Polish leaders. From the first appearance of the government 
bloc, the New York Times greeted it and the emerging political 
orientation it represented with a distaste that soon ripened into 
open hostility.25 In June, 1937, Times writer-editor Otto Tolis­
chus visited Poland for a firsthand view of the situation, and 
reported that it was increasingly evident that the regime was 
adopting a form of Polish fascism that focused on alienating 
the non-Polish ethnic and religious minorities in order to gain 
support from the Polish middle and lower classes.26 Prompted 
by these revelations, the paper devoted an editorial to the 
Camp of National Unity, angrily calling it "not only strongly 
nationalist and authoritarian, but also more and more racial 
and exclusivist." The Times concluded by warning that "Po­
land, the oppressed land freed in the name of liberty and self-
determination, is being remade in a spirit and on a pattern 
terribly like that of Nazi Germany," a trend that would certain­
ly alienate from Poland "the world sympathy which more than 
anything else won the Poles their independence."27 British 
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public and private appraisals of domestic Polish affairs were 
equally critical. Both the London Times and the British ambas­
sador to Poland, Sir Howard Kennard, bemoaned the thinly 
disguised authoritarian nature and program of the Camp of 
National Unity, and later ridiculed it as the farcical attempt of 
nonpoliticians to find a political solution to Poland's myriad 
problems.28 The French press, however, was more restrained in 
discussing these developments. It generally accepted the polit­
ical evolution within Poland as a necessary evil given the coun­
try's geopolitical situation.29 
Biddle, too, was aware that, in a larger sense, Poland's do­
mestic development was a reflection of her extremely un­
stable international position. Traditionally, one constant factor 
overshadowed Polish diplomacy: the dangerous geopolitical 
position of Poland between Germany to the west and Russia to 
the east. Ptfsudski had long since laid down the fundamental pre­
cept that if Poland were to survive as an independent state, 
she would have to pursue a policy of "equilibrium" between 
her two great neighbors. As practiced by Colonel Beck, this 
policy meant good relations with both powers but no formal 
alliance with either. Poland, Pilsudski argued, must steer a 
middle course of her own, while building up the defensive al­
liance with France. Although sound in conception, the policy of 
equilibrium was fraught with new dangers as a result of Hit­
ler's seizure of power in 1933. Thereafter, Poland became a 
potential battleground, in both the military and ideological sense, 
in the struggle between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Con­
sequently, the pressures for Poland to go the totalitarian route 
of her two powerful neighbors became increasingly greater 
during the later 1930s.30 Biddle's dispatches made it painfully 
clear that Poland's fate would be a crucial test of Europe's 
future, not only in terms of that country's ability to escape Nazi 
aggression but also to the extent that the country was able to 
maintain its remaining democratic institutions intact in the 
face of the totalitarian wave that appeared to be engulfing the 
continent. 
Roosevelt's search for a solution to the deteriorating situa­
tion in Europe and the Far East first emerged in his famous 
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"Quarantine" speech, delivered in Chicago on October 5, 
1937. Breaking openly for the first time with his earlier isola­
tionist stance, Roosevelt condemned those aggressors who 
jeopardized the freedom and security of the world, and hinted 
at the need for collective action to guarantee international 
peace. The speech provoked both applause and violent isola­
tionist reaction in the United States, while the European re­
sponse was equally varied. The German government immedi­
ately assumed that the combined influence of Roosevelt and 
Hull had begun to have its effect on American foreign policy. 
The Nazi ambassador in Washington cabled Berlin that hence­
forth "we must not count on American isolationism as an ax­
iom," although he suggested that the United States would in­
tervene actively in European affairs only if Great Britain were 
directly involved in a world conflict.31 Biddle informed Roose­
velt later that month that Polish leaders welcomed the new 
American position, but he stressed that Poland could do very 
little by itself to oppose German aggression in East Central 
Europe.32 Moreover, on October 7 Gazeta Polska, the official 
organ for the Polish government, lauded the Quarantine 
speech as the signal for a dramatic switch from American isola­
tionism to a more active role in world affairs. The Poles, how­
ever, apparently realized that Washington was more concerned 
with Asia than Europe. Several days later, a lead editorial in 
the same newspaper speculated that although isolationism was 
deeply rooted in American tradition, nevertheless Japanese ag­
gression in the Far East would enable Roosevelt to change 
American opinion.33 
In his letter to Biddle on November 10, four days after Italy 
joined Germany and Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact, Roose­
velt revealed his growing concern over Poland's difficulties and 
the worsening European situation in general: "I am glad that 
the Chicago speech has apparently made a real dent in govern­
ment thinking in Europe even though it is heartily disliked by 
some of the "powers that be.' Since you wrote, the general situ­
ation seems to have got worse instead of better and there is no 
question that the German-Italian-Japanese combination is 
being amazingly successful—bluff, power, accomplishment or 
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whatever it may be." He underscored the importance of alert­
ing the entire world to the expansionist nature of fascism, for 
"we cannot stop the spread of Fascism unless world opinion 
realizes its ultimate dangers." The president concluded by as­
suring Biddle that he was "awfully glad to have you in 
Warsaw where you are literally on the firing line—more so in 
many ways than if you were in Paris or Berlin or Moscow. If 
things get worse, Warsaw and Prague and Vienna will, one or 
all, become focal points."34 
From his vantage point in Warsaw, Biddle eagerly agreed 
with the president's views, but presented a somewhat more 
realistic appraisal of the forces operating in Poland. He noted 
that in East Central Europe, an area "constantly subjected to 
the cross currents of various conflicting ideologies," an observ­
er did not have to be "supersensitive to feel the terrific pres­
sures which the advocates of totalitarian doctrine constantly 
bring to bear on the leading statesmen, both here and in the 
neighboring states." In this context, Biddle voiced his belief 
that the political attitudes of the East European leaderships 
served as "barometers" of the Western democracies' desire 
and willingness to enforce the spirit and letter of the League of 
Nations system. With regard to Poland, he offered the follow­
ing analysis of the domestic political scene: "So far, the pre­
dominant leading element of the present Polish regime has 
evinced its adherence to Pifsudski's idea of advancing during 
this regenerative interval along the lines of 'democracy con­
ducted under the idea of authority,' a condition which from a 
Western viewpoint would appear to be inconsistent with pur­
suance of a strictly democratic concept. However, in terms of 
Eastern European viewpoints, such a course is accepted as an 
evolutionary process compatible with their forward looking 
program." In this situation, Biddle assured Roosevelt, he was 
doing his best to advance the cause of democracy in Poland by 
developing his daily contacts to the point where he could "dis­
creetly offer constructive suggestions whenever the opportu­
nity might psychologically present itself."35 
These observations on the state of Polish democracy 
provoked some interest in Washington, but Roosevelt and the 
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State Department naturally focused their attention on Biddle's 
reports concerning Nazi activity. His day to day, exhaustive 
analysis of German policy toward Poland, with its careful re­
cording of the alternating degrees of German pressure, was an 
accurate gauge by which the American government could 
measure the broader aspects of Hitler's tactics and strategy in 
Europe. Biddle had a keen awareness of the Nazi danger in 
Europe from both personal and professional experience. In 
July, 1934, a few days after the murder of Austrian Chancellor 
Engelbert Dollfuss by Nazi agents, Biddle—who was enter­
taining a group of friends and relatives at his hunting lodge in 
Strecken—decided to journey to Vienna to attend the funeral of 
the dead statesman. On the way there, his party was caught in 
the cross fire during an engagement between armed Nazi 
party "militia" and the Austrian Heimwehr in a small village 
outside Vienna, and several of those present were arrested for 
a short while and treated rather harshly by Nazi bullies.36 This 
demonstration of Nazi brutality left a strong impression on 
Biddle that greatly influenced his subsequent attitudes toward 
Germany.37 
Biddle confirmed this firsthand impression of the National 
Socialist movement during the following two years by a con­
scientious study of European politics and diplomacy, especially 
after he had access to classified information as American rep­
resentative in Oslo. Consequently, when he arrived in Warsaw 
in June, 1937, Biddle was prepared not only to lend a sympa­
thetic ear to a country that he knew was high on the list of 
Hitler's ambitions but also to keep his own government well 
informed of real or anticipated Nazi moves against Poland. Ac­
cordingly, he developed a close working arrangement with 
Ambassador William C. Bullitt, then in Paris. Since Bullitt was 
a major proponent of American involvement in Europe, Biddle 
was able to gain a clear perspective regarding the impact of 
Polish-German relations in France and England and, indirect­
ly, on United States policy toward Europe. Through the use of 
personal correspondence as well as occasional visits, Biddle 
developed an information network that he used to update both 
American and Polish official circles on the nuances of each oth­
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er's diplomacy. For example, in July, 1938, when the Czecho­
slovak question had emerged as the key issue of international 
affairs, he informed Bullitt of how a personal animosity of long 
standing between Beck and the under-secretary of the French 
Foreign Office, Alexis Leger, had entered into the delicate equa­
tion of Franco-Czech-Polish relations.38 Conversely, on nu­
merous occasions Biddle passed along to Polish diplomats 
the information he had received from his American counter­
parts in London, Berlin, and Moscow as well as Paris, and 
became highly prized by Warsaw as an important source of 
knowledge on Western outlooks.39 Beck also utilized Biddle as 
a conduit for transmitting Polish views to the Western powers, 
especially France, on the correct assumption that the Ameri­
can would promptly pass them on to Bullitt.40 
The major Polish personality with whom Biddle had the 
closest contact was Colonel Beck, a long-time associate of 
Ptfsudski and minister of foreign affairs since 1932. With Ptf­
sudski's death, Beck's position within the Polish regime had 
grown steadily stronger, particularly after Hitler's seizure of 
power began to affect Poland's foreign relations. In an attempt 
to adjust Polish foreign policy to the new circumstances, it 
appeared to many that Beck had brought Poland closer to 
Germany through the conclusion of a ten-year Declaration of 
Non-Aggression in January, 1934, and by at least outwardly 
indicating that Polish-German problems could be resolved 
peacefully and through greater mutual understanding.41 But 
although he seemed to be pulling decisively away from Pilsud­
ski's axiom of equilibrium between Germany and Russia, Beck 
was careful to step evenly between the two great powers and 
to make no genuine commitment to either side. 
At first Biddle, too, misjudged the actual degree to which 
Beck had tied himself to a pro-German course, even suggesting 
that official Polish anti-Semitism had been influenced by Ger­
man pressure.42 More accurately, in one of his first reports 
from Warsaw, Biddle speculated that "the reason why Colonel 
Beck is so strongly pro-German is found in his theory that the 
Fascist powers in Europe are growing stronger, while the 
Democratic forces are gradually losing out"; he suggested that 
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as France lost its ability to keep Germany in check, Poland 
would have to rely increasingly on her own devices.43 "From 
my own observations," he informed Roosevelt in August, 
"Colonel Beck is steadily becoming the leading force in the 
Polish Government, due mainly to his initiative, his willing­
ness to make decisions, and to shoulder responsibility. I find 
him a man of courage and intelligence." Biddle noted that dur­
ing their "frequent conversations," Beck placed "increasing 
emphasis on what he calls "voisinage'—or the good neighbor 
policy," while admitting that "his 'tight-rope walking' role is a 
difficult one."44 
Indeed, by 1937 Beck's "tight-rope walking" had become 
more precarious than ever. In spite of the relatively smooth re­
lations with Germany since the Declaration of Non-Aggression 
and Hitler's personal assurances that "it would be madness to 
attempt to seize territories from Poland or to push her 
away from the Baltic," the Nazi remilitarization of the Rhine­
land had drastically shaken Poland's position.45 The abject 
failure of the French to take decisive action against Hitler's 
repudiation of the Locarno Pact seriously undermined the en­
tire Eastern and Central European alliance system erected by 
France in the 1920s. Throughout most of 1937 there was a 
subtle but obvious increase of German pressure on Poland, in­
cluding rising tensions in Danzig and German demands for 
free extraterritorial transit across the Corridor. Roosevelt, who 
was kept closely informed of these events, wrote to Biddle: "I 
appreciate the difficult position of Poland, but I hope that the 
Polish government will not find itself compelled to do things 
which would be regarded by the democratic nations as yielding 
to Germany."46 But Beck, who had never had much faith in the 
ability or willingness of France to fulfill her commitments to 
Poland, demanded with a sense of futility that the time had 
come to demonstrate the "vitality, strength, and permanence" 
of the Franco-Polish alliance.47 
Nevertheless, in July, Beck confided to Biddle that he did 
not believe Hitler wanted war with Poland. Biddle concluded 
that, for the moment at least, Hitler would "humor" Poland 
and maintain good relations with her.48 Although Hitler's 
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statement of November 5 to the effect that he had no intention 
of altering the status of Danzig apparently found some cre­
dence among Polish officials, Biddle himself was convinced that 
Hitler simply wished to postpone the conflict until a more 
favorable moment.49 In retrospect Biddle's viewpoint proved to 
be correct. On the same day that Hitler gave his assurance 
about Danzig, the fiihrer also told his generals at a meeting in 
the Reich chancellery to prepare Germany for war in the near 
future, and on November 6 Italy joined Germany and Japan 
in the Anti-Comintern Pact. In December, after six months of 
intensive study and observation, Biddle sent the State Depart­
ment a balanced and accurate summary of Poland's posi­
tion: 
Although Colonel Beck has been frequently suspected in the 
past (particularly by the French) of leaning towards Germany, 
my own observations convince me that he is first and foremost 
a Polish patriot thinking in terms mainly of Poland's own 
interests, and following the precepts of his former chief, the 
late Marshal Pi/sudski. . Pilsudski had constantly stressed 
the importance not only of maintaining an equilibrium between 
forces on Poland's Eastern and Western frontiers but also the 
importance of building up as good friendship as possible with 
Germany during peace times, as well as of maintaining correct 
normal relations with the Soviet. This formula envisaged Po­
land's ability both to rehabilitate herself economically, socially, 
and otherwise, and to construct her defenses, militarily, so­
cially, religiously, and otherwise, against what Colonel Beck 
considers the "unlimited" menace of Bolshevism. In 
contrast to Colonel Beck's regarding communism as an "un­
limited" menace which seeks to penetrate every element in 
the structure of national life, he regards Germany as a "lim­
ited" menace, whose aims are at least ear-marked. To my 
mind, this has been the guiding influence in Colonel 
Beck's direction of Poland's foreign policy. . I definitely 
feel Beck, in directing the course of Poland's foreign policy, 
constantly keeps his eye on Britain's movements, and that 
his estimate of Britain's future action plays an important role 
in the Minister's formulation of Poland's long-term policy. 
To my mind, in terms of European considerations Beck's 
fondest aspiration is a close tie-in with Britain.50 
Biddle apparently hoped that by presenting the Polish situa­
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tion in this light, he could prod Washington into adopting a 
more forceful stance in European affairs. His frustration at 
American lethargy in this area was evident in a private 
memorandum written at the same time as the above-quoted 
official report. To himself, Biddle observed that in the crucial 
years of growing international danger "it was always Britain 
and France who were asked to carry the burden. The United 
States of America sits happily on the outside and every other 
nation sighs with hands folded."51 
The events of 1938 tended to confirm the impression that 
Beck was acting in ever closer association with Germany. In 
fact, Beck's analysis of Polish interests, aside from Danzig 
and the Corridor, was based on his anticipation of Western 
reactions to German policies in Central Europe. He was fully 
convinced that the Western Powers would not risk war in 
order to block Hitler's ambitions in Austria and Czechoslo­
vakia, and that to oppose Berlin on these issues would only 
serve to endanger Poland's relations with Germany. Conse­
quently, the Nazi takeover of Austria in March was mutely ac­
cepted by the Polish government as an internal matter for 
Austria and Germany.52 As for Czechoslovakia, Beck was equal­
ly sure that Poland should take advantage of the destruction 
of that country if it came about as a result of its abandonment 
by the Western Powers. Relations between Prague and War­
saw had been marked by open hostility since 1920, when the 
Conference of Ambassadors in Paris had ceded parts of Te­
schen (Cieszyh, Cesin) and Austrian Silesia to Czechoslovakia 
along with 76,000 Poles. Not only would the breakup of the 
Czech state restore this area to Poland, but the transfer of the 
equally contested Subcarpathian Ruthenia to Hungary would 
produce a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Beck believed 
this development to be especially desirable, for it would 
strengthen Poland's position in Central Europe and lead to the 
formation of an East European bloc to stem further German ag­
gression in this area. During the early months of 1938, there­
fore, he began to apply pressure on Czechoslovakia on behalf 
of the Polish minority, a campaign clearly coordinated with 
similar demands made by Hitler for the Sudeten Germans 
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and by Hungary for Ruthenia.53 Biddle reported his analysis 
of Beck's plans to Hull in April: 
Beck's energetic action vis-a-vis the Polish minority in Czecho­
slovakia comes as no surprise to me, for Beck has in­
formed me that the Polish minority would claim autonomous 
administration immediately, in the event that German influ­
ence led to a like claim by the Sudeten Deutsch. It is now 
becoming steadily clearer to me that in the light strictly of 
Poland's own long-range defensive policy, Beck's energetic 
activities . are motivated mainly by an underlying serious 
apprehension as regards Germany's potential moves. I am 
aware that Beck is concerned lest through intensified diplo­
matic and political-economic pressures, the Germans succeed 
in bringing the Czech government around to making a "deal" 
with Germany on all of Bohemia, or perhaps even on the whole 
of Czechoslovakia, before Poland might succeed in her efforts 
to bring about automony for her own minority in Czecho­
slovakia. I am, moreover, aware that the Government is 
also concerned lest Hitler at the back of his mind might vi­
sualize the extension of German political and economic hege­
mony right down the Danubian Valley, to the Black Sea, with 
an eventual eye to the Ukraine. Beck has not forgotten 
the late Marshal Pifsudski's long-range dream, which 
envisaged a neutral wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, as a 
means of stiffening the defensive position of each state in such 
an area, towards resisting, according to Pilsudski's apprehen­
sions, an eventual and inevitable German drive eastwards. In 
this connection, Pilsudski was hopeful that an eventual direct 
contact might be resumed between Poland and Hungary.54 
A few days later, Biddle observed to Roosevelt that "in this 
part of Europe the atmosphere may be characterized by 
steadily increasing tension. All States, including Poland, east 
and south of Germany, live in constant apprehension as to 
which might be the next victim of Hitler's expansion pro­
gram." This in turn led Beck to direct Polish foreign policy 
"even more cautiously than ever," trying "to make friends 
with Germany at every possible turn, in a play for time, 
wherein he hopes to strengthen Poland's defensive position 
against what Pilsudski anticipated, and now he, Colonel Beck 
anticipates, as an inevitable eventual conflict with Ger­
many."55 
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In the aftermath of the May crisis, during which Czecho­
slovakia had mobilized its armies along the German frontier 
in anticipation of a Nazi invasion, Biddle presented the State 
Department with an important analysis of Beck's policies 
designed to delineate his motives and clear away the con­
fusing inconsistencies in Polish policy.56 Biddle explained 
that Poland felt she could make no firm international commit­
ments in advance of an actual war between Germany and the 
Western Powers for fear of endangering her policy of equilib­
rium and, in fact, her very existence; hence, Beck "necessarily 
plays his diplomatic cards with extreme care." Moreover, 
Beck had anticipated the failure of London and Paris to sup­
port Czechoslovakia, and the realization of his fears only 
further undermined belief in Polish circles in the sincerity of 
France's commitments to her East European allies. Nonethe­
less, Beck realized that Poland could not resist German 
military or political pressures alone. Accordingly, Biddle 
believed that once the democracies employed forceful mili­
tary action against Hitler, "I should look for Poland to strike 
out vigorously, and even eagerly, on the side of Britain and 
France." 
This lengthy memorandum formed part of a series of re­
ports designed to furnish the American government with a 
broad survey of major trends in European diplomacy set 
down on the eve of the Munich crisis. In another paper written 
at the same time, Biddle sought to calculate the effects of 
Hitler's Eastern European ambitions on Polish policy in par­
ticular, and their more general effect on Poland's relationship 
with the Western Powers. Ever since the Austrian Anschluss, 
Biddle had been convinced that the direction of Nazi ambition 
lay to the east, and that Hitler's ultimate goal was the acquisi­
tion of the Ukraine with its vast food and mineral resources.57 
From conversations with Beck and other officials in 1938, 
Biddle gathered that this view was also prevalent among 
Polish leaders, and that in spite of his apparently pro-German 
policies, Beck would never accept an alliance with Hitler 
against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Beck told Biddle 
emphatically that Poland would do everything it could to 
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prevent or counter a German move into Russia. "My ob­
servations lead me to feel," Biddle informed the State Depart­
ment, "that the [German] acquisition of any part of the Russian 
Ukraine would fail to compensate Poland for having Germany 
on her East and South as well as her West. Beck im­
parted in the strictest confidence what I consider to be a most 
enlightening disclosure of his foreign policy in terms of its 
long-range outlook. In effect he said he felt that someday, 
in the event that Germany might find an envisaged acquisition 
of the Ukraine impossible, through Nazi-styled peaceful pene­
tration, Poland might have to fight to prevent passage of 
German troops over her territory. In such event, Ger­
many would attack Poland, not as the objective, but as the 
means of reaching Germany's envisaged Ukrainian objec­
tive."58 
Beck, in the same conversation, also admitted that he 
believed Germany's friendship to be only temporary. Danzig 
and the Corridor would soon become "objectives of German 
aspirations," and Poland increasingly recognized that "a 
conflict of German and Polish interests is being led to by 
events in the making." In the event of a German attack, Beck 
argued, Poland would resist with all her resources in the hope 
that she would halt the Nazi war effort. Biddle further ob­
served that although Beck knew that Chamberlain wished to 
avoid war at any cost, he nevertheless felt that the aid of 
Britain and France represented Poland's only chance in the 
event of a war with Germany. Biddle concluded his report 
with a rather bleak assessment of the policy of appeasement: 
"In evaluating Beck's policy, I wish to emphasize the im­
portance of bearing in mind not only Poland's potentially 
black outlook in the event either of continued German military 
or peaceful infiltration eastwards, but also that Beck 
was bitterly disappointed over France's refusal to march, 
subsequent to Hitler's march into the Rhineland. In fact, Beck 
later told me personally that France had made a great tactical 
error. To his mind, failure to march at that time would prove 
costly in terms of the long-run, not only for France, but also 
for Poland and Britain."59 
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By the end of July, Biddle cautiously noted a somewhat 
more relaxed atmosphere prevailing in Europe, in view of 
the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Czech problem 
as a result of Lord Runciman's impending trip to Prague. 
Nevertheless, he informed Roosevelt that although Polish 
officials were "keeping their fingers crossed the next six 
weeks may be expected to prove a period characterized by 
show-downs, back-downs, and critical negotiations."60 In fact, 
the pessimism of official circles in Warsaw over the outcome 
of the Czechoslovakian situation resulted in a direct inquiry 
by the Polish government as to what role the United States 
might play should a European war break out. For the first 
time since his arrival in Warsaw, Biddle was put in the difficult 
and, evidently for him, frustrating position of having to admit 
that his government could offer no official encouragement or 
support to Poland. In talks with a "high ranking Polish official," 
Biddle could only attempt to allay Polish fears that the United 
States might supply Germany with war materials, and to 
suggest that although neutrality sentiment was still wide­
spread in America, "Nazidom's neo-pagan policy of extreme 
anti-Semitism" had caused considerable revulsion there.61 
Regardless of Biddle's guarded remarks, the impending 
Czech crisis stirred the administration into action. Alarming 
dispatches about Hitler's plans from American representatives 
in Europe, particularly from Bullitt in Paris and Joseph 
Kennedy in London, began to reach the State Department, 
and on August 16 Hull announced that the Axis nations 
"could not count us out in pressing their plans for conquest."62 
While Chamberlain conferred with Hitler at Godesberg on 
September 22-23, Bullitt urged Roosevelt to intervene as a 
mediator in the crisis, and Hull told the president that "the 
evidence we had been receiving was overwhelming that 
Germany was armed to the teeth and was bent on widespread 
aggression at all hazards." On September 26 Roosevelt 
addressed a strongly worded message to Hitler urging a 
peaceful settlement of the issue, and he instructed Biddle to 
communicate the same message directly to Beck in order to 
dissuade Poland from pressing its demands on Czechoslo­
vakia.63 
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But in spite of the peaceful outcome of the Munich settle­
ment, Hull remained skeptical of its long-range results. 
From Warsaw Biddle cabled him on September 30 that the 
still unresolved demands of Poland and Hungary for Czech 
territory continued to make the situation in Central Europe 
dangerous, and he recommended that Roosevelt suggest an 
international conference of these states to negotiate the issue. 
In reply, Roosevelt instructed Biddle to give Beck a personal 
message to the effect that he hoped Poland would contribute 
to peace by avoiding the use of force.64 The seizure of Teschen 
by Poland on October 2 frustrated Roosevelt's move; for, as 
Biddle informed him four days later, Beck's determination to 
settle accounts with Czechoslovakia in the event that country 
was abandoned by the West, had been unshakable. Biddle's 
subsequent summary of the Czech crisis reinforced Hull's 
skepticism: "It is now becoming clear that Hitler's plans 
envisage (a) a period of internal reconsolidation and 'diges­
tion' for Germany; and (b) a reinvigorated drive Eastward and 
Southeastward. As for what is left of unfortunate 
Czechoslovakia, Hitler, as I have long anticipated, is bringing 
all possible pressure to bear on Prague to fall in line with 
Berlin. I still perceive no tangible grounds for hopes that the 
Munich Conference might lead to a general European ap­
peasement and pacification—and I continue to feel that Europe 
is passing through a period of armed truce."65 In a similar 
letter on November 5, Biddle repeated his doubts as to the 
positive results of Munich, concluding that: "I find it equally 
difficult at this writing to foresee any development which in 
final resort will not imply a variable degree of German hege­
mony over the various individual states east and southeast of 
Berlin."66 
Although Beck had gained one of the goals of his policy, 
the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia seriously weakened 
Poland's international position and resulted in its further 
encirclement by Germany. The Munich settlement was hardly 
completed when Hitler began to apply pressure against Po­
land in the by then familiar pattern. Nazi strategy focused on 
Danzig, the area that Beck called the "barometer of German-
Polish relations."67 On October 24, German Foreign Minister 
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Ribbentrop presented Polish Ambassador to Germany Jozef 
Lipski with a series of "fundamental demands" that included 
the return of Danzig to the Reich, the construction of a Ger­
man highway and railroad across the Corridor, and Polish 
membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact.68 Beck rejected these 
demands through a note to Ribbentrop on November 19, and 
five days later Hitler issued a secret directive ordering prep­
arations for the military occupation of Danzig.69 The Poles 
were keenly aware of the growing tension in Polish-German 
relations, and moved to bolster their international position. 
Hence, on November 27 Warsaw and Moscow issued a joint 
Polish-Soviet declaration confirming all existing agreements 
between the two countries and expressing the determination 
to resolve calmly any outstanding issues. A major increase 
in trade between the countries was listed as a major objec­
tive.70 
By December, Biddle, who had received accurate informa­
tion about these developments from his numerous contacts, 
reported to Hull in no uncertain terms his views on Hitler's 
plans for Poland. He felt certain that Germany's ultimate goal 
was complete European hegemony, and foresaw the establish­
ment of a vassal Ukrainian state as the key to that policy. 
Although the Soviet Union loomed as the chief obstacle to 
this program, Biddle felt that Hitler would avoid a direct 
military confrontation with the Russians until he had gained 
"complete ascendancy over the area between Germany's 
eastern and the Soviet's western frontier." Accordingly, Biddle 
believed that Berlin intended to apply the Czechoslovak 
"solution" to Poland: dividing the country into several parts 
through annexation of the Corridor, Danzig, and Upper Silesia 
to the Reich, outright incitement of the Ukrainian minority to 
break away from Poland and join up with Ruthenia, and the 
promise of Vilna to Lithuania. He predicted that Hitler would 
unleash the heretofore muzzled Nazis in Danzig to agitate 
against Poland much as the Sudeten Germans had been used 
to pressure Prague, and concluded pessimistically: "I discern 
increasing signs that Hitler is fast closing in on Poland." 
In the uncertain early months of 1939, Biddle kept Washing­
INTRODUCTION 25 
ton closely informed of the rapidly deteriorating relations 
between Germany and Poland, having already concluded that 
war between them would be averted only in the unlikely 
event that Beck made substantial concessions to Hitler regard­
ing Danzig. It was clear to Biddle that the attitude of Britain 
and France toward Poland's dilemma would be the crucial 
factor in Beck's negotiations with Hitler, but he judged that, 
unlike Czechoslovakia, Poland would fight alone if neces­
sary.72 The American envoy set out to arouse his country's 
support for the valiant Polish cause, while simultaneously 
bolstering the resolve of Warsaw. Roosevelt's January 4 
speech to the Congress, in which he announced that the United 
States would adopt "all measures short of war" to halt inter­
national aggression, produced a wave of articles in the Polish 
press greeting this American initiative with overt enthusi­
asm.73 Biddle promptly called upon Szembek to express his 
pleasure at the Polish response, indicating that his own per­
sonal satisfaction was shared by the American government.74 
On the following day Beck traveled to Berchtesgaden, and 
after several days of talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop came 
away in a very pessimistic mood. Immediately upon his re­
turn to Warsaw, he telephoned Biddle to confirm that Roose­
velt's speech had made a profound impact on the Polish gov­
ernment and had caused Hitler considerable worry. Beck then 
arranged to confer with Biddle at length about his talks with 
the fuhrer. Although Hitler had insisted that Danzig return to 
Germany, he had assured Beck that all problems were open 
to negotiation, an assurance in which Beck had little faith. 
Moreover, the Polish foreign minister was uneasy over what 
he discerned as a marked departure from Hitler's normal be­
havior: "When Hitler had greeted him, he was philosophical 
and pensive in demeanor—and only during his oration wherein 
he reviewed his accomplishments over the past year did he 
evince a spirit of boastfulness."75 
Events began to move rapidly after Beck's meeting with 
Hitler. Biddle's representations on behalf of Poland appeared 
to be achieving concrete results when the Export Bank in 
Washington granted long-term credits for the Polish purchase 
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of American cotton. Toward the end of January, Ribbentrop 
visited Warsaw and repeated Hitler's earlier demands con­
cerning Danzig and the Corridor. Beck, confiding in Biddle, 
revealed the substance of the German demands and admitted 
that they were completely unacceptable. Biddle hazarded the 
guess that Hitler's apparent willingness to negotiate with 
Beck was an effort to put England and France off guard as he 
prepared for his final move against Poland.76 In March, Biddle 
reported that he and Beck were in full agreement that Hitler 
would launch his drive against Poland within six months. 
Moreover, he wrote to Roosevelt that the American arma­
ments program and the "firmness of attitude" on the presi­
dent's part with regard to aggression "have served as a 'stop, 
look and listen' sign to the dictators," and had the effect of 
"stiffening British and French resistance."77 But the Nazi 
seizure of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, which Biddle 
had predicted in a dispatch to Hull the previous month,78 and 
the similar absorption of Memel on March 23, precipitated a 
major turnabout in the European situation. On March 26, 
Lipski in Berlin reaffirmed Poland's refusal to yield to German 
demands, and two days later Beck bluntly told the German 
ambassador in Warsaw that any attempt to alter the status of 
Danzig would be considered a casus belli. The Polish position 
was strengthened considerably on March 31 when Britain de­
clared itself ready to guarantee the independence of Poland. 
When the British verbal guarantee received new stature 
with its conversion on April 6 into an Anglo-Polish statement 
of intent to sign a formal mutual assistance pact,79 Hitler 
resolved to act decisively. The infuriated fuhrer had already 
drawn up a far-reaching, secret directive for military opera­
tions against Poland—the famous "Case White"—which was 
issued April 3. Now, in a major foreign policy speech before 
the German Reichstag on April 28, he openly condemned 
Polish "acts of belligerence" and expressed his keen disap­
pointment with the deterioration of German-Polish relations 
due to Warsaw's treachery.80 When Hitler capped this sweep­
ing indictment by declaring that the Anglo-Polish agreements 
had voided the 1934 German-Polish nonaggression declara­
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tion, the situation had become ominous. Beck responded in 
equally determined fashion on May 5, likewise speaking be­
fore a joint session of the Polish legislature. After convinc­
ingly exposing as hollow each German charge that Poland had 
refused to negotiate with Berlin in good faith, the Polish 
foreign minister closed with a defiant warning to Hitler: "We 
in Poland do not recognize the conception of peace at any 
price! There is only one thing in the life of men, nations, and 
states which is beyond price, and that is honor."81 Hitler in 
turn accepted the Polish challenge by concluding the "Pact 
of Steel" alliance treaty with Mussolini on May 22, amidst 
much bellicose publicity. Thoroughly alarmed at the mounting 
threat to Poland, Biddle promptly sent the State Department 
a lengthy memorandum in which he presented a remarkably 
accurate survey of the German policy that he had gathered 
from Polish intelligence sources.82 
The courageous stance of the Poles strengthened Biddle's 
resolve to help them as much as possible. Throughout the 
summer of 1939 he painfully chronicled the evidence of mount­
ing Nazi pressure against Poland, urgently seeking to make 
the American government aware of the impending danger. His 
letters to Roosevelt continuously underscored the importance 
of the British position toward Poland and expressed the hope 
that the president's attitude would have a bolstering influence 
on England and France.83 Simultaneously, Biddle began to 
espouse openly the Polish cause in messianic tones that re­
vealed the extent of his deeply felt personal involvement in 
and identity with the destiny of his host country. Szembek 
noted a conversation with him on April 25, in which he "ex­
pressed admiration for the position and conduct of Poland" 
and asserted that "if Europe succeeded in freeing itself from 
the totalitarian dictators, it could thank Poland for that."84 
Shortly thereafter, during a dinner at the American Embassy, 
Biddle went so far as to tell Polish officials that England, 
France, and the United States should be made to understand 
that Polish armies represented the advance guard of the 
European forces against aggression and that consequently 
Poland deserved the active financial and diplomatic support 
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of those states. He suggested that the Polish government 
should step up its propaganda in America in order to drum up 
support for its stance against Germany, and pledged his own 
active participation in such an undertaking.85 In June he 
warned the State Department that the apparent easing of Ger­
man press attacks against Poland, and Hitler's insistence on 
his willingness to negotiate with Warsaw, were merely familiar 
Nazi tactics designed to confuse the Western Powers.86 
Indeed, by the end of the month Biddle, in an increasingly 
philosophical mood, had become so pessimistic that he wrote 
to Roosevelt that he doubted whether war could be averted. 
After a series of in-depth conversations with a number of Pol­
ish officials, Biddle noted that "it would be difficult to liquidate 
the current conflict of forces in Europe through statesmanship 
and diplomacy in that the differences at stake did not wholly 
constitute material problems. Indeed, underlying the conflict 
were two discernable, basically different conceptions, 
recognized principles governing international relationships 
counted for naught in Berlin's view." He felt that the Western 
democracies could not realistically expect to coexist with "the 
totalitarian regimes and all they implied." Since Munich had 
revealed the bankruptcy of appeasement, the only recourse 
left was to strengthen and maintain "the anti-aggression front 
[which] might prove an expensive operation, but if it suc­
ceeded, it would prove far cheaper than a conflagra­
tion."87 
These observations, as well as some prodding by the Polish 
embassy in Washington, began to have some effect on the ad­
ministration. At a lengthy White House conference with Sen­
ate leaders on July 18, Hull stressed the urgency of the diplo­
matic cables and reports from Warsaw and Berlin in a futile 
effort to have the embargo on arms shipments to Europe 
lifted.88 The meeting was especially important because it came 
on the eve of Poland's requests for an extension of American 
credit in order to build up and supply her armed forces in prep­
aration for a German attack. The administration had already 
turned down a Polish request for helium in November of the 
previous year on the grounds that Poland's military situation, 
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and hence nonbelligerent status as demanded by the Neutral­
ity Act, was too precarious. More recently, in May, 1939, the 
Polish minister of trade, Antoni Roman, had vainly appealed 
to Henry Morgenthau that his country would need consider­
able financial assistance to keep its army mobilized when that 
step was taken.89 On August 9, Ambassador Potocki reported 
to Sumner Welles in the State Department that Germany had 
begun to station troops along the Polish border, and that Po­
land was determined to resist an invasion. Potocki added that 
the refusal of Congress to revise American neutrality laws had 
encouraged Hitler's plans against his country, and he ended 
the interview with an appeal for money in order to buy planes, 
copper, and other raw materials.90 
The final days of August saw the culmination of hopes for a 
peaceful resolution of Polish-German disputes and, therewith, 
the preservation of peace. Near the end of August, both Bullitt 
and Biddle cabled Hull that Hitler would probably launch an 
attack against Poland within the next week.91 On his own ini­
tiative Biddle had already drawn up plans for the evacuation 
of his embassy staff from Warsaw by August 21, and four days 
later the Polish government released its evacuation plans.92 
Both Chamberlain and Bonnet appealed to Roosevelt to use 
his influence in order to preserve peace. Accordingly, on Au­
gust 24, the American president, not wanting to pressure Po­
land, sent a note to Hitler and Moscicki urging negotiation, a 
move that Hull argued would have no substantial effect.93 
Meanwhile, the conclusion of the German-Soviet nonaggres­
sion pact on August 23 had rendered Poland's situation more 
desperate than ever. On August 25, when the formal Anglo-
Polish Mutual Assistance Treaty was finally concluded, Biddle 
telegraphed to Hull that Poland had decided to fight if Danzig 
were invaded, but that the whole issue was still open to pos­
sible negotiation.94 When Berlin ignored Roosevelt's appeal 
and Moscicki replied by blaming Hitler for the inflammatory 
situation and stressing the Polish desire to avoid war, the cause 
of peace seemed doomed.95 Nonetheless, in Warsaw Biddle 
continued to offer encouragement to the Polish government 
while urging them to use restraint.96 All of these last minute 
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efforts to ward off hostilities ended on September 1, as the Ger­
man armies suddenly poured across the Polish frontier and 
Nazi aircraft began to bombard Polish cities. 
The outbreak of war thrust Biddle into the center of world 
attention, and gave him an opportunity to marshal internation­
al support for beleaguered Poland. The saturation bombing of 
Warsaw presented him with the issue upon which he could build 
his entire case against German aggression and the system that 
had spawned it. When Luftwaffe pilots also bombed the Ameri­
can Embassy villa at Konstancin, just outside Warsaw, Biddle 
promptly expressed outrage and indignation at the fact that 
he personally was considered a military target.97 He vented his 
displeasure in a telephone call to Bullitt in Paris, who trans­
mitted reports of the German aerial attacks on Polish civilians 
to Roosevelt.98 The president used this eyewitness account as 
the basis for a message addressed to the leaders of the belliger­
ents, plus Britain, France, and Italy, demanding a halt to furth­
er "ruthless bombing from the air of civilians," and ordered 
additional investigations to confirm the initial reports.99 With 
German troops rapidly advancing into Poland, the government 
withdrew from Warsaw on September 6 and began a retreat 
across the country to the Romanian border. On the road to the 
designated temporary government seat of Krzemieniec, Bid­
dle, his wife, and their diplomatic entourage experienced their 
second brush with German aircraft, which harassed the mov­
ing columns continually. Biddle had fastened a large American 
flag to the roof of his car to emphasize his diplomatic neu­
trality, but found it only attracted the attention of the pilots. 
Estimating that there were "about 5,000" German planes in­
volved, he noted that "It seemed impossible to get away from 
them. My own car was bombed fifteen times and ma­
chine-gunned four, forcing me to take refuge in a roadside 
ditch."100 Biddle's dispatch of September 8, deliberately pub­
lished by the State Department a few days later, decisively 
exposed the hollowness of Hitler's denials that civilians had 
been bombed by German aircraft, and greatly furthered the 
growth of world outrage against Berlin.101 
Biddle was most upset, however, by the vicious air attack 
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on Krzemieniec, a small, defenseless market village distin­
guished only for its temporary diplomatic visitors. The town 
was completely devoid of military or political significance, 
having as yet neither Polish military nor government leaders 
in its midst. Nonetheless, on September 12 waves of German 
dive-bombers struck in late morning, killing about fifty Poles and 
wounding scores of others. Biddle at once called an "indigna­
tion meeting" of the assembled diplomats, who agreed to 
send messages to their home offices protesting the outrage.102 
Accordingly, Biddle had good reason to wire Hull on Septem­
ber 14 that "in view of what the members of my staff and my 
family and I have experienced and witnessed, I find it diffi­
cult in many cases to ascribe the wanton barbaric aerial bom­
bardment by German planes to anything short of deliberate 
intention to terrorize the civilian population and to reduce the 
number of child-producing Poles irrespective of category."103 
From that point on, collapse of the Polish state was only a 
matter of time. When Britain and France failed to deliver the 
massive air assistance they had promised, the Polish civilian 
and military leadership hastened the push southeastward to 
the friendly Romanian territory under cover provided by the 
valiant but outmanned Polish army. The Poles were especially 
disheartened when the great French land offensive against the 
German rear, which the French General Staff had guaranteed 
would take place within fifteen days of a German attack on 
Poland, likewise did not materialize. The final blow to Polish 
hopes came on September 17. On that date, the Soviet Union 
violated its nonaggression treaty with Poland by invading the 
beleaguered country from the east, in line with the secret 
protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Caught between the prover­
bial hammer and anvil, and abandoned by her allies, Poland 
faced the inevitable. Her government crossed the Romanian 
border, arriving in Bucharest on September 18. From there 
Biddle made his way to Paris, where Hull sent him a telegram 
commending his work "under conditions of great emergen­
cy." On September 30, Moscicki, interned by the Romanian 
government, resigned as president of Poland, and former cabi­
net minister WladysTaw Raczkiewicz assumed the office in 
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Paris. Hull immediately issued a statement recognizing the 
Polish government in exile and continuing Biddle in his capac­
ity as ambassador to Poland. 
During the course of the war Biddle was subsequently ap­
pointed ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to six 
additional governments in exile (Czechoslovakia, Greece, 
Luxemberg, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands), as 
well as interim ambassador to France, and conducted crucial 
negotiations with the Reynaud government immediately prior 
to the fall of that country in June, 1940. Biddle retired from the 
State Department in 1944 and was commissioned a lieutenant 
colonel in the United States Army. After the war, he was at­
tached to the Allied forces headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) 
and later made a special assistant to the Army Chief of Staff. 
He died on November 13, 1961, six months after having been 
appointed ambassador to Spain. 
All of the traits attributed to Biddle in the above sketch of 
his activities—careful attention to all factors that might influ­
ence foreign policy decisions, a broad range of personal con­
tacts that opened valuable sources of information to him, an 
appreciation of both the Polish and the general European 
international situations, and above all, a concern lest his gov­
ernment not realize the dangers to international order posed 
by Hitler—are particularly evident in the detailed analytical 
report of the fall of Poland and selected prewar dispatches and 
memoranda presented below. They prove decisively that 
"Tony" Biddle was, indeed, a "diplomat's diplomat," despite 
his clear lack of any formal training in the art of diplomacy. 
Moreover, he provided the exceptional example of a "citizen 
diplomat" rising to the task before him, thus justifying the ap­
pointment of men without prior diplomatic experience to key 
posts. 
1. Arthur Krock, writing Biddle's obituary for the New York Times on November 
14, 1961, noted that "his reports of the oncoming Nazi assault on Poland and France 
remain in the State Department files as models of prescience and accurate informa­
tion." See also Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), 
1: 652-53, and William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isola­
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PART TWO

The Biddle Report


CHAPTER ONE 
Pivotal Events

Factors and Forces

Which Led to War

From Warsaw I had observed the course of Hitler's machina­
tions and the fulfillment of his aggressive plans [first] vis-a-vis 
Austria, then Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.1 Neither in the 
case of Austria nor of Czechoslovakia did I look for support 
from the Western powers. At the same time, however, I felt 
that when in turn Poland became the object of Nazi appetite, 
the Poles could be counted upon to fight, and that by the time 
Germany's aggressive attention would have turned vis-a-vis 
Poland, the continental picture would have become so changed 
as to have prompted the Western powers to lend their support 
to the first country willing to resist Herr Hitler's apparent 
determination to redraw the map of Europe. 
In observing various aspects of Nazi technique vis-a-vis Aus­
tria and in turn Czechoslovakia, I discerned the same formula 
in the preliminary stage of machinations against the latter as 
had been practiced against Austria. Herr Hitler was still play­
ing on the "right of self-determination" as a pressuring instru­
ment, a political pretext for intervention in the internal affairs 
of neighboring states. By then he had made it a "racket" In 
a later stage, however, he broke even his own moral code, by 
deliberately enveloping the Slavs of former Czechoslovakia in 
his aggressive drive. 
During the course of the foregoing lamentable events, 
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Nazidom's policy was one of divide and conquer, a policy in­
volving the study of and the play on weakness. The formula, 
moreover, conceived by Berlin's "political engineers" and ap­
plied in the cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and eventually 
Poland, entailed in each case, similar tactics by stages: first 
demands, then hate propaganda, including insults and pin-
pricking, then wild accusations, then inspired border-incidents, 
and finally leading up to shameless, deliberate aggression. 
As regards the policy of "divide and conquer" (a leaf more 
than likely taken from the Hapsburg's book), I discerned and 
appraised as significant the fact that while Herr Hitler was 
engaged in waging his campaign vis-a-vis Vienna (and simul­
taneously feeling the pulse in London and Paris), his attitude 
towards Prague was cordial; towards Warsaw unusually 
friendly. (That Herr Hitler was more friendly towards Warsaw 
than Prague at this time, augured to my mind that Czechoslo­
vakia was "next" on Herr Hitler's "political menu"). Once 
Austria was swallowed, Herr Hitler's attitude towards Prague 
changed from friendly to frigid; thence to ice cycles. Mean­
while, he became even more disarmingly amicable with War­
saw (an attitude which by this time might be likened to the 
wolf in "Little Red Ridinghood"). When Czechoslovakia had 
succumbed, Herr Hitler in characteristic fashion "glared" at 
Warsaw in turn—his next potential victim. 
OCTOBER 16, 1938 
Polish official circles, shortly after October 16, 1938,2 in­
formed me confidentially to the following effect: 
In conversation with Polish Ambassador [Jozef] Lipski on 
this date, [German Foreign Minister Joachim von] Ribbentrop 
had alluded significantly to the necessity of an early settlement 
of the Danzig problem, and to the question of facilitating com­
munications, in terms of an autostrada [highway], between the 
Reich and East Prussia. On this occasion, however, Herr von 
Ribbentrop had not mentioned the question of extra-territori­
ality in connection with the proposed autostrada. Ambassador 
Lipski had subsequently imparted to his Government his con­
cern over Herr von Ribbentrop's insistence upon an early 
settlement of these two points. 
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I was aware, moreover, that the Polish Government had 
been studying various formulae looking to a solution of the 
Danzig problem as well as of the question of facilitating Ger­
man-East Prussian communications across Pomorze.3 In this 
connection, I had gained the impression that Minister Beck 
and his associates were inclined to prefer a non-extra-territori­
al autostrada to the then existent numerous routes of commu­
nication between the Reich and East Prussia. In that they felt 
these numerous routes served to facilitate anti-Polish espio­
nage activities, they looked upon the establishment of one 
main route as affording better opportunity to guard against 
these activities. I furthermore gained the impression that they 
hoped to trade a Polish-financed non-extra-territorial auto­
strada for a just and permanent settlement of the Danzig ques­
tion. 
In connection with the foregoing, a leading official of the 
Foreign Office subsequently told me that in studying Berlin's 
envisaged plans in connection with the proposed autostrada, 
his attention was drawn to the fact that not only did each 
successive plan envisage an extra-territorial highway, but also 
that each plan in turn specified an increase thereof, ranging 
from five to twenty-five kilometers, in width. In discussing this 
point with Minister Beck, he emphasized his opinion that Ber­
lin's specifications on this score only went to show that Berlin 
regarded the project more as a strategic factor, than one facil­
itating communications. 
JANUARY 5 [1939] 
Following Beck's return from his January 5, 1939 visit to 
Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, I asked him whether Herr Hit­
ler was difficult to talk and deal with personally." Minister Beck 
replied that on occasions previous to January 5, when he had 
meetings with Herr Hitler, the latter had usually evinced a 
clear and reasonable attitude and a most cordial manner. Dur­
ing the Minister's aforementioned meeting with Herr Hitler, 
however, he stated [that] the latter was cordial as usual, but in 
other respects a different man; a discernible change had 
taken place. In the course of their lengthy conversation, Herr 
Hitler seldom looked Minister Beck in the eye as had previous­
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ly been his custom; instead, he kept his eyes focused on the 
ceiling. I gained the impression that this conversation took the 
form more or less of a monologue, wherein Herr Hitler 
"thought out loud" in a tour d'horizon for several hours. This 
attitude of Herr Hitler's put Minister Beck on guard. The 
Minister sensed that this was not the man he had known be­
fore, and even during the course of the conference, he realized 
that Poland henceforth had to be more alert than ever before 
vis-a-vis Germany. 
As to whether he thought Herr Hitler was blurring or meant 
war, Minister Beck observed that he did not know. Herr Hitler, 
previous to the close of 1938, had been confident he could gain 
his objectives without involving Germany in a war. His easy 
"bloodless" successes had apparently gone to his head, an ef­
fect which had in a large measure contributed towards the 
change which Minister Beck discerned on January 5. 
In response to my further inquiry as to whether among the 
circles around Hitler, there were any individuals possessing 
the qualities of real leadership, Minister Beck stated in effect 
the following: when Herr Hitler had surrounded himself with 
what now composed the inner Nazi circles some of the latter, 
like [Alfred] Rosenberg and Ribbentrop, acted on their own 
initiative along lines of their conception.5 Minister Beck at­
tributed to them the attempt to set up Ruthenia as a center of 
Ukrainian agitation, for he had been unable to discern Herr 
Hitler's hand therein. Indeed, Minister Beck felt that von Rib­
bentrop had become a danger for Herr Hitler's regime in that 
Minister Beck suspected him of refraining from giving Herr 
Hitler the correct versions of discussions and communiques. 
In this connection, Herr Hitler could read only German and 
was thus at the mercy of translators under von Ribbentrop's 
direction. Men of the calibre of [former Foreign Minister Kon­
stantin] von Neurath were not whole-souled Nazis, but they 
carried out Herr Hitler's orders to the letter. Field Marshal 
[Herman] Goering possessed the qualities of leadership, but his 
influence on the direction of German foreign policy was ap­
parently eclipsed, for the moment at least, by von Ribbentrop's 
hold on Herr Hitler. Minister Beck went on to say that during 
 45 PIVOTAL EVENTS, FACTORS, AND FORCES
his January 5 meeting with Herr Hitler, the latter revealed for 
the first time that he regarded Goering as his successor. In 
this connection, Herr Hitler remarked that he regretted that 
the necessity to concentrate so much labor on the construction 
of the Siegfried Line had retarded progress on his construction 
program for Berlin. However, Field Marshal Goering was tho­
roughly familiar with his program and could carry on in case 
anything happened to him. 
After his conference with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 
Minister Beck and Count Michael Kubienski, his Cabinet 
Chief, dined with von Ribbentrop in Munich. Minister Beck in­
formed me that during the dinner he told von Ribbentrop that 
following all previous conferences with Hitler he had left Ger­
many with a feeling of optimism as to the possibility of coming 
to an arrangement on whatever Polish-German differences 
happened to have been outstanding at the moment. This 
time, however, he was leaving with a sense of pessimism as to 
the future. Minister Beck inferred that he had deliberately 
made this remark in the hope that von Ribbentrop would re­
peat it to his chief. Minister Beck felt, however, that von Rib­
bentrop failed to do so. From the time that Minister Beck re­
turned from Berchtesgaden, I discerned underlying signs of 
increasing Polish-German dissension. 
March ushered in a crucial political period, with a series of 
pivotal events which proved disadvantageous to the security 
of the Polish state; in brief, they marked Poland's partial en­
circlement: 
Occupation of Prague, March 15 
Germany's ultimatum to Lithuania, March 20 
Germany's treaty with Slovakia, signed March 23 
Germany's treaty in connection with Memel, signed 
March 24 
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In sum, this spelled the liquidation of one country, and the 
partial decomposition of another, all within a period of two 
weeks. Thenceforth, it became increasingly clearer that the 
European situation in general was rapidly deteriorating. The 
Polish-German situation in particular went from bad swiftly to 
worse. Herr Hitler's action vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia was inter­
preted by the Polish Government and military circles as a 
breach of Herr Hitler's avowed code of bringing back with [in] 
the Reich only people of German nationality. Moreover, these 
Polish circles felt that this action presaged the possibility of 
unlimited adventures in Eastern and Central Europe. I became 
aware, moreover, that the events between the 15th and 24th of 
March augured added difficulties for future potential negotia­
tions between Poland and Germany, in that through these ac­
tions Herr Hitler had destroyed the last vestige of confidence 
the Polish Government and military circles might otherwise 
have had in his word. Partly attributable to Germany's unilateral 
actions between March 15th and 20th, and partly due to Am­
bassador Lipski's having discerned signs of an early presenta­
tion of German demands on Poland, the Polish Government on 
the night of March 20 undertook a "regroupment" of its armed 
forces, as well as a secret calling up of certain classes of re­
serves. No mobilization posters appeared; the police discreetly 
notified the reservists at night time. Several cleverly conceived 
black-outs in Warsaw served to cover the movement of men 
out of the city. 
MARCH 21 
I was informed by Polish officials that on March 21, von 
Ribbentrop verbally communicated in behalf of his Govern­
ment the following "proposal" to the Polish Government: 
1.	 Danzig's return to the Reich. 
2.	 Extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between 
East Prussia and the Reich. 
3.	 The Reich in exchange was willing to recognize the 
whole of the Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's 
Western frontier. 
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4.	 The Reich would recognize the maintenance of Poland's 
economic interests in Danzig. 
5.	 The Reich would recognize the settlement of the out­
standing economic and communications problems aris­
ing for Poland out of the union of Danzig with the 
Reich. 
In von Ribbentrop's conversation with Ambassador Lipski 
on this occasion he stressed the importance of speed in the 
settlement of these questions as a condition of the Reich's 
maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. Minister 
Beck subsequently told me that his Government was surprised 
by the urgency with which these proposals were presented 
and the circumstances under which they were made; however, 
animated by the desire of maintaining good Polish-German 
relations, his Government did not refuse conversations, al­
though they considered the German demands unacceptable in 
the sense in which they were presented.6 
MARCH 26 
Minister Beck informed me that in the interests of a 
search for an amicable solution of outstanding Polish-German 
differences in regard to Danzig and the transit roads between 
the Reich and East Prussia, his Government had that day for­
mulated its point of view in writing to the German Govern­
ment as follows: 
Fully appreciating the importance of maintaining good 
neighborly relations with Germany, the Polish Government 
proposed a guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate 
entity of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which would 
be based upon the complete freedom of the internal life of the 
local population, and the safeguarding of the respect for the 
rights and interests of Poland. Moreover, the Polish Govern­
ment was willing to study together with the German Govern­
ment all further facilities for travellers in transit, as well as 
technical facilities in railway and road transit between the 
Reich and East Prussia.7 
Minister Beck interjected at this point that his Government 
was guided by the idea of offering to the citizens of the Reich 
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all possible facilities for them to travel in transit across Polish 
territory without any difficulties. The Minister went on to say 
that his Government had stressed that it was its intention to 
treat German demands with the utmost liberality, with the 
only reservation that Poland could not surrender her sover­
eignty over the territory through which the transit roads would 
pass. Finally, his Government had stated that its attitude in 
the matter of communications facilities through Pomorze was 
dependent upon the attitude of the Reich with regard to the 
question of the Free City of Danzig. Minister Beck empha­
sized, moreover, that his Government in formulating these pro­
posals was acting in the spirit of the Polish-German Declara­
tion of 1934, which provided for the direct exchange of views in 
problems concerning both countries, entitling each of them to 
state its point of view in the course of negotiations. He con­
cluded by stating that on the occasion of Ambassador Lipski's 
transmitting the Polish Government's reply to von Ribbentrop, 
the former had told von Ribbentrop that in view of events 
which had threatened Poland's strategic position, Poland had 
undertaken as a precautionary measure a regroupment of her 
armed forces. 
MARCH 29 
An officer of the President's [Moscicki's] household as 
well as an official of the Foreign Office divulged in strictest con­
fidence the following broad outline of Poland's plan of de­
fense: (a) to keep the Polish army intact; (b) to resist as long as 
possible an attempted capture of Warsaw and/or the "Indus­
trial Triangle";8 (c) withdrawal of the main body of Polish 
forces under cover of delayed action if and when pressure from 
a potential German attack made it necessary, to the main de­
fensive position on the line of the strategic Narew, Bug, Vis­
tula and San rivers; (d) to delay the adversary's advance until 
the advent of rainy and wintry weather and until assistance 
from Poland's Western Allies might have diverted the full 
brunt of the German attack from the Polish front. My infor­
mants went on to say that while this was the Polish defense 
plan in terms of the broad sweep, the Government and the Gen­
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eral Staff had decided that, in event the capture of Warsaw by 
the adversary became imminent, the Government and the Gen­
eral Staff would withdraw from Warsaw—the Government re­
establishing its seat in Eastern Poland, the General Staff set­
ting up its headquarters at some point between the newly 
established Government seat and the fighting front. In other 
words, allowing for unforeseen turns in the course of a poten­
tial conflict, the Polish Government and High Command (a) 
regarded as their paramount aim: to hold the Polish fighting 
forces intact, awaiting the effects of wet and subsequently 
wintry weather, and effective action of Poland's Western Allies 
to alleviate pressure on the Polish front; and (b) had come to 
feel that they could less afford the loss of any sizeable portion 
of their first line fighting strength, which would be difficult if 
not impossible to replace, than the loss of territory and even of 
their capital, the recapture of which changed conditions and 
counter attacks in a later stage might permit.9 
The British Ambassador on numerous occasions between 
March and the outbreak of war, as well as the French Ambas­
sador and the Belgian Minister, discussed with me the ques­
tion of evacuating Warsaw in the event the Government de­
cided to move its seat into Eastern Poland. On these occasions 
we exchanged ideas as to the most practical methods of trans­
porting our respective staffs, and the kind of clothes and equip­
ment which, as well as provisions, our staffs should take 
along.10 
MARCH 31 
On March 31, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced the 
assurance of British and French support to Poland "in the 
event of any action which clearly threatened Polish indepen­
dence, and which the Polish Government accordingly consid­
ered it vital to resist."11 Between that date and April 4, the date 
of Minister Beck's departure for London, Berlin directly and 
indirectly exerted pressure on Poland in an effort to prevent 
the Minister's London visit. This was done obviously with a 
view to precluding the signing of any agreement. In connection 
with Germany's efforts on this score, I noted that Berlin re­
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sorted vis-a-vis Danzig and the Ukrainian minorities to what 
had become its classical pressuring tactics. In fact, I came to 
consider the condition of [the] political atmosphere in Danzig 
as a barometer of the state of Polish-German relations. In turn, 
the state of these relations was reflected in the relations be­
tween the Polish Government and the Ukrainian minority. 
On April 6, an Anglo-Polish Communique recorded the as­
surances of mutual support agreed upon by both Governments, 
pending the completion of a permanent agreement, [ulti­
mately] signed on August 25, 1939.12 Upon his return from 
London, the Minister informed me that he had been deeply im­
pressed by the seriousness and earnestness both of Prime Min­
ister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. He had talked perhaps 
four hours with each. Their conversations were characterized 
by a tour d'horizon in general and a discussion of Polish-Ger­
man relations in particular. Minister Beck reminded me of a 
remark he had made several months previously to the effect 
that if war were eventually to be declared on Germany, it 
would be decided in Paris. Now, since his trip to London he 
said he felt that the point at which it might be decided to de­
clare war on Germany was about "mid-channel." 
The Minister concluded his remarks by emphasizing his 
sense of profound appreciation of London's comprehension of 
Poland's position in particular and European developments in 
general. The Anglo-Polish Pact was unique in that it marked 
Britain's first definite commitment in Eastern Europe. The 
Pact prescribed that it was for each country to decide when 
and if the independence were threatened. These provisions 
placed each contracting country in respect to the other, in a 
position somewhat similar to the bridge player who watches 
over the shoulder of his partner while the latter plays the hand. 
In the current situation it was Britain watching over the 
shoulder of Poland. In discussing these provisions with me, 
Minister Beck emphasized that he was profoundly sensible of 
Poland's responsibility as a partner in the Pact. 
In the last days of March, the Belgian Minister imparted to 
me that he and several others of our colleagues had learned 
in strictest confidence a general idea of the Government's 
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defense plan. He added he felt that well in advance of any 
move on the part of the Government and the General Staff to 
re-establish their seat and headquarters respectively, in Eastern 
Poland, a train should definitely be reserved for and assigned to 
the Diplomatic corps in order to avoid last minute confusion. 
He wondered whether I would make some discreet soundings 
on this score and apprise him of my findings. In response I 
said that I understood that the Government's plan provided 
among other factors for transportation facilities for the Diplo­
matic corps as well as for the various governmental depart­
ments in [the] event [that] the Government decided to move its 
seat elsewhere. 
For over one month, the Polish Government received no for­
mal reply to its counter proposal of March 26, (made in reply 
to Ribbentrop's verbal proposal of March 21 to Ambassador 
Lipski). Minister Beck told me at about this time that he had 
been led to understand that his Government's counter propos­
als had been treated by Berlin as a refusal of negotiations. On 
April 28, however, Herr Hitler delivered an address to the 
Reichstag wherein he announced that he had proposed to the 
Polish Government the following: 
1.	 Cession of Danzig to the Reich. 
2.	 Extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between 
East Prussia and the Reich. 
3.	 In exchange, the Reich would recognize the existing 
Polish-German frontiers. 
4.	 In addition, Herr Hitler said that these proposals had 
included two other conditions which the Reich was wil­
ling to give in exchange, namely: a 25-year non-aggres­
sion pact; and a Polish-German-Hungarian condomin­
ium of Slovakia. 
Moreover, Herr Hitler stated that these proposals, which had 
been transmitted to the Polish Government on March 21, rep­
resented Germany's minimum demands of Poland.13 
Minister Beck subsequently told me that Herr Hitler's men­
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tion of a triple condominium of Slovakia was the first he had 
heard of that suggestion. He added that in former conversa­
tions only allusions had been made that in the event of a gener­
al agreement the problem of Slovakia could be discussed. As 
far as Poland was concerned, however, she had not consented 
to carry on such conversations, for it was not Poland's custom 
to make bargains with the interests of others. The Minister also 
stated that Herr Hitler's mention of an extension of the non­
aggression pact to 25 years had not been put forward in any 
definite form in any of the recent conversations. In this same 
address as well as in a memorandum handed to the Polish 
Government on the same day, Herr Hitler unilaterally de­
nounced the Polish-German non-aggression Pact of 1934, on 
the grounds that it was incompatible with the recent Anglo-
Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance and hence no longer 
binding. In analyzing the contents of the memorandum and the 
speech, I was of the opinion that the memorandum represented 
more or less a translation in diplomatic language of Herr Hit­
ler's speech. 
In discussing with Minister Beck, later in the day, his reac­
tions to Herr Hitler's Reichstag address and memorandum, 
Beck said in effect the following: Herr Hitler had misrepre­
sented facts in suggesting that Poland had become intransi­
gent after the British Prime Minister's announcement on 
March 31 of British "assurance of support to Poland in the 
event of any action which clearly threatened Polish indepen­
dence and which the Polish Government accordingly consider­
ed it vital to resist." The Minister emphasized that Poland had 
been compelled to take precautionary measures for defense in 
mid-March. Indeed, he was explicit on the date whereon Po­
land had made its stand vis-a-vis Germany, stressing that these 
measures had been taken on March 20-21, which was prior to 
the British Prime Minister's offer of support. 
The Minister went on to say that since he regarded Herr Hit­
ler primarily in the light of an Austrian mentality, he thought 
the latter would still have a flash of reasoning. Moreover, Herr 
Hitler in his own interests had moved inadvisedly in having 
changed his methods of diplomacy and his diplomats at the 
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same time. He might have successfully changed one or the oth­
er separately, but the simultaneous change had been a major 
error. Hitler had been confused and off-balance since he had 
learned of the Anglo-Polish Pact and had not yet collected 
himself.14 
It was obvious that Herr Hitler was now trying to create a 
cleavage between the Western powers and Poland. Minister 
Beck earnestly hoped Herr Hitler's efforts on this score would 
not succeed, for if the Western Powers and Poland stood to­
gether, they might possibly hold Herr Hitler in check. The 
greatest danger lay in the possibility that he might be allowed 
to gain the illusion he could localize a conflict. He might be 
halted—yet this could not be accepted as a foregone conclusion— 
for Minister Beck recalled that Herr Hitler had remarked to 
Admiral Horthy that if matters came to the point whereat he 
found it necessary to risk war, it was better to have it soon.15 
Minister Beck felt that should this be the mood Herr Hitler 
might develop in the course of the next few months, it would be 
dangerous. This, the Minister said, was in line with his own 
thought that the Austrian mentality knew how to deal with 
weakness but became undecided when faced with the neces­
sity of dealing with strength. 
Herr Hitler had committed a major diplomatic error in hav­
ing resorted to an open declaration of demands in a public 
address. Moreover, von Ribbentrop had committed an even 
greater blunder in permitting his Chief to omit diplomatic 
channels, after the Anglo-Polish Pact, as a means of ex­
changing ideas toward ascertaining Poland's position vis-a­
vis Herr Hitler's demands. Indeed, by having resorted to an 
open declaration of demands, Herr Hitler had given Poland 
its first opportunity to make public her side of the case. The 
Minister then said that he had previously abstained from 
making public reference to Polish-German differences in order 
to avoid risking a challenge to Herr Hitler's prestige in view 
of the potential dangers involved therein. 
Turning to the subject of Herr Hitler's unilateral denuncia­
tion of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, 
Minister Beck said that his Government could not accept any 
54 THE BIDDLE REPORT 
interpretation thereof which would amount to a renounce­
ment of the right to conclude political agreements with third 
parties—for this would be practically equivalent to the re­
nouncement of the independence of foreign policy. Indeed, 
Poland's acceptance of such an interpretation would boil 
down to Poland's permitting Germany the right to define 
what corresponded to Poland's interests. As far as this point 
went, Germany had herself publicly undertaken obligations 
towards Italy and the German-Slovak agreement of March 
1939. These were clear indications of what interpretation 
Germany had placed on the Pact of 1934. Moreover, Minister 
Beck rejected as groundless Herr Hitler's objections to the 
alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual 
Assistance with the Polish-German Pact of 1934. The Anglo-
Polish Pact had a purely defensive character and threatened 
the Reich no more than did the Polish-French Alliance which 
the Reich had recognized as compatible with the Pact of 
1934. 
The Minister pointed out that the Pact of 1934 stated 
clearly in its opening paragraphs that: "the two governments 
are determined to base their mutual relations on the principles 
contained in the Paris Pact of August 27, 1928." The Paris 
Pact, a general renouncement of war as an instrument of state 
policy, just as the Pact of 1934 constituted such a renounce­
ment in bilateral Polish-German relations, clearly made the 
reservation that "every signatory power which would hence­
forth seek to promote its state interests through war, will have 
to be deprived of the benefits of the present treaty." Germany, 
the Minister said, had accepted that principle by signing the 
Paris Pact, and confirmed it in the Pact of 1934, along with 
the other principles of the Paris Pact. It followed, therefore, 
that Poland would be no longer bound by the Pact of 1934 if 
Germany had recourse to war in contradiction with the Paris 
Pact. Poland's obligations, according to the Polish-British 
understanding, would come into operation in the event of 
German action threatening the independence of Great Britain 
and consequently in the very circumstances wherein the Pact 
of 1934 and the Paris Pact had ceased to be binding on Poland 
as regards Germany. 
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Minister Beck added that Herr Hitler had no justification 
for his unilateral decision to renounce the Pact of 1934. He 
also stated that the manner in which Herr Hitler had abro­
gated the Pact was a flagrant violation of the provisions con­
tained in the Pact which called for a 6 months' notice by either 
Government before denunciation. Moreover, the Minister 
pointed out that the decision to renounce the 1934 Pact had 
taken place after the previous refusal of the Reich to accept 
explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish Pact 
with the 1934 Pact, which the Polish Government had in­
tended to furnish the Reich's representative in Warsaw. Herr 
Hitler, as indicated by the text of the German memorandum, 
had apparently made his decision on the strength of press 
reports without consulting the views either of the British or 
the Polish Governments as regards the character of the agree­
ment concluded. It would not have been difficult to do so, for 
immediately upon the Minister's return from London he had 
expressed his readiness to receive the German Ambassador, 
who had hitherto not availed himself of the opportunity. 
Hence, Poland had had no possibility to discuss its viewpoint 
because since April 6, the Reich had rendered impossible all 
direct contact. 
In reviewing the substance of Herr Hitler's April 28 speech, 
I was aware that in many respects it was a skillful as well as 
menacing bit of oratory. Since the occupation of Czechoslo­
vakia and previous to his address, reports had indicated that 
in terms of home public opinion, Herr Hitler's star had gone 
into a tail spin. However, by this speech he had succeeded in 
regaining over night public favor and had started his star again 
in the ascendency. Indeed, his play up of "encirclement" 
proved a popular rallying slogan for Germans of all shades of 
opinion. Moreover, to internal mass opinion, lacking in factual 
data, he appeared convincing in his claims as to the great 
value of the country's material gains. I noted furthermore, 
that his address, though probably primarily designed to meet 
demands of his internal situation, was at the same time aimed 
at serving external policy as well. 
It seemed to me that Herr Hitler was making a subtle bid 
to detach the Western powers from Poland, and in line with 
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this a bid for renewed intervention of the "peace at any price" 
elements in Western Europe. As a matter of fact, as early as 
May 4 the London Times, as I recall it, bluntly stated that 
Danzig was really not worth a war. One of the leading foreign 
correspondents in Warsaw informed me the day after the ad­
dress that London had telephoned him several times asking 
why the Poles had refused what seemed like reasonable 
proposals and at the same time adding that in London political 
circles there was considerable consternation. In my own 
opinion, I felt that the speech was far from reassuring. As a 
matter of fact, it served to abrogate two important Pacts: 
the Anglo-German Naval Accord, and the Polish-German 
Non-Aggression Pact. Herr Hitler's allusions, moreover, to 
President Roosevelt's constructive efforts on the side of peace 
savored of a play to the home galleries at the expense of 
dignity and statesmanship. To my mind, his "play up" of 
"Lebensraum" smacked again, as it always had in the past, 
of long-range war-like intentions. The very word "Lebens­
raum" implies to me intended aggression, for it indicates a 
program envisaging the annexation of those resources which 
the country would require for the conduct of war—otherwise, 
access of these resources might be acquired through normal 
commercial channels. I considered the speech as a whole 
mainly in the light of defensive prestige propaganda for home 
consumption. As to the potential effect of the address, I was 
inclined in the first place to consider it not as a "marking 
time" dissertation, but one presaging events to come. While 
the door was left open a crack, it had been slammed on the 
only worthwhile factor—disarmament. Moreover, I felt that it 
left Europe in a state of iron tension with alliances the only 
alternative. 
Polish official circles "kept their chins up" in the face of 
Herr Hitler's unilateral abrogation of the Polish-German 
Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, and did their best to minimize 
its potential effect. I had the impression, however, that the 
Polish Government's industrialization program was based, 
more than they were willing to admit openly, upon the Gov­
ernment's hope of maintaining this Non-Aggression Pact in 
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vigor for another year and a half at the least. As a matter of 
fact, while a large part of the "Industrial Triangle" had been 
constructed with a notable degree of efficiency by the time war 
eventually broke out, the project as a whole required at least 
six months for completion—and additional time for tuning into 
volume production schedules. 
I was informed by official circles that before industrializa­
tion in the so-called "Industrial Triangle," Poland [was] 
faced with the question as to whether to confine its acquisition 
of the main part of its armaments' requirements to purchases 
abroad, or to construct its own industrial base of supply. My 
informants admitted that in adopting the latter course, the 
Government's decision was partly attributable to optimism as 
to the duration of the 10-year Non-Aggression Agreement 
signed in 1934. They believed they would at least have the 
"Industrial Triangle" a going concern before encountering a 
definite challenge from Germany. It appeared, moreover, that 
the Government's industrialization program envisaged (a) 
building up a capacity to supply its army with essential arms 
and ammunition, after as well as before the potential outbreak 
of war, which the Government felt would immediately cut 
Poland's access to western sources of supply, and (b) creating 
industrial balance in a chiefly agricultural state, as well as 
additional fields of employment as a contribution towards 
solving the increasing problem of overpopulation. As matters 
turned out, when the challenge came after only five years of 
the 10-year Non-Aggression Agreement and war appeared 
inevitable, construction of the industrial center had progressed 
too far to permit a turning back. This meant that funds which 
might otherwise have been available for the large-scale pur­
chase of much needed armaments were tied up in the uncom­
pleted industrial development at the time war broke out. 
In a lengthy conversation with Minister of Finance [Eu­
geniusz] Kwiatkowski, he remarked that previous to Poland's 
March regroupment of armed forces, Poland had been on her 
way towards a gradual raising of the living standard of the 
masses and towards economic rehabilitation. It had long been 
his dream and the object of his strenuous efforts to witness 
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during his term of office tangible evidence of progress resultant 
from the combined endeavors of himself and his associates to 
bring Poland out of "red ink". In a predominantly agricultural 
state [such] as Poland, benefits from economic and financial 
ascendency were slower in reflecting themselves in the lives 
of the masses than in the more industrialized states. However, 
during the past year he had perceived a noticeable ameliora­
tion in the economic structure of the country as a whole. 
Moreover, he and his associates, realistically facing the prob­
lem of over-population with which Poland would be in­
creasingly faced during the ensuing 10 years, had determined 
to diversify the economic structure of the country through an 
industrialization program which they aimed, among other 
factors, as a means of creating openings for employment. 
Then came the necessity to mobilize, forcing the Government 
to alter instantly and completely its comprehensive program 
of economic rehabilitation. Indeed, in a country with such 
limited financial means, mobilization to the extent of the 
present one meant a diversion of the flow of funds from the 
channels of economic development into purely defense chan­
nels. There was no alternative, for there was not enough 
money to serve both purposes simultaneously. However, under 
the circumstances, the Government had decided to protect 
the state which they had helped reconstruct. There was no 
course but to prepare to defend Poland's independence 
through sacrifice. Moreover, the Government was profoundly 
impressed by the whole-hearted and consolidated support of 
the Polish people, behind their decision. There was a minimum 
of grumbling, and the mood and capacity of the masses to 
make sacrifices for the independence of their country was in­
deed touching. Mobilization was costing Poland at the rate of 
2,000,000 zTotys per day.16 The Government was meeting 
these costs not with an ideal schedule, but in the most practical 
manner possible. 
I was aware that as late as March 7, 1936, Herr Hitler had 
stated publicly that it would be unreasonable and impossible 
to deny a state of such a size as Poland an outlet to the sea. 
However, I had frequently received reports from usually re­
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liable sources to the effect that Herr Hitler's plan vis-a-vis 
Poland envisaged the diminution of the Polish state by the 
annexation of Danzig, Pomorze (the Corridor) and Upper 
Silesia, as well as the decomposition of the rest of Poland (in 
line with Herr Hitler's further reported plan to set up a chain 
of small units, dependent upon Germany, as a buffer between 
Germany and Russia). I felt that if these reports were well-
founded, Herr Hitler envisaged a Polish state reduced con­
siderably in terms of territory, and to about 15,000,000 racial 
Poles in terms of population. The obvious inconsistency be­
tween Herr Hitler's statement of March 7, 1936 and his re­
ported plans raised the question in my mind as to whether, if 
Herr Hitler eventually succeeded in reducing the size of the 
Polish state, he would still feel morally bound by his March 7, 
1936 declaration. 
MAY 5 
On May 5, Minister Beck delivered an address before the 
Polish Parliament, elaborating Poland's case in reply to Herr 
Hitler's address to the Reichstag on April 28.17 In general 
Minister Beck said that his Government regarded the propo­
sals of the Reich as a demand for unilateral concessions. He 
emphasized that his country was prepared to approach ob­
jectively and with utmost good will any points raised for 
discussion by the Reich. However, two conditions were es­
sential if the discussions were to prove of real value; peace­
ful intentions, and peaceful methods of procedure. The 
address, moreover, reiterated most of the points which the 
Minister had previously imparted to me in a discussion follow­
ing Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag of April 28, and 
which I have recited in substance under date of April 28 of 
this report. On the same day [May 5], the Polish Government 
sent a note to the German Government explaining their point 
of view in reply to the German Government's memorandum 
of April 28. The Polish Government repeated its counter 
proposals and refuted the German argument that the Anglo-
Polish mutual assistance pact was incompatible with the 
Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. It reminded 
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the German Government that no formal reply to the Polish 
counter proposal had been received for a month, and that only 
on April 28 did the Polish Government learn that "the mere 
fact of the formulation of counter proposals instead of the 
acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without al­
teration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a 
refusal of discussions." 
In addition the Minister developed his Government's point 
of view on the question of Danzig along the following lines: 
in refuting Herr Hitler's description of Danzig as a German 
city whose contacts with Poland were forced upon it by the 
dictators of the Peace of Versailles, Minister Beck stated that 
Danzig was not invented by the Versailles Treaty. It had 
existed for many centuries. As a result, if one were to set apart 
the emotional elements, Danzig was a positive cross between 
Polish and German interests. The German merchants of Dan­
zig had assured the development and prosperity of that time, 
thanks to the Polish overseas trade. Not only the develop­
ment but the very reason of Danzig's existence were formerly 
due to the then decisive fact that it was situated at the mouth 
of Poland's only great river; now it is also important because 
of its position on the main waterway and railway line con­
necting Poland of today with the Baltic. While the popula­
tion of current-day Danzig was predominantly German, its 
livelihood and prosperity depended upon the economic po­
tential of Poland. 
Poland stood firmly on the ground of its rights and interests 
in connection with its overseas trade and its maritime policy 
in Danzig. Seeking reasonable and conciliatory solutions, 
Poland had purposely notendeavored to exert any influence 
on the free national ideological and cultural development of 
the German majority in Danzig. Minister Beck stated that he 
heard a demand for the annexation of Danzig to the Reich. 
When he received no reply to his Government's proposal of 
March 26 of a common guarantee of the existence and rights 
of Danzig, and when he subsequently learned that this counter 
proposal had been regarded as a refusal of negotiations, he 
asked himself what was the real aim of it all. Was it the free­
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dom of the German population of Danzig, which was not 
menaced, or a matter of prestige—or was it a matter of barring 
Poland from the Baltic, wherefrom Poland would not let 
herself be barred? The same considerations concerned the 
communications across Pomorze (the Corridor). Poland had 
granted the Reich all railway facilities and had allowed the 
citizens of the Reich to travel from the Reich to East Prussia 
without customs or passport formalities. Moreover, the Polish 
Government had suggested the extension of these facilities to 
road transport, and again the question appeared as to what 
was the real aim of it all. Poland had no reason to obstruct 
the German citizens in their communication with their 
eastern province. Neither did Poland have any ground what­
soever for restricting its sovereignty on its own territory. 
In connection with both questions, the future of Danzig 
and the communications through Pomorze, it was still a case 
of one-sided concessions which the Government of the Reich 
seemed to be demanding from Poland. A self-respecting nation 
did not make one-sided concessions. Where was reciprocity? 
It looked rather vague in the German proposals. In Herr 
Hitler's speech, the Minister continued, he had proposed as a 
concession the recognition and definite acceptance of the 
existing frontier between Poland and Germany. In that it 
would have been a recognition of Poland's property, indis­
pensable, de jure and de facto, this proposal also could not 
alter the Minister's point, that the German claims with regard 
to Danzig and communications across Pomorze remained one-
sided demands. In concluding his address the Minister stated 
that peace was a valuable and desirable thing. His generation 
which had bled in several wars surely deserved a period of 
peace. However, peace, like almost all things of this world, 
had its price, high but definable. He and his countrymen of 
Poland did not know the conception of peace at any price. 
There was only one thing in the life of men, nations, and 
states which was without price—that was honor. 
About 20 minutes after I returned to my office from Parlia­
ment, the Minister telephoned to ask me whether I thought 
that he had presented Poland's case in such a way as to be 
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understood clearly by the Anglo-Saxon mentality. He then 
requested me to call on him later in the afternoon. In the 
meantime, my inquiries amongst the known experts on all 
sections of Polish public opinion disclosed that the tempo of 
public sentiment was considerably in advance of the calm 
tone of Minister Beck's address. 
Later in the day when I called on the Minister he touched 
on several outstanding points. He said that good neighborly 
relations with Germany had always been a cornerstone of 
Polish foreign policy. Hence, the German memorandum would 
be studied with understanding and attention. He felt that 
Germany's recent demands for an extra-territorial autostrada 
and railway had been caused, not by the communications 
needs of the German citizens so much as by Berlin's desire 
to disorganize Poland and other countries neighboring on 
Germany. His envisaged plan vis-a-vis Poland was far more 
extensive than his stated claims in respect to Danzig. Indeed, 
strategic and lebensraum considerations had played a larger 
role than racial considerations in Hitler's desire for Danzig's 
annexation to the Reich. 
Just as the cession of the Sudeten area to Germany removed 
the keystone in the dam in Czechoslovakia, so the cession of 
Danzig and an extra-territorial passageway across Pomorze to 
a Germany whose Fuhrer envisaged himself the sovereign of 
a pan-Germanic Europe, would prove the barring of Poland 
from the Baltic and Poland's consequent suffocation. This 
eventual undoing of Poland as an independent state would 
throw her at the mercy of Germany. In other words, for Poland 
it was not a question of prestige but of keeping open the 
national economic windpipe. 
While Poland in taking this strong stand was at first moti­
vated by a desire to protect her own interests, she also hoped 
thereby to instill in other states a spirit of resistance against 
Germany's boa-constrictor appetite. Hence, Poland's submis­
sion to Germany's demands would undermine the physical 
and moral forces which Poland was trying to foster. Poland 
felt that were Hitler ever to be stopped, this was the time to 
do it, and since Germany's aggressive attentions at that 
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moment were turned on her, it was her duty to "halt Hitler" 
It was essential at this point to draw the line whereat all 
countries would resist Germany's aggressive intentions. In 
discussing the more general aspects Minister Beck said that 
Germany had had recourse to a policy of pressure and faits 
accomplis in Eastern Europe. Now Germany was no doubt 
of the opinion that she could employ the same methods against 
Poland. Poland, however, to all attempts of the kind, would 
duly answer. No one-sided decisions would ever be accepted 
by Poland. 
It was obvious that Herr Hitler was exerting great efforts 
towards detaching the Western powers from Poland. More­
over, Herr Hitler had evinced considerable resentment of 
what he endeavored to make out as Britain's interference in 
German aims in Eastern Europe. The Minister would also 
like to rectify one statement which Herr Hitler had made 
regarding the Non-Aggression Agreement, wherein Herr 
Hitler had said that he himself had initiated it. The Minister 
was in a position to know that it was the former Marshal 
Pilsudski who had actually conceived of the Non-Aggression 
Pact.18 
Were Danzig eventually to be militarized under German 
control, this would spell a German threat to the Port of Gdynia 
and to all traffic of that Port.19 It only took a glance at the map 
to appreciate that Gdynia would come within easy range of 
any high calibre guns in the Free City. (In connection with 
Germany's possible eventual militarization of Danzig, one of 
von Ribbentrop's agents who visited Warsaw about this time 
remarked to me that Germany would eventually insist upon 
Danzig's annexation. In fact, von Ribbentrop had been known 
openly to state that his Government would have to have 
Danzig by September at the latest. My informant further re­
marked that in order to satisfy German mass mentality, a 
triumphal victory march into Danzig would be an essential 
requisite). With reference to Herr Hitler's demand for an 
extra-territorial passageway across Pomorze, the Minister 
said that the Polish General Staff, having studied the effect of 
the autostrada in Czechoslovakia, stated that from the mili­
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tary viewpoint an autostrada in the width envisaged by the 
Germans could be made to serve strategically as a barrier 
almost as formidable as a broad river. 
According to British Embassy circles, General [Edmund] 
Ironside, during his visit to Poland [July 17-21], had denoted 
his sense of satisfaction over the Polish General Staffs defen­
sive plan envisaging, when circumstances made it advisable, 
gradual retirement of the main body of Polish troops under 
cover of delayed action to a main defense position along the 
line of the Narew, Bug, Vistula and San rivers.20 Further­
more, while I was unable to acquire confirmation from official 
circles, I understood from unusually reliable sources that both 
General Ironside and representatives of the French General 
Staff had made it clear, in Paris as well as Warsaw, that the 
Western powers could not be expected to render Poland 
effective assistance for at least three months from, say, the 
first of August.21 
Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, imparted to me, as 
an illustration of the increasingly imperialistic attitude of 
upper Nazi circles, that during a conversation a few days 
before with a German industrial magnate, he had made an 
astonishing remark to him. He had said that Poland, as well 
as other smaller states, had to come under German domination 
since their economic structures were complementary to that 
of Germany. This would be only good business—these were 
no times to consider sentiment and the rights of smaller na­
tions to independence. This remark, the Ambassador felt, 
typified the increasingly imperialist view that the inner Nazi 
circles were assuming. 
Towards the end of July there arose amongst the diplo­
matic corps of anti-aggression forces a feeling that further 
delay in the implementation of the Anglo-Polish Pact with 
some definite form of financial accommodation, might con­
ceivably serve German diplomacy as an instrument for dis­
crediting London with other anti-aggression forces. Reports 
were also reaching official and diplomatic circles in Warsaw 
that Berlin was maintaining close surveillance over Anglo-
Polish relations—and particularly negotiations for the extension 
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of financial and military equipment aid to Poland. Further 
reports indicate that Herr von Ribbentrop continued to tell 
Herr Hitler that certain political and financial influences in 
London opposed to Britain's involvement in war over Danzig 
or Pomorze, were still sufficiently effective to exert a restrain­
ing influence upon the leading members of the British Gov­
ernment. 
JULY 20 
By July 20, I had come to the conclusion that Europe was 
headed for war some time before the middle of October—that 
little short of a miracle could prevent it. I was convinced, 
moreover, that the first stage would be a Polish-German con­
flict. Accordingly, I felt that we should take at least pre­
liminary steps towards establishing a practical means of 
evacuating American citizens from Poland in event of an 
emergency. I discussed this matter with the officers of my 
staff, and with Consul General John K. Davis. They were all 
in accord with my foregoing views. Following several further 
conversations between Mr. Davis, Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, 
Third Secretary of Embassy, Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey, vice 
consul, and myself, Mr. Elbrick accompanied by Mr. Bailey 
and clerk of consulate, Mr. Sadler, proceeded to Brzesc 
(which we considered to be the most practical center for 
evacuation, due among other reasons, to its geographical 
position, as well as to its being an important railway junction), 
to seek a near-by country place which might serve as a 
suitable concentration center for American citizens in event 
of hostilities. After careful search, they returned to Warsaw 
and submitted a well-considered recommendation that an 
estate belonging to Mr. and Mrs. W. Vierzbicki22 be leased 
for the purpose in view. They found it possible to rent the 
second floor of the rather large manor house, the chapel, and 
other premises. This place was 10 kilometers northwest of the 
Brzesc railway. As a result we took an option on this estate, 
pending (a) further developments in the international and 
political arena, and (b) authorization from the State Depart­
ment to accomplish a formal lease. 
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In conversation with Beck in the latter days of July, he told 
me that Poland did not want war. However, if war came, 
Poland would fight. He felt, nevertheless, that peace could 
still be preserved, but not at the price of unilateral conces­
sions. At this point he said that at a recent meeting of the 
Council of Ministers it was decided Poland had a line beyond 
which she would not permit German infringements. While on 
that occasion the Minister refrained from divulging what 
constituted the line, it later became clear that Poland would 
not tolerate any arbitrary alteration in the political status of 
Danzig as a Free State. Moreover, Poland would not tolerate 
interference either with the Polish-Danzig customs union or 
Polish rights and interests in the Free City. He referred then 
to Herr Hitler's renunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact, 
stating that he had asked himself how and why could a new 
non-aggression pact be expected to give assurance when the 
Pact of 1934 had been denounced out of hand. 
By this time, I was aware that while Minister Beck felt 
that peace could still be preserved, he had not shut his eyes to 
signs indicating that an eventual German attack was almost 
unavoidable. I knew, however, that he was striving in every 
way to postpone the hour of a potential clash as long as pos­
sible. I recall his having stated on several occasions that if it 
had to come eventually, he earnestly hoped he could put it off 
as long as possible—at least until the winter weather set in. 
He emphasized that the Poles would fight if necessary and if 
an attack came in the wet and wintry weather, Poland could 
defend herself more effectively against the type of warfare to 
which the German fighting machine was attuned. On each of 
these occasions he would add that the prospect of another war 
was lamentable—grim. Two wars for one generation were more 
than enough.23 What Poland needed and what he had always 
hoped to see were at least 15 more years of peace wherein to 
rehabilitate herself. He would then add that if there were no 
way to prevent the threatened conflict honorably, then he for 
his part would do his utmost to gain time for his country and 
his allies. 
In conversation with Economic Counselor of the Foreign 
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Office, Mr. Jan Wrszlacki,• 24  on July 31,1 asked him what was 
the attitude of Polish officialdom and the "man in the street" 
in Poland towards the United States, in connection with the 
prospect of war in Europe. He replied that neither official 
circles nor the "man in the street" looked to the United States 
for active intervention. While both elements regarded the 
United States as a great moral force on the side of peace and 
of the maintenance of the international codes of law and order, 
they felt the United States was too remote from the scene of 
European difficulties to assume other than a neutral role at 
least during the preliminary stage of European conflict. In a 
subsequent conversation with Beck, he expressed similar 
observations. Towards the end of July the Polish financial 
delegation, who for some weeks had been negotiating in Lon­
don for financial accommodation in implementation of the 
Anglo-Polish Pact, returned to Warsaw. They were disap­
pointed over the results of their negotiations, which had 
yielded them export credits only. These they were unable to 
translate into purchases other than in England, where they 
could not get an immediate delivery in essential military re­
quirements in time to meet a rapidly approaching German 
challenge. By this time the Polish Government realized that 
if they were to acquire the necessities in terms of military 
equipment before the threatened outbreak of war, they would 
need cash with which to purchase in the open market planes 
and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, and other vital neces­
sities of war. Marshal [Edward] Smigfy-Rydz bore out this 
thought in his remarks which are recounted in a later part of 
this report under the date of August 10. 
1. The original version of this report, written in October, 1939, is deposited in 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York), under the file listing 
PSF 38, "Poland." 
2. Biddle undoubtedly meant October 24, 1938, when German Foreign Minister 
Ribbentrop held » lengthy conversation with Polish Ambassador to Germany Jozef 
Lipski at the latter's request. For the German minutes of this talk, see DGFP, D, 
5:104-7; the Polish version is in Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 454-58. For a discus­
sion of the significance of this conversation for the future of German-Polish relations, 
see M. Wojciechowski, Stosunkipolsko-niemieckie 1933-1938, pp. 520-30. 
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3. Known as "Pomerania" or the "Corridor" to English-language readers. 
4. For Biddle's official report to Washington on the Polish appraisal of this con­
versation, see Document 17 printed in Part 3 below. The German report on the 
Hitler-Beck talk of January 5 is in DGFP, D, 5:152-58; Beck's version is in PWB, 
no. 48. See also Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 482-94. 
5. The rival, often competing, concepts of Germany's international destiny 
within the hierarchy of the Nazi regime are well treated in Klaus Hildebrand's The 
Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley, Cal., 1973), esp. pp. 12 32. 
6. Ribbentrop's report on the March 21 conversation with Lipski is in DGFP, D, 
6:70-72. See also PWB, no. 61. 
7. Lipski's memorandum to Germany and Ribbentrop's report on the talks of 
March 26 are in DGFP, D, 6:121-24. Lipski's account is in PWB, no. 63. 
8. Biddle here refers to the Centralny Okrecj Przemyslowy, or "Central Industrial 
Zone," frequently known by its initials COP. The COP was designed to serve two 
main ends: (1) to convert the Sandomierz region in the heart of the backward south­
eastern part of Poland into a major industrial zone that could alleviate the serious 
Polish unemployment problem by providing many new job openings in a densely 
populated area, and (2) to develop an industrial complex that could turn out the 
sorely needed mechanical aids for the Polish manufacturing, communication, and 
agricultural sectors, but at a moment's notice convert to armaments production, far 
from the vulnerable borders. For contemporary views of the COP, see W. 
Kowieradzki, Plan Centralnego Okregu Przemyslowego (Warsaw, 1937), and 
J. Rakowski, Rola Centralnego Okregu Przemyslowego (Warsaw, 1938). 
9. Full details of the Polish Operational Plan "Zachod" (West), as the plan for 
military action against the Germans was called, are in the official publication of 
the Historical Commission of the Polish General Staff in London, Polskie Sily 
Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie swiatowej, vol. 1: Kampania Wrzesniowa 1939, part I 
(London, 1951), pp. 257-420. That portion of the General Staff charged with opera­
tional planning was understaffed, and hence could only concentrate on one potential 
target area at a time. Accordingly, convinced that the primary danger to Poland lay 
in the Soviet Union, they had worked out - complete operational plan "East" by 
March, 1939. As it became increasingly apparent that Germany would be the more 
likely foe, the Polish planners worked furiously to develop a coherent operational 
plan for a western front, but they were unable to advance beyond detailed planning 
for the first stage of what would be essentially u defensive action against the 
Germans (as Biddle reported). But such crucial questions as how the additional 
succeeding steps of the campaign, especially the actual route of withdrawal across 
Poland to Romania, would be conducted, were never answered in detail. Hence, 
as the campaign rapidly passed through its initial phase, Polish actions appeared to 
be increasingly based on impromptu calculations and improvisations rather than 
solid preparatory planning. 
10. Assuming that the provisional government seat would be somewhere east 
of the Vistula River, perhaps in the Pripet Marshes, the British began to prepare 
for their escape. During the summer the wife of Clifford Norton, counsellor to the 
British Embassy, hid a cache of skis and foodstuffs in the mountains near the border, 
and also purchased a medium-sized truck, which was kept ready for evacuation use 
at a moment's notice. Bethell, The War Hitler Won, p. 102. 
11. The text of Chamberlain's statement of guarantee is in Documents on 
British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series (London, 1951), 4:552 (hereafter cited 
as DBFP). See also Edward Raczyriski, In Allied London (London, 1962), pp. 13-14. 
12. The text of the April 6 communique is in DBFP, Third Series (London, 
1952), 5:47^*9. See also Raczyhski, In Allied London, pp. 16, 342. 
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13. See N. H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler (London, 1942), 
2:1631. 
14. The reader should keep in mind that no firm obligation, in the form of ­
binding treaty, existed between Britain and Poland on the date mentioned by Biddle. 
What in fact had been signed by the two states—as Biddle himself noted—was a 
temporary, provisional agreement outlining the basic principles upon which the 
permanent mutual assistance pact would be formulated later; this was finally 
arranged and signed on August 25, the day before Hitler's originally scheduled 
assault on Poland. Thus, when Biddle refers to an "Anglo-Polish Pact" prior to 
that date, he means the earlier provisional agreement to conclude such a treaty. 
15. Miklos Horthy, regent (and hence head of state) for Hungary. His relationship 
with Hitler has been spotlighted in the collection of Horthy's personal documents, 
The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy, ed. M. Szinai and L. Szucs (Budapest, 
1965). See also the recent studies by M. Adam, Allianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini 
(Budapest, 1966), and M. D. Fenyo, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hun­
garian Relations, 1941-1944 (New Haven, 1972). 
16. In 1939, the internationally accepted value of the Polish zloty was 5.26 units 
to one American dollar. 
17. PWB, no. 77. 
18. For a discussion of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact, see K. Lapter, 
Pakt Pi/sudski-Hitler (Warsaw, 1962), and A. M. Cienciala, "The Significance of the 
Declaration of Nonaggression of January 26, 1934, in Polish-German and Interna­
tional Relations: A Reappraisal," East European Quarterly 1 (1967):l-34. 
19. The development of the port of Gdynia began in 1923 as a result of Polish 
difficulties with Danzig, and owed much to the interests and energy of Eugeniusz 
Kwiatkowski (minister of trade and commerce in 1926-1930, deputy premier and 
minister of finances from October, 1935 to September, 1939). It was located 21 
kilometers west of Danzig, on Polish territory. From a tiny fishing village of 15,000 
in 1923, it grew into a city of 150,000 in 1939 and was then the second largest Baltic 
port after Copenhagen. 
20. General Ironside noted, however, that the Polish defense plan was based on 
"too low an opinion of the German army's value." See Roderick Macleod and Denis 
Kelly, eds., Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (New York, 1962), 
p. 80. The British summary of Ironside's visit is in DBFP, Third Series, 6:415-19. 
21. Anglo-French and Anglo-Polish staff talks in April and May, 1939, clearly 
indicated that Britain and France would offer only limited and indirect help to the 
Poles. See Sidney Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London, 
1973), pp. 146-47. See also the Ironside Diaries, pp. 80-81, 185. 
22. The name is correctly spelled "Wierzbicki." In this case, as in all instances 
of spelling or typographical errors in the original report, the corrected version will 
be footnoted only at the first occurrence. 
23. Beck here undoubtedly referred to the First World War and the Russo-
Polish War of 1919-1921, both of which exacted a heavy toll of Poland's human 
and material resources. 
24. The name is correctly spelled "Wszelaki." 
CHAPTER TWO 
Final Steps of the Crisis: A

Prelude to the German Onslaught

By the beginning of August the situation in Danzig had rapid­
ly deteriorated. It appeared that German diplomacy was exer­
cising all the chicanery at its command to build up a case on 
an envisaged aggression. The swift march of events in connec­
tion with Danzig and the German minority in Poland were 
drifting towards a situation wherein it was likely that neither 
side would be in a position to "climb down" German accusa­
tions in the persecution campaign inspired by Nazi propagan­
da increased in tempo and volume. Minister Beck in regard 
thereto remarked to me that Herr Hitler's technique entailed 
making a statement and then repeating it a sufficient number of 
times to force the reader to believe it. Gradually, the familiar 
Nazi technique came into full play, reminding one of the days 
preceding the violation of Czechoslovakia: pin-pricking and 
baiting incidents along the frontier increased. 
As over the past 18 years, the Free City had frequently been 
looked upon as Europe's powder magazine, so now it was 
rapidly taking its place at the head of the list of "high explo­
sives" ' I recall that during my visit to Danzig during the first 
week in August, my conversation with a leading official of the 
Danzig Senate revealed the rapidly growing imperialistic atti­
tude on the part of Danzig statesmen, reflecting no doubt the 
attitude in Berlin. This official said to me that Danzig and the 
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Corridor represented only a part of the question in Germany's 
mind vis-a-vis Poland—there was Upper Silesia as well, and 
even the matter of Poznah. He personally liked some of the 
Poles and realized they saw the question from their own stand­
point. However, since the question at issue was a matter of 
German policy, it would have to be settled on German terms. 
AUGUST 9 
On August 9th, the German Government made a demarche 
in the form of a Note Verbale to the Polish Government, 
through the Polish Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, which marked 
Germany's first direct intervention in differences between the 
Polish Government and the Danzig Senate. In brief, this de­
marche took issue with the Polish Government over the tenor 
of the latter's then recent Note to the Danzig Senate. More­
over, the German Government made itself clear in no uncer­
tain terms that it regarded Danzig as a German question.2 
I recall that before sending their reply to this Note, Minister 
Beck and his associates weighed the question with utmost 
care. After consideration of all aspects (and in step with cur­
rent Polish public opinion), Minister Beck requested the Vice 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, [Mieros/aw] Arciszewski, to con­
vey to the German Charge d'Affaires [Johann von Wuhlisch] 
Poland's reply to the effect [that] Poland would regard any 
future intervention by the German Government to the detri­
ment of Polish rights and interests in Danzig as an act of ag­
gression.3 Minister Beck dined with me that night, and in­
formed [me] of the foregoing. 
AUGUST 10 
As near as I can recall, it was on this date, during the visit of 
Post Master General [James] Farley and his daughters, that 
Marshal Smigfy-Rydz, General [Kazimierz] Sosnkowski, Gen­
eral [WacJaw] Stachiewicz, and officers of their respective 
staffs, dined at my house. In the course of after dinner conver­
sation, Mr. Farley asked the Marshal how well prepared Po­
land was for war in [the] event of a Polish-German conflict. The 
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Marshal replied that in numbers of able and courageous 
troops, Poland was rich; however, Poland was in serious need 
of additional equipment both for the air and ground forces. In 
fact, Poland was more in need of equipment than money at the 
moment, for the potential outbreak of war would immediately 
result in cutting Poland's communications with the west, in the 
Baltic, thereby delaying if not to a large degree preventing Po­
land's receipt of raw materials and equipment. 
The Marshal went on to say that he was well aware that Po­
land would have to bear the main brunt of the early stage of any 
war in the near future. Moreover, he realized that this brunt 
would take the form of an attack unprecedented in fury. He 
had full confidence in the courage of his troops and in their 
willingness to resist an attack, but he wanted to furnish them 
with every possible chance to defend themselves with ade­
quate modern equipment against the form of attack he antici­
pated. The Marshal felt that for a period of between two and 
three weeks after the outbreak of war, the weight and swift­
ness of attack would undoubtedly tend to disrupt communica­
tions and cause a general state of confusion. In fact, Poland 
would probably be cut off from the outside world during that 
stage. In the meantime, the Polish armies would be endeavor­
ing to adopt their tactics to the adversary's strategy. He esti­
mated that the Polish forces would be able to readopt their 
tactics effectively in about two weeks after the commencement 
of hostilities. (The first signs of definite victory by Polish 
forces under the leadership of General Sosnkowski at Lwow 
on September 15, tended to bear out the Marshal's forecast on 
the above score, in that General Sosnkowski demonstrated a 
readoption of tactics during this battle against the German 
forces. For further details see my observations under date of 
September 16). The Marshal concluded by stating his belief 
that despite [the] anticipated unprecedented violence of attack, 
the individual courage and persistence of the Polish soldier 
would eventually enable a reconsolidation of the Polish forces 
to emerge from what might possibly appear at first to have 
been chaotic conditions. 
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AUGUST 11 
In the course of the day I learned from our Consul in 
Danzig, Mr. Kuykendall, and from Polish official circles, that 
(a) League High Commissioner [Carl J.] Burckhardt conferred 
with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, having flown there by 
plane from Danzig, and (b) concurrently, a meeting between 
[Italian Foreign Minister] Count [Galeazzo] Ciano and von 
Ribbentrop took place at Salzburg. Information subsequently 
indicated (a) that while there was reason to doubt that Herr 
Hitler was cognizant of the full text of the Polish response of 
August 10 (to Herr Hitler's aforementioned demarche of Au­
gust 9) at the time of his meeting with Dr. Burckhardt on 
August 11, since it was transmitted to the Foreign. Office in Ber­
lin only that same day, (b) that there was but little doubt that 
Herr Hitler was fully aware of the text when he received 
Count Ciano shortly after his conference with Dr. Burckhardt. 
In this connection, I was subsequently informed that reports 
from Berlin indicated that the contents of the final paragraph 
of the Polish response of August 10 had thrown Herr Hitler 
into a towering rage. This, together with other information I 
received at that time led me to feel that while all signs indi­
cated Herr Hitler had already laid out his intended campaign 
against Poland, this reported fit of anger might possibly have 
served to hasten his decision to strike. By this I do not mean 
that had the Polish reply been conciliatory in tone Herr Hitler 
might have called off his intended campaign, but rather it 
might conceivably have served to the extent merely of post­
poning the German thrust for a matter of days or possibly 
weeks. (Later in the month reports reaching Warsaw indicated 
that having studied their meteorological reports which fore­
cast a spell of clear weather in the first half of September, the 
German High Command were pressing for early action if a 
march on Poland was to be effected.) 
At the time, I gained the impression that: (a) on the one 
hand, Minister Beck felt Herr Hitler would compromise at the 
last moment rather than risk coming to grips with Britain and 
France. Moreover, the Minister felt and earnestly hoped that 
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through diplomatic tactics he might stall off as long as pos­
sible—at least until late autumn—what was then assuming the 
complexion of an inevitable Polish-German conflict; and (b) 
on the other hand, Herr Hitler was led by his close advisers to 
believe Britain and France would not intervene in Poland's be­
half. If my impressions were correct, then subsequent events 
proved them both to have been mistaken.4 
AUGUST 21 
Reports reaching official circles in Warsaw indicated acceler­
ation in the pace of concentration of German troops vis-a-vis 
Poland. Major Colbern, Military Attache, and I had long re­
garded the degree of discernible troop movements, especially 
in the Breslau-Oppeln area, a barometer of Germany's pos­
sible military intentions vis-a-vis Poland. By August 21, more­
over, our information led us to expect a potential German 
attack to take the form of a frontal drive from the Breslau-
Oppeln area in the direction of Warsaw, under cover of a 
flanking attack from the southwest, driving towards Warsaw. 
AUGUST 22 
With the approval of the Department of State, I entered into 
a formal lease for the estate belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Vierz­
bicki, about 10 kilometers from the Brzesc railway station 
which Mr. C. Burke Elbrick of my staff, Vice Consul E. Tomlin 
Bailey, and clerk of Consulate, Mr. Sadler had recommended 
as an appropriate evacuation center after a careful search of 
the countryside. I called a meeting of the members of our Mis­
sion and stated in effect (a) my apprehension of the imminence 
of war, and (b) my belief that we should take steps to notify 
American Citizens in Poland that they should make up their 
minds whether to evacuate or remain in Poland in face of pos­
sible hostilities. My associates all being in accord with these 
suggestions, we subsequently released by mail on August 22 
the following message which had already been prepared before 
the aforementioned conference: 
"1 . In view of the recent developments in the unstable 
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situation of which you are undoubtedly acquainted through 
the press and otherwise, it is suggested that you give im­
mediately serious consideration as to whether in case an 
emergency arises, you would remain in Poland or depart. In 
case you should have the intention to depart from Poland in 
such circumstances, it is further suggested that as transpor­
tation and other facilities might be interrupted or made dif­
ficult, arrangements for a planned departure should not be 
delayed too long. 
"2. American citizens in Poland are expected at all 
times to comply fully with Polish law and regulations includ­
ing the measures promulgated recently for the defense of the 
country, such as anti-air, gas defense, and similar measures. 
"3. American citizens should study carefully all require­
ments of this nature with a view to being thoroughly familiar 
with them in case any emergency arises." 
AUGUST 23 
In Moscow, von Ribbentrop and Molotoff signed the Ger­
man-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression.5 President Roosevelt 
made an appeal to King Victor Emanuel [of Italy] for inter­
vention in the cause of peace. The King of Belgium broadcast 
a peace appeal in behalf of the Oslo States.6 Reports reaching 
Warsaw indicated that the British Ambassador to Germany de­
livered to Herr Hitler a message from the British Government 
and a personal letter from the British Prime Minister. I subse­
quently learned that the main points in the Prime Minister's 
letter were: (a) reemphasizing Britain's resolution to fulfill its 
obligations to Poland; (b) affirming his willingness to discuss 
all Anglo-German problems provided a peaceful atmosphere 
could be created; (c) expressing earnest desire that a detente 
might be brought about permitting direct Polish-German dis­
cussions on reciprocal treatment of minorities. The main points 
in Herr Hitler's reply to the Prime Minister's letter were: (a) Brit­
ain's resolution to support Poland could not modify the policy 
outlined in the German Government's Note Verbale of August 
9th to the Polish Government; (b) he was prepared to accept 
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even a long war rather than sacrifice German honor and na­
tional interests; (c) if Britain persisted in its own mobilization 
measures, he would immediately order the total mobilization 
of German forces.7 
AUGUST 24 
President Roosevelt sent messages to the Polish President 
and Herr Hitler urging peaceful settlement of differences by 
direct negotiation, arbitration or conciliation at the hands of a 
disinterested power. Minister Beck imparted to me that Polish 
Ambassador Lipski had an interview with Field Marshal Goe­
ring during the course of the afternoon. According to Lipski's 
report, the interview had been most cordial. The Marshal ex­
pressed regret that his policy of friendly German-Polish rela­
tions had met with failure, and admitted his influence no 
longer counted in the matter; he added that he did not exclude 
the possibility of war with Poland. Goering stated that the 
main obstacle to any diminution of German-Polish tension was 
Poland's alliance with Britain.8 Upon receipt of the foregoing 
report, Minister Beck, after consultation with President Mos­
cicki and Marshal Smigfy-Rydz, determined that if Berlin 
made any further suggestions along this line, the answer would 
be decidedly in the negative. This, together with previous re­
ports of like bearing, led Minister Beck to look for Berlin to 
resort vigorously to such methods, in hopes of detaching the 
Western Powers from Poland, and thus gaining a free hand in 
Eastern Europe. He emphasized to me his determination that 
Poland should not be drawn into intrigues of this character. 
With further reference to the Lipski-Goering conversation, 
Lipski reported that Goering asserted that Germany, faced 
with the two possibilities of going along with Britain or with 
Russia, was forced to go with Russia. 
By decree of [the] Danzig Senate, dated August 23, Herr 
Forster was appointed Chief of State of the Free City of Dan­
zig. Peace appeal broadcast by His Holiness the Pope. 
AUGUST 25 
I was informed by reliable Polish officials that British Ambas­
sador Sir Nevile Henderson called on Herr Hitler at the latter's 
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request at about 1:30 p.m. I subsequently learned that Hitler 
made proposals concerning two groups of questions: (a) neces­
sity for an immediate settlement of Polish-German differences; 
(b) an offer of eventual friendship and alliance between Britain 
and Germany. Herr Hitler urged the Ambassador to fly by 
plane to deliver his proposals to the British Government.9 
Minister Beck informed me that the President of Poland had 
that day replied to the peace appeal broadcast by the King of 
Belgium on August 23. Minister Beck pointed out that in his 
reply, President Moscicki expressed his admiration for the 
ideas expressed by His Majesty, and stated Poland had always 
defended the idea that peace, if it was to last, could not be 
based on the oppression of others. Similarly, Poland had al­
ways considered the best guaranty of peace to be the settle­
ment of international disputes by the method of direct nego­
tiations based on justice and respect for the rights and interests 
of those concerned.10 
An official of the Foreign Office informed me that the Anglo-
Polish Accord of Mutual Assistance was formally signed at 
about 4 o'clock that afternoon. (I later learned that a Polish 
official who had arrived in London that morning was urged by 
an official of the British Foreign Office to return immediately 
by plane to his country, in that London had received informa­
tion indicating the stage was set for a German march on Po­
land on August 26)." A report which reached official circles in 
Warsaw indicated that that night, Hitler learned from his Am­
bassador in London of the signing of the Anglo-Polish Accord. 
Reports from informed quarters in Berlin indicated (a) that, 
comforted by the strategic bearing of the German-Soviet Pact 
upon his own forward-looking schemes, Herr Hitler was in­
clined to waver after receiving the Prime Minister's personal 
letter on August 23, and (b) that while he was subsequently 
offended by the news of the formal signing of the Anglo-Polish 
Pact, tending to consider it in form of a response to his mes­
sage to the British Government (imparted to the Ambassador 
at 1:30 p.m. the same day), he was still inclined to waver, and 
refrained from renewing marching orders which he had report­
edly meanwhile countermanded. It is not inconceivable to my 
mind that Herr Hitler's hesitancy over the next five days was 
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in part attributable to a combination of the report on the 
formal signing of the Anglo-Polish Pact, and the previously 
broadcasted announcement of Moscow's postponement of rati­
fication of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Agreement. 
Moreover, I gained the impression that during those days of 
hesitancy, Herr Hitler had hopes less for a compromise in 
Polish-German differences than for a detachment of Britain 
from Poland. 
Reports reaching official circles in Warsaw disclosed that 
during the afternoon, Berlin's telephonic communications with 
London and Paris were suspended several hours. Other reports 
indicated [that] Signor Mussolini had been several times in 
telephonic contact with Herr Hitler throughout the day. More­
over, I learned from Kuykendall in Danzig, as well as from in­
formed Polish officials, that the pace of military preparations in 
Danzig had markedly accelerated.* During the evening I was 
informed that at about 5 p.m., Herr Hitler asked the French 
Ambassador to transmit a message to Premier [Edouard] Dala­
dier. In effect this message suggested that France, with whom 
Germany had no motive to quarrel, should abstain from con­
tinuing to support Poland, against whose attitude Herr Hitler 
complained vehemently. 
Polish President Moscicki replied to President Roosevelt's 
appeal of August 24. In effect, Moscicki accepted President 
Roosevelt's proposal, stating: (a) Poland considered direct 
talks between Governments to be the most suitable method of 
resolving difficulties between states; (b) on [the] basis of these 
principles, Poland concluded non-aggression pacts with Ger­
many and Russia; and (c) Poland considered also that the 
method of conciliation through the intermediary of a disinter­
ested and impartial third party was a just method of restoring 
differences between nations. President Moscicki added that al­
though he clearly wished to avoid even the appearance of de­
siring to profit by the occasion to raise points of litigation, he 
deemed it his duty, nevertheless, to make clear that in the pres­
ent crisis, it was not Poland which was formulating demands 
and demanding concessions of another State. President Roose­
velt made a second appeal to Herr Hitler for maintenance of 
peace, enclosing the reply from the Polish President. 
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German merchant ships reportedly [were] ordered by the 
German Government to remain in or return to German ports. 
During the course of the evening, Minister Beck told me that 
despite an intensification of efforts of German provocateurs to 
inspire incidents along the frontier and in Danzig, he and his 
associates would continue not to permit their emotions to 
cloud their perspective. 
AUGUST 26 
I learned that the British Ambassador to Germany flew by 
plane to London, delivered Herr Hitler's message of August 
2612 to his Government, and sat in the Cabinet meeting which 
considered the question of a reply.13 Herr Hitler cancelled [the 
Battle of] Tannenberg celebrations. Reports reaching Warsaw 
indicated a further exchange of messages took place between 
Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. Major Colbern and I were 
informed by Military and Governmental circles respectively 
that their reports revealed German troop concentrations vis-a­
vis Poland were reaching a point indicating readiness for an 
attack. 
AUGUST 27 
Herr Hitler cancelled the Nazi Party "Congress of Peace" 
at Nuremberg. Reports reaching Polish governmental circles 
indicated [that] (a) all German airports [were] closed, and that 
except for the regular civilian lines, flights over German terri­
tory as a whole were forbidden. All German aviation services 
were suspended, and (b) rationing was introduced in Germany. 
The Polish-German frontier was closed to railway traffic. I was 
told by informed Polish officials (a) that the British Admiralty 
had assumed control of British shipping; (b) that reports indi­
cated France had about 3,000,000 men under arms; (c) that 
Herr Hitler received Premier Daladier's response to his letter 
of August 25;14 (d) that Herr Hitler had rejected Daladier's 
proposal [of August 26] that one more attempt be made at 
direct Polish-German negotiations; and (e) that at the conclu­
sion of Herr Hitler's letter [of August 27] to Premier Daladier, 
he had made the demand that the Corridor as well as Danzig 
must become a part of the Reich.15 
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In my conversation with Minister Beck in the late afternoon, 
he stated [that] he earnestly believed Poland was demonstrat­
ing its sense of responsibility to its allies as well as to the cause 
of peace, through restraint which it had practiced in the face 
of accumulative incidents obviously inspired by Nazi agents in 
Danzig and at other points along the Polish-German frontier. 
Moreover, he emphasized his and his associates' determination 
to keep cool, and remarked that he had the impression that 
Herr Hitler had not yet made up his mind to go to war. 
British Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard, in a later conver­
sation, imparted to me that following inquiries in the matter of 
German allegations of mass ill-treatment of the German mi­
nority by the Polish authorities, he had found that these allega­
tions were characterized by exaggerations, if not complete 
falsification. Moreover, he had already telegraphed his Gov­
ernment at length to this effect on August 24th, and was, pre­
vious to our talk, preparing a further cable in the same sense 
based upon additional investigation.16 
In connection with the foregoing, I was aware that the Ger­
man press alleged that one Mr. Karletan, who had been ar­
rested in connection with the murder of a Polish policeman, 
was beaten to death and his wife and children cast out of the 
window. The Manchester Guardian correspondent who sub­
sequently made it his business to check the allegation, told the 
British Ambassador and a member of my staff that upon visit­
ing Mr. Karletan in prison, he found him well, that he had not 
been beaten, and that the allegations regarding his wife and 
children were erroneous. 
I was, moreover, aware that in May 1939, a considerable 
exodus of members of the German minority of the Katowice 
and Lodz districts took place. Mid-August, according to usual­
ly reliable sources in Katowice and Lodz, marked the com­
mencement of a further illegal exodus, under pressure from the 
German side of the frontier. When a number of them asked to 
return, the Poles evinced their disapproval, since they held 
they had reason to suspect the members of the German minor­
ity had, during their sojourn in Germany, been schooled in 
espionage propaganda activities and sabotage. In this connec­
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tion, the Polish authorities uncovered a training center of this 
character in Katowice, conducted by the Junge Deutsche 
Partei and several centers of similar nature in Lodz. 
I was aware that numerous Germans were discharged par­
ticularly from plants engaged in war industry. However, there 
were cases drawn to my attention in May as well as August, by 
plant managers of Lodz, wherein the attitude of individual 
German provocateurs amongst the combined Polish and Ger­
man working forces became so obnoxious as to force the man­
agers to discharge a number of the Germans in each case to 
avoid serious clashes between them and the Polish element. In 
such cases, moreover, according to my informants, the usually 
well behaved German element had unfortunately been forced 
into a false position by the provocateurs, and consequently 
suffered discharge along with the latter. 
My sources of information in southwest Poland held, more­
over, that many Germans left Poland in order to be on the Ger­
man side of the frontier, should war break out. Of pertinent 
bearing, informed Polish officials maintain that the number of 
refugees from the German minority approximates nearer the 
figure of 16,000 to 17,000 than the exaggerated figure of 76,000 
alleged by the German press. 
AUGUST 28 
Late on the night of August 28th, I was told by informed 
Polish officials that British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson 
had returned to Berlin. He was received by Herr Hitler about 
10:30 p.m. that same evening, and handed the latter the British 
Government's reply dated August 28, to the German Govern­
ment's communications of August 23 and 25.17 I was aware 
that this reply, previous to delivery, had been communicated to 
the French and Polish Governments. Pursuant to the Polish 
Government's authorization, moreover, this reply informed the 
German Government that Poland was ready to enter immedi­
ately into direct discussions with the German Government. 
The aforementioned British reply of August 28th, to my mind, 
represented the key document of the British-German exchange 
of Notes, in that it announced Poland's declared willingness 
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for direct negotiations, and thus served importantly to place 
on Germany, the responsibility for waging war. My aforemen­
tioned informant told me moreover, that Herr Hitler, after 
reading a translation of the text of the communication, stated 
he would study it, and would give the British Ambassador a 
written reply the next day. I learned the following day that dur­
ing the course of the conversation which took place between 
the British Ambassador and Herr Hitler, when the former 
handed the latter the British Government's aforementioned 
reply, Herr Hitler expatiated on Poland's misdeeds, spoke of 
his generous March offer to Poland, and stated it could not be 
reiterated. He said, moreover, that nothing short of the return 
of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor, as well as a rectifica­
tion in Silesia, would satisfy him. Moreover, Hitler held that 
Poland could never be reasonable, and he spoke of annihilating 
Poland. 
AUGUST 29 
On the night of August 29th, I was informed by Polish offi­
cial circles that at about 7:30 p.m., Herr Hitler handed the 
British Ambassador his reply to the British Government's 
Note, at the same time offering verbal explanations.18 The Am­
bassador thereupon cabled the message to his Government. 
Later, Minister Beck imparted to me the following: in brief, the 
message stated that, though skeptical as to prospects of a suc­
cessful outcome, the German Government accepted the British 
Government's proposal of direct Polish-German negotiations, 
provided a Polish plenipotentiary with full powers arrived in 
Berlin during the course of the following day, Wednesday, 
August 30th. The communication concluded by stating that the 
German Government would at once draw up proposals for a 
solution acceptable to themselves, and, if possible, would ap­
prise the British Government thereof before the arrival of a 
Polish negotiator. In response to the British Ambassador's ob­
servations that this condition smacked of an ultimatum, Herr 
Hitler and von Ribbentrop both assured him it was only in­
tended to stress the urgency of the moment. 
The Polish Government issued a protest against the German 
 83 FINAL STEPS OF THE CRISIS
occupation of Slovakia, stated to have been effected in order to 
protect Slovakia against the Poles.19 
As a result of urgent requests by the British and French Am­
bassadors that the Polish Government postpone its call for 
general mobilization in order to avoid provoking Herr Hitler at 
this crucial hour, the Polish Government reluctantly accepted 
to postpone the order from 11 p.m., August 29, as was original­
ly planned, to August 30, at 3 p.m. o'clock. On the morning of 
August 30, Minister Beck in imparting to me the reasons for 
postponement of general mobilization orders, stated in marked 
earnestness that while his Government had consented to com­
ply with the requests of their allies, they had done so contrary 
to their own realistic views on events current and in-the-mak­
ing. However, he had agreed with his associates that Poland, 
fully aware of her responsibilities to her allies as well as to her­
self, was capable of proving herself a worthy ally under all 
circumstances. (I am aware [that] this delay in mobilization 
proved costly to Poland, in that it served to prevent many re­
serve troops—estimated by Polish authorities at between 
350,000 to 400,000 men—from reaching the western theater of 
operations before the German aerial attacks had bombed the 
rail junctions, thus crippling east to west transportation facili­
ties). 
AUGUST 30 
I learned from Polish official sources (a) that the British Cab­
inet met to consider Herr Hitler's last communication of Au­
gust 29, and sent a reply thereto; and (b) that in behalf of his 
Government, the British Ambassador in Berlin delivered an 
interim response to the German ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
between midnight of the 29th and 6 a.m. of the 30th, wherein 
it was pointed out, among other factors, that it was unreason­
able to expect that the British Government could arrange for 
the appearance of a Polish representative with full powers in 
Berlin within the course of the following day and that the 
German Government should not count upon it.20 
During the course of the day, the British Ambassador [in 
Berlin] received three messages to transmit to the German 
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Government. The first was a message from the British Prime 
Minister direct to Herr Hitler; it informed him of having made 
representations urging Warsaw to guard against frontier in­
cidents, and asked the German Government to take similar 
precautions. The second informed the German Government 
that the British Government's counsel of restraint had met 
with the Polish Government's assurance that the Polish Gov­
ernment had no intention of provoking further incidents, and it 
asked for a like attitude on Germany's part. The third pointed 
out that the demand that a Polish Emissary with plenary pow­
ers come to Berlin to learn of German proposals was unreason­
able. It suggested the German Government invite the Polish 
Ambassador to come and hand him the proposals for transmis­
sion to the Polish Government. This communication, more­
over, recalled to the German Government that it had promised 
to communicate its proposals in detail to the British Govern­
ment, which would undertake, if a reasonable basis were of­
fered, to do its best in Warsaw to facilitate negotiations.21 
At about midnight, (the hour set in the "ultimatum" em­
bodied in Herr Hitler's Note of August 29, as the limit for the 
arrival of a Polish Emissary with Plenary powers), the British 
Ambassador called on von Ribbentrop and handed him the 
British Government's formal reply to the German Govern­
ment's Note of August 29. In the final paragraphs of this reply, 
the British Government, in pointing out the necessity of an 
early commencement of discussions, insisted upon a military 
standstill on both sides, during the period of negotiations. It 
expressed, moreover, its confidence in acquiring a like engage­
ment from the Polish Government, provided the German Gov­
ernment gave similar assurances. Finally, it suggested the es­
tablishment of a temporary modus vivendi in Danzig, of such 
nature as to avoid incidents which might render Polish-Ger­
man relations still more difficult. Von Ribbentrop's attitude 
throughout this meeting was, according to reports, markedly 
hostile and excited, and according to Polish officialdom's subse­
quent reports, this hostile attitude exhibited by von Ribben­
trop became increasingly violent as the British Ambassador 
conveyed in turn each communication received from his Gov­
ernment during that day. 
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After the Ambassador had finished making his communica­
tions, von Ribbentrop produced a lengthy document which he 
rapidly read aloud in German. The Ambassador thus found it 
possible to gain only the gist of about 7 of the 16 points con­
tained in the document. When, at the close of von Ribbentrop's 
reading, the Ambassador asked for a copy of the text of those 
proposals in order to communicate the substance thereof to 
his Government, von Ribbentrop refused, stating the proposals 
were now out of date, in view of the failure of a Polish Emis­
sary to come to Berlin by midnight. The Ambassador there­
upon observed that in such case, the clause in Herr Hitler's 
Note of August 29 to which the Ambassador had drawn Herr 
Hitler's and von Ribbentrop's attention the preceeding night, 
actually constituted an ultimatum. Von Ribbentrop denied this 
was the case, and reiterated it was intended only to stress the 
urgency of the moment. The Ambassador asked why, then, 
could von Ribbentrop not adopt normal procedure; let him 
have a copy of the proposals; invite the Polish Ambassador to 
call on him, and hand him the proposals for transmission to the 
Polish Government. Von Ribbentrop replied in violent terms 
that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador to come to 
him. Von Ribbentrop hinted, however, that it might be differ­
ent if the Polish Ambassador were to ask him for an inter­
view.22 
About 10:30 p.m. Minister Beck telephoned to ask me to 
come to his house. The Minister met me at the door and es­
corted me to his living room where we joined a group consist­
ing of several members of his family and officers of his staff. The 
ensuing hours were devoted to an informal review of events of 
the day. Moreover, the Minister "filled me in" on details 
concerning what had recently transpired between the four 
capitals, Warsaw, London, Paris and Berlin. Touching on the 
German demand for the appearance of a Polish Emissary in 
Berlin by midnight, Minister Beck stated that neither he nor 
his associates intended that he should go to Berlin to be treated 
as another President Hacha.23 I left Minister Beck shortly after 
midnight, the hour which marked the commencement of the 
heated conversation between Sir Nevile Henderson and von 
Ribbentrop in Berlin. 
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AUGUST 31 
I subsequently learned that Henderson was informed during 
the early hours of the morning of the 31st that the German 
Government had decided to issue orders for a march on Poland 
by 1 p.m. o'clock, should a Polish Emissary with plenary 
powers not arrive before that hour.24 It is conceivable, to my 
mind, that the Ambassador was correct in having attributed a 
further delay in the attack until dawn of September 1 to a final 
attempt on the part of the Italian Government to preserve 
European peace. In this connection, I later learned that during 
the course of August 31st, the Duce sounded out Paris and 
London as to their willingness to collaborate towards a peace­
ful settlement. While the replies from the French and British 
Governments were reportedly favorable in principle, lively 
interest being evinced by the French Government, the replies 
were not received by the Italian Government until September 
1, after Germany and Poland had already come to grips.25 
The following day, I learned from an informed officer of 
Minister Beck's staff that at about 2 o'clock that morning in 
Berlin, the British Ambassador disclosed to Lipski the sub­
stance of his midnight conversation with von Ribbentrop, and 
pointed out that the plebiscite in the Corridor and cession of 
Danzig were the two main points in Hitler's proposals. The 
British Ambassador moreover observed his doubts as to 
whether any negotiations might succeed if conducted with von 
Ribbentrop, and suggested that Lipski recommend that his 
Government propose immediately a meeting between Field 
Marshals Smigly-Rydz and Goering. Following his talk with 
the British Ambassador, Lipski communicated the substance 
of the foregoing to Minister Beck.26 
During the course of the same night, August 30-31, British 
Ambassador Kennard communicated to Minister Beck the 
British Government's (a) reply to Herr Hitler, and (b) com­
ments contained in Lord Halifax's cable of August 30, to [the] 
effect 1 / that [the] British Government had proposed in Berlin 
a military standstill during discussions, to which it was hoped 
the Polish Government would have no objections, and 2/ that 
since the Polish Government had authorized the British Gov­
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eminent to say Poland was prepared to enter direct discussions 
with the German Government, the British Government hoped 
that, provided a method and general arrangements for dis­
cussions could be satisfactorily agreed, the Polish Government 
would proceed without delay. 
Following Kennard's early morning telephone call, I called 
on him at about 8:40 a.m. whereupon he imparted to me a 
summary of the foregoing and asked me whether I thought 
any further peace efforts might be expected to be exerted by 
President Roosevelt. In response I pointed out that Herr Hitler 
had failed to reply to messages the President had already sent 
him, and that I had no indication that the President was con­
templating further steps. 
Subsequent to the above meeting, I learned from official 
sources that [at] about 9:30 Kennard called on Minister Beck. 
Minister Beck handed the Ambassador the Polish Govern­
ment's reply to his aforementioned demarche which had taken 
place during the night of August 30-31. (Count Joseph Potocki 
attended this conference, in case the necessity arose to trans­
late Poland's reply which was written in the Polish language). 
Minister Beck told the Ambassador that he would at once in­
struct Lipski in Berlin to seek an interview either with the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs or the State Secretary, with a view 
to stating Poland had accepted [the] British proposals. In re­
sponse to the Ambassador's question as to what attitude the 
Polish Ambassador would adopt if von Ribbentrop handed him 
the German proposals, Minister Beck said that the Polish Am­
bassador would not be authorized to accept such a document 
as, in view of past experiences, it might be accompanied by 
some ultimatum. In this view, it was essential that contact be 
made in the first instance, and that then details should be dis­
cussed as to where, with whom, and on what basis negotiations 
should be commenced. Beck subsequently informed me that in 
the text of the Polish Government's formal reply, which the 
British Ambassador telegraphed to his Government, the Polish 
Government confirmed its readiness for a direct exchange of 
views with the German Government on the basis proposed by 
the British Government and communicated to the Polish Gov­
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ernment by Lord Halifax's telegram of August 28, addressed to 
the British Ambassador to Poland. The Polish Government 
also expressed its readiness, on a reciprocal basis, to give 
formal guarantees that in [the] event of negotiations Polish 
troops would not violate German frontiers, provided a corre­
sponding guarantee were given regarding nonviolation of Pol­
ish frontiers by German troops. The Polish Government more­
over, stressed the necessity of securing a simple provisional 
modus vivendi in Danzig.28 At noon, following his talk with 
Kennard, Minister Beck telephoned instructions to Lipski in 
Berlin to seek an interview at once, either with the Foreign 
Minister, or the State Secretary, and inform either or both that 
Poland would accept the British proposals of August 28 as a 
basis for direct negotiations. Accordingly, about 1 p.m. Lipski 
telephoned State Secretary [Ernst von] Weisacker to request 
an early appointment with the Foreign Minister. About 3 p.m. 
the State Secretary telephoned Lipski to ask him whether he 
would appear as Ambassador or Emissary with plenary 
powers, to which question Lipski replied he would appear as 
Ambassador. At 6 p.m. o'clock, the State Secretary tele­
phoned Lipski to say that the Foreign Minister would receive 
him at 6:30 p.m. 
I was subsequently told by an officer of Minister Beck's staff 
that during the meeting which took place, Lipski stated he was 
appearing solely in capacity of Ambassador without plenary 
powers to discuss or negotiate, and handed von Ribbentrop a 
brief communication to effect that the Polish Government 
was weighing favorably the British proposal for direct discus­
sion, and that a formal answer in this matter would be com­
municated to the German Government in the immediate fu­
ture. Neither did Lipski ask for the German proposals, nor did 
von Ribbentrop offer to give them to him. Their meeting, which 
lasted but a few minutes, proved futile. Lipski subsequently 
described the meeting to me as "ceremonious".29 Following 
this occasion, Lipski failed in his efforts to establish contact 
with Warsaw, due to the German Government's having closed 
all means of communication between Poland and Germany. 
At about 9:30 p.m. the German radio broadcast their 16 
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point proposals, in spite of the vigorous efforts (which I later 
learned) Henderson had made to forestall the broadcast.30 I 
also learned that previous to the broadcast, the Ambassador 
pointed out to Goering that this procedure would probably 
wreck the last prospect of peace. Moreover, when the Ambas­
sador begged the Field Marshal to intervene in the matter, the 
latter said he could not, adding that the German Government 
felt obliged to broadcast their proposals to prove their "good 
faith". 
This conversation, which according to the Ambassador's 
report was his last one with the Field Marshal, lasted about 
2 hours. The Ambassador gained the impression from certain 
of Goering's remarks that it represented a last effort on his 
part to detach Britain from Poland. Moreover, the Ambassador 
augured the worst from the fact that Goering was in a position 
at such a moment to give him so much of his time. The Ambas­
sador felt that since Goering had been made President of the 
New German Defense Council (war cabinet) a few days be­
fore, he could scarcely have afforded at such a moment to spare 
time in conversation if it did not mean that everything down to 
the last detail was then ready for action. 
I later ascertained from authoritative sources that orders 
had that night been issued to march on Poland. 
In Warsaw, Minister [Stanisfaw] Lepkowski, Counselor to 
President Moscicki, was at Minister Beck's house during the 
early part of the evening. While listening in to a German 
radio station about 9:30 p.m., Lepkowski heard the broadcast 
of Germany's 16 point proposals. He immediately imparted to 
Minister Beck the substance of what he had heard, and [the] 
Chief of [the] Foreign Office Press Bureau, [Wiktor] Skiwski, 
who had taken down a shorthand record of the broadcast, gave 
the Minister the details. (This radio broadcast marked the Pol­
ish Government's first receipt of the full text of Germany's 16 
point proposals). Minister Beck immediately informed Mar­
shal Smigfy-Rydz thereof by telephone. Later, in response to 
Lepkowski's question, Minister Beck stated there was no use 
in waking up the President and bothering him with a recital 
of these points. 
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In bidding good night to Count Joseph Potocki, Chief of the 
Anglo-Saxon Division of the Foreign Office,31 who had dined 
with Minister Beck that night, the Minister stated in effect that 
he felt they could go to bed feeling that at least that night there 
would be no war. In discussing this with Count Potocki at a 
later date, he shared my impression that Minister Beck's re­
mark might conceivably have been attributable to the follow­
ing thoughts in the back of his mind: (a) that Herr Hitler, 
deeming Britain's acquiescence essential to the success of his 
aspirations, might at the last moment refrain from marching on 
Poland if he became convinced Britain would come to Poland's 
aid; (b) that in accepting Britain's proposals of August 28 as 
a basis of direct negotiations with Germany, Poland had given 
Herr Hitler a face-saving formula for at least a postponement 
of a conflict with Poland; and (c) that Minister Beck's pro­
posal of a provisional modus vivendi might prove a potentially 
effective card. 
I later was apprised shortly before dawn on September 1, 
that Kennard received from Lord Halifax a telegram in re­
sponse to his own message of August 31 imparting Poland's 
acceptance of Britain's proposals of August 28 as basis for 
direct discussions, together with Minister Beck's appurtinent 
observations. Lord Halifax felt that while the British Govern­
ment was glad to learn that the Polish Ambassador at Berlin 
was being instructed to establish contact with Germany and 
while the British Government fully agreed as to the necessity 
of discussing detailed arrangements for negotiations, and 
agreed as to the undesirability of Minister Beck's visit to Ber­
lin, the British Government failed to see why Poland should 
find difficulty in authorizing the Polish Ambassador to accept a 
document from the German Government. Moreover, the Brit­
ish hoped that Poland might see its way clear to modify its 
instructions to him in this respect. Lord Halifax then went on 
to point out that there was no mention of ultimatum in the 
report on the German proposals which had been sent by Am­
bassador Henderson to the British Government, and the sug­
gestion that the demand for the appearance of a Polish Emis­
sary in Berlin on August 30 amounted to an ultimatum was 
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vigorously repudiated by von Ribbentrop. If the document did 
contain an ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally 
refuse to discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. Lord 
Halifax went on to point out that he should have thought that 
the Polish Ambassador could be instructed to receive and 
transmit a document, and to say that (a) if it bore the com­
plexion of an ultimatum, he anticipated the Polish Government 
would be unable to negotiate on such a basis, and (b) in any 
case, in the view of the Polish Government, questions as to the 
venue of the negotiations, the basis on which they should be 
held, and the persons to take part in them, had to be discussed 
and decided between the two Governments.32 
In response to the foregoing communication from Lord Hali­
fax, Kennard telegraphed that Lord Halifax's telegram had 
been decoded at 4 a.m. the morning of September 1, and that 
Lipski had already called on von Ribbentrop at 6:30 p.m. the 
previous day. The British Ambassador pointed out, moreover, 
that in view of this fact, which had been followed by the 
German invasion of Poland at dawn that day (September 1), it 
was clearly useless for him to take the action suggested.33 
Several points in connection with the foregoing exchange of 
diplomatic communications stand out clearly in my mind. Had 
Hitler honestly desired a peaceful settlement, he could have 
taken full advantage of the British Government's offer of good 
offices in the matter of direct negotiations between the German 
and Polish Governments. The Polish Government's practice 
of restraint under trying circumstances, and its further assur­
ances of continued restraint to the British Ambassador in War­
saw, as late as August 30, in spite of an intensification of in­
creasingly intolerable German provocation in Danzig and at 
other points along the frontier, revealed the Polish Govern­
ment's willingness to contribute its share towards an improve­
ment of the atmosphere. It seemed unlikely that Hitler 
believed it reasonable to expect a Polish Emissary with plenary 
powers to come within 24 hours to Berlin without even know­
ing in advance the basis of negotiations in which he would be 
required to engage. It also seemed that Herr Hitler and von 
Ribbentrop attached more importance to the appearance of a 
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Polish Emissary with plenary powers in Berlin than to the 
demands contained in the 16 point proposal. 
In Warsaw, on the night of August 31,1 turned on the radio 
about 9:30 p.m., and heard the announcement of Russia's rati­
fication of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. This en­
gaged my suspicion, lest it serve as a signal to set the German 
military machine in motion against Poland. This suspicion, on 
top of my previous uneasiness about the situation, prompted 
me to put in a telephone call for Kuykendal, our Consul in 
Danzig. The operator said it would be difficult to complete the 
call, as lines were occupied to such extent that I would have 
to await my turn. I let the order stand, requesting her to call 
me regardless of what hour she could put me through. At about 
11:30 I again called the operator, and was told there was 
trouble somewhere along the line; she thought however, this 
might be repaired in short order. This aroused my concern. I 
thereupon telephoned Mr. Jan Wrszelacki, officer of the night at 
the Foreign Office, and asked whether his night reports indi­
cated that conditions along the frontier were more than hither­
to disturbing in character. He replied in the affirmative, adding 
that all along the line, and especially down towards Katowice, 
border incidents had been rapidly increasing during the eve­
ning. Moreover, the atmosphere in Danzig was becoming dis­
turbingly more tense. 
Immediately following this conversation I sent a cable to the 
President and the Secretary [of State], stating in effect that 
while the Germans might conceivably still be bluffing, the situ­
ation was becoming more tense along the border and called 
for even closer watching than hitherto. As a matter of fact, I 
felt that matters had reached a point whereat anything could 
happen. 
I then retired for what I instinctively felt would be a night of 
uncertain length. 
1. For a good discussion of Danzig's domestic developments and international 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Polish-German Conflict

and

The Embassy's Activities

SEPTEMBER 1 
I awakened at 5:30 in the morning. At first I did not under­
stand what had disturbed me. I went to the window and 
peered over a tranquil city. All was quite—and yet I felt trouble 
was in the air. (It was only later that I ascertained it had been 
Warsaw's first air alarm that had disturbed my rest—I had evi­
dently been subsconsciously aroused by the sirens, which had 
ceased by the time I awoke. The plane which had caused the 
sounding of the siren had bombed the race course at the edge 
of town). When I put in a telephone call for Mr. Jan Wrszlacki 
at the Foreign Office, the night operator (still on duty) in­
formed me his line was busy. It remained busy so long that I 
felt confident something was wrong. Finally I succeeded in 
getting through to him, and in response to my question, he 
said I was correct in my expressed suspicion that the Germans 
had attacked. He had just been able to confirm preliminary 
reports that German troops had been attacking at various 
points along the frontier, including Danzig, since dawn. The 
air fields at Katowice had already experienced air attacks. 
Aware that I should lose much time in getting word to the 
President and the Secretary of State by cable in that this 
would entail coding at our end and decoding at their end of the 
line, I requested my house telephone operator to try making 
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a call to Ambassador [William] Bullitt in Paris, who could 
relay the message to Washington. When the operator later 
told me that a call to Paris over lines through Berlin was 
impossible, I suggested he take a chance and try placing the 
call via Copenhagen. To my happy surprise, the idea worked— 
and with no undue delay, under the circumstances, I suc­
ceeded in reaching Bullitt. Realizing we might be cut at any 
second, we were brief—I told him war had started, and asked 
him to apprise the President accordingly by telephone. He 
assured me he would. Having long known the ambassador to 
be a man of clear thinking, energy, and action, I felt confident 
the President and the Secretary would learn the news in a 
matter of minutes. (I later learned to my profound sense of 
satisfaction that this turned out to be the case). 
After my telephone talk with Mr. Wrszlacki, I awakened all 
members of my household, telephoned Consul General J. K. 
Davis and members of my staff, and notified them that war 
had commenced. In that I had been inclined to place con­
siderable credence in the substance of the Turkish Ambassa­
dor's disclosure as to what his Military Attache had some 
weeks before been able to learn of Germany's contemplated 
plan of attack, envisaging among other factors an aerial 
bombardment characterized by flights of about 100 planes at 
20 minute intervals (which I subsequently reported to the 
Department, and which subsequent events proved approxi­
mately correct in many cases); and in that early morning 
aerial bombardments within the close proximity of several 
cities, including Warsaw, had already been officially reported 
to Mr. Wrszlacki at the Foreign Office, I decided to install, at 
the earliest moment, the clerks and all American women 
members of my staff in the house which preparatory to just 
such eventuality I had previously rented for them at Con­
stanscin,1 a resort in the midst of a pine forest about 18 
kilometers from the heart of Warsaw which the Foreign Office 
had in February recommended as a reasonably safe haven 
from aerial bombardments in event of an attack. I felt they 
would be safer there, at least, until I might have been able to 
gain a clearer picture of what tactics the Germans intended 
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employing via-a-vis Warsaw. Besides, I felt that even if, in 
the preliminary stage, the city itself did escape bombing, 
there might possibly be planes passing over and around War­
saw, causing air alarm sirens at various intervals during the 
night as well as day time. Hence, I believed my staff would 
be able to get a better night's sleep, (so important during 
tense times) in Constanscin than in Warsaw. Moreover, con­
ditions permitting I planned to have them come into town to 
work at the Embassy during the day time. As I was warned 
by the police authorities that all roads leading out of Warsaw 
were already under guard and that passes would be required 
to go beyond the city limits, I personally escorted the women 
members of my staff to Constanscin. I thereupon returned to 
Warsaw for a prearranged conference with Minister Beck and 
his associates at the Foreign Office. 
During the course of this conference, the Minister and 
several officers of his staff disclosed the substance of their 
reports of aerial bombardments which had taken place at 
various intervals over a wide area of Poland. Minister Beck 
stated his opinion that Herr Hitler pictured himself sovereign 
of a pan-German continent, and that Poland had decided to 
contribute her part towards halting Herr Hitler's drive 
towards that objective. Minister Beck told me confidentially 
that in a message from Lord Halifax, the latter indicated he 
now understood the Minister's policy vis-a-vis Rumania.2 
Later, during a conversation at the Embassy with officers of 
my staff, I urged that following further air raids in and around 
Warsaw, one and whenever possible two of us together should 
proceed to the scenes of bombardment for the purpose of 
making eye-witness reports on the circumstances and the 
damage incurred. From the very outset of the conflict, the 
importance of recording only eye-witness reports was clearly 
understood by all the members of our Mission. 
Towards the close of the afternoon the first sizable flight 
of German planes took place over the city. From the court­
yard of our Chancery we watched maneuvers between Polish 
pursuit planes and German bombers. Since the German 
planes were flying at an altitude of between 12 and 15,000 
98 THE BIDDLE REPORT 
feet, the fire from the anti-aircraft batteries and heavy machine 
guns fell short of their marks. (We could see the tracer bullets 
shoot through space like balls of fire, headed for their ob­
jectives). There was a heavy machine gun battery on the roof 
of a house next door to our Chancery. However, the anti­
aircraft fire appeared to prevent the planes from risking fly­
ing lower and diving. This raid entailed no bombardment of 
the heart of the city. I thereupon decided to have the women 
members of my staff whom I had that day left at Constanscin, 
come to work in town during the day and return to Constan­
scin to spend the night, pending a turn for the worse in the 
aerial attacks over Warsaw. 
During the course of the day, (and again on September 2) 
the following message at our request was radio-broadcasted 
over the government-controlled broadcasting station: 
It is requested that American citizens who desire to leave the 
country and who may experience difficulty in doing so, report 
to the American consular officers at Brzesc nad Bugiem where 
efforts will be made to arrange for their departures. 
These measures contributed importantly towards the evacua­
tion of between 300 and 400 American citizens before the 
railway communications to the north were cut after the com­
mencement of hostilities. 
During the course of the afternoon I was informed by an 
official of the Foreign Office (a) that at about six A.M. o'clock 
that morning Herr Hitler issued proclamation to effect he 
would meet force with force; (b) that the scrapping of Dan­
zig's constitution and the annexation of Danzig was pro­
claimed; and (c) that subsequently Herr Hitler in [an] address 
to [the] Reichstag declared he would not call upon Italy for 
assistance. (It later came to light that in an exchange of views 
which took place between Count Ciano and Herr von Ribben­
trop on May 6th and 7th in Milan they concurred, among 
other points, 1/ in the need of striving to preserve peace in 
Europe for a long period, in order to afford both Italy and Ger­
many time to perfect their internal reconstruction and military 
preparations, and 2/ the duration of this period was to be 
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fixed by Italy at three years; by Germany at four or five. 
These among other points formed the foundation of the Treaty 
of Alliance signed by Berlin on May 22nd.) 
Motoring out to Constanscin that evening (it was still light) 
we were stopped by military guards at the outskirts of War­
saw. The guards pointed to an air raid which was taking place 
a short distance ahead of us, over what was reportedly an 
ammunition dump in close proximity of the Wilanow Pal­
ace. When the attack appeared to be over, we continued on 
our way. A few minutes later, however, we spotted a plane, 
evidently one of the same group of German planes which had 
engaged in the aforementioned attack. It was flying at about 
tree-top height, from the direction of the Vistula, and turned 
to cross the road ahead of us. To our discomfort, the pilot 
gave every sign of intending to swoop in behind us. Just as he 
started up the road after us, however, he apparently spotted 
a heavy machine gun nest in the field at his right—and as they 
opened fire, he sped off like a sky-rocket. It was not until later 
that night at our villa in Constanscin that I found that the 
day's bombardments had severed the telephone connections 
between Constanscin and Warsaw. 
SEPTEMBER 2 
I had already talked on August 29 with Mr. Brooks, man­
aging director of the Giesha Mines of Katowice,3 with whom 
I had previously been in frequent contact regarding serious 
developments. After ascertaining from him that the affairs 
of his company had been taken over by the Polish Govern­
ment as a war emergency, I urged him to evacuate his Ameri­
can engineers and employees as soon as possible. He assured 
me he would act on this advice immediately. On that same 
day I discussed the serious trend of events with executives of 
the Gydinia-America Line, and ascertained that they were 
taking all possible precautions under the circumstances 
against the occurrence of an early emergency. Moreover, I 
discussed with Count Czapski, of the American Scantic Line, 
the seriousness of the current trend of developments, and 
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ascertained that he and his associates were taking all pre­
cautionary measures possible under the circumstances in con­
nection with American business interests, direct or indirect. 
Mr. Sztoleman, of the Vacuum Oil Company informed me on 
September 2nd that he was removing the headquarters of the 
company's operations to Lwow. 
In my early morning meeting with Minister Beck and 
several officers of his staff, the Minister told me that at about 
2:00 A.M. the first secretary of the Polish Embassy in Berlin 
had telephoned Count Potulicki, Officer of the night at the 
Foreign Office, that in line with President Roosevelt's initia­
tive, Herr Hitler wished to notify the Polish Government that 
he had given orders to limit aerial bombardments to military 
objectives.4 Minister Beck pointed out that it was evident 
that the German Government had re-established telephone 
communications with Warsaw specifically to enable the sec­
retary of the Polish Embassy in Berlin to transmit this 
message to the Polish Government. The Minister said that he 
would discuss this matter further with me later in the day. 
Air alarms became more than hitherto frequent throughout 
the day. 
During luncheon in the garden restaurant of the Euro­
pejski Hotel my family and I, as well as the other guests of 
the restaurant, watched an air raid overhead. No one evinced 
other than calm interest, and aside from an occasional glance 
upward to note the progress of the aerial action, the waiters 
served the various tables, as if the raid were a usual occur­
rance. 
In the course of my second call at the Foreign Office, 
about 4:00 P.M. o'clock, an air alarm sounded. The officials 
with whom I was talking received warning from the guards 
on duty at the Ministry that the raid was expected to be of 
serious character. They therefore invited me to continue our 
discussion in the air-raid cellar of the ministry. Once in the 
cellar I found it most efficiently fitted out for the emergency, 
in fact I have seen nothing since, anywhere so well equipped: 
a special air ventilation system connected with the roof, tele­
phones, for inner-office and inter-ministry communication, 
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operated on electric power system, independent of the regular 
city service. Moreover, there were several guards trained on 
the technique of gas defense and several trained nurses. 
Minister Beck eventually came down and joined our con­
versation. He informed me that his Government was then re­
plying through the Hague to the German Government's 
aforementioned proposal to limit aerial bombardments to 
military objectives. The Polish reply stated that the Polish 
Government had given "similar" orders, that it was main­
taining them despite bombardments which had caused nu­
merous casualties amongst the Polish civilian population, but 
that it reserved the right to retaliate should this happen again. 
Minister Beck went on to say that despite Herr Hitler's mes­
sage, his reports indicated that at 8 o'clock that morning Ger­
man planes had bombarded Ciechanow, a town close to the 
East Prussian border, killing 21 civilians and 4 soldiers, and 
wounding 36 civilians, 9 of whom were women, [and] 4 chil­
dren; and Lublin, killing 30 inhabitants. Minister Beck added 
that his Government took a grave view of these acts and par­
ticularly in view of Herr Hitler's message transmitted both 
through the Hague and by telephone from Berlin to Warsaw; 
the Polish Government was considering what action to take. 
Of pertinent bearing, I was aware that Polish Government 
circles attached considerable significance to the fact that 
Herr Hitler, transmitting his aforementioned message to 
Warsaw, had not only called upon The Hague to serve as 
intermediary, but had also re-established telephone communi­
cations with Warsaw for the purpose. These circles were in­
clined to ascribe this "double-barreled" action to Herr Hit­
ler's anxiety lest, when Britain and France honored their 
respective alliances with Poland, they might bombard the 
industrial areas of Western Germany (after Britain's and 
France's intervention, Berlin was quick to discern the West­
ern Powers' disinclination to engage in aerial bombardments 
of German industrial areas. At least during the course of the 
Polish-German conflict). 
In connection with air raids, I anticipated that any delay in 
intervention by the Western Allies might make the Germans 
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less apt to observe scrupulously the conditions embodied in 
their September 2nd agreement with the Poles, i.e., limiting 
aerial bombardments to military objectives. In fact, I con­
sidered that potential fear of reprisals in form of allied aerial 
attacks over the industrial areas of Western Germany about 
the only factor which might serve to restrain the Germans 
from broadening the scope of their aerial activities from 
strictly military objectives. Subsequent developments ap­
peared to bear out my thought on this score. At 6 P.M. the 
Polish radio broadcasting station addressed a broadcast to the 
then-convened French Chamber of Deputies, refuting a re­
port which Minister Beck had just learned was being circu­
lated amongst the Deputies, and which Minister Beck was 
inclined to ascribe to Berlin's inspiration, to [the] effect that 
German troops had suspended all attack. During the broad­
cast a German air raid was taking place over the outskirts of 
Warsaw. 
In the late afternoon Major Colbern, Military Attache, and 
I met to review the course of military and aerial activities 
since the outbreak of war. The Major reported that, as in the 
case of the previous day, the German air force had continued 
on an extensive scale its attacks on objectives throughout 
Poland. As far as either of us could ascertain at that juncture, 
attacks were directed chiefly at military, industrial, and 
communications centers. We ascertained at the same time, 
however, that many casualties amongst civilians had resulted 
due in part to the fact that garrisons existed in all Polish 
cities. The effect of the bombs, in most cases reported, indi­
cated light incendiary bombs. We concurred, moreover, in 
our observations that in the course of that day, German 
bombers had flown over Warsaw at two hour intervals at [an] 
estimated height of 12 to 15,000 feet; moreover, neither of us 
had observed any hits by Warsaw anti-aircraft batteries. The 
Major then stated that the Polish General Staff estimated 600 
German planes had taken part in these raids, and that the 
direction indicated they were shuttling back and forth be­
tween East Prussia and former Austria. 
Major Colbern furthermore reported the following resume 
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of German ground attacks which had taken place up to noon 
that day (September 2); Danzig Division which had attacked 
in direction of Gdynia was driven back by Polish counter­
action at Orlowo. East Prussian front: four German infantry 
divisions and one cavalry brigade attacking in direction of 
Neidenberg-MTawa, reached Mlawa vicinity; Pomorze fron­
tier: two German infantry divisions and one light armored 
division attacked on front Chojnice-Notec River, advancing 
25 kilometers to Naklb vicinity; Poznan frontier: One Land­
wehr division and mechanized units, elements of one fortress 
division attacked in direction Zbaszyn-Poznan, advancing 
about 15 kilometers; On front Wartenberg-Nanslau, one 
mechanized and two infantry divisions attacking in direction 
Wielun and Kepno reported making slow progress. Silesian 
front: one armored and four infantry divisions attacking on 
both sides of Katowice to Rybno and Czestachowa; Katowice 
uncaptured. Slovakian frontier; one armored and one infantry 
division attacking on either side of Zakopany advanced about 
30 kilometers to Nowy-Targ. At no point had the Polish main 
defensive positions been reached or broken through. The 
Polish forces claimed to have captured or destroyed one Ger­
man armored train and 100 tanks during fighting of Septem­
ber 1. 
Dined that night at Europejski Hotel and went afterwards 
to the Foreign Office to ascertain reports on latest develop­
ments before motoring out to Constanscin for the night. We 
were awakened by the drone of German bombers, which at 
about 6:30 A.M. began passing over Constanscin and War­
saw in flights of threes and fours at about three-quarters of 
an hour intervals. They seemed to be flying at about 15,000 
feet. Suddenly a medium-sized bomber swooped down in a 
low power-drive, so low that it seemed as though the plane 
had scraped our roof, dropping eleven bombs in rapid suc­
cession (6 of which fortunately proved duds). One bomb ex­
ploded and another landed unexploded in our yard, about an 
acre in size, while a dud went through the roof of the adjacent 
villa (situated about 200 feet apart from our villa), landing 
unexploded in the cellar. The pilot started releasing his bombs 
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close to and between a small brick factory (about 200 yards 
distant) and the villa adjacent to ours—and he continued re­
leasing his bombs in rapid succession as he dove down to­
wards our villa. As we heard the explosions coming nearer 
and nearer, and as our villa correspondingly shook with in­
creased intensity, we stood crouched against the wall of the 
stair-well expecting each moment that the next bomb would 
crash in on us. It was therefore with a sense of relief that I 
saw the tail of the plane, signalling the end of the raid. I 
subsequently discovered how fortunate we were in having 
swiftly sought refuge in the stair-well, in that the concussion 
and flying fragments of the bombs had burst and scattered 
the glass of the windows of the rooms which we had pre­
viously evacuated. 
I was later informed by the police authorities that in their 
investigation, shortly after the bombing they collected in vari­
ous rooms of our villa, 20 pounds of fragments of exploded 
bombs. These fragments had come in through the windows. 
Moreover, I saved as a souvenir of the occasion, a piece of 
metal about half the size of my hand. It served as a sort of 
signal of attack as it whistled in its flight through space and 
with a dull clang, landed against the wall several feet from 
where I was standing on the second floor veranda, previous 
to entering the villa to take refuge in the stair-well. 
Having experienced the worst, short of a casualty, both my 
family and I became more or less fatalistic; we gained a sense 
of being, so-to-speak, veterans of the more violent aspect in 
the "war of nerves" In fact, this experience served psycho­
logically useful in dealing with what was to come. 
One of the two following possibilities, as in effect I cabled 
the [State] Department after the incident, represent to my 
mind about the only conceivable explanation for the pilot's 
action: (a) he might conceivably have dived to bombard the 
nearby small brick factory, mistaking its comparatively broad 
wooden shingle roof line for a hanger (for it was close thereto 
that he started releasing his bombs), or (b) having dived to 
bomb what he may have mistaken for a hanger he might 
possibly have seen a Polish pursuit plane take off at the pilot's 
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school some three and one-half kilometers distant, in which 
case he might have released his rack of bombs regardless in 
an effort to lighten his load preparatory to a quick get away. 
As regards the Foreign Office's recommendation in February 
as to the safety of Constanscin from the theater of aerial at­
tacks over Warsaw, I am aware that my informants had in 
mind the following: 
The nearest objectives of possible military bearing from our 
villa were 1/ a small aerodrome used as a school for civilian 
pilots a little over 3 kilometers distant, 2/ an electric power 
plant about 5 kilometers distant, and 3/ a wooden bridge 
across the Vistula river about 8 kilometers distant. 
After the bombardment, I preceeded immediately to the 
nearby house wherein the women members and several of 
the clerks of my staff were quartered, to see whether they 
were all right. They had experienced several vibrations from 
the bomb explosions but suffered no injury or damage. 
I then proceeded into Warsaw. Due to the damage to our 
villa, and the fact that the line-men had failed to restore 
telephonic service between Constanscin and Warsaw, I de­
cided to take up quarters for my family and myself in the 
apartment on the second floor of the Chancery. During one 
of my two visits to the Foreign Office, in the course of the day, 
my conversation with several officers was again adjourned to 
the air raid cellar, where the discussion was continued in an 
atmosphere of calm. On this occasion my informants dis­
closed: (a) The British Government's final note presented in 
Berlin about 9 A.M. giving Herr Hitler until 11:00 A.M. to 
give an undertaking to withdraw his troops from Poland;5 (b) 
at 11:15 A.M., Prime Minister Chamberlain radio-broad­
casted to the nation that no such undertaking had been re­
ceived and that consequently Great Britain was at war with 
Germany; (c) the ultimatum of the French Government was 
presented at 12:30 P.M. [and] expired at 5:00 P.M.6 
When I dropped by the Foreign Office after dinner about 
9:30 P.M., I received a message inviting me to Minister 
Beck's house adjacent to the Ministry. There I was greeted by 
the Minister and Mrs. Beck who were dining informally with 
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a few officials of the Minister's staff and their wives. I joined 
them at the table until dinner was over. Subsequently over 
coffee, Minister Beck told me that he and his associates pro­
foundly appreciated France's and Britain's honoring their 
respective alliances with Poland. He went on to say, more­
over, (a) that in the course of September 2, twenty-seven 
Polish towns and cities had been objects of German aerial 
attacks; (b) that during the course of the day, September 3, 
Dublin, Torun, Poznah, Krakow, Plbck, among other cities 
and villages had experienced attacks from the air. Moreover, 
bombs had been released in several cases amongst the 
peasants working in the fields; (c) about 1500 civilians had to 
date been either wounded or killed in Poland. The Minister 
then stated that Polish forces had since the outbreak of war 
brought down a total of 64 German planes. Poland mean­
while lost a total of 11 planes. In concluding our talk the 
Minister said that his Government was immediately trans­
mitting a vigorous protest to the Hague, wherein would be 
listed violations of the Polish-German agreement of Septem­
ber 2, to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives. 
On leaving the Foreign Office and in walking through the 
fore-court I discerned signs of packing up archives, an indi­
cation which at the moment I was to mark down as a pre­
cautionary measure. During the course of that day, Septem­
ber 3, the tempo of air raids over Warsaw was about the same 
as on the previous day. The suburbs and several localities 
close by experienced bombings. 
I was aware that Minister Beck and his associates had been 
hoping that the Western allies would stage a diversion ac­
tivity either in the air or on the ground or both. After the 
close of the conflict, I met [the] Polish Ambassador to Lon­
don, Count [Edward] Raczynski, in Paris. In strictest confi­
dence he imparted the following: He had engaged in numer­
ous conversations with Mr. Winston Churchill just previous 
to and immediately following September 1, the date of the 
outbreak of Polish-German hostilities. During earlier con­
versations, Churchill had expressed his personal feelings that 
Britain as well as France should make some effective move 
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in terms of a diversion activity in order to allow Poland to 
reconsolidate her armies. On the day that.Churchill was ap­
pointed first Lord of the Admiralty, Ambassador Raczynski 
had another conversation with him. At that time Raczynski 
pressed him for an explanation as to why neither Britain nor 
France had undertaken some form of effective aerial activi­
ties vis-a-vis Germany. In response, Churchill stated that his 
Government refrained from waging aerial bombardments 
over Germany for fear of antagonizing American public 
opinion. Raczynski was not satisfied with this explanation, 
feeling that it was being put out to camouflage the real 
motives for lack of aerial action. Hence, he continued daily 
to press Churchill until finally the latter told him the follow­
ing in utmost confidence: He said that France was still weak 
in the air and depended upon British air strength to support 
her in the event of a German attack. Accordingly, if France 
were to engage in aerial activities at that time which might 
provoke retaliation measures, and if the British air fleet be­
came engaged in the North Sea area, France might find her­
self a victim of the same type of aerial warfare which the 
Germans were then conducting against Poland and that 
France might fare no better than Poland. Britain at that 
moment had to look to the French army for ground resistance 
while the French had to look to the British air force as the 
main stay for her air resistance. Raczynski told me in strictest 
confidence that he realized that Churchill was telling him 
straight facts.7 
SEPTEMBER 4 
Awakened by early morning air raid. A number of raids 
occurred at regular intervals throughout the day. Other than 
when the broadcasting station warned that the raids might be 
of a serious character, however, the alarm, after the morning 
attacks, was not sounded. In the afternoon at about 4 o'clock, 
while I was at the Foreign Office, the alarm sounded shrilly, 
warning of a large-scale bombardment. Again the conversa­
tion in which I was engaged was adjourned to the cellar. A 
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few minutes after our arrival there, Minister Beck, with 
whom I had had an appointment within a quarter of an hour 
of that time, came to join us. He had been on his balcony 
watching the machine gunners on the roof of the Ministry 
shoot down a comparatively low-flying German bomber 
directly overhead. 
This air raid was longer than usual. The flight, consisting of 
about 60 or 80 planes, seemed to be trying to destroy the main 
bridges leading across the Vistula. The German pilots demon­
strated a reckless daring in swooping down low over the city, 
and dropping bombs on their objectives. The Polish anti-air­
craft guns were able to defend the bridges, and after a lengthy 
attack, the Germans abandoned their efforts in that regard. 
Before leaving, however, they dropped incendiary bombs in 
the outskirts, causing a circle of fire to be laid around the city. 
The Polish authorities were apprehensive lest this circle of fire 
had been effected deliberately in order to facilitate the bomb­
ing of the city on a return flight that night. Three German 
bombers were shot down that day. I left the Foreign Office 
just as the last one met its end. Damage resulting from the raid 
was considerable. On this, as on previous days, all members of 
our Mission at various times personally checked on all acces­
sible scenes of bombings. Dined at the Europejski. An officer 
of G-2 joined us. He mentioned among other things his con­
cern over the reported effectiveness of the drive of German 
columns in the direction of Modlin. 
Upon entering the Foreign Office at 11:30 P.M., I immedi­
ately gained the distinct impression that the Ministry in gener­
al was uneasy over reports of the turn of military develop­
ments in the vicinity of Modlin, north of Warsaw. Mrs. Beck, 
who together with a number of the wives of officers of the For­
eign Office, had been working like a trojan, was in charge of the 
information desk. On this occasion she was assisted by Count­
ess Joseph Potocka, who took turns with Countess Michael 
Lubienska and Countess Paul Starzynska, wife of Minister 
Beck's secretary, in operating the telephone switch board 
while Mrs. Beck answered the questions of the numerous call­
ers at the Ministry. I watched them while I was awaiting word 
110 THE BIDDLE REPORT 
to go upstairs. They worked fast and efficiently. I recognized in 
this scene another example of the admirable capacity and will­
ingness of Polish womanhood to meet a crisis. 
I went upstairs. It was dark save for the meager rays of a 
blue shaded lamp in the corner of the enormous gallery on to 
which open the offices of the officials. There were small groups 
of officers speaking together in whispers as they walked up and 
down the carpeted gallery. The atmosphere was charged with 
electricity; uneasiness. My conversation with several officers of 
Minister Beck's staff confirmed my previous impression: the 
turn in developments in the vicinity was causing grave con­
cern. If anything arose which they thought I should know, 
they would telephone me. I departed, and as I walked through 
the Ministry courtyard, to get into my car, I perceived in the 
clear light of the moon that what had the night before looked 
like a packing up of the archives had now the earmarks of an 
evacuation move in the near future. I noted that along with the 
archives, army cots were being packed in several large motor 
trucks. 
Chief of Protocol, Major [Aleksander] Lubiehski imparted 
next day that Minister Beck had called him at midnight to in­
form him that reports from the direction of Modlin indicated an 
early heavy attack in a southerly direction, towards Warsaw. 
He then told Major Lubiehski to come to him again at 5:00 
A.M., adding that at that time he would either tell him to go 
back to bed or instruct him to notify the Diplomatic Corps to 
evacuate Warsaw by gradual stages throughout the day. 
At about 2:00 A.M., night of September 4-5, I was awak­
ened by sounds of motor lorries and tanks passing by the 
Chancery. I found it was a lengthy mechanized column con­
sisting of troop-filled lorries, heavy guns, and medium-sized 
tanks which were rushing through the heart of the unlighted 
city toward Modlin. The column travelling at a speed of ap­
proximately 40 miles per hour took about two hours to pass 
our chancery. It was evident, in view of my talks earlier in the 
night, [that] these were reinforcements being rushed to check a 
threatened break-through at Modlin. It was a grim picture. 
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SEPTEMBER 5 
At 5:00 A.M., Minister Beck conferred again with Major 
Lubienski, this time informing him of the Government's de­
cision to evacuate Warsaw, and of his decision to evacuate the 
Diplomatic Corps gradually during the course of the day. 
Moreover, he instructed the Major to notify the various mis­
sions accordingly. Between 11:00 A.M. and noon (Septem­
ber 5) military developments north of Warsaw had taken so 
unfavorable a turn as to cause Minister Beck to call in Lubi­
enski and instruct him to accelerate the pace of the diplomatic 
Corps's evacuation. On this occasion Minister Beck empha­
sized he wanted the entire corps out of Warsaw by the end of 
the day. 
During the course of the preliminary phase of Poland's 
mobilization in March, I learned in strictest confidence from 
an official of President Moscicki's household as well as from an 
official of the Foreign Office that the Polish Government was 
considering, among other precautionary measures, the pos­
sible necessity of removing the seat of Government to another 
section of Poland in [the] event the capture of Warsaw was 
threatened during a potential Polish-German conflict. While 
the Government guarded with utmost secrecy this possibility 
as well as the designated evacuation point, I later became 
aware that confidential instructions had been issued to plant 
managers of the "industrial triangle" to start moving their 
machinery to the Lublin area, and that the President secretly 
sent a representation to the Lublin-Zamosc area to make a cen­
sus of billeting possibilities, to organize a communications 
center, et cetera. This and other information prompted [my] 
belief that the Government had decided upon the same area 
for its own possible evacuation. 
It was still in March that my aforementioned informants di­
vulged in strictest confidence the following broad outline of 
Poland's plan of defense: (a) to keep the Polish army intact, 
(b) to resist as long as possible an attempted capture of War­
saw and/or the "Industrial Triangle", (c) withdrawal of the 
main body of Polish forces under cover of delayed action, if 
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and when pressure from a potential German attack made it 
necessary, to the main defensive position, on the line of the 
strategic Narew, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers, (d) to delay the 
adversary's advance 1/ until the advent of rainy and wintry 
weather and 2/ until assistance from Poland's Western allies 
might have diverted the full brunt of the German attack from 
off the Polish front. My informants went on to say that while 
this was the Polish defense plan in terms of the broad sweep, 
the Government and the General Staff had decided that, in [the] 
event the capture of Warsaw by the adversary became im­
minent, the Government and the General Staff would with­
draw from Warsaw—the Government re-establishing its seat in 
Eastern Poland, the General Staff setting up its headquarters 
at some point between the newly established Government seat 
and the fighting front. 
In other words, allowing for unforeseen turns in the course 
of a potential conflict, the Polish Government and High Com­
mand (a) regarded as their paramount aim: to hold the Polish 
fighting forces intact, awaiting the effects of wet and subse­
quently winter weather, and effective action of Poland's Wes­
tern allies to alleviate pressure on the Polish front; and (b) had 
come to feel that they could less afford the loss of any sizable 
portion of their first line fighting strength, which would be dif­
ficult if not impossible to replace, than the loss in the prelimi­
nary stage of a conflict, of territory and even of their capital, 
the recapture of which changed conditions and counter at­
tacks in a later stage might permit. 
Still later I was informed confidentially by an official of the 
Foreign Office to the effect that, in event the Government de­
cided to evacuate Warsaw, (a) it would want the Embassies 
and Legations to follow, (b) that the Government would supply 
each Embassy and Legation with a large motor truck, (c) that 
besides motor trucks a special train would be placed at the 
disposal of the diplomatic corps to transport the Chiefs of Mis­
sion and their respective staffs to whatever new capital might 
eventually be designated; and (d) that our respective automo­
biles might join the trucks in a military guarded "caravan" to 
their destination. While I appreciated the good intentions of 
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the Government, to extend us these conveniences, I antici­
pated that a potential German campaign would entail aerial as 
well as ground attacks aimed at crippling at the outset 
transportation and communications lines, which might tend to 
cause confusion to such an extent as to render unlikely the 
Government's ability to place transportation facilities at our 
disposal. Hence, I purchased a large truck, with a view to pro­
viding against the possibility of our Embassy^ being forced to 
spend the winter in Eastern Poland (even possibly on the edge 
of the Pinsk marshes). I loaded the truck with canned goods, 
kerosene lanterns, candles, et cetera, for I felt that I should 
provide our Embassy group at least with enough of the bare 
necessities of life to tide them over a possible preliminary 
shortage of food in event we suddenly found ourselves forced 
to set up headquarters at some eastern point inaccessible to 
supply centers. 
In conversation with General Carton de Wiart, V.C. (Chief 
of the British Military mission) at about 10:30 A.M., he ex­
pressed his apprehension lest Warsaw be surrounded and pos­
sibly come under the fire of German guns within several days. 
(From these remarks I gained the distinct impression that 
little, if anything, in the form of an effective diversion activ­
ity might be expected from the British and possibly the French 
forces in the course of the next few days at least). 
Pursuant to Chief of Protocol Lubienski's notification, at 
about noon members of our Embassy staff evacuated Warsaw 
by automobile at various hours throughout the day, arriving 
towards the end of the afternoon at the newly designated 
Foreign Office headquarters at Naleczow, about 23 kilometers 
west of Lublin [see map]. In accordance with cabled instruc­
tions from the State Department, the Consulate General 
moved into the Chancery and the Embassy remained with the 
Government. 
As we crossed the bridge from Warsaw to Praga an air raid 
took place and the police authorities stopped us, counseling us 
to pull over to the side of the road to await the end of the 
attack. When the authorities realized that the planes were 
headed eastward, they let us continue our journey. As we 
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turned from the outskirts of Praga, into the road for Lublin, we 
ran into a second raid from the same flight of planes. Anti­
aircraft units along side of the road fired over our heads at the 
bombers. Further along the road, British Ambassador, Sir 
Howard Kennard accompanied by his Counselor, Mr. Clifford 
Norton and Mrs. Norton, having passed us in a fast moving car, 
stopped a little way ahead of us to ask if all was well with our 
group. 
Before leaving Warsaw I decided to leave my motorcycle 
with attached sidecar, at the Chancery in case stranded Ameri­
can citizens who might wish to evacuate Warsaw, lacked 
means of transportation. Besides, I left two 200 liter barrels of 
gasoline. I also left a sack of flour and several boxes of canned 
provisions, at the Chancery in case food stock might run low. 
Pursuant to Mr. Harrison's earnest request that he be al­
lowed to delay his departure in order to attend to some out­
standing personal matters, I requested him to accelerate com­
pletion of his business, and to join us as soon as possible at 
Nale.czdw. (Pursuant to a conversation with the Under Secre­
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, Count Szembek, the next 
morning (September 6) I telephoned Mr. Harrison and Major 
Colbern, who had postponed his departure in order to contact 
the General Staff, requesting them both to come to Nale,czow 
at the earliest moment. Accordingly, they assured me they 
would leave Warsaw that afternoon at about 4:30 P.M.) 
Upon arrival in Nale,czow I made arrangements with For­
eign Office officials and the Chief of Police to billet and board 
my family and the members of my staff. As I cabled the De­
partment, Nale/izow is a small cure resort. We were billeted 
in several rooming houses. Part of the diplomatic corps was 
billeted in and around Naleczow and part in Kazimierz about 
7 kilometers distant. Together with a number of our colleagues 
we had dinner that evening in the dining hall of the newly es­
tablished Foreign Office, formerly the cure house of the resort. 
French Ambassador [Leon] Noel joined our table and re­
marked to Mrs. Biddle that he did not think we would remain 
long in NaTe,cz6w. 
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At that time, and under war circumstances, living conditions 
were comparatively primitive, gasoline for the automobiles 
scarce, and communications difficult. We soon found Nal^ czow 
was in the direct path of a regular run of German bombers, 
shuttling back and forth between East Prussia and Slovakia. 
However, as I cabled on September 6, the nearest point thus 
far bombarded was the local railway station, three kilometers 
distant from the civilian community in which we were billeted. 
This bombardment, however, took place a few hours previous 
to our arrival on September 5. Subsequent investigation re­
vealed that several German planes had, on a low power-dive, 
bombed two trains which had come to a stop alongside the 
little station; one was a troop train, the other filled with civil­
ian passengers. The bombing had been concentrated, severe. 
Many civilian passengers, and to a lesser degree the troops, re­
ceived serious injuries. (I was aware of the blunder both of the 
station master and of the conductors of both trains, in having 
permitted a train of civilians to stop alongside a troop train). 
Upon arrival at one of the rooming houses to which we had 
been assigned I found a number of the injured women and 
children receiving first aid treatment inside the house, and on 
the back porch, one woman who was due shortly to give birth 
to a child, had had her leg severed at the knee. Most of the 
others had suffered head wounds. There were no proper dress­
ings for the wounded available. We thereupon contributed 
some gauze and bandages which I had fortunately secured 
for emergency purposes in a Red Cross kit, from Mrs. Beck, 
Minister Beck's wife, on the previous night in Warsaw. After 
these unfortunate people had been taken off to a hospital in 
Lublin, we moved into the house. Counselor of Embassy, Mr. 
North Winship and Third Secretary, Mr. C. Burke Elbrick 
joined us shortly thereafter. 
SEPTEMER 6 
During my early morning conversation with Count Jan 
Szembek, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, he imparted that 
his reports indicated that the Polish forces, reinforced by the 
mechanized column which had rushed through Warsaw on the 
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night of September 4-5, had succeeded in arresting the drive of 
the German mechanized columns, and were then holding posi­
tion in the Zegrze-Modlin sector north of Warsaw. In the early 
part of the afternoon, the Breslau radio broadcasting station 
announced in the Polish language that our Embassy had ar­
rived in Nale,czow. As the location of the new capital had until 
then been guarded confidentially by the Polish Government for 
protection of Government officials as well as the diplomatic 
corps, this announcement indicated, to my mind, [the] efficiency 
of German espionage activities. 
During the course of the day, I cabled the State Department 
my observations on certain aspects of aerial bombardments. I 
pointed out that experience during aerial raids and subsequent 
investigations of outcome thereof, prompted my belief that the 
question of limiting bombardments from the air to objectives 
of military bearing bore serious consideration in light of cir­
cumstances which prevailed throughout the belligerent coun­
tries. In Poland, as in France, Britain, and Germany, during 
war time, mobilization involved the billeting of troops in civili­
an communities. As for Poland practically every village of, say, 
500 inhabitants housed 50 to 100 troops. As regards industry, 
both the larger and the smaller manufacturing plants engaged 
in production both of armaments and articles for domestic con­
sumption were usually surrounded by densely populated com­
munities of employees. I felt therefore that the question con­
cerning aerial bombardments called for consideration in the 
light of whether the bombardment of objectives of military 
interest was of sufficient value to the program of the adversary 
to warrant endangering the civilian population. (In view of the 
foregoing cabled observations, it was with more than ordinary 
interest that subsequently, on September 13, I learned of the 
German Government's announcement of that date that all 
Polish towns and villages harboring armed soldiers, snipers or 
marauding bands, would be regarded forthwith as military ob­
jectives.) 
During a conference at about 7:00 P.M. between French 
Ambassador Noel, and myself, at the house where my family 
and I were billeted, Count Szembek telephoned me urgently 
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requesting that both the Ambassador and I meet with him at 
the earliest moment at his headquarters. He added that Brit­
ish Ambassador Kennard was already on his way. Within a 
few minutes, we reached the Foreign Office. I recall that Szem­
beck, a charming character possessing the manners and gener­
al attitude of the 18th century Polish nobility, greeted us with 
characteristic cordiality. After friendly inquiries as to the state 
of our comfort in our new quarters, and after apologies for 
calling a conference on such short notice, he remarked with 
dignity and composure (as if he had just recalled the purpose 
of the conference) that the reason for calling us together was to 
inform us that a German mechanized column of considerable 
strength had unfortunately just broken through the Polish lines 
north-west of us, and was rapidly approaching Pulawy, some 
18 kilometers distant from NaTe,cz6w. He went on to say that 
it was difficult at the moment, due to poor communications, to 
ascertain the exact strength of the German force. However, in 
the absence of full information in regard thereto, his Govern­
ment, after consulting General Headquarters, had considered 
it advisable that the Foreign Office and the diplomatic corps 
move on to some point whereat they were less likely to be sur­
rounded, cut off from General Headquarters, and possibly cap­
tured. 
At the close of our conference, and as I was taking leave of 
Count Szembek in the garden outside the newly set-up Foreign 
Office, a Polish pursuit plane brought down a German light 
bomber directly overhead. The German pilot, wounded in the 
shoulder, landed by parachute at the other end of the garden, 
a comparatively short distance from where we were standing. 
Count Szembek stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Diplomatic Corps were to evacuate Nalsczow immedi­
ately and proceed directly to Krzemieniec, located about 480 
kilometers from Nafeczow and about 30 kilometers from the 
Russian border. The Prime Minister would establish head­
quarters for himself and staff at Luck, and the President would 
set up his headquarters at a point in the vicinity of Luck. I 
thereupon earnestly requested Count Szembek's assurance 
that members of my staff driving automobiles be allowed 
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enough gasoline to carry them at least to Luck, where I under­
stood there was a supply of gasoline sufficient to afford refuel­
ing. Count Szembek admitted that the scarcity of gasoline in 
NaTeczdw was deplorable, but assured me he would do all 
possible to see that the gasoline requirements of my staff were 
met. Forseeing, however, the hectic rush for fuel, I urged Mr. 
Winship and Mr. Elbrick to drive their automobiles, at the ear­
liest moment, to the gasoline pump and remain in their cars 
in order to avoid confusion. 
I was anxious, moreover, to save the women members of my 
staff the confusion and discomfort of becoming envolved in 
what promised to be more or less of a "tussle" for gasoline 
around the pump of the service station. Fortunately, finding, 
therefore, that I could spare some gasoline, I turned over to 
Miss McQuatters, who throughout the entire trek from War­
saw to Krzemieniec at the wheel of my Ford station wagon, 
drove Miss Saunders, Miss Hillery, Miss Pinard, and Mr. 
Aneksztejn, assistant to the disbursing officer, a sufficient 
amount of gasoline in tin containers to carry the car through to 
the refuelling service station at Luck. (Miss McQuatters, the 
only woman to drive a car during the trek, gained the respect 
and esteem both of Polish official and diplomatic circles, for 
having safely conducted her car and passengers through the 
lengthy and exhausting, as well as dangerous day and night 
runs which the trek entailed). Furthermore, I subsequently suc­
ceeded in obtaining a "best-efforts" promise from the Chief of 
Police (with whom I had previously established a friendly re­
lationship) to furnish American citizens, who might come 
through during the course of the night or the next day, with 
sufficient gasoline to see them at least on their way to Luck. Fol­
lowing these preliminaries, the members of our Embassy, 
commencing at about 11:00 P.M., departed from Nafe,cz6w at 
various intervals throughout the night. 
I endeavored to arrange the distribution of passengers 
amongst the automobiles of our caravan in such a way as to 
have (a) two drivers per car where possible, and (b) some one 
who spoke the Polish language in each car. In cases where this 
was not possible due to lack of space in any car, I urged that a 
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car lacking someone familiar with the Polish language, accom­
pany a car occupied by one. 
Night travel under war conditions then prevailing, was, to 
say the least, a difficult, and dangerous task. Only the most 
meagre amount of illumination was permitted from our head­
lights which, according to regulation, were covered by a blue 
cloth hood. Moreover, upon approaching towns the military 
authorities stopped all cars and instructed the driver to ex­
tinguish all lights. This, coupled with the fact that "black­
outs" in Polish towns were practiced in the literal sense of ex­
pression, made driving throughout the cities and towns a 
precarious matter. One had to slow down to a speed of about 
3 or 4 miles an hour and frequently come to a stop, due to loss 
of bearings. I recall that the night we passed through Tarno­
pol enroute from Krzemieniec to Zaleszczyki I had to walk ahead 
of the car with one hand on the radiator, literally feeling my 
way and calling back to Mr. Charles Moszczyhski (a member 
of my staff) who was then at the wheel.8 We progressed thus 
for some 6 to 7 city blocks' distance, until we reached a part of 
the town where the buildings were sufficiently low to permit 
the glow of the moon to light the street. 
On the other hand, night driving along the open road en­
tailed other difficulties. Dry weather had made the roads ex­
ceedingly dusty—a white pulverized dust arose in the wake of 
each car like a thick fog, and frequently took from 3 to 4 
minutes to settle sufficiently to permit visibility. Moreover, the 
military authorities chose the cover of night to effect their 
major movements of troops, supplies, and heavy guns. 
Hence, one frequently passed lengthy lines of troop-laden 
buses and lorries, and columns of mechanized equipment, 
including artillery of varying calibre. This, the lack of light, 
the narrowness of the average road, and the exasperating 
dust contributed towards making the automobile driver's 
position an uncomfortable one. 
After the first few days of hostilities the German pilots 
discovered that, aside from anti-aircraft measures at Warsaw, 
several other important cities, armaments, communications, 
and other centers of vital military interest, there was little if 
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any resistance to fear. Hence, these pilots soon became in­
creasingly daring in their general operations, power-diving 
to surprisingly low altitudes, and frequently "hawking" traffic 
along the highways. The latter usually entailed machine-
gunning. The drivers and passengers of automobiles were 
usually prevented by the hum of the automobiles' motors 
from detecting the approach of a plane. We finally developed 
a technique along the following lines: we left open the radio 
switch, for the approach of a plane usually registered a dis­
tinct clicking noise, and we constantly kept an eye on peas­
ants working in the fields. If we noted their faces turned sky­
ward, we instantly made for the nearest trees (if any were 
within a short distance)—and if they were not; we instantly 
stopped the car. We then shut off the motor, opened the doors 
of the car, and ran for the nearest cover. If woods were at 
hand, so much the better, if not, we sought the culverts at 
either side of the road, lying face up, to keep an eye on the 
plane. If the plane went on, we would immediately shift 
backwards or forwards from our positions in case the pilot 
returned with an idea of maching-gunning the spot whereat 
he had originally marked us (this proved to be the practice of 
the pilots). 
Another measure, but more extreme in character, in event 
of emergency was the following: if one was suddenly found 
to be the objective of a plane close overhead, and in the ab­
sence of nearby cover, the best procedure in event of ma­
chine-gunning was to stop and stand absolutely straight; in 
event of a bombing, to drop instantly to the ground and lie 
flat. Careful study of maps and inquiries as to the terrain 
along the route preparatory to embarking on day trips, more­
over, were essential. Bombardment flights usually occurred 
at dawn; again about 11:00 A.M., and again between 4 and 
6 P.M. It was therefore only prudent for one to have in mind 
the probable necessity of seeking shelter (for one's automo­
bile) just previous to or during these periods. Leaving 
Nalfeczow we drove throughout the night. In passing through 
various towns along the route, I gave the Starostas9 lists con­
taining the names of those members of our Mission, who 
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were driving automobiles, requesting that, should they run 
short on gasoline in those vicinities, the Starostas replenish 
their supply. At the same time, I urged the Starostas to assist 
any other Americans who might be in need of gasoline. 
Several kilometers west of Wfodzimierz, and just as we 
were approaching a railroad crossing, we noted ahead of us 
an automobile accident. It turned out to be a collision be­
tween a truck and a small sports model automobile belonging 
to the officer in charge of the French Embassy's codes. While 
he had escaped injury, his wife was seriously shaken up, and 
had received a deep cut on the head as well as a concussion. 
By good fortune, Mrs. Kulski, wife of the assistant counselor 
of the Polish Foreign Office (as Mr. and Mrs. Kulski lacked 
transportation, I had invited them to accompany us from 
NaJ^czow), proved herself an expert at First Aid. By the side 
of the road, with ordinary needle and thread, she stitched the 
head wound. (I recently received a report that the young 
French woman finally reached Rumania in safety and was 
well on the road to recovery). 
SEPTEMBER 7 
After refueling in Luck, each car of our Embassy Group in 
turn proceeded through Dubno to Krzemieniec. At the out­
skirts of Dubno the car I was driving was halted by military 
guards. We stopped under some trees during an aerial bom­
bardment of the railway yards, not far distant. I arrived at 
Krzemieniec at about 10:30 A.M. (Thursday, September 7). 
Mr. Kulski (assistant Counselor of the Foreign Office, who 
together with his wife had accompanied us from Nal^ czow 
in one of my two cars) took charge of preliminary arrange­
ments towards setting up the Foreign Office and billeting the 
various Embassies and Legations.10 I was informed by the 
Foreign Office that their reports indicated (a) the Polish forces 
were experiencing a major three-column attack; in the north 
one column was headed for Warsaw; in the central region 
another column was headed for Warsaw via Czestochowa; 
still another column was headed for Krakow from the direc­
tion of Slovakia; (b) Polish forces in Pomorze consisting of 
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about 100,000 troops were threatened by a pincer movement 
consisting of columns from East Prussia and from the direc­
tion of Czestochowa; (c) that day was considered critical 
concerning success or failure of German flanking attacks 
vis-a-vis Warsaw. 
Observation during our lengthy motor trek eastward had 
revealed that at the very outset of the conflict, the first day, 
the German bombers engaged in a series of effective attacks 
on all important railway junctions. Shuttling back and forth 
between Slovakia and East Prussia in three main broad 
bands of flight in the general direction, respectively, [of] 
Bialystok-Lwow in the east, Mlawa-Jarosiaw in the central 
part, and Gdynia-Katowice in the west, these bombers had 
succeeded in putting most of the main railway junctions out 
of business in short order. To this perhaps to more than any 
other factor was attributable the disruption of the transporta­
tion of reserve forces, which in turn caused the failure to com­
plete mobiliation. 
By this time, I was aware of the effectiveness of the Ger­
man mechanized thrusts under cover of the withering effect 
of efficiently coordinated aerial bomb and machine-gun bar­
rages. The German mechanized columns were breaking 
through wherever possible and pressing forward in swift long-
distance thrusts, frequently leaving the opposing divisions 
behind to fight it out. It was estimated by official circles at this 
point that the Germans were employing between 85 percent 
and 90 percent of their first line air force. It was found neces­
sary by the Polish command to limit the main part of the 
Polish air force to collaboration with the troops in the line, 
thus leaving but few planes to combat effective efforts of the 
German bombers to disrupt communications, cripple in­
dustrial operations, and render general confusion. 
After the close of the Polish-German conflict, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister of the Polish Government, General 
[Wiady&taw] Sikorski, imparted to me in strictest confidence 
the following: on November 11, General Georges, Chief of 
Staff of the French Army, had told him that on the seventh 
day of the war, the French High Command urged the French 
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Government to permit the French army to march on Ger­
many, pointing out that there were less than 20 German divi­
sions vis-a-vis the Maginot line, whereas France at that time 
had about 46 divisions prepared for action. The High Com­
mand felt that an opportunity which would not again present 
itself was at hand. The French Government however refused 
this suggestion.11 Assuming this disclosure to be exact, I 
should attribute the French Government's refusal to reasons 
confidentially cited by the First Lord of the British Admiralty 
in his aforecited conversation with Polish Ambassador to Lon­
don, Count Raczynski, on September 3rd. In other words, I 
am inclined to believe that the hesitancy on the part both of 
the French and British Governments to permit their military 
forces to launch an attack against Germany was primarily due 
to their desire first to gain equality if not superiority in terms 
of air strength.12 
During a subsequent visit at the Foreign Office I was in­
formed (a) that the Prime Minister was establishing his head­
quarters at Luck, (b) that President Moscicki was establishing 
his headquarters in three different locations within the district 
between Krzemieniec, the President's headquarters, and Luck. 
While I found that proper communications from Krzemieniec 
had not yet been established, a spokesman of the Foreign Of­
fice expressed his hope of placing at our disposal in the near 
future short wave sending facilities. We were meanwhile ex­
periencing difficulties in receiving and sending communications. 
Under the extraordinary circumstances prevailing, and as I 
was aware that the American Press correspondents lacked 
means of communications with the outside, I cabled our Min­
ister in Bucharest, Mr. Gunther, asking him to notify the re­
spective agencies that the following correspondents could be 
contacted if addressed care of our Embassy: Mr. Petersen, 
Associated Press, Mr. Walker, New York Herald Tribune, Mr. 
Neville, Time Magazine, Mr. Small, Chicago Tribune, and Mr. 
Shapiro, New York Times. 
Having expected Mr. Harrison, Second Secretary of Em­
bassy at Nafeczow, pursuant to my telephone instructions of 
September 6, to join us there that day, and having had no 
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information as to his whereabouts since that telephone call, 
I became concerned regarding his welfare. Accordingly, I 
asked the Starosta of Krzemieniec to telephone other Sta­
rostas along the line for news of Mr. Harrison. The Starosta 
subsequently reported no information available. The first 
news I learned from him was from an American newspaper 
correspondent who arrived in Krzemieniec. He had seen Mr. 
Harrison leaving Warsaw in his car on September 6 with a 
Polish friend and much luggage. I was relieved when Mr. 
Harrison finally arrived in Krzemieniec on September 9. It 
seemed that his delay in arriving at Krzemieniec was due to 
his having conducted some Polish friends to their country 
place in the area northeast of Lublin. 
SEPTEMBER 8 
News reaching the Polish Foreign Office from G[eneral] 
H[ead] Q[uarters] during the course of September 8 continued 
to indicate an unfavorable turn for the Polish forces. It more­
over became clear that the preliminary objective envisaged in 
the rapid eastward advance of the German troops in south 
Poland was the capture of Lwow. A German seizure of Lwow 
might conceivably have presaged a further German advance 
toward the Russian frontier, a possibility which might have 
spelled a severance of our connections with Rumania. 
[I] cabled [the] Department to the following effect: Aerial 
bombardments by German air force includes railways (fre­
quently endangering trains of refugees and wounded); fac­
tories engaged in war production (endangering surrounding 
communities) bridges (endangering public in transit and people 
living near bridge-heads) and all places resembling airports, 
troop centers, and barracks. I went on to point out that while 
they were ostensibly giving the appearance of adhering to the 
principle of limiting aerial bombings to objectives of military 
bearing, the German planes, in my opinion, were straining the 
point, and taking advantage of every opportunity irrespective 
of danger to the civilian population. It was, moreover, evident 
that the crews of the German bombers released their bombs 
even when in doubt as concerned the identity of the objectives. 
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By way of illustrating this point, I cited the following cases: 
1/ bombardment of a sanatorium in the woods nearby Otwock; 
ten children living there were killed; 2/ bombardment of 
modern flats one kilometer from barracks on Warsaw out­
skirts; 3/ bombardment of hospital train (clearly marked with 
Red cross on roof) standing alongside of uncovered Warsaw 
East Station, and during the process of unloading wounded 
soldiers. This and the demolition of a girl guide hut (12 girls 
killed) resulted from the heavy bombardment of the East 
Station; 4/ bombardment of a refugee train bound eastward 
from Kutno. 
SEPTEMBER 9 
Shortly before 9:00 A.M. on the morning of September 9, I 
sent Miss McQuatters, Miss Saunders, Miss Hillery, Miss 
Pinard of my staff, in my Ford station wagon, and Mrs. Peder­
sen in the car driven by her husband, to Sniatyn, a Polish-
Rumanian border town, where, thanks to the friendly as­
sistance of one Mr. Agerton Sykes acting in behalf of the 
British Embassy in Poland, they were enabled to acquire suf­
ficient gasoline to enable my car and that of Mr. Pedersen 
of my staff to return to Krzemieniec, as well as to procure 
transportation from the Rumanian border to Cernauti. 
Shortly after my arrival in Paris, in late September, Polish 
Ambassador to France, [Juliusz] Lukasiewicz, imparted in ef­
fect the following: Either on September 9 or 10, (he was a 
little vague as to the exact date) he was taken a-back when 
General [Stanislaw] Burckhardt-Bukacki (Polish General Staff 
Officer attached to the French General Staff) told him that 
[French Commander in Chief] General Gamelin had empha­
sized his opinion that the Polish armies should withdraw to a 
position in southeast Poland behind a contracted line some­
what described by a line drawn from the southwest corner of 
the Pinsk marshes, to the western junction of the Polish-Ru­
manian border. The Ambassador's immediate reaction to the 
foregoing was unfavorable. To him it indicated that Poland 
could count on little if any effective help from France. More­
over, he pictured that a move of this character might con­
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ceivably lead to a Russian advance through the Vilno area, 
and to a grim outcome for the Polish forces, under continued 
and probably redoubled ferocity of German aerial attacks, if 
the former were concentrated in a contracted area. The Am­
bassador thereupon wrote, in his own handwriting, a report 
on his aforecited reactions, requesting General Burckhardt-
Bukacki to transmit it to General Gamelin. (This had taken 
place during the night of Paris' first alarm).13 
As of connected bearing both on General Gamelin's afore­
mentioned remarks and Ambassador Lukasiewicz's subsequent 
reactions thereto, the Ambassador told me that in reflecting 
on the full implications of General Gamelin's remarks, he 
called to mind the following: In the first half of August dur­
ing a meeting between British and French representatives 
with Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Molotoff, in 
Moscow, M. Molotoff had bluntly remarked that an agreement 
between the Western powers and Russia could be practical 
only if Britain and France could persuade Poland to permit 
Russian troops to enter Poland via the Vilno and east Gali­
cian areas at any time that the Russians deemed such action 
necessary. 
The British and French representatives had replied that this 
was a matter which M. Molotoff should take up directly with 
Poland. In response, M. Molotoff said that Russia had only 
non-aggression and commercial agreements with Poland and 
that since Britain and France were Poland's allies, they were 
the proper parties to put the question to Poland. 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs Bonnet had later 
sounded out Ambassador Lukasiewicz on the above score. In 
response the Ambassador had remarked to Minister Bonnet 
that the latter was unquestionably aware of the answer before 
putting the question. Moreover, the Ambassador had pointed 
out his opinion that M. MolotofFs remarks along the above 
lines represented merely a tactical play. Indeed, while on the 
one hand M. Molotoff was undoubtedly playing for time, on 
the other hand he had deliberately posed the one question 
which might cause tension between the Western powers and 
Poland. The Ambassador had added, moreover, that he would 
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therefore prefer to consider that the question had not been 
broached by Minister Bonnet—and emphasized that if France 
pressed the question formally, it would be a mistake, for such 
action might lead to an "all round" serious misunderstanding. 
The Ambassador went on to say to me that about the same 
time, Minister Beck had replied along similar lines to British 
Ambassador to Poland, Sir William Howard Kennard's sound­
ings on the above score. Ambassador Lukasiewicz then told 
me that following these unfruitful soundings on the part of 
Minister Bonnet and Ambassador Kennard, he personally 
gained the impression that the British and French representa­
tives in Moscow resorted to stalling the issue in their further 
conversations with the Soviet authorites. In concluding his re­
marks Ambassador Lukasiewicz told me that about the 19 or 
20 of August, Minister Bonnet in conversation with him 
evinced considerable optimism over the prospect of coming 
to a deal with Moscow. The Ambassador had replied frankly 
that while the representative then negotiating in France's be­
half was no doubt a military expert of high standing, never­
theless, the Ambassador felt it would be difficult for the French 
representative to gain a clear insight as to what was in the 
back of the Russians' mind, in that the French representa­
tive was not familiar with the Russian language, and had been 
in Moscow but a short time. At a later date, Minister Bonnet 
had admitted to Ambassador Lukasiewicz that he had been 
right as to his reaction on this score. 
SEPTEMBER 10 
I walked to the heighth of the mountain adjacent to and 
overlooking the town of Krzemieniec. From that point I 
peered down and studied the effect of the reflection of the 
sunlight both on the nickel trimmings and the shiny roofs of 
cars of our Embassy group. I had in mind that the parking 
of automobiles in a group served according to our experience 
to invite the attention of passing German pilots. I thereupon 
decided that, in the interest of protecting our motor vehicles, 
it was essential to construct a shed to shelter them from the 
sight of passing German pilots. Hence, I ordered the construe­
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tion of a lean-to shed for our automobiles. Moreover, I re­
quested as a further precautionary measure, that the nickel 
trimmings on all of our cars be painted a dull gray. (Besides, 
my chauffeur and I together did a quick, if not artistic job, 
in giving one coat of dark gray paint to my yellow cadillac. 
I subsequently threw several buckets of dust on the paint 
before it dried. The result proved an excellent form of cam­
ouflage.) Contrary to the counsel of a number of my col­
leagues and their chauffeurs, I painted the roof so as to leave 
a yellow U.S.A. They held it would only draw attention from 
the sky. 
Lunched quietly in the back room of a small restaurant at 
the north end of the village, with Soviet Ambassador [Niko­
lai] Charanov,14 Mrs. Charanov, their small son and daugh­
ter, their military attache, and Estonian Minister Marcus. In 
the course of conversation the military attache remarked that 
he had just talked by telephone to the Soviet Consul at 
Lwow, who said the bombardment, especially of the railway 
station and yards, was becoming steadily more intensive. 
Moreover, the German southern forces were advancing 
rapidly towards the City from the west. The Ambassador 
then mentioned the large scale mobilization which was cur­
rently taking place in Soviet Russia. In response to my 
question as to whether the mobilization was attributable to 
Moscow's anxiety lest, if the thrust of the German southern 
forces towards Lwow succeeded, the Germans might declare 
Lwow the Capital of an independent Ukrainia[n] state under 
German auspices, the Ambassador merely smiled, and 
shifted the trend of conversation. When Minister Marcus had 
departed, however, Ambassador Charanov referred to my 
question, stating that, "strictly off the record" and quite un­
officially speaking, I had probably hit the nail on the head. 
However, he was lacking in sufficient information to be clear 
on the situation. Either his Government had not communi­
cated with him or what communications they had sent had 
failed to reach him. He would therefore ask Minister Beck 
the next morning for permission to go to the town on the 
Russian side of the frontier, in order to telephone his Gov­
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eminent. In response to my question as to whether he believed 
his country, in view of its own oil requirement for its agri­
cultural structure based upon about 65% to 70% motorization, 
and now for this reported augmentation of mobilized forces, 
could afford to satisfy Germany's oil requirements, the Am­
bassador stated his belief that Germany would suffer a great 
disappointment. His own country's oil requirements would 
increase rapidly in proportion to the increase in mobilization. 
In concluding our conversation he informed me that many 
of my colleagues had requested him to grant them and their 
respective staffs visas for Soviet Russia in case the Govern­
ment and Diplomatic Corps were cut off from Rumania. This 
was another matter regarding which he wanted to discuss 
with his Government by telephone. 
Soon after my arrival in Paris in late September, Luka­
siewicz told me the following: He had requested General 
Burckhardt-Bukacki (just arrived in France to consult with 
[the] French General Staff) to inform the French General 
Staff that if Britain and France did not at an early hour lend 
Poland some assistance in terms either of ground or aerial 
diversion activities vis-a-vis Germany, the Polish military 
situation might be expected to disintegrate rapidly. More­
over, Lukasiewicz asked Burckhardt-Bukacki to warn the 
French General Staff that if they did not quickly lend aid 
along the foregoing lines, they must beware of Russia's 
eventual entrance into the conflict. In this connection, Am­
bassador Lukasiewicz pointed out that Russia would be 
motivated (a) by a desire to relieve Germany of the appre­
hension and necessity of fighting on two effective fronts 
and thus give Germany a free hand to turn against the west, 
and (b) by a determination to prevent the possibility of 
Lwow's being captured by the Germans and declared the 
capital of a Ukrainian state under German auspices, and 
(c) by a desire to gain sufficient part of Poland for herself to 
improve strategically her then currently vulnerable western 
frontier.15 Economic Counselor of the Foreign Office, Mr. Jan 
Wrszlacki, came by our embassy in a droshky accompanied 
by three other members of the Foreign Office. They were a 
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pathetic sight. Their laps were piled with suitcases; their 
faces looked haggard and worn. They had just arrived from 
the railway station about five kilometers distant. Their arrival 
in Krzemieniec proved a welcome sight, for we were aware 
that the train of which Mr. Wrszlacki and Count Potulicki 
(associate counselor of the Foreign Office) had been in charge, 
had left Warsaw five days before with the wives and children 
of the officials and the staff, as well as a number of junior 
officers of the Foreign Office. We were aware, moreover, that 
while this journey would have taken no more than over night 
under normal conditions, it had taken more than four days 
under the current circumstances. 
During the train's journey reports reached Krzemieniec 
from time to time indicating that it had frequently been forced 
to change its routing because of repeated bombardments from 
the air. This led to its being referred to as the "Phantom 
Train." Mr. Wrszlacki subsequently told me that the train, 
carrying about a thousand passengers, had suffered aerial 
bombardments seventy-two times. Enroute he and Count 
Potulicki had adopted and successfully developed a system 
of protecting the passengers from the air raids. The planes 
began by releasing bombs directly at the train, fortunately 
missing, though narrowly in each case. At a signal either 
from Mr. Wrszlacki or Count Potulicki, the locomotive engi­
neer would stop the train. All passengers who could, in­
stantly left the train, running for the nearest woods at the side 
of the tracks. Those who failed to reach the door of the cars 
before the return of the planes to machine-gun the passengers, 
fell flat on their faces on the floor of the steel cars. More­
over, before the planes returned following the bombing to 
carry out their machine-gunning, the locomotive engineer 
usually reversed the train some distance in order to prevent 
the pilots from marking the place at which the train refugees 
had sought cover in the woods. Mr. Wrszlacki had the 
highest praise for the engineer's intelligence as well as 
courage. He said that on almost all occasions when the en­
gineer had thus shifted the train's position, the returning 
bombers had blindly machine-gunned the woods directly 
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opposite the train's new position, thinking the passengers had 
sought shelter there. Despite seventy-two bombardments of 
this character, there were no casualties among the passen­
gers—though there had been many "close shaves." The Ger­
man air force's continuous knowledge as to the whereabouts 
of this train is an outstanding example of the efficiency of the 
German espionage activities in Poland. 
SEPTEMBER 11 
Beck arrived in the morning. He informed me that, ac­
companied by several experienced members of his staff, he 
had for the past four days been maintaining a mobile position, 
in order to coordinate operations of the Foreign Office with 
those of the other Ministries as well as the High Command. 
The Minister went on to say with emphasis that until Sep­
tember 9 the Germans had given at least a semblance of 
adherence to Germany's agreement of September 2 with 
Poland (to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives). 
Since then, however, the activities of the German airforce had 
in his and his associates' opinion been characterized by 
"methodical bombardment of open towns" The Minister 
by way of illustration then cited (a) bombardment both of the 
Transfiguration and Pilsudski hospitals, the summer theater 
and civilian dwellings in Sienna street, all in the center of 
Warsaw; (b) what had amounted to the demolition of Siedlec 
(a communication center), and (c) the destructive bombard­
ment of Zamosc, which he emphasized possessed no military 
interest whatsoever; (d) intensive bombing of Brszesc on 
September 9 when five heavy bombs evidently aimed at the 
railway station missed their mark, landing one kilometer 
distant in the center of the civilian community rendering, a 
number of casualties and considerable property damage. He 
and his associates had been eye-witnesses on this occasion 
and had narrowly escaped with their lives. 
Just outside the Foreign Office I was hailed by Soviet Am­
bassador Charanov, who told me he had just talked with 
Minister Beck. The Minister had granted him permission to 
cross the frontier to telephone his Government. He bade me 
 133 POLISH-GERMAN CONFLICT
adieu and walked to his house. About an hour later the 
Brazilian Minister told me he had seen Ambassador and 
Mrs. Charanov, accompanied by their two children and 
military attache, leaving Krzemieniec in their large 
automobile. The Minister added that he failed to see why 
the Ambassador's desire to telephone from a point only about 
25 kilometers distant necessitated piling at least five bags 
on the roof and 4 or 5 others on the side of the car. Events 
proved my Brazilian colleague's skepticism, as to the Am­
bassador's intentions, to have been correct. This was the last 
we saw of Ambassador Charanov. 
General Carton de Wiart, V.C., Chief of the British Mili­
tary Mission, imparted his opinion based on recent observa­
tion that the Polish soldier, in action in direct contact with 
his German adversary, was worth four German soldiers. 
Had picnic lunch at top of mountain overlooking Krze­
mieniec, with British and French Ambassadors. We re­
viewed events current and of recent past. 
During the night of September 11-12, Count Michael 
Potulicki, officer on duty during the night at the Foreign Office, 
received an urgent telephone call from the P.A.T. Office 
(Polish Telegraph Agency) in Lwow, stating that two columns 
of tanks were headed from the direction of Sanbor; one 
towards Luck, aiming to cut off the Government from the 
south, the others towards Tarnopol, and that both columns 
were skirting Lwow. Count Potulicki was also told that the 
P.A.T. agency had received orders to evacuate Lwow for 
Luck, as had the staff of the Lwow Radio Broadcasting Sta­
tion. Count Potulicki sent a message to Minister Beck ap­
prising him of this conversation. As a result Minister Beck 
gave orders to mobilize all Government officials for a confer­
ence in the morning. 
SEPTEMBER 12 
On the morning of September 12, at about 10:50 A.M., 
Krzemieniec, a defenseless, open village, suffered a severe 
bombardment, immediately following which I cabled the 
Department a full report. The little restaurant where I lunched 
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on September 10 with Soviet Ambassador Charanov was 
blown and burned to bits. In brief, a flight of four German 
bombers suddenly swooped down on our section of the vil­
lage. They commenced to release their bombs at the edge of 
the town and at a short distance just opposite to the British 
and American Embassies located on the main street. As they 
swung into line with the main street they continued to release 
their bombs. Thence they followed the main street to the 
crowded market place which they swept with a spray of 
machine gun bullets. Three more planes flew low over the 
village from another direction releasing bombs within even 
closer proximity of the other foreign Embassies and Legations 
as well as the Foreign Office. 
Upon verifying the casualties I found they included 16 
civilians killed, 40 seriously injured, and many slightly in­
jured. Besides considerable damage to business and resi­
dential property resulted. Moreover, the population was 
terrorized by the suddeness and viciousness of the raid. The 
aftermath was a pathetic scene: burning houses, local in­
habitants rushing hither and thither in meaningless fashion; 
unfortunates bewailing the loss or injury of their dear ones, 
small groups silently and grimly carrying off several fatally 
shot women and children; many run-away horses dragging 
their rattling peasant carts after them, and upsetting every­
thing before them—in general a scene of panic. Almost all 
merchants and restaurant-keepers rushed into the hills, lock­
ing their places of business behind them. This forced our 
Embassy group thenceforth to take our meals in the cellar 
of the University which housed the Foreign Office, and where 
a restaurant had been provided for the officials and staff of 
the Foreign Office. The fires caused by the incendiary bombs 
were difficult to extinguish, in that the water supply of the 
village depended upon a primitive system: filling barrels with 
water from the nearby river, hauling them up to one's house, 
and emptying the barrels into the house tank. Water thus 
delivered cost 80 groscher per barrel. Hence, in several parts 
of the village whole sections of houses went up in smoke. 
Shortly after my arrival at Krzemieniec I looked around 
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for some place which might serve as an air raid shelter in 
case of an attack. I concluded that the best place for the 
members of my staff and my family was a narrow gulley, 
about 18 feet in depth, directly opposite and about 300 feet 
from our Embassy. At the outset of the raid which actually 
took place, and recognizing the familiar drone of the bombers, 
I called to members of my staff and family who were in and 
around the Embassy at the time to make for the aforemen­
tioned gulley. On the way across the main street, Mrs. Biddle 
suddenly experienced a presentiment, she said she instinc­
tively felt the gulley was a dangerous place. As the explo­
sions were rapidly coming nearer—not only could we hear the 
whistle of the bombs on their downward course then, from 
what seemed almost overhead, but also could we see the shell 
fragments and pieces of clay, kicked up by the explosions, 
passing overhead and around us—a quick decision was es­
sential. We reversed our course, and stepped in behind the 
back wall of the British Embassy. As matters turned out 
Mrs. Biddle's presentiment proved a fortunate one, in that 
three bombs exploded in the gulley I had previously chosen 
as a shelter. 
Shortly after the bombardment, one of my colleagues, came 
to see me. Though calm, he expressed his annoyance over the 
Government's failure to provide the Diplomatic Corps with 
some measures of air-raid protection and with adequate police 
protection from what he had been led to apprehend might 
possibly develop into an uprising against both the Diplomatic 
Corps and the Foreign Office on the part of some of the more 
restive elements amongst the civilian population. He concluded 
by stating [that] he felt confident that in view of prevailing 
circumstances his own Government would sympathetically re­
gard a recommendation, should he make one, that he and his 
staff leave Poland at the earliest moment. In response, I said 
the pace of the conflict was unprecedented in tempo and that, 
given several days wherein to "dig in" in its new quarters 
and reconsolidate its position, the Government might possibly 
ameliorate conditions for the Foreign Missions. Meanwhile, 
I believed the best thing he could do was to keep his "chin 
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up," and make the best of a situation which was no more 
pleasant for the Government than for the members of the 
accredited Foreign Missions. This, I added, was a time when 
only the primitive factors of life counted—everyone had to 
shift for one's self—and if one wished an air raid shelter, one 
ought to get out and dig one; moreover, as regards the restive 
elements among the local population, I too was aware of their 
mounting recalcitrance towards the presence of the Diplomatic 
Corps as well as the Foreign Office in their village, in that they, 
since the morning's bombardment, regarded the combined 
presence of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Missions as 
having brought on the bombardments. The best measures I 
could conceive at the moment of meeting difficulties with these 
elements, was to walk in the middle of the street, especially 
after dark, and preferably not alone. I concluded by stating 
that as far as our Embassy was concerned, we were going to 
"sit tight" and stick with the Government either in Krze­
mieniec, or any other place to which they might possibly have 
to go. When I next encountered my same colleague several 
hours later, he said he had thought it all over carefully, and 
was going to remain at the Government's side, no matter what 
the circumstances, and he did. 
Moreover, three others of my colleagues came to me towards 
the close of the afternoon and stated that the neutral mission 
chiefs were considering requesting either the Italian Ambassa­
dor or myself to urge in their behalf that the Diplomatic Corps 
be sent immediately to some point either on the Polish or Ru­
manian side of the Polish-Rumanian frontier in order to be out 
of the theatre of aerial bombardments and threatened thrusts. 
In reply I stated that our Embassy would remain with the 
Government, but that I believed that already there had been 
some talk amongst Polish official circles as to the possibility 
of moving further south. 
By this time I became worried over the condition of Mr. 
Burke Elbrick's (third secretary) health. During the lengthy 
dusty run from Nai^czow to Krzemieniec he had contracted 
a bad throat. Now it had developed into an abcess, and he 
was running a high temperature. As he insisted upon being 
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on the job day and night I had a difficult time persuading him 
to remain in bed even for a part of one day. Despite the 
doctor's energetic efforts, the throat went from bad to worse. 
As a long motor ride to the Rumanian border might prove 
dangerous for him in his weakened condition I hesitated to 
send him to Bucharest for treatment. His untiring energy, 
moreover, and conscientious and dependable application to his 
work—he was always on the job in spite of his temperature and 
painful throat—gained my high respect and esteem. 
About noon that same day, the Papal Nuncio emphasized 
his desire that I attend a conference of neutral mission chiefs 
which he intended calling at 4:00 P.M. He stated his purpose 
was to acquire the consent of the conference to address a 
collective protest to some leading world statesman, and asked 
me whether I would personally approve his suggestion that 
the protest be addressed to his Holiness the Pope. I expressed 
my approval, emphasizing that in joining in such a protest, I 
should want it understood that there was no political signif­
icance attached to the protest and that I would do so merely 
as an objective observer of what had taken place and on hu­
manitarian grounds. He expressed his appreciation of my at­
titude. I then consented to his request that he announce to the 
meeting my personal approval of his proposal on the foregoing 
grounds. The Nuncio thereupon chose as our meeting place a 
small grandstand at one end of a sports field, close by the 
Foreign Office, and at the edge of a series of freshly dug but 
still uncomplete trenches. Twice during the conference we 
were driven into these trenches by two separate flights of 
German planes at exceptionally low altitudes over the town. 
On these occasions, however, the planes refrained from re­
leasing bombs, and it was believed they had returned for pur­
poses of reconnaissance. 
When the Nuncio announced" the purpose of the meeting, 
stating at the same time my approval on the basis aforede­
scribed, the Turkish Ambassador declared his support thereof. 
Thereupon in turn, the Italian Ambassador, the Spanish, the 
Swiss and Bulgarian Ministers arose, and in most emphatic 
terms, stated their refusal to become a part to such a protest. 
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They each pointed out that, in view of the delicate political 
situation prevailing in Central Europe, they did not wish to go 
on record as having taken action which might conceivably be 
subsequently interpreted as a criticism of German military tac­
tics. The Nuncio, the Turkish Ambassador, and I thereupon 
re-emphasized the fact that the Nuncio's proposal was devoid 
of political significance and was based upon a purely humani­
tarian standpoint, and entailed merely our observations as in­
dividuals who had been the eye-witnesses of an aerial bom­
bardment of an open town. Nevertheless, our aforementioned 
colleagues refused to waver from their respective stands. The 
Nuncio thereupon proposed, and it was unanimously agreed, 
that he make a record, merely of the fact that the conference 
had taken place; and that each neutral Mission Chief present 
had stated his intention to transmit his observations to his re­
spective government. Thereupon, the conference ended. 
The Nuncio subsequently made the aforementioned record, 
handing it to Cardinal Hlond (then just arrived in Krzemien­
iec) with the request that he transmit it personally to his Holi­
ness the Pope. In later conversation with the Cardinal, he 
expressed to me his disgust with the brutality and ruthless­
ness of German aerial tactics throughout the interior of Po­
land. I consider Cardinal Hlond a man of outstanding courage 
and intelligence; he is fair and just in his opinions, and not 
given to exaggeration. Cardinal Hlond and Mr. Elbrick en-
route to Krzemieniec had had to leave their cars and seek 
shelter from an air bombardment in the same woods. 
About 10:00 o'clock that night Major Colbern, our Military 
attache, arrived in Krzemieniec by automobile from Tarnopol 
where he had been observing military activities. Enroute from 
Tarnopol, he had taken a short cut which had led him through 
back country. He had observed evidences of recalcitrance on 
the part of the Ukrainian population along the way. As a 
matter of fact, he came to a stop at a cross-road in order to 
read the signs for it was after dark. Suddenly he became aware 
that he was surrounded by 7 or 8 Ukrainian peasants who ap­
peared to be closing in on him. The spokesman for the group 
bluntly declared that they intended to have his automobile, 
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and ordered him and his chauffeur out of the car. Realizing 
his predicament, he whipped out his revolver, warning them 
that he would shoot the first one to touch his car. He then 
bade his chauffeur to go on, leaving the group behind without 
further incident. The Major cited this incident as a warning 
to us and the members of my staff, should we be forced to 
take the same road in event we evacuated from Krzemieniec. 
During this conference with Major Colbern we compared 
notes as to our respective observations and reports we had re­
ceived regarding the theater of military operations. Immediate­
ly subsequent to the aerial bombardment I discerned that the 
local population turned bitterly against the diplomatic corps 
as well as the Foreign Office, in the belief that their presence 
in the town was a danger. As a matter of fact, several officials 
in the Foreign Office imparted to me their concern over the 
rapidly mounting recalcitrance of the local population. More­
over, the Starosta, commencing that day, declared a nightly 
curfew between 9:00 P.M. and 4 A.M. In order to police this 
curfew, the Starosta armed a number of the local youths with 
old fashioned rifles. Most of them I feel confident had never 
had a gun in their hands before. This action alarmed several 
of my colleagues to such an extent that they protested vigor­
ously to the Foreign Office, but without avail. The only prac­
tical steps I could take to insure the safety of my staff was to 
obtain special cards of identity for them which might serve to 
pass them by the guards at night. Even at that, however, the 
situation was difficult, in that a number of these armed youths 
could not read. Moreover, when one turned on one's flash­
light to show his card of identity, these youths usually forbade 
the light, (unless the bulb had previously been rubbed with 
carbon paper and thus dulled the light to such extent as to 
render it useless for reading). 
SEPTEMBER 12-13 
At midnight, M. Sequin, Counselor of the French Embassy, 
rushed into the officer of the night at the Foreign Office, and 
informed him that an officer of the French Military Mission 
had just reported that a mechanized column consisting of 
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tanks and motorized infantry was rapidly advancing in the 
direction of Krzemieniec. 
Shortly after my arrival in Paris, in late September, Polish 
Ambassador to France, Lukasiewicz, told me that pursuant 
to Minister Beck's instructions, he had imparted in effect the 
following to [French Foreign Office Undersecretary Alexis] 
Leger on September 12 at about 10:30 P.M. He said that Min­
ister Beck had proposed any one of the following courses in 
order to permit the Polish army a sufficient breathing spell to 
reconsolidate; (a) a ground attack, or (b) at least a feint in 
terms of preparation for a ground attack of sufficient magni­
tude to divert Germany's attention, and (c) an air attack over 
military objectives in the interior of Germany, 1/ to impress 
the German population with the fact that Germany was at 
war with France and Britain (many German prisoners taken 
in Poland up to and including September 12 professed igno­
rance of this fact) and 2/ to divert the brunt of German aerial 
attention from Poland. Lukasiewicz went on to say that dur­
ing this talk he reiterated the same warning regarding the 
possibility of Russia's entrance into the conflict as he had in­
formed the French General Staff through General Burckhardt-
Bukacki on September 10. 
In response to the foregoing, Leger had seemed inclined 
to agree with the strategic bearing of Minister Beck's sugges­
tions, thus transmitted. Later that same evening, through 
arrangements made by Leger, Lukasiewicz had repeated to 
Premier Daladier the foregoing message from Minister Beck, 
together with his own observations regarding Russia's pos­
sible intervention, in the event Russia gained the impression 
that France and Britain would do nothing to help Poland. The 
Ambassador told me that at the outset of his talk Daladier 
evinced a sympathetic attitude. At the end of the conversa­
tion, however, Daladier had remarked that while he under­
stood the position, the British were opposed to aerial bombard­
ment in the interior of Germany, for fear of offending Amer­
ican opinion. In response to Lukasiewicz's request, moreover, 
Daladier said he had no objection to the former's verifying 
Britain's stand in this matter. In subsequently verifying the 
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foregoing, Lukasiewicz found that while such an idea might 
have existed in the minds of the British Government the idea 
had not been based on any statement by official American 
sources.16 Ambassador Lukasiewicz thereupon sought an­
other meeting with Premier Daladier, and after considerable 
delay gained the impression that the latter was deliberately 
avoiding him. However, he finally gained access to the Pre­
mier, and frankly stated his findings on the above score. He 
felt that Daladier wished to avoid further discussion of this as­
pect. The Premier thereupon called in General Denain of the 
French General Staff who produced a military map of Poland. 
Upon examining it, the General stated that according to his 
report the situation in Poland appeared to be in hand and 
that Lukasiewicz's apprehensions accordingly seemed to be 
unfounded, adding that the Polish forces were in the process 
of being reconsolidated behind the Vistula-San line. Perceiving 
there was little use of arguing the point further, since he gained 
the impression that Premier Daladier welcomed this means 
of avoiding the issue at stake, Ambassador Lukasiewicz re­
tired. 
Reports reached the Foreign Office indicating (a) that the 
German Government announced that all Polish towns and vil­
lages harbouring armed soldiers, snipers or marauding bands 
would be regarded forthwith as military objectives, and that 
the civil population would be bombarded, and (b) that Lord 
Halifax warned Hitler that the British Government in conse­
quence held itself free to take reprisals. 
SEPTEMBER 13 
Minister Beck invited me to have a talk after luncheon in 
the cellar of the University which was then housing the 
Foreign Office.17 Minister Beck thereupon stated his concern 
over the lack of communication facilities with the outside 
world, and urged me to try to establish communications with 
my Government, either directly or through relays by way of 
Bucharest and Paris. He added that it would also be a source 
of comfort to him and his associates to know that a neutral 
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mission had established touch with the outside world. Besides 
this, he discussed other aspects of current developments. 
In a further conversation with Minister Beck he disclosed 
in effect the following: 1/ the German air and ground forces 
had succeeded in destroying all lines of Polish armament 
industry, 2/ that while the situation was now exceedingly 
difficult, both the Polish Government and the High Command 
were determined to reconsolidate their forces and continue 
resistance, 3/ that among military and other official circles, 
the impression was rapidly gaining ground that France and 
Britain were staging more of a demonstration than a serious 
attack vis-a-vis Germany; his reports indicated that Paris 
and London official circles were informing the Polish Ambas­
sadors in both capitals that they hesitated to permit their 
respective air forces to bombard German communications 
and war industrial plants, for fear of the potential unfavorable 
effect thereof on American public opinion. (During this con­
versation, a ranking officer of the Polish army who was present 
stated at this point that he did not see why the French and 
British did not send planes for Polish pilots to carry out the 
disagreeable task, if the French and British hesitated to en­
gage in bombardments of this character themselves. The 
officer concluded by stating his opinion that for the Poles, it 
would be a case of justified retaliation). At the end of my talk 
with Minister Beck, he emphasized that this was a dramatic 
moment for Poland; perhaps a matter even of Poland's life 
or death. He intimated moreover that we might possibly soon 
be on our way towards the south. I was aware that Minister 
Beck and his associates in the Government as well as the High 
Command felt that if the French and British did not launch 
immediately a major shock attack, it might spell the end for 
Poland. 
About 3:00 P.M. that same afternoon, it was officially de­
cided and announced that the Foreign Office and the Diplo­
matic corps were to evacuate Krzemieniec immediately and 
proceed to Zaleszczyki, about 250 kilometers distant. Later in 
the afternoon, I had another talk with Minister Beck upon 
which occasion he informed me (a) that his military reports 
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showed that whenever the Polish infantry had come into 
direct contact with the German infantry, the former had 
proved themselves superior, (b) that Polish troops had suc­
ceeded in checking the German advance on Lwow by the 
previous day's capture of about 7 tanks which had been part 
of a reconnoitering mechanized thrust at the city's outskirts, 
(c) in the theatre of military operations in Western Poland, 
1 / the Polish army hitherto trying to withdraw eastward from 
a "pocket" formed by the German forces between Warsaw 
and Modlin, had suddenly wheeled into a southwestward 
counter attack, recapturing Lodz, 2/ the German southward 
drive was threatening to break through the Polish lines at 
Modlin, 3/ Polish forces were still holding Warsaw. 
Minister Beck stated that he haa personally already par­
ticipated in two wars; the Great War, and the Polish war 
with the Bolsheviks. In this third war, he had had to stand 
aside. However, he still hoped to take active part in a fourth 
war, and perhaps to end his days on a battlefield as had his 
forefathers. Minister Beck then stated he had urged Marshal 
SmigJy-Rydz during the first days of the conflict to launch 
every bomber at his disposal in an attack on Berlin—at any 
cost. The demoralizing effect in Germany, the inspiring effect 
it would have in the West, would have justified the sacrifice. 
I gained the impression during my talk with him that the 
Minister was suffering from deep emotions and mixed feelings 
about the performance of Poland's military establishment. In 
fact, I felt he knew at that time that nothing could really pull 
the chestnuts out of the fire for Poland. 
At about the same hour that I received from Mr. Kirk, 
Charge d'Affaires of our Embassy in Berlin, a telegram via 
Stockholm and Bucharest to the effect that the German 
Government was urging Consul General John K. Davis' and 
his staffs departure from Warsaw, Minister Beck received 
from the Polish Minister in Riga a radio message to [the] 
effect that Minister John Riley of our Legation in Riga had 
requested the latter to ask Minister Beck to issue instructions 
to cover the evacuation of Consul General Davis and his staff. 
In discussing the substance of Mr. Kirk's message with 
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Minister Beck, he disclosed his receipt of the message from 
Riga. He then told me that both communications had reached 
Krzemieniec when it was no longer possible to communicate 
with Warsaw, even over military lines. 
Though orders had been issued to proceed immediately to 
Zaleszczyki, I decided it would be safer, based upon previous 
experience, to proceed after nightfall, especially in view of 
the customary flights of German planes between 4:00 and 
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Several of our group decided 
to proceed by day light. I preferred to wait until after dark 
before starting out with the cars containing my family and 
Mrs. Kulski of the Polish Foreign Office (who still lacked other 
means of transportation. The Government by that time had 
provided a place for her husband, Counselor of the Foreign 
Office, in one of the official cars). Again there was considerable 
confusion and difficulty in acquiring sufficient gasoline to fuel 
all cars bound for the south. 
Before leaving Krzemieniec I went back to the University 
where Mr. Alex Small (correspondent of the Chicago Tribune) 
was billeted, to make sure that he was aprised of the evacua­
tion, and that he would have transportation south from the 
town. (I had seen to it that all other Americans in the town 
were notified and provided for in terms of transportation). 
Armed with a flashlight I passed through the immense halls 
of the University and entered what I believed to be his 
(Small's) room. It appeared to have been recently vacated. 
I then went outside the building and shouted for him, where­
upon I felt the muzzle of a rifle in my back, and turned only 
to find, to my added discomfort, that the young lad who held 
the gun had his finger on the trigger. I knew sufficient Polish 
to understand that in a Ukrainian dialect he was ordering me 
not only to cease shouting, but also to cease using my flash­
light. Having finally persuaded him that my mission was a 
friendly one and an effort to help get another foreigner out of 
town, (an action which I felt confident would appeal to him), 
he accompanied me through six or more rooms in the Uni­
versity. Having made a thorough search for Mr. Small, and 
having later received a report that several Americans had left 
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by a train which had departed for the north that same day, 
I decided it was best to go on, leaving behind one car for 
several hours, in case Mr. Small might appear. I learned 
subsequently from the Paris office of the Chicago Tribune 
that Mr. Small had actually left Krzemieniec on the afore­
mentioned train and after a harrowing experience succeeded 
in keeping ahead of the incoming Russian troops and 
reached German-occupied Poland through which he traveled 
on a refugee train to Berlin, whence he proceeded to Paris. 
Having made sure that all the cars of our group would be 
able to acquire ample fuel for the trip, we proceeded by way 
of Tarnopol, which as I pointed out in an earlier part of this 
report was in utter darkness, having suffered a severe aerial 
bombardment during the late afternoon, and again just pre­
vious to our entry. (The black out was so intense that I found 
it necessary to walk in front of the car, with one hand on the 
radiator cap, and feel my way along, calling back directions 
to Mr. Moszczyriski at the wheel of my car. It took us well 
over an hour to traverse this comparatively small city). 
We continued to our destination, Zaleszczyki. The only 
incident worth recording enroute was that on attempting to 
pass a slow moving truck on a mid-country road, I was forced 
to turn on the dimmers of my headlights for an instant (having 
driven thus far entirely without lights) since the road was 
narrow and the driver of the enormous truck in front either 
failed to hear my claxon or refused to pull over. Just at that 
moment the canvas flap in the back of the truck opened and 
a Polish soldier, obviously intoxicated, pointed his rifle (which 
was far from steady in his hands) at us shouting he was going 
to shoot, because I flashed on the lights. Realizing he was 
drunk and suspecting we might be in "for it," I felt there was 
nothing to do but leave the lights on and make a dash to pass 
the truck. Pressing the accelerator down to the floor, the car 
lept forward, and missing the ditch by inches, we fortunately 
got around to the side of the truck before the soldier, whose 
brain at that point was fortunately functioning slowly, decided 
to pull the trigger. 
The remainder of the journey was uneventful other than 
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that we passed several cavalry units on reconnaissance, and 
noted a number of mechanized units moving up into position 
under the cloak of darkness. 
SEPTEMBER 14 
We drew into Zaleszczyki about 2:30 A.M. September 14, 
and went straight to the Starosta, of whom I requested in­
formation as to whether there were rooms available for our 
party. He politely indicated there was one bed available, and 
that if we wanted it, we had better claim it at the earliest 
possible moment—before someone else came along. I said we 
would prefer to park our cars under trees, and sleep in the 
cars the rest of the night. With an expression of considerable 
relief he offered to conduct us personally to a nearby park, 
which he would gladly put at our disposal. Having subse­
quently parked each car carefully under the shelter of a grove 
of trees, we all settled down the rest of the night. 
In the course of the morning, the Breslau radio announced 
in Polish the arrival of the diplomatic corps at Zaleszczyki, 
another example of efficient German espionage. At 6:00 A.M. 
we were awakened by the hum of a plane directly overhead. 
Everyone was so exhausted, however, that no one evinced 
any interest. In view of the low altitude of the plane I par­
ticularly welcomed the sight of the Polish insignia. We there­
upon cooked breakfast on our kerosene, stove, and upon look­
ing around, found we were drawn up in the park of an old 
estate on the edge of the Dniester River, and about 200 yards 
from the Polish bridge head of the International Bridge, 
connecting Poland with Rumania, which two days later be­
came the object of a fierce German aerial attack. 
The first action I undertook was to contact the Starosta 
again in an effort to billet the members of my staff and my 
family. By that time an officer of the Polish Foreign Office had 
set up headquarters in the building of the Starosta, and he 
indicated to us certain quarters which would be available 
during the course of the day. Meanwhile, Mrs. Biddle went 
to the old Palace on the estate whereon we had parked our 
cars, and inquired as to whether rooms might be available 
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for our use. The proprietor said he would be glad to accom­
modate us provided we could supply our own beds, as the 
house was completely unfurnished. I subsequently succeeded 
in acquiring the approval of this move on the part both of 
the Foreign Office official and the Starosta. I thereupon pro­
cured beds in the town and assigned rooms to the various 
members of my staff. In the early morning we set up an office 
on the front lawn, and I succeeded in acquiring the services 
of two policemen; one for the day, and the other for the night, 
to guard our automobiles and trucks, and to see that all 
automobiles on the estate were kept under shelter of trees 
(this precaution became an essential throughout our trek). 
About noon Mr. Kulski, Assistant Counselor of the Foreign 
Office, arrived from Kuty, where Minister Beck and his asso­
ciates in the Government had decided [to stop] en route south 
to headquarters, instead of Zaleszczyki. Kulski imparted 
confidentially that the President and his cabinet had changed 
their minds about Zaleszczyki for several reasons, the main 
one being that the General Staff had decided to set up its 
headquarters at Kolbmyja, and the Government wanted to be 
at a point nearby. (I feel, moreover, that two other factors had 
contributed to the Government's decision, notably: (a) dis­
turbing reports of a large concentration of mechanized units 
in southwest Russia indicated a possible Russian move into 
Poland, (b) Kuty was further distant than Zaleszczyki from 
the Russian border and (c) the vehicular bridge across the 
Dniester river at Zaleszczyki seemed a more prominent 
objective for aerial attacks than the long but low wooden 
bridge at Kuty). Kulski then gave me Minister Beck's private 
telephone number in Kuty, stating that the Minister wanted 
me to have it but cautioning me not to communicate it to 
anyone else. Moreover, Kulski said that Minister Beck would 
appreciate my coming to Kuty after I might have established 
a communications relay bureau in Cernauti.18 Minister Beck 
did not wish any other members of my staff, however, to come 
to Kuty in view of the shortage of food and inadequacy of 
lodgings. I immediately interpreted this message from Min­
ister Beck to mean that Zaleszczyki would no longer be re­
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garded as an official center for the Diplomatic corps. My 
impression on this score was subsequently borne out by a 
message received by my colleagues advising them to proceed 
to Cernauti in Rumania, from whence they could maintain 
contact with the Government at Kuty by automobile. 
During the afternoon of September 14, I cabled the Depart­
ment that Minister Beck on the previous day had earnestly 
requested me to communicate his conviction, based upon 
tragic scenes at various points, to which he had been an eye­
witness, that from the outset Poland had been the "victim 
of methodical aerial bombardment of open towns", which too 
frequently had been defenseless and of no military interest. 
In this cable I added my own observation that in view of what 
members of my staff and my family had experienced and 
witnessed I found it difficult to ascribe the frequently wanton 
aerial bombardment by German planes to anything short of 
a deliberate intention to terrorize the civilian population with 
a view to its creating a state of general confusion, to de­
moralizing repercussions on the Polish fighting forces, as 
well as to discrediting the Polish Government in the eyes of 
its people and the accredited foreign missions. [Moreover] 
Major Colbern and his companions had witnessed during 
their passage through Siedlce and Brzesc three distinct in­
stances wherein unjustified bombardment had taken place; 
and my further investigation of the outcome of the aerial 
bombardment of Krzemieniec revealed that the low flying 
planes had dropped in the vicinity of the Foreign Office 
diminutive parachutes to which were attached glass bulbs 
and other small containers, which being suspected of con­
taining bacteria were then under examination by official lab­
oratories. 
It occurred to me by way of illustration that if the world 
were forced to accept Germany's interpretation of objectives 
of military interest in connection with aerial bombardments, 
as demonstrated by [the] German air force during the Polish-
German conflict, then the civilian communities of today, 
should they wish to safeguard themselves against being con­
sidered in any way of military interest, would have to under­
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take a radical re-vamping in terms of physical layout. More­
over, the planners, architects and engineers of civil communities 
of tomorrow would have to conceive of an entirely different 
adoption from what we have come to accept as a normal city 
plan. Accordingly they would have to consider the necessity 
of isolating by a distance of at least 10 kilometers, the center of 
civilian habitations, not only from military barracks but also 
from railways, factories, public utilities, and even churches 
and hospitals. Moreover, in order to guard against possible air 
attacks, the water and gas supply lines and communications 
lines running between the utilities plants and the center of 
civilian habitations, would have to be sunk no less than 30 
and preferably 40 feet below ground—for it should be borne in 
mind that a 1,000 pound bomb, according to experience in the 
Polish-German conflict, can cut through 27-29 feet of rein­
forced concrete like a knife through butter. 
Moscow's official Pravda attacked Poland for its treatment 
of the Russian minority.19 
SEPTEMBER 15 
In the early morning, after consultation with Major Col­
bern, I cabled the State Department the following observa­
tions: If the Polish Army were to effect a reconsolidation, a 
breathing spell was essential. In this connection, about the only 
means of diverting the attention of the German air force from 
Poland would be some form of diversion[ary] activity in the 
west. As matters then stood the Polish forces were unable 
effectively to counter attack, to concentrate at any threatened 
point for any protracted defense, or to maintain effective com­
munications between what then appeared to be three Polish 
armies operating separately. 
I also cabled the department on the same day that Major 
Colbern's and my observations indicated 1/ German mecha­
nized units threatened to surround Lwow, 2/ German columns 
hitherto advancing eastward in direction of Lwow had di­
vided, one element going forward towards Przemysl-Stryj, in 
center of Polish oil fields, one other element going forward in 
the general direction of Rawa-Ruska-Jaroslaw, 3/ German 
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column at Radom attacking in north-easterly direction towards 
Garwolin was reported encountering difficulty in forcing cross­
ing of river Vistula, 4/ east Prussian force attacking in general 
direction of Minsk-Mazowiecka-Wyszkow had reportedly 
reached the Siedlce-Minsk road, 5/ report that a second col­
umn was approaching Brzesc on River Bug was unverified, 
6/ advanced elements of the German forces above indicated 
[that they] consisted mainly of mechanized units; infantry of 
main bodies had reportedly advanced to line: San-Vistula-
Bug Rivers, 7/ Polish-Poznah army under command of Bort­
nowski in area Kutno-Warsaw-Lodz was reportedly attempting 
counter-offensive in direction of Rawa-Mazowiecka-Skiernie­
wice. Until 10:00 on the morning of September 14, the Pol­
ish forces were reportedly holding Warsaw-Torun-Kutno-
Poznan, 8/ terrain and weather favorable for operations of 
German motorized and air forces. It was doubtful whether 
the Polish plan envisaged reorganization behind the San-
Vistula-Bug line would succeed unless heavy rainfall restricted 
action of the German forces, 9/ the British military mission 
had reportedly recommended the withdrawal of all organized 
Polish military units east of the Vistula River to general area 
south of the Pinsk marshes in an effort to maintain communi­
cations with Rumania; current disorganization of the Polish 
army would make such concentration difficult. 
Information which reached official circles indicated that 
on this date the German Government had invited (a) Lithua­
nia to occupy Vilno and (b) Hungary to occupy the Polish 
oil fields up to and including Stanislawow. 
Vice-consul Morton, who had just arrived in town from our 
evacuation center at Brzesc, accompanied by Mr. Dzieduszy­
ski, went with Mrs. Biddle in the morning to the Charge 
d'Affaires of the Rumanian Embassy to assist Mr. Morton in 
obtaining visas for Rumania. Mr. Morton volunteered to re­
main at Zaleszczyki as long as possible to assist any stray 
American citizens which might find their way to that point. 
I highly approved of his suggestion. 
Having ascertained that gasoline in Kuty, or at any place 
enroute on the Polish side of the border, was more scarce 
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than in Zaleszczyki, and having gotten down to our last few 
liters, as well as having in mind Minister Beck's expressed 
hope that I establish some kind of a communications center 
in Cernauti before joining him at Kuty, I left Zaleszczyki. 
Before leaving however, I asked Mr. Harrison to remain there 
until the following day, when I planned to reach Kuty. 
I arrived at Cernauti, Rumania, late in the afternoon. I 
immediately telephoned our Minister, Mr. Franklin Mott Gun­
ther, in Bucharest asking his approval of my setting up a pro­
visional relay communications office in Cernauti, and his good 
offices in requesting permission of the Rumanian Government 
to permit my carrying out this plan. Moreover, I asked Min­
ister Gunther whether he would be so kind as to permit his 
counselor, Mr. Fred Hibbard to come to Cernauti in order to 
facilitate me in organizing the mechanics in connection with 
my aforementioned plans. Through the helpful cooperation of 
Minister Gunther and Mr. Hibbard, I was able to set up a 
provisional office in Cernauti. 
Miss McQuatters and Miss Saunders arrived early in the 
morning by train from Bucharest. Mr. Hibbard arrived the 
following day by train. 
SEPTEMBER 16 
Mrs. Biddle and I left Cernauti for Kuty during the morn­
ing. On arrival at Kuty we were assigned quarters in a small 
cottage in the center of town. The British Ambassador and his 
Counselor, Mr. Clifford Norton, (who was accompanied by 
his wife) were assigned quarters in a small house nearby. The 
French Ambassador and his Counselor were also billeted 
nearby upon their arrival later that day. I had numerous con­
versations with various officials of the Government as well as 
with Minister Beck. 
In an informal conversation with a group of Polish officials 
at Stare Kuty, on September 16, they all expressed their con­
cern over Russia's mobilization in general and over the con­
centration of Russian mobilized units vis-a-vis Tarnopol, and 
along the Polish-Russian border south of Tarnopol. This con­
centration indicated either a move against Poland or Bessara­
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bia; they were apprehensive lest it be the former. Minister 
Beck's Chief of Cabinet, Count Michael Lubienski, remarked 
at this point that in his opinion Russia's paramount aims in 
terms of imperialism were the same today as during the reign 
of the Czars; (a) Control of the Baltic (b) Control of the Dar­
danelles, and (c) possession of India. All other moves were 
comparatively insignificant in terms of imperialistic ambitions. 
Before my conversation with Polish Government officials 
terminated, one of them disclosed that between the 15th and 
17th, the Germans had succeeded in piercing the Polish front 
lines by 6 motorized raids. These raids penetrated in most 
cases to the extent of about 200 kilometers behind the Polish 
armies. 
Aside from combatting each raid in an effort to localize 
the effect thereof, Polish G[eneral] H[ead] Q[uarters] remained 
comparatively unperturbed thereby. (Nevertheless, I am aware 
that the sudden appearance of mechanized columns in areas 
formerly unentered by German troops created a demoralizing 
effect upon the civilian populations in each respective case). 
These motorized raids took place somewhat as follows: 
1. One column broke through from a point between Lomza 
and Ostroleka, eastward, reaching the outskirts of Bialystok. 
2. Another column from somewhat the same point of ori­
gin penetrated in a southeasterly direction reaching the out­
skirts of Brzesc. 
3. Another column penetrated from Wyszkow southward, 
reaching the neighborhood of Warsaw from the east. After 
this column had retreated to Kaluszin, it was attacked and 
defeated by the First Division of Polish infantry. 
4. Another column originating at a point between Sobata 
and Kutno penetrated to the outskirts of Warsaw from the 
west. This column reached the outskirts of Warsaw and after 
an encounter with defense forces retreated to the neighborhood 
of Raszin. On September 14, this column was defeated by the 
army of General Kutrzeba which first fought its way out of the 
Kutno-Lodz line and later out of the Skiernevice-Lawicz line 
into Warsaw to form part of the city defenses. 
5. Another column succeeded in crossing the Vistula and 
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the Bug rivers at about Wlodawa, penetrating eastward to 
the outskirts of Wlodzimierz-Wolynski. 
6. Another column originating at a point near Rzeszow 
penetrated eastward to the outskirts of Lwow, dividing at a 
point west thereof into two columns, one proceeding in a 
southeasterly direction, the other in a northeasterly direction, 
with a view to encircling the city. The main forces of this 
column were attacked by divisions under the orders of General 
Sosnkowski, at the time when he was leading them from the 
neighborhood of Przemysl en route to Lwow. 
In connection with columns mentioned in sub-sections 1,2,5, 
above, it was hoped by the High Command that they could 
also be successfully turned back by reserve divisions. 
In the course of a conversation that evening with Minister 
Beck he said he (as in the case of other Government officials 
with whom I had previously talked) was apprehensive in con­
nection with Russia's mobilization and concentration of troops 
vis-a-vis the Polish frontier. He recalled that Herr Hitler 
had spoken to Marshal Pilsudski in 1934 regarding Germany's 
possible association with Poland in a campaign vis-a-vis Rus­
sia. Goering had spoken in like terms to Marshal Smigly-
Rydz on one occasion in 1935 and on [one] occasion in 1937. 
Even during von Ribbentrop's January 1939 visit to Warsaw, 
he had significantly alluded to the possibility of joint Polish-
German action vis-a-vis Russia. 
He then recounted with marked enthusiasm the report of 
General Sosnkowski's victory of the previous day (September 
15) against an attempt of the German forces to capture Lwow. 
He said that General Sosnkowski's troops had succeeded in 
defeating the German thrust and had captured 10,000 pris­
oners, besides having put out of business about 100 tanks. 
News of this victory had served to instill the Polish forces with 
renewed fighting spirit. Moreover, it indicated that General 
Sosnkowski had been able to adopt his tactics to the strategy 
of the German forces. (This statement recalled to my mind 
Marshal Smigly-Rydz's forecast on August 10 to the effect 
that it would probably take the Polish forces between two and 
three weeks to readopt their tactics to German strategy.) 
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In response to my question as to whether the Polish forces 
had sufficient ammunition to continue an effective resistance 
behind the new defense line then being established, Minister 
Beck frankly admitted that Poland was then low in ammuni­
tion and he was aware that every possible effort had to be 
made to obtain fresh supplies. (At this moment I was of the 
opinion that even if the Poles succeeded in setting up a 
contracted line of defense, they could not be expected to hold 
out for perhaps more than three weeks at the most against 
continued concentrated German aerial bombardment and 
redoubled mechanized thrusts, unless the Western powers 
extended to Poland effective assistance in terms of guns and 
ammunition, and some form of military diversion activity in 
the west to draw off at least part of the German forces from 
the Polish front). 
Minister Beck then told me that King Carol had been "very 
chic" in his attitude especially during the past several days. 
(The Minister did not develop this point further, however.)20 
At this point, Minister Beck turned to me and in marked 
earnestness, asked whether I could and would cable immedi­
ately to President Roosevelt, stating that he sincerely hoped 
that if the President found occasion again to mention the 
possibility of the United States' sending raw materials to 
France and Britain, that the President might see his way clear 
to include the mention of "Poland" (Minister Beck said he 
had learned that on a recent date, President Roosevelt had 
made a public statement to the effect that he did not believe 
that our neutrality law would prevent the United States from 
shipping raw materials to France and Britain). The Minister 
went on to say that he realized the difficulty if not the im­
possibility of sending raw materials from the United States 
to Poland; however, since Britain and France were belliger­
ent countries as well as their ally, Poland, he felt that it would 
not be too much to ask that Poland be included in any sub­
sequent statement of like character. 
Minister Beck informed me at this time that President 
Moscicki had set up his headquarters at Zaiucze about four 
kilometers from Sniatyn. Moreover, general headquarters 
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was being re-established at Kolomyja, a short distance from 
Kuty. The Polish army, at this time, was considered by the 
High Command to be almost intact, and the High Command 
was already commencing the re-establishment of a new Polish 
front line behind which it was intended that the Polish army 
would adopt a definitely defensive position. Minister Beck 
stated with convincing sincerity that for Poland it was now a 
matter of life or death, and every hour counted. Reconsolida­
tion of Polish forces on a new line had to be effected and mu­
nitions had to be made immediately available. 
At the conclusion of our conversation, Minister Beck urged 
me to start in motion at the earliest possible moment at least 
some measures which might form a basis of establishing the 
means of aiding the wives and children of Polish officers en­
gaged in the war, and who then were rapidly accumulating as 
refugees in Rumania. He said that individually and collec­
tively their case would shortly become a pathetic one in that 
the few ztotys that they did possess would soon be of little 
value. In response I told him I would go immediately to 
Cernauti and cable the President. I would at the same time 
take steps towards setting up some form of relief for the 
aforementioned Polish refugees. This would probably take me 
until about 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock the next morning, at which 
time I would return to Kuty. He thanked me warmly and 
asked me to come to see him upon my return. 
While I was engaged in conversation with Minister Beck, 
Mrs. Beck told Mrs. Biddle that enroute from Brzesc to 
Krzemieniec, the Minister told her that, not having slept for 
three nights and days, he must have a nap. They turned 
their car into a nearby wood, where in the shelter of the trees, 
he stretched himself out on the ground and slept for two hours. 
Up to that moment they had been driving rapidly but at a 
steady speed, and each town they encountered enroute was 
bombed severely just as they arrived. This unexpected break 
in their journey had evidently put the German bombers' 
schedule out of balance, for both Mrs. Beck and the Minister 
had noticed that on continuing their trip southward, each 
town they passed through had been bombed just about two 
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hours previous to their entry. They believed that they had been 
spotted by spies who had communicated to the planes over­
head at the outset of their journey. They felt very fortunate 
in having escaped what had appeared to be a plan to net their 
car in the bombardments of the villages. 
Once in Cernauti I endeavored to communicate with Am­
bassador Bullitt with a view to discussing with him the means 
of informing relief organizations in the United States of the 
increasing plight of reportedly accumulating Polish refugees 
in Rumania, only to be informed by the operator that only an 
officer of the American Mission accredited to Rumania would 
be permitted to telephone out of the country. I was therefore 
forced to await the arrival of Mr. Fred Hibbard, before being 
able to contact Ambassador Bullitt by telephone. 
SEPTEMBER 17 
About noon Major Colbern, Military Attache, came to my 
room, having arrived from Kuty. He confirmed reports which 
I had learned previously during the early part of the morning. 
(The Major had not awaited my return to Kuty, since he had 
been informed that the Government itself would leave Polish 
soil for Rumania that day, due to the fact that they had been 
cut off from their army by the entry into Poland of Russian 
mechanized columns which were rapidly closing in on Kuty 
and Kolbmyja). 
The Major went on to say that between 8 and 9 o'clock that 
morning he had talked with officers both of the British and 
French Military Missions, both of whom in response to his 
question said they had no news other than the massing of 
Russian troops at the Polish frontier. While he was subse­
quently out on a reconnoitering trip, in an eastwardly direc­
tion from Kuty, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, he met com­
ing towards him, a column of Polish infantry, marching side 
by side with a lengthy column of tanks. He stopped his car 
and the first tank in the column also stopped. As the door of 
the tank opened, he was surprised to see a young Russian 
officer step out, for at the outset, the Major believed these 
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tanks must be either Polish or French, since they were going 
along side of and in the same direction of the Polish infantry. 
In response to his question in Polish as to where the tanks 
were going, the young officer stated in apparent sincerity 
that they were going to fight the Germans. About one half 
hour later, he encountered a group of Polish officers, who told 
him that the Russians had come to their aid against the 
Germans, and what was more they were willing at that point 
to accept help from the devil himself. 
British Ambassador Kennard accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. 
Norton came to my rooms about noon and confirmed news 
of the Government's intended early departure from Kuty. 
When I finally reached Ambassador Bullitt in the early part 
of the morning he informed me that he had just heard a radio 
broadcast announcing the entrance of Russian troops into 
Poland. Shortly after this telephone call I met several news­
paper men in the lobby of the Hotel in which I was stopping 
who confirmed the report which Ambassador Bullitt had 
imparted. One of the correspondents stated that streams of 
Poles were already pouring into Rumania, in most cases 
blocking the roads at the bridge heads at Zaleszczyki and 
Kuty and that the Polish Government was expected to leave 
Poland at any minute, if they had not already done so. A 
little later while I was discussing with my chauffeur over a 
map as to the best way I might skirt around the blocked roads 
in order to get back to Kuty, several of my colleagues as well 
as the chauffeur of an official of the Polish Foreign Office came 
along the street. They informed me that there was no use in 
attempting to return to Kuty as the Government had decided 
to leave during the day and that the roads leading to Kuty 
were so jammed with traffic and refugee pedestrians that I 
could not hope to get near the bridge leading across the river 
to Kuty anyway. Besides, the bridge itself was jammed with 
refugees making their way into Rumania. 
A few moments later as we were talking together we were 
informed by another colleague that we should remain in 
Cernauti [to wait] for Major Alexander Lubienski, Chief of 
Protocol, who would transmit a message to the diplomatic 
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corps in behalf of Minister Beck. Shortly thereafter, Major 
Lubieriski appeared and stated that Minister Beck wished to 
convene a meeting of the diplomatic corps upon his arrival in 
Cernauti and that the Major would keep us posted as to the 
hour of his arrival. As matters turned out events thenceforth 
moved rapidly and I subsequently learned that we were to 
meet with the Chief of Protocol at 4:00 o'clock that afternoon. 
Even before the hour appointed for this meeting I learned that 
it was uncertain whether Minister Beck would be permitted by 
the Rumanian authorities to meet with the Diplomatic Corps 
either individually or collectively. Accordingly, I came to the 
conclusion that if Minister Beck and his associates in the 
Polish Government were granted safe conduct through Ru­
mania they would eventually foregather at the Polish Embassy 
in Bucharest. My thoughts on this score were later confirmed 
by Major Lubieriski who said that if the Government were 
permitted transit through Rumania the most likely place for 
a meeting would be at the Polish Embassy in Bucharest. 
I therefore telephoned our Minister, Mr. Franklin Mott 
Gunther, in Bucharest and asked his cooperation towards 
arranging for our railway transportation from Cernauti to 
Bucharest for the members of my staff and family. Before 
leaving, however, information which I received convinced me 
that a meeting between Minister Beck and myself in Cernauti 
would be prevented by the local Rumanian authorities. I had 
already learned that German pressure on the Rumanian gov­
ernment was already causing them to waver in their ex­
pressed intention to grant the Polish Government safe con­
duct through their country. Subsequent events proved this 
information to be correct. 
As we boarded the train we counted 40 or more Polish 
planes flying into Cernauti. The Rumanian Government had 
permitted these planes to enter Rumania provided they main­
tained an altitude not exceeding 200 feet. These among other 
Polish planes which flew into Rumania composed the last 
stand behind the formerly envisaged contracted line of defense 
which had been in the process of forming when the entry of 
the Russian troops provided the "coup de Grace." 
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I later learned from President Moscicki's Counselor, Min­
ister Lepkowski, that at 6:30 A.M. that morning (September 
17) he had been telephoned at Zalucze, the President's head­
quarters 4 kilometers from Sniatyn, by the Polish Prime Min­
ister, then headquartering at Kosow, near Kuty, that Russian 
troops had already entered Poland at various points along the 
Polish frontier. The President, accompanied by his Counselor 
had subsequently proceeded to Kuty where he called a Coun­
cil of Ministers meeting. Among other matters, it was decided 
at this meeting (a) that President Moscicki send a message 
to the Polish nation by means of radio, to be transmitted by 
means of Minister Beck's mobile radio station in Kuty, to 
Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, with instructions that he 
rebroadcast it in the President's name. The message was to the 
effect that the Polish Government would continue its struggle 
for the Polish nation even if forced to evacuate into an allied 
country, (b) that since the Government had already been cut 
off from the army, the Government would evacuate into 
Rumania, but only when this move was found absolutely es­
sential in order to avoid capture by the Russian troops. 
Later in the afternoon, President Moscicki had, according 
to his rights under the Constitution, told Lepkowski that he 
felt it necessary in order to insure the Constitutional succes­
sion, that the latter prepare a decree voiding his decree of 
September 1, 1939 nominating Marshal Smigly-Rydz as his 
successor. The President realized the urgency of this action 
and of dating the document from Polish soil, since he could 
not foresee the fate in Rumania of Marshal Smigly-Rydz, 
should the latter as well as the Government be eventually 
forced into Rumania. He later signed the decree prepared 
according to his instructions in the presence of his associates 
at Kuty.21 
Towards evening, when the Government learned that a 
Russian mechanized column had reached Sniatyn, 28 kilo­
meters distant from Kuty, the Government decided to proceed 
to Rumania. Accompanied by members of his Government, 
the President started across the bridge between Kuty and 
Syznica on the Rumanian side. At the bridge Minister Lep­
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kowski, the President's Counselor, and General Schalley, 
Chief of the President's Military Household, encountered 
Rumanian Ambassador to Poland [Gheorghe] Grigorcea and 
Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy Rosetti, who stated that 
the Rumanian Government proposed either one of the two 
following procedures: (a) safe transit through Rumania to a 
neutral country, or (b) residence for the Polish Government 
in Rumania provided it ceased to function politically. The 
Ambassador then stated he understood the President would 
prefer the former proposal. He then offered to lead the Presi­
dent and his group in automobiles to Cernauti. 
During the course of the day of September 18, Polish 
Government circles learned that under threat of aggression 
Berlin had forbidden Bucharest to allow safe transit of the 
Polish Government through Rumania. During the latter part 
of September 18, Grigorcea transmitted to President Moscicki 
an invitation for him, his family and his official household, to 
occupy the shooting lodge of Prince Nicholas at Bicaz. 
Moreover, the Ambassador invited Beck, his staff and other 
Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister to proceed 
to Slanic where they would be afforded temporary quarters. 
At the same time Lepkowski learned that Marshal SmigTy-
Rydz had been conducted to Craiova. 
On September 21, President Moscicki received King Carol's 
Minister, Mr. Flonder, at Bicaz. Following this conversation, 
the President became convinced that there was no hope of 
safe conduct for him and his Government through Rumania. 
He consequently instructed his Counselor, Lepkowski, to 
proceed at once to Paris to see that his aforementioned decree 
[nominating Wieniawa-DIugoszowski] was put into effect. 
Meanwhile, in Bucharest I found that it would be impossible 
for me to make contact either with Moscicki or with Beck or 
any of the officers of the Polish Government due to their strict 
internment by the Rumanian Government. 
SEPTEMBER 19 
In the lobby of the Hotel Palace Athenee I spotted Colonel 
Gestenberg, former German Military Attache in Warsaw and 
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an officer whom Polish official circles came to regard as Goe­
ring's local "mouth piece", and then currently accredited to 
Bucharest. I remarked to Dutch Minister to Poland, Mr. Ro­
senthal, with whom I then was talking, that since he had been 
charged with the protection of German interests in Poland, I 
thought it would not be inappropriate if he were to engage 
Colonel Gestenberg in conversation with the view to ascer­
taining information regarding conditions in Warsaw. Rosenthal 
accepted my suggestion in good spirit, promising to inform 
me later as to the substance of his talk with the colonel. 
Subsequently Minister Rosenthal told me the following: In 
response to his question as to why the German air force had 
released bombs close by the two villages -at Constanscin, 
Gestenberg said that since he lacked information on this inci­
dent he was unable to offer any explanation therefor. In re­
ferring, however, to the bombardment of Krzemieniec the 
Colonel admitted that this had been a blunder on the part of 
the German planes. Gestenberg then went on to say in re­
sponse to the Minister's further questions that the German 
High Command expected Warsaw to surrender shortly. Al­
ready the population was suffering from a shortage of food 
supplies and he thought that this together with the growing 
tendency to loot would cause early civil strife amongst the 
inhabitants. This, in turn, would undoubtedly result in a call 
for truce. He understood that in the meantime the air force 
would refrain from releasing highly explosive bombs. This he 
thought was no longer necessary. As a matter of fact the air 
force had up its sleeve other methods even more effective at 
this stage of the game (he later admitted under questioning 
by Rosenthal that what the air force had up its sleeve was 
the use of incendiary bombs containing thermite). The Colonel 
concluded his remarks by saying that he understood that the 
German High Command would shortly renew an offer to per­
mit the evacuation of whatever staffs of foreign missions still 
remained in Warsaw. This indicated to my mind that once 
this evacuation had taken place, and in event Warsaw refused 
to surrender, the German air force would concentrate upon 
"firing" the city into submission. In my opinion, moreover, 
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the German High Command's desire to remove whatever mis­
sion staffs were left was motivated on the one hand by the de­
sire to avoid harming the foreign representatives, and on the 
other hand to clear the city of all possible foreign witnesses 
to what the German air force had in store for the city. 
Of pertinent bearing, it is interesting to note the following 
inconsistency in Germany's attitude in connection with her 
tactics vis-a-vis Poland: During and immediately subsequent 
to the Polish-German conflict, any public references to the 
barbaric character of German aerial tactics drew from the 
"propaganda factory" in Berlin, the most vigorous denials as 
well as most energetic efforts to discredit the sources of such 
references. By contrast, however, in late October, the Germans 
assumed actually a boastful attitude as regards the destruction 
rendered Poland in general and Warsaw in particular. They 
appeared to be attempting to exploit the extensive destruc­
tion wrought with a view to impressing and instilling fear in 
visiting neutral diplomats—perhaps even with a view to scar­
ing them into the German camp. Indeed, German agencies in 
Budapest were openly advertising excursions to visit the scenes 
of destruction in Poland. Moreover, the Reichkomissar of 
Warsaw, when he delivered a "welcoming" address at the 
Warsaw station to the passengers (mostly diplomats) of an 
incoming train about October 28th, urged in effect that they 
look around carefully at the extensive destruction. He went on 
to say that while he deplored the outcome of the bombard­
ment, nevertheless, the Poles had brought it on themselves. 
Moreover, he felt confident that close observation of the vast 
amount of damage would lead the visitors to recommend that 
their respective Governments intercede for peace. A former 
officer of my staff who was present on this occasion and re­
ported the foregoing to me stated his opinion (a) that the ex­
pedition conducted by a Dr. Stracha, an officer of the Whil­
helmstrasse Protocol Division, had been organized mainly 
in the interest of propaganda, and (b) the Reichkommissar's 
aforementioned address was obviously directed towards in­
stilling fear in the foreign representatives, by drawing their 
attention to damage to Warsaw as an example of the capacity 
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of the German air force and to a lesser extent the German 
105 and 150 millimeter guns to render destruction. 
After President Moscicki and the members of his Govern­
ment had been interned at various points in Rumania, direct 
communication between them was prohibited. This served 
seriously to impede the mechanics of arranging for President 
Moscicki's Government's retirement with a view to setting 
up a new Government in Paris. I learned authoritatively that 
Minister Beck had at once recognized the necessity of a Gov­
ernmental change, and that he and Mrs. Beck worked dili­
gently to facilitate the matter. In fact, due to his being pre­
vented from leaving his place of internment, Mrs. Beck 
served as liason between the President and his Ministers, 
thus conducting the necessary negotiations. I later talked with 
a close friend and associate of Minister Beck, who had just 
left him in Rumania. He said that the Minister had earnestly 
bade him to be loyal to the new Government. However bitter­
ly opposed the latter might be towards him, he said he would 
not lift a finger to obstruct them. In fact, he recognized that 
support from all quarters behind the new Government was a 
matter of vital necessity. 
1. The correct spelling is "Konstancin." 
2. Throughout 1939, the French and Romanians eagerly pressed the Poles to 
expand the 1921 Polish-Romanian Pact of Mutual Assistance, which was specifically 
directed against Soviet aggression, to include Germany as well; in fact, Paris had 
attempted to have Britain make a Polish guarantee of armed aid to Romania in the 
event of a German attack a condition of the Anglo-Polish Pact. Beck refused per­
sistently, however, on the grounds that such a move would not only arouse the 
Germans against the Poles, whom they could charge with not acting in the spirit 
of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, but also would push Hungary com­
pletely over to the Nazi camp, since it would imply Polish acceptance of Romanian 
claims against Hungary. See Beck's views as expressed during his April, 1939, visit 
in London, in DBFP, Third Series, 5:2, 15. 
3. The Giesche mine referred to by Biddle was formed in 1922 as a result of the 
American takeover of the old German firm Bergwerksgesellschaft Georg von 
Giesches Erben. Known formally as Giesche S.A., it was one of the W. A. Harri­
man financial holdings and specialized in zinc production. Because of its origins and 
operating procedures, it has been held up as an example of German capital active 
in Poland under the cover of another national firm. See Z. Landau and J. Tomas­
zewski, Kapiialy obce w Polsce 1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1964). 
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4. Here Beck was apparently confused. According to Dr. Kulski, he was the of­
ficer on duty that evening at the Foreign Office, and hence took incoming calls from 
the Polish Embassy in Berlin. He immediately contacted both military headquarters 
and Beck (waking the latter), who agreed that Kulski should officially accept the 
German message. Shortly thereafter, still in the middle of the night, the Dutch min­
ister, acting as a liason between the Poles and Germans, repeated the message to 
Kulski, who informed him of the Polish answer. 
5. The text of the British reply to Germany is in DBFP, Third Series, 7:535. 
6. The text of the French note to Germany is in DGFP, D, 7:534. 
7. The issue of British refusal to unleash a major air offensive against Germany 
in the opening days of the war became a point of bitter debate. In his diary Raczynski 
noted that Churchill conversed with him on September 4 about the problem of a 
joint Anglo-French offensive, and reported that London was exerting great pressure 
on Paris to launch a massive ground attack on the greatly weakened Siegfried line. 
Churchill then remarked that "unfortunately, the British had no divisions in the 
field themselves and were therefore not in a position to put strong pressure on the 
reluctant French. Britain would support a land offensive with the whole strength of 
the RAF; but the military were not in favour of a long-range air offensive indepen­
dent of land action, since it could not achieve any strategic result and would mean 
heavy losses in men and planes." See Raczynski, In Allied London, p. 31. Through­
out the first weeks of war, Churchill nonetheless continued to encourage the Poles 
to expect Allied action. In his own memoirs Churchill explained the situation in 
terms that corroborated his story to Raczynski, noting that "the French government 
requested us to abstain from air attacks on Germany, stating that it would pro­
voke retaliation upon their war factories, which were unprotected. We contented 
ourselves with dropping pamphlets to rouse the Germans to a higher morality." 
Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 422-23. No mention 
is made of the secret conference of the British Chiefs of Staff in July, 1939, when 
British bombardment of Germany in the event of a Polish-German conflict was 
ruled out on the grounds that, as Biddle reported, the French would receive the 
brunt of German retaliation and would collapse beneath the strain. See J. R. M. 
Butler, Grand Strategy (London, 1956), vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941, p. 56. 
8. Charles Moszczyhski remained with the American Embassy to Poland which 
had later set up headquarters in Angers, France until, March, 1940. He then returned 
to his native United States, and that same year received his doctorate in history 
from the University of Wisconsin. Today, as Charles Morley, he is professor of 
Russian and Polish history and vice-chairman of the history department at Ohio 
State University. He has written the foreword to this volume. 
9. The "starosta" was the chief political figure in the Polish county government 
system (powiat). 
10. See Chapter 2, note 11 above. Biddle incorrectly described Kulski's position, 
which was head of the Polish Foreign Ministry's legal division. 
11. A concerted French attack on the Siegfried line, manned only by a skeleton 
force of German regulars without armor support and a poorly trained and equipped 
home militia, was the main fear of the German high command; at the Nuremburg 
trials, both Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl stated that only the complete in­
activity of the British and French prevented a collapse of the German war machine 
during the Polish campaign. See Keitel's testimony in Trial of the Major War Crimi­
nals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg, 1947), 10:513-22; and 
Jodl's testimony in ibid. (Nuremburg, 1948), 15:350. 
12. Although this was certainly a consideration of the Allies, it was not the deci­
sive argument against immediate land and air operations on a massive scale. Lon­
don and Paris viewed the German assault on Poland as merely the first phase of 
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what would be a long, drawn-out conflict, and had no intention of exposing their 
military establishments to what could have been a devastating attack. Accordingly, 
though German generals later expressed their belief that a concerted Anglo-French 
attack would have crumbled the German army in its tracks, the Allies were not 
prepared to gamble their national existence in the opening round of a mortal con­
flict; moreover, neither the British nor French were ready militarily or psychologi­
cally to move against Germany at that point. See Bethell, The War Hitler Won, 
chaps. 3-5. 
13. This section agrees with the episode as related by Kukasiewicz in his mem­
oirs, Diplomat in Paris, 1936-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Juliusz Zukasiewicz, 
Ambassador of Poland, ed. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz (New York, 1970), pp. 297-301. 
The full text of Lukasiewicz's note.to Gamelin is in the same source. 
14. The name is correctly spelled "Sharanov." 
15. Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Pahs, p. 298. 
16. According to Kukasiewicz, ibid., pp. 303-5, immediately following this con­
versation with Daladier he telephoned his good friend Bullitt and requested him to 
obtain a precise and final opinion from Washington on the American view of British 
and French strategic bombing of Germany. Within several hours, Bullitt replied 
that no such American position against the bombing, as described by Daladier, 
existed. On September 13, the Polish ambassador to the United States, Jerzy Potocki, 
informed Raczyiiski that Hull had told him categorically that "the United States 
government had no talks with England aimed at restraining its air attacks on the 
territory of Germany," since Roosevelt's September 1 appeal had only called on the 
belligerants to refrain from bombing open cities and civilian populations. At the 
same time, however, Hull told Potocki that "in his opinion the Allies are fully carry­
ing out their obligations toward Poland and that the concentration of Russian 
troops is not offensive in character." Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris, pp. 307-8, 
citing a document from the archives of the Sikorski Museum in London (file no. 
A.12.53/24). 
17. There was no university in Krzemieniec; the school building in question was 
a lyceum, equivalent to a junior college. 
18. The frontier town in Romania selected as the rallying point for the with­
drawing Polish and foreign civilian and military establishments. 
19. The Russian minority in Poland was quite small, consisting of about 137,700 
people, though Poland did have about 4,440,000 Ukrainians. See Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland (Warsaw, 1938), p. 22. 
20. On September 17 the Romanian ambassador assured Beck in the name of 
King Carol that the officials of the Polish government would be accorded free pas­
sage through Romania. See Beck, Final Report, p. 228. 
21. According to article 13, paragraph 2b, of the Polish constitution, the presi­
dent could nominate his successor in time of war. Moscicki nominated Boles/aw 
Wieniawa-D/ugoszewski to the post, but because of opposition from General Sikor­
ski and from the French government, this was voided in favor of Wfadysfew 
Raczkiewicz, whose appointment was confirmed on September 29. See Lukasiewicz, 
Diplomat in Paris, pp. 342-70. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Factors Contributing

To Poland's Defeat

In the belief that it would enable the reader to gain a clearer 
perception of events covered in the subsequent chapters of 
this report, I take occasion at this point to cite below a sum­
mary of factors which to my mind contributed towards Po­
land's defeat: 
1. Suddenness of the attack. Fighting commenced between 
4 and 5 a.m., Friday, September 1, simultaneously at Danzig 
and at numerous points along Poland's western and southern 
fronts. Warsaw experienced its first air raid at about 5:15 a.m. 
2. Failure of the British and French as well as the Polish 
military authorities to visualize the full capacity of the German 
air force to disrupt communications, to cripple industrial 
operations and to render general confusion by harassing ci­
vilian communities as well as the military forces in the field. 
As matters turned out, Germany employed between 85 and 
90 percent of her total first line air strength, a ratio of 4 or 5 
to 1, in relation to the Polish air force.1 
3. At the commencement of the conflict, the German air 
force effectively bombed all Polish airplane, spare parts, and 
motors manufacturing plants, as well as pilot training schools. 
In fact, within four days after the commencement of hostilities 
there no longer existed the means of turning out more planes 
and pilots, and Poland could thenceforth count upon no planes 
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other than those in actual use—upon no pilots other than those 
already trained. 
4. Upon the outbreak of hostilities German bombers, con­
tinually shuttling back and forth in three broad bands between 
East Prussia and Slovakia, as well as former Austria, effec­
tively bombed all important rail junctions in Poland. This crip­
pling of the main east-west as well as north-south transporta­
tion lines was largely responsible for preventing (a) the 
completion of mobilization which had been postponed for 16 
hours at the urgent request of the British and French Govern­
ments (according to Polish official circles, between 300,000 and 
400,000 Polish reserves failed to reach their assigned posi­
tions), and (b) the prompt movement of supplies and ammuni­
tions and reinforcements. 
5. Failure of Poland's system of communications to stand 
up under the destructive effects of aerial bombardments. It is 
safe to say that after the first few days of hostilities there was 
no Central Command. Too much reliance, in my opinion, was 
placed on mechanical methods such as tele-wiring which 
events proved impractical for operations in the field against 
the violent effects of the modern offensive. The inner communi­
cating above ground wiring proved vulnerable to aerial attack 
and to cutting by parachute technicians who were frequently 
dropped from planes behind the Polish fighting lines. In brief, 
this tele-wiring system proved too dependent upon line main­
tenance to be practical. The field commands were, to my mind, 
inadequately provided with field short-wave radio apparati and 
there was a lack of sufficient motorcycle despatch riders and 
messengers. 
6. Failure of the Central Command, when at the outset it 
became clear that the Polish army was faced with about 75 
percent of the entire German armed forces, to execute its orig­
inal plan to withdraw the main bodies of troops under cover of 
delayed action to the main defense lines along the strategic 
rivers. (This plan had gained General Ironside's expressed ap­
proval, according to the British Embassy, during his visit to 
Warsaw). The Polish army allowed itself to become engaged in 
pitched battles instead of effecting a delayed action either to 
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cover an orderly withdrawal to the rivers or a maneuvering 
position. 
7. Lack of an organized fortified main line of defense. On 
September 12, Minister Beck told me that while he had been 
aware of the desirability of constructing a fortified line of de­
fense along the strategic rivers, Narew, Bug, Vistula and San, 
he and his associates had realized that the expense involved 
in such an undertaking was more than Poland could afford. In­
deed, it was all Poland could do to raise through its recent in­
ternal loan, funds to purchase the bare necessities in terms of 
planes and anti-aircraft equipment, without permanently crip­
pling Poland's economic structure. Even at that, however, 
these funds could not be expected to afford Poland adequate 
resistance against 85 to 90 percent of Germany's first line air 
strength. In other words, Poland had had to spread whatever 
moneys she had at her disposal to the maximum extent in 
terms of war preparation. 
8. German air mastery permitted the reconnaissance and 
bombing planes to uncover and to a large extent prevent the 
secret concentration of Polish troops for counter attack. 
9. After the first phase of the conflict, the continual Ger­
man aerial bombardments served to terrorize the civilian com­
munities, prevented the Government from functioning effec­
tively, and harassed General Headquarters. 
10. Long lines of civilian refugees frequently cut across the 
Polish troops on [the] march. This had a demoralizing effect 
upon the troops in that they thus ascertained that their homes 
were being detroyed, and their families injured and killed. In 
many cases, moreover, these lines of refugees requisitioned 
military rail transportation, and appropriated supplies destined 
for the army. 
11. Failure of Poland's Western Allies to afford relief in 
terms of diversion activities particularly in the air (I am in­
clined to believe that this was largely attributable to the West­
ern Allies' joint desire to gain equality if not superiority in 
terms of air strength). 
12. The delay on the part of Poland's Western Allies in 
declaring war on Germany. While this delay is understandable 
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in each case for various reasons, nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the Poles were rushed off their feet. This delay, moreover, 
served undoubtedly to render Germany confident that she had 
no great cause to fear a major attack in the west. 
13. The Poles were given no time for revision of military 
leadership where required or to revise their tactics to meet the 
strategy of the adversary, or to give their troops a breathing 
spell. There were many Polish soldiers who never saw a Ger­
man soldier—only tanks and planes. In most cases, however, 
when Polish infantry or cavalry came into direct contact with 
the Germans, the former proved themselves superior. 
14. The unusual dry weather, which prevailed throughout 
Poland previous to and at the time of the conflict, rendered 
the country as a whole a sort of dry hard plain which greatly 
facilitated the employment of tanks and other elements of 
mechanized divisions. Moreover, the excellent visibility per­
mitted the German planes to operate anywhere at all times. 
15. The large minorities in the loosely knit Polish state had 
served as fertile ground for the skillful and effective subversion 
machinations of German agents previous to the conflict. In 
fact, elements thus organized in advance of the conflict proved 
valuable aids to the German totalitarian form of campaign in 
terms of internal sources of information as well as agents in 
fomenting internal unrest and division during the course of the 
conflict. 
16. The disadvantage of a mainly agricultural state fight­
ing a highly industrialized state. Only an industrial country or­
ganized along totalitarian lines, and equally ruthless as the ad­
versary, could have resisted the recent thoroughly equipped 
modern offensive which Germany launched unless the follow­
ing factors existed: (a) climatic, geographic and geological 
conditions, (b) a previously constructed fortified defense line, 
supplemented by strong air defense elements, which might 
have enabled it to hold out long enough, and (c) a highly indus­
trialized ally to "knock out" the adversary's factories, commu­
nications, and air bases. 
In all these essential conditions Poland was lacking.

At the outset of the conflict the main bodies of the Polish
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fighting forces were divided into three army groups covered by 
advanced attachments at about 7 different points: the north 
army group based on the Vistula river southeast of Torun. This 
group, according to the original defense plan, was to withdraw 
to a position ranging from the Narew-Bug-Vistula rivers' junc­
tion and up to cover Warsaw. The Central army group was 
based on an area southeast of K6dz. This group, according to 
the original defense plan, was to withdraw to a position on the 
Vistula, mid-way between Warsaw and the junction of the Vis­
tula and the San rivers. The southern army group was based on 
the Nida river in an area northwest of Tarnow and northeast 
of Krakow. This group was to withdraw to a position along the 
San river. Moreover, the plan called for an extension of the 
line along the Narew river by moving up reserve divisions. 
Reports indicated that the northern group, contrary to plan, 
allowed itself to be drawn into pitched battles with the adver­
sary. This, in the face of overwhelming odds together with the 
swiftness of the German pincer-like thrusts (which developed 
from the converging major drives from the German army 
groups in the northwest, and in the southwest of Poland as well 
as from the "Condor Legion" frontal attack on the Polish de­
fenses in front of Katowice) tended to cut off this group's re­
tirement, and served to prevent its executing its withdrawal ac­
cording to the original plan. This upset in the original plan 
caused the central army group to alter the scheduled direction 
of its withdrawal and instead to take up the position originally 
assigned to the northern army group in covering Warsaw. At 
the same time, the southern army had to withdraw likewise in 
a northeasterly [direction] instead of its scheduled direction 
north to maintain contact with the central army group. This 
left the San river line insufficiently defended to check a swift 
moving powerful German mechanized thrust aimed at Lwow. 
Notwithstanding the aforecited among other difficulties and 
set-backs, there was still a possibility of the Polish forces re­
consolidating behind a newly massed contracted line of de­
fense, for the Polish forces had actually taken up position 
along part of their main defense river line. At this juncture, 
however, Russia delivered the "coup de grace" by suddenly 
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marching in and occupying the very territory whereto the new­
ly envisaged Polish position would have necessarily looked for 
supplies and reinforcements. 
The following are a few examples of the important role 
which espionage played in the German campaign: 
1/ The system of communication between the spies behind 
the Polish lines with the German forces both ground and 
aerial was conducted with marked efficiency. The spies had 
been organized in Poland to such an extent previous to the out­
break of war that in many cases they commanded key positions 
in the communications as well as in other fields. After the com­
mencement of the war, numerous spies were dropped behind 
the Polish lines by parachute from German planes. These men 
engaged in cutting communications lines, spreading alarming 
rumors amongst Polish communities and in many cases, dis­
guised in Polish officers' uniforms, intercepted and counter­
manded military orders. 
2/ Shortly after the outbreak of war an official of the For­
eign Office in Warsaw noticed from his office window, the 
continued presence of a man in the side street below, onto 
which gave the private entrance to Minister Beck's house. The 
Minister frequently used this entrance, and whenever states­
men and diplomats were received by him confidentially in his 
home, they likewise made use thereof. Suspecting the man was 
up to no good, the forementioned official of the Foreign Office 
ordered his arrest. Subsequent police investigation revealed 
that the man had been noting on a piece of paper the license 
numbers of Minister Beck's and visiting diplomats' automo­
biles. It was moreover disclosed that he intended to communi­
cate these numbers to agents in the eastern part of Poland in 
order that they might be able to identify the cars in the case of 
their possible arrival in that region during further stages of the 
conflict. While this spy wore Polish clothes, he was identified 
by his German shoes. 
3/ Again, an officer in command of troops near Krzemien­
iec sent orders for the delivery of a given amount of supplies 
for a certain time of the day. The supplies failed to arrive. 
Upon investigation, the officer commanding found that his 
172 THE BIDDLE REPORT 
orders had been countermanded. In subsequently tracing back 
to Krzemieniec, he found an individual in the uniform of a Pol­
ish officer walking along the roadside. Something about the 
man caused the officer commanding to stop and question him. 
He replied in broken Polish with a discernable German accent. 
He put the man under arrest and discovered under further 
examination that it was this spy in the uniform of a Polish 
officer who had countermanded his order. 
4/ It was found by the Polish military intelligence that 
German aviators were receiving signals from German spies 
(dressed as Polish peasants) who stepped out numbers and 
other signs with their feet in plowed fields throughout the 
countryside. 
5/ I personally became suspicious of telegraph operators 
in small towns along the line of our trek. My suspicions were 
supported by remarks of some of my colleagues who felt that 
while telegraph operators accepted their cables, they de­
stroyed instead of dispatching them; in other cases, they de­
liberately juggled the message in such a way as to arrive at the 
other end of the line in a garbled state. I am convinced that 
this happened to some of my own cables. 
1. On every vital point—manpower under arms, the degree of mechanization in the 
army, and potential firepower available—the German war machine was vastly superi­
or to the Polish by September, 1939. On September 1, the Polish army contained 
840,000 troops, or 70 percent of the total called for in the mobilization plan; they were 
organized in 27 regular infantry divisions, 3 reserve infantry divisions, 8 cavalry bri­
gades, 3 mountain brigades, 1 armored motorized brigade, and numerous special 
units and volunteer militia battalions. The Wehrmacht opposed this with about 
1,400,000 troops—88 percent of the total called for in operational plans—organized 
into 37 regular and 9 improvised infantry divisions, 1 mountain division, and 14 
mechanized divisions, of which 6 were regular armor, 4 light armor, and the re­
maining 4 mechanized infantry attack units. Tadeusz Rawski, Zdzis/aw Stapor, and 
Jan Zamoyski, eds., Wojna wyzwolencza narodu polskiego w latach 1939-1945, 
2d ed. (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 128-37. The disparity in equipment between the two 
forces was even more revealing. The Germans had 2,700 tanks to the Poles' 887— 
of which 574 were reconnaisance vehicles; 6,000 cannon and mortars to 4,800 for the 
Poles; 4,500 antitank guns to 1,250 for the Poles; and 1,900 aircraft to the 388 at the 
disposal of the Poles. The figures are more striking when drawn from a comparison of 
the firepower available to the average regular infantry division in the German and 
Polish armies. The ratios, all in favor of the Germans, were: artillery, 2:1; mortars, 
2.7:1; and machine guns and pistols, a crushing 10:1. Added to this were the problems 
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encountered by the Poles in transport. While the average German infantry division 
was fairly well mechanized, its Polish counterpart relied heavily on horse-drawn trans­
port, with its many inherent shortcomings. Eugeniusz KozJowski, Wojsko Polskie 
1936-1939 (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 90, 164. An exhaustive breakdown of the material 
strengths of each side on the eve of the war is contained in Polskie Si/y Zbrojne, vol. 1, 
pt. 1, chaps. 4 and 5. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Military Aspects of the Polish-German Conflict

And Lessons To Be Learned Therefrom

Reports previous to the outbreak of the conflict indicated, 
and campaign operations following the commencement of hos­
tilities revealed, that the German plan vis-a-vis Poland en­
visaged the lightning destruction of the Polish armed forces be­
fore the development of an effective threat from the West. It 
was clear from the outset that Germany had pitted against the 
Polish forces an efficiently organized, modern, and powerful 
fighting machine. The outstandingly efficient co-ordination of 
air and ground force operations proved highly effective in the 
forward thrusts of Germany's swift moving campaign. That 
the conception and execution of the German plan of campaign 
were brilliant, was demonstrated by events—Germany had 
gained complete domination over Poland in less than a month's 
time. In brief, it may be said that against Poland the German 
High Command applied their entire "bag of tricks" in terms 
of Blitzkrieg tactics, formerly tried out and perfected in the 
military laboratory of the Spanish civil war. 
In tracing the successful course of numerous swift, long-
range thrusts of German mechanized columns (which in some 
cases left far behind them important bodies of German and 
Polish forces in the throes of combat), and in reviewing reports 
describing the effectiveness of these thrusts, it is well to bear 
in mind the following: 
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1. Weather conditions prevailing throughout Poland were 
highly favorable for this campaign of swift, long-range move­
ment. 
2. The comparatively flat terrain in Western Poland and the 
parts of Central and Southern Poland traversed, offered little 
if any effective check to the advance of these columns. 
3. The exceptionally dry weather had so dried up the riv­
ers that they were reduced in effectiveness as strategic bar­
riers. 
4. The Polish forces were inadequately equipped with 
anti-tank guns. 
5. The Polish forces were quantitatively out-mastered in 
the air. 
6. The possibility of German reconnaissance as well as 
bombing planes to shuttle back and forth from East Prussia 
to former Austria as well as to Slovakia. This permitted the 
discovery of any and all attempts of the Polish troops either 
to concentrate or maneuver their forces. 
As of connected bearing on the military aspect, I take oc­
casion to draw the reader's attention to the following angle. 
Professor Dr. Yakimowicz,1 formerly professor in charge of 
the general clinic of Warsaw University, told me that previous 
to the outbreak of war he had received confidential reports 
through what he considered reliable channels in the interna­
tional medical fraternity, that Germany in its totalitarian war 
program was prepared to engage in bacterial as well as other 
forms of warfare, not only against Poland, but also if subse­
quently deemed necessary against Poland's Western Allies. 
He had brought this to the attention of his Government, and 
while his Government were distinctly averse to the employ­
ment of any such type of warfare, they permitted him to pro­
ceed with research in connection therewith, with the view 
merely (a) to ascertaining the practical possibilities in this 
field, and (b) to keeping up their sleeve whatever formula the 
professor might conceive. 
Accordingly, Dr. Yakimowicz had, after considerable re­
search, worked out a formula which he called the "bacterial 
cocktail" This entailed the mixture of certain quantities of the 
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germs of dissentery, typhus, and pneumonia, in bouillon in a 
container about the size of a small water glass. This according 
to the Professor, was sufficient to permeate fifty or more gal­
lons of bouillon. This bacterial lotion could be spread in the 
adversary's territory by several methods: (a) it could be dis­
persed on a rainy or misty night by a type of spray gun over a 
given objective from an aeroplane, (b) it could be dropped 
from the plane over the villages or countryside selected, in 
small colored glass tubes attached to small parachutes (the 
tubes must be colored in order to keep out the light which 
renders the germs ineffective), or (c) a specialist in bacterial 
warfare might be let down from the plane by parachute-
once landed he could empty the contents of the bacterial tubes 
into artesian wells, water supply tanks, and other vital places. 
The Professor emphasized that while daylight tended to di­
minish the effectiveness of the bacteria, damp or wet weather 
at any time was the most favorable condition for spraying 
bacterial lotion from a plane. He then went on to say that be­
cause villages as a rule depended mainly upon artesian wells, 
and in general an open water system, this type of community 
would serve as the easiest victim of bacterial warfare such as 
above described. Fortunately, for both sides in the Polish-
German conflict, this type of warfare was not resorted to. 
After the close of the conflict, Dr. Yakimowicz informed me 
that he had imparted the results of his bacterial research to 
the head of the Pasteur Institute, pointing out to the latter 
that he had reason to believe that the Germans were prepared 
to resort to this, among other forms of totalitarian warfare. 
In response to the remark of the head of "Pasteur" to the 
effect that such a thing was too horrible to contemplate and 
that he refused to entertain such barbaric ideas, Dr. Yakimo­
wicz pointed out that if and when the Germans did resort to 
this type of warfare, the French and British laboratories 
would be forced to conceive of some form of retaliation. More­
over, they would have to prepare large quantities of serums to 
fight the spread of disease thus introduced. Dr. Yakimowicz 
told me that he was surprised at the attitude of the Head of 
the Pasteur Institute, for he felt that it was indicative of West­
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ern Europe's lack of comprehension of the extent to which 
their adversary was prepared to go under pressure. 
Observations and study of the course and effect of military 
tactics provided by the Polish-German conflict brought to 
light the following lessons, which in my opinion might be use­
fully applied in considering our own national defense prob­
lems. 
1. That success in the modern offensive is largely depen­
dent upon complete co-ordination of air and ground force 
operations. 
2. That success in defensive action against modern of­
fensive operations necessitates (a) a completely organized 
fortified position, (b) adequate equipment essential for stand­
ing off the adversary's air raids. This includes the integral 
essential, an air force at least equal to that of the adversary. 
Superiority or at least equality in the air is essential to chal­
lenge effectively the adversary's planes (a) operating in coordi­
nation with the efforts of the troops and mechanized units in 
the theater of combat, and (b) bombing and otherwise ha­
rassing various points in the interior of the country. In Poland, 
during the first several days, the German air force made at 
least a pretense of limiting its intense aerial bombardments 
to objectives of military interest. The German pilots soon aban­
doned all pretense, however, and resorted to indiscriminate 
and large-scale use of incendiary bombs over cities, towns, and 
villages. 
This new phase raised the question of the necessity of ade­
quate fire prevention and fighting apparatus and organiza­
tion, as an essential defensive factor. Most cities, towns, and 
villages other than Warsaw, many of them composing indus­
trial, rail and other communications centers, were short of and 
in many cases totally lacking in anti-aircraft cannon. Poland, 
with her meagre supply of this essential equipment, was only 
able to distribute it sparsely throughout the country. 
After witnessing a number of air raids, I came to the con­
clusion that in centers where machine gun batteries composed 
the only element of defense against air attacks, the machine 
gunners would frequently have proved themselves more effec­
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tive, had they held their fire until the planes risked flying in 
low and power diving. Instead, as in a number of cases I recall 
the machine gunners started firing ineffectually at the planes 
when they were still out of range, thus exposing their posi­
tions to subsequent attack from the planes. 
Experience through the conflict taught us that from the 
standpoint of comparative safety for the civilian, large cities, 
provided they were afforded the maximum requisite in air 
defense measures, afforded more security than the smaller 
towns and villages throughout the comparatively sparsely de­
fended countryside. In the latter centers, air defense as well 
as bombproof shelters were practically non-existent. 
From the reports of Major Colbern, Military Attache, as 
well as from observations of Polish official circles, I gained the 
impression that in sectors along the battle front where the 
character of fighting permitted patrolling operations, patrol 
units would have derived considerable advantage from the 
use of sub-machine guns (the kind frequently employed in the 
past by "gangsters" in the United States). The lightness and 
mobility as well as intense volume of fire of this gun would 
render the patrol the maximum capacity to cope with surprise 
attacks of opposing patrols without diminishing his essential 
mobility. 
I furthermore noted with interest that in General Sosnkow­
ski's defense of Lwow against the eventually overpowering 
forces of his adversary, General Sosnkowski brought into use 
a number of 7.92 mm anti-tank rifles, secretly developed by 
the Polish armament industry previous to the conflict. The 
General later told me that this weapon, fired from the shoulder, 
proved effective especially against the comparatively thinly-
armored German tanks. (The latter, he said, were inferior to 
the tanks formerly manufactured in Czechoslovakia). 
Major Colbern observed that during the recent conflict, 
the Germans replaced their old 77's with 105 mm guns. These 
105's, not much heavier than the old 77's, have about the same 
mobility and fire a heavier projectile with a range of some 
2,000 to 3,000 meters greater than the 77's. In fact, reports 
indicated that the 105's had an effective range of about 10,000 
meters. 
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Moreover, in their artillery bombardment of Warsaw, the 
Germans brought into play, in addition to their 105, their 
150's which, with a range of from some 12,000 to 15,000 meters, 
proved effective for counter battery work and in cases where 
destructive power was required. However, according to the 
judgment of Major Colbern (who visited Warsaw about Oc­
tober 29) he believed that notwithstanding the intense artillery 
fire, Warsaw suffered less therefrom than from aerial bombard­
ment. 
Further lessons derived from the Blitzkrieg campaign 
against Poland, as well as from reports on German aerial 
tactics vis-a-vis British and French naval and commercial ton­
nage, raise the following additional factors for consideration 
in connection with our own national defense problems. 
1. A two-power air force of no less than 10,000 first line 
planes, including strategically placed air bases with under­
ground hangers. 
2. Sufficient naval aircraft carriers. 
3. A two-coast swift, long-range light navy, equipped with 
guns of the maximum caliber possible. 
4. A two-coast fleet of submarines, mine layers, and mine 
sweepers, equipped with the most modern devices. 
5. A great quantity of mines stored and ready for immedi­
ate use on both coasts. 
6. Sufficient tank and mechanized divisions. 
7. Rapid-fire rifles for the infantry, cavalry and motorized 
troops, and sub-machine guns for patrol units. 
8. Sufficient quantity of anti-tank guns and anti-tank 
rifles. 
9. Motor transport sufficient to enable at least the military 
forces to be independent of railways. 
10. Anti-aircraft elements: longest possible range anti­
aircraft cannon and heavy machine guns—being governed as to 
requisite quantity by realistic appraisal of Germany's and 
Russia's recently manifested interpretation of military objec­
tives, as an example of what to provide against in modern to­
talitarian warfare. 
We as citizens of the United States should come to regard 
this necessity in the light of a national insurance policy and 
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accept the necessary annual military and naval appropriations 
as a constant over that period. In arriving at this opinion I 
have taken into consideration the following factors: If an early 
cessation of current European hostilities materializes before a 
definite victory by either side, then such a cessation, in my 
opinion, would prove more in the light of a truce providing a 
breathing spell for recuperation and realignment of forces, 
than a prelude to durable peace. 
Even if however, a definite victory were attained by either 
side in current hostilities, I can foresee little better than a 
post-war period of say, 10 years or more, marked by economic 
and social unrest, growing out of shutdowns in war industry 
and leading perhaps even to revolutions and counter-revolu­
tions, particularly on the Continent. Besides, another factor 
which I do not overlook and which may conceivably have an 
important bearing on future trends, is that current-day youth 
both in Germany and Russia are born and raised in an exclu­
sive spartan atmosphere, all trace of the athenian having been 
elbowed out by totalitarian leadership. Conquest in one form 
or another is the keynote of their upbringing—they know little 
else. Hence, with the mentality of the oncoming generations of 
two major powers of the world attuned to warlike thought, 
we, even as geographically remote as we feel ourselves today, 
must take into account the possible developments from this 
condition over the next fifteen to twenty years. 
1. The correct spelling is "Jachimowicz." 
CHAPTER SIX 
The Russian Aspect 
As a matter of interesting background in regard to the Russo-
German Non-Aggression Agreement and its implications, I re­
call Minister Beck's having said that there were two times 
when Russia became dangerous: (a) when the Russian Gov­
ernment derived a measure of self-confidence from prosperity 
throughout the country, in which case, the Government felt it 
had a free hand to engage in world revolutionary tactics 
abroad, and (b) when the Government was on the defensive in 
relation to the peoples of Russia due to the country's experi­
encing hard times—in which case there was a danger of the 
Government's deciding that foreign conquest was necessary to 
divert the attention of the masses from their internal difficulties. 
Minister Beck's expert on Russian affairs imparted to me 
that according to Lenin's works and in the records of the 6th 
[Congress of the] International, Moscow had envisaged a 
Russo-German Block eventually under Russian domination— 
that the Russians did not plan to attack Germany, but rather to 
let the Western powers weaken her, then at the psychological 
moment jump in and liberate the German people, decompose 
Germany, then Bolshevise her. 
As far back as March 1937, I reported from Oslo that in­
formed circles there had confidentially disclosed to me that 
through usually reliable channels they had received a report 
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that during a conference in London between Foreign Minister 
Eden and German Ambassador von Ribbentrop (shortly before 
the latter's departure for Berlin to sign the Anti-Comintern 
Pact) Mr. Eden stated he had information that conversations 
had been taking place between certain Generals of the German 
and Russian armies and that their discussions envisaged a 
military alliance. While Eden admitted receipt of the foregoing 
report, he omitted reference to the fact that his information 
also indicated that von Ribbentrop was aware of these conver­
sations and their purpose. In response to Eden's question as to 
whether his information was correct, von Ribbentrop reminded 
Eden that he had undoubtedly been long aware of the close 
relationship between the military circles of Germany and Rus­
sia. Mr. Eden said yes, but that was before Nuremberg, where 
Herr Hitler had taken occasion to attack Bolshevism. In re­
sponse von Ribbentrop lamely offered to try to ascertain fur­
ther light on Eden's report. Eden then concluded by stating 
that the British Government would regard with grave concern 
any such negotiations. While I was unable to confirm the sub­
stance of this report and in that I regarded this talk (if true) 
and its implications one of the potential pivots of history in the 
making, I considered it of sufficient interest to pass it on to the 
State Department for its information and verification.1 
Previous to my arrival in Poland, I had been informed by a 
Polish diplomat whom I consider not only extremely well-in­
formed on his own country's affairs, but also one of the most 
able diplomats in Europe, that Poland due to her geo-political 
position had to practice a policy of "balance-diplomacy" be­
tween Germany and Russia. It was not long after my arrival 
in Poland that I found my informant's appraisal of Polish 
policy to be exact. Moreover, it was clear to me that in Po­
land's interest Polish foreign policy was directed towards the 
maintenance of correct relations with each of her neighbors 
and towards preventing collaboration between the two—a pros­
pect which would prove fatal to Poland. 
In connection with this policy of "balance-diplomacy", I 
was interested in Minister Beck's remarks that as far back as 
1935, Goering had proposed to Marshal Smigfy-Rydz Pol­
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ish-German collaboration vis-a-vis Russia.2 Moreover, I was 
informed by a leading official of the Polish Foreign Offiice, that 
the period 1935-37 was marked by several further German 
overtures on this score. Indeed, he recalled that on several vis­
its to Berlin during that period German people from the boot­
black to the intellectual, greeted him with some direct or in­
direct reference to eventual Polish-German collaboration 
vis-a-vis Russia. In other words, it had become common talk. 
Moreover, Minister of Finance Kwiatkowski told me that as 
late as January 23-25, 1939, von Ribbentrop during his visit to 
Warsaw significantly alluded on several occasions to a pos­
sible collaboration between Poland and Germany against Rus­
sia.3 
Appraising Polish-Russian relations, I felt that in spite of the 
existence of a non-aggression and a commercial agreement,4 
there was a deep sense of distrust and hatred between these 
two Slav nations. Moreover, I had my doubts whether if Russia 
had a chance to make a turn to her own advantage she would 
stand steadfastly by the sanctity of these agreements. As for 
Poland, she represented to my mind the last western window 
looking east and in such light could be depended upon to ad­
here strictly to her obligations. To be sure, while Poland mani­
fested no affection for Russia, Poland did her best to maintain 
correct relations. Outside the non-agression agreement, Po­
land was determined to confine her relations exclusively to the 
commercial aspects in line with her commercial agreement. 
She wanted no political "trucking" with the Soviets. 
Of related interest, Polish Ambassador to France Lukasie­
wicz informed me after my arrival in Paris following the Pol­
ish-German conflict, that in the first half of August, during a 
meeting between British and French representatives with 
Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotoff in Moscow, 
Molotoff had bluntly remarked that an agreement between the 
Western powers and Russia could be practical only if Britain 
and France could persuade Poland to permit Russian troops to 
enter Poland via the Vilno and East Galician areas at any time 
that the Russians deemed such action necessary. The British 
and French representatives had replied that this was a matter 
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which Molotoff should take up directly with Poland. In re­
sponse, Molotoff said that Russia had only non-aggression and 
commercial agreements with Poland and that since Britain and 
France were Poland's allies, they were the proper parties to 
put the question to Poland.5 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bonnet, had later sounded 
out Ambassador Lukasiewicz on the above score. In response 
the Ambassador had remarked to Minister Bonnet that the 
latter was unquestionably aware of the answer before putting 
the question. Moreover, the Ambassador had pointed out his 
opinion that Molotoff s remarks along the above lines repre­
sented merely a tactical play. Indeed, while on the one hand 
Molotoff was undoubtedly playing for time, on the other hand 
he had deliberately posed the one question which might cause 
tension between the Western powers and Poland. The Ambas­
sador had added, moreover, that he would therefore prefer to 
consider that the question had not been broached by Bonnet— 
and emphasized that if France pressed the question formally, 
it would be a mistake, for such action might lead to an "all 
round" serious misunderstanding. 
The Ambassador went on to say to me that about the same 
time, Minister Beck had replied along similar lines to British 
Ambassador Kennard's soundings on the above score. Ambas­
sador Lukasiewicz then told me that following these unfruitful 
soundings on the part of Minister Bonnet and Ambassador 
Kennard, he personally gained the impression that the British 
and French representatives in Moscow resorted to stalling the 
issue in their further conversations with the Soviet authorities. 
In concluding his remarks Ambassador Lukasiewicz told me 
that about the 19 or 20 of August, Bonnet in conversation with 
him evinced considerable optimism over the prospect of com­
ing to a deal with Moscow. The Ambassador had replied frank­
ly that while the representative then negotiating in France's 
behalf [General Doumenc] was no doubt a military expert of 
high standing, nevertheless, the Ambassador felt it would be 
difficult for the French representative to gain a clear insight as 
to what was in the back of the Russians' mind, in that the 
French representative was not familiar with the Russian lan­
guage and had been in Moscow but a short time. At a later 
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date, Bonnet had admitted to Ambassador Kukasiewicz that he 
had been right as to his reaction on this score. 
I recall having felt that after Poland had decided to cut its 
bridges with Germany, she was inclined to pay insufficient at­
tention to her relations with Russia. Moreover, I was inclined 
to feel that at about that time the Polish Intelligence Service 
in Russia was not functioning up to standard—had failed to keep 
Warsaw fully apprised of developments in the making. 
While I fully understood Poland's reluctance to permit the 
Red Army to step one foot onto Polish territory, I questioned in 
my mind, whether in the event of a German invasion, Poland 
might not be inclined to accept help from the Devil himself. 
The thought therefore occurred to me that if Poland and Rus­
sia could work out a formula whereby Poland could attach 
Russian forces to the Polish war machine, and whereby the 
Polish Government were the sole judge as to the character, ex­
tent and timing of Russian assistance, Poland might have held 
this up her sleeves as an effective weapon vis-a-vis Germany. 
In the early part of August, [Deputy] Commissar for For­
eign Affairs [Vladimir] Potemkin came to Warsaw and con­
ferred with Minister Beck. The Minister subsequently imparted 
to me his opinion that Potemkin throughout his conversation 
had shown full comprehension of Poland's position. Moreover, 
Potemkin had remarked that Poland's attitude towards Russia 
was not as bad as had been widely suspected, for it was clear 
that Poland was not playing ball with Germany. He added that 
enlightenment on this score had led towards greatly facili­
tating a clearer Polish-Russian understanding.6 (I was aware 
that at this time, Poland felt that all she needed from Russia 
were raw materials and that she entertained hopes of obtaining 
further requirements whenever needed, within the framework 
of the commercial agreement). 
After the signing of the Anglo-Polish Accord, I looked for 
Russia to relax in that the accord removed the possibility of a 
Russian-dreaded Polish-German collaboration vis-a-vis Rus­
sia. In this light, the Accord offered Russia a strategic advan­
tage in a political sense and thus allowed her to sit back and 
take her time before making her next move. 
Following March 31, whereon British Prime Minister Cham­
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berlain announced Britain's and France's support of Polish 
independence, and the British and Polish Government's "cov­
ering note" of April 6, Herr Hitler reportedly reacted violently 
in that the completion of the agreement envisaged in this 
covering note implied a potential two-front conflict should 
Herr Hitler embark on further adventures—a prospect to which 
Germany was historically opposed. Both Germany and Britain 
shortly thereafter bid vigorously for Stalin's hand. Thus Stalin 
was afforded the opportunity to choose with which side he 
would throw in his lot, both of which powers Stalin, in my 
opinion, considered imperialistic. 
A leading official of the Polish Foreign Office informed me 
that in February his Government had received secret reports 
from Berlin indicating that the German Government had 
reached a conclusion that unless its efforts to detach the West­
ern powers from Poland succeeded, war was inevitable. It was 
at this point that, according to my informant, Berlin seriously 
started laying the ground work for a German-Russian rap­
proachment. Again, Polish official circles received reports in 
early April which indicated that after March 31, Germany 
initiated in earnest the conversations which were signed on 
August 23 and ratified in Moscow on August 31, 1939. 
There was no logical reason for Stalin to back Great Britain 
which he considered as the personification of capitalistic im­
perialism and regarded rightly as not yet ripe for Communist 
propaganda. (Indeed, Trade Unionism in England is too 
healthy and too politically strong to admit Bolshevist theories). 
As regards Germany, there was from Stalin's point of view, 
every reason to back it. 
1. The obvious gains to be achieved in Poland. 
2. Both systems are based on totalitarianism and near-
Communist ideals. 
3. Similarity of ultimate aims. Germany or Hitlerism aims 
at world domination by conquest; Stalinism or Communism at 
world domination by world revolution. 
4. Only one barrier existed to prevent an understanding— 
Herr Hitler, a professed anti-Communist, was after all just one 
mortal man. 
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5. Germany, as a reaction to Nazi rule, was becoming 
internally ripe for Communist propaganda and social unrest. 
Cooperation with Germany in conquest or occupation of 
Central and Eastern Europe would bring the Russian ideology 
closer to Germany and sap theirs, speed up internal trouble, 
liquidate Nazism and natural evolution towards something 
closer to Stalinism and less dangerous for Moscow. In both 
Germany and Russia, statesmanship had given way to novel 
experiments in general, based upon the glorification of the 
state as a super deity in itself, upon the suppression of the 
individual, upon the worship of one man who regards himself 
as the exclusive master of the fate and souls of his people, 
upon the doctrine of one given race over all others, and of 
its consequent right to bid for world domination—in cases of 
Germany and Russia, the objective was the same, though the 
approach to that end differed at the outset. 
Moreover, National Socialist totalitarianism is in my opin­
ion a general adaptation of Bolshevism, [which,] as Commu­
nist totalitarianism, entails a policy of world domination 
through conquest primarily in the name of militarized Na­
tional Socialism. In assessing the real strength of the National 
Socialist doctrine it is well to bear in mind that while declaring 
a ruthless crusade against Communism to destroy the Commu­
nist Party in Germany, Herr Hitler borrowed some of the 
most characteristic axioms of Communism for his State Total­
itarian and Social program. The explanation of this phenome­
non rests in the fact that in Germany, dictatorship was insti­
tuted as the direct result of growing social unrest. 
Shortly after Hitler came to power in Germany there was a 
break in cordial relations between Moscow and Berlin. This 
was brought about by the necessity of ideological shadow­
boxing: Berlin's so-called anti-Bolshevist crusade, and Mos­
cow's so-called anti-Fascist line-up. When, however, ideologi­
cal tactics were no longer useful there was a natural tendency 
on the part both of "National Bolshevism" of Germany and 
"Bolshevist Nationalism" of Soviet Russia, to come closer to­
gether—both are opposed to the so-called capitalist democra­
cies. 
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Russia's participation in the European conflict substantially 
augmented the complexities of the scope of the war. The im­
plication of German-Russian collaboration are far-reaching. 
1. In the current state—for Europe. 
2. In a later stage—for Asia and possibly for the world at 
large unless broken up before it gained momentum. Herr Hit­
ler and Stalin might be expected to collaborate against the 
rest of society which upholds the principles of human freedom 
and the rule of right over might, so long as it suited the interest 
of one or the other. At the same time, however, like two 
gangsters, they might attempt to "do each other in" at every 
turn and perhaps even work subversively towards each other's 
downfall. 
With ideologies now so to speak "out of the window" and 
with the lid off "power politics," western civilization finds it­
self faced with an unlimited menace in the combination of 
imponderable sinister imperialistic forces. 
Seen from the Warsaw angle the following observations stand 
out as important bearing on what eventually developed into a 
Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression. I recall that during 
the formative period of the anti-aggression front, all signs in­
dicated that Moscow was deliberately giving encouragement to 
Britain, France, Turkey, Poland, Rumania and other links in 
the anti-aggression chain. During the course of Moscow's 
encouragement to these powers, I gained the impression that 
Moscow discerned signs of concern in Berlin over growing re­
sistance abroad, which Hitler chose to label "encirclement" 
At about this juncture, my interest was engaged by what I 
considered the significant implications of remarks on the part 
of Russian Ambassador to Poland, Charanov. He inferred 
that Russia was not going to permit itself to become an in­
strument of British policy, whereby so frequently in the past 
Britain had looked to others to fight her battles for her. These 
remarks indicated to me that Moscow was still making up its 
mind as to which side to choose. 
Later, Moscow offered Berlin a Non-Aggression Agreement. 
At the time, I interpreted this as a move aimed among other 
factors at boosting Berlin's confidence in the face of increasing 
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resistance from abroad. Moreover, aside from whatever subtle 
designs in behalf of Soviet imperialism Stalin might have en­
visaged, he undoubtedly had in mind laying the groundwork 
for world revolution. Hence, I felt that while Moscow had on 
the one hand lent its encouragement towards building up re­
sistance against Germany, on the other hand Moscow had 
deliberately taken steps to relieve Berlin of the worry of a Rus­
sian attack in the East by agreeing to conclude a Non-Aggres­
sion Agreement. As observed in my previous writings, Mos­
cow's machinations smacked of a deliberate attempt to foment 
a European conflict. In line with this thought, Moscow rati­
fied the Non-Aggression Agreement on the night of August 31, 
and Germany attacked Poland between 4 and 5 o'clock the 
following morning, September 1, indicating to my mind, that 
ratification had served as the final factor which released the 
German forces against Poland. 
Reports just subsequent to the entry of Russian forces into 
Poland indicate (a) that German military observers had ac­
companied the former and (b) that the German observers 
upon their return to Berlin pointed out that judging by orga­
nization and performance of the Russians on this occasion, 
Germany could crush the Russian military establishment at 
any time it decided to do so. These reports might possibly 
lead Herr Hitler to believe he could afford to permit Russian 
forces to engage in a westward thrust, feeling he could arrest 
the thrust whenever he chose. Once Herr Hitler gained such 
an impression, he might let the Russians lunge westward with 
a view to "bringing home" the Bolshevik menace in the minds 
of western Europe, feeling at the same time that if he thus 
succeeded in sufficiently frightening the Western powers, he 
might either enlist their active assistance towards checking the 
Russians, or at least count on their neutrality while he turned 
against Russia. 
If he failed, however, in his efforts to frighten the Western 
powers with the Bolshevik "bogey," and/or with the implica­
tions of a German-Russian Pact, either into a compromise 
peace or into giving him a free hand in the East, he might 
conceivably embark upon a set plan for joint action with Rus­
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sia, to break up the British and perhaps even the French Em­
pires. By that time, Russia might request, and Hitler might 
be glad to accord her, technical assistance towards reorganiz­
ing Russia's military and economic forces. This process might 
involve a period of as much as two years, during which time 
Herr Hitler might attempt to freeze the Western front while 
he whipped the Russian army into shape. 
As for possible joint action between Germany and Russia, 
it might in a preliminary stage involve in terms of Russian 
aspirations a diversionary thrust against Britain via Scandi­
navia, with a view to gaining submarine and aviation bases 
from which to hold the major portion of the British fleet in the 
North Sea and Home waters to cover a Russian move—vis-a­
vis possibly India, Turkey, and perhaps Iran. In this connec­
tion, I was aware that between 65 and 70 percent of Russian 
agriculture is on a motorized basis, and that an air or naval 
attack from the Black Sea or effective air attacks from Iran 
vis-a-vis Batum or Baku, might paralyse Russia's economic 
as well as military structure. Accordingly it is not inconceiv­
able that with a view to protecting her oil bases, a campaign 
against Iran may later figure in Russia's military plans. 
I feel that when Herr Hitler authorized von Ribbentrop to 
sign the German-Russian Pact on August 23, he was willing 
to pay a high price for Russia's neutrality, and an even higher 
price for Russia's support should he subsequently require it. 
Herr Hitler's plans previous to the outbreak of the Polish-
German conflict, according to all indications, had envisaged a 
swift "blitzkrieg" victory over Poland, with subsequent vigor­
ous efforts towards bringing about a peace with the Western 
powers. Towards this end, he had probably hoped (a) to 
neutralize Russia during his "blitzkrieg" vis-a-vis Poland, and 
(b) subsequently intimidate the Western powers by the implica­
tions of a German-Russian Pact. In other words, he hoped to 
make the Bolshevik "bogey" and its implied joint action with 
Nazism serve as a pressuring instrument vis-a-vis Britain and 
France, in an effort to make them more responsive to peace 
proposals in the western theater. 
Failing in these efforts, Herr Hitler might conceivably enter 
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into a joint program with Stalin, envisaging the redrawing of 
the map of Europe. During the period of Herr Hitler's efforts 
to free himself of a conflict in the West, I should look for 
him to put the wheels of his "propaganda machinery" in mo­
tion towards subtly building up the Bolshevik "bogey" and 
picturing it as the "world's menace No. 1" In this connection, 
Herr Hitler would probably work on the neutrals. Moreover, 
he might possibly encourage Italy, (the sole member of the 
Axis free to express openly its consistent dread of the Bol­
shevik doctrine) to launch a propaganda campaign aimed at 
playing up Bolshevism as Europe's paramount danger. Indeed, 
were Signor Mussolini to perceive anywhere along the line 
that the Western powers were gaining superiority over Ger­
many, it is not inconceivable that Signor Mussolini, fearing 
Herr Hitler's fall might spell his own undoing, and therefore 
hoping to keep the Nazi regime intact, might spare no effort in 
staging a propaganda "play-up" along the above lines. 
The foregoing observations are all based upon the assump­
tion that Britain and France do not contemplate initiating of­
fensive action, due mainly to the desire first to acquire equality 
if not superiority in the air. If action by Germany and/ or Rus­
sia should in the meantime prompt the Western powers to take 
the initiative, this of course might change the whole picture. 
It is, moreover, not inconceivable that the Polish-German con­
flict represented only one of several episodes in the current 
war. Should the scare methods of Herr Hitler and the political 
pressures of the "peace-at-any-price" elements in Western 
Europe fail towards giving Herr Hitler a free hand in the East, 
by say March, I should be inclined to look for present hostil­
ities to endure for a minimum of two years. 
1. Although there is no published record of this conversation, Eden's concern 
over a possible Russian-German alliance was such that in 1937 he sent a memo­
randum to the British Chiefs of Staff warning about the possibility. See The Memoirs 
of Anthony Eden (Boston, 1962), vol. 2, Facing the Dictators, p. 590. 
2. In January, 1935, Goring visited Poland ostensibly on a hunting expedition 
but with far-ranging political objectives as targets. He delivered an expansive 
speech before several high-ranking Polish diplomats and military officials; although 
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no available source mentions Rydz by name as having been present at this meeting 
since he belonged to the latter group in Poland he could well have been there' 
On this occasion, Goring stressed the common bond of Western civilization that had 
traditionally joined Poland and Germany together as a "bulwark" against the 
"Tatar barbarism" of the East, of which Soviet Russia was the latest version, and 
then proposed that Berlin and Warsaw join forces in an attack on the Soviet Union 
In dividing the spoils, Goring assured his listeners that Germany would be content 
with the northwestern portion of Russia, while Poland could have the entire 
Ukraine. He subsequently repeated this proposal to Ptfsudski himself; in each case, 
the Polish reaction was openly cold and discouraging. Undoubtedly Beck had this 
incident in mind in his remark to Biddle. See Szembek, Diariusz, 1:230-31. The 
first clear mention of a Goring-Rydz conversation concerns a meeting in Poland in 
early 1938, when Rydz had become a major political figure. During Goring's visit 
to Warsaw on February 23-26, he held a lengthy conversation with Rydz, during 
which the Nazi leader repeatedly stressed the common threat of the Soviet Union 
to both Poland and Germany but stopped short of renewing his earlier proposal. 
See Szembek, Diariusz, 4:41-42. 
3. Ribbentrop's conversation with Beck is in DGFP, D, 5:167-68. The Polish ver­
sion is in PWB, nos. 50-56. 
4. The text of the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1932 is in PWB, no. 151. 
A number of commercial agreements covering a variety of topics were concluded 
between the two countries in the period following the signing of the non-aggression 
treaty. Texts of all such trade pacts are in Dokumenty i materiafy do historii 
stosunkow polsko-radzieckich (Warsaw, 1967), vol. 6. 
5. This report is not entirely accurate. During the initial stage of the Moscow 
talks, the British and French agreed to obtain Poland's approval for the passage of 
Soviet troops through her territory in the event of war, and they even speculated 
that mounting German pressure would force the Poles to agree. See DBFP, Third 
Series, 7:2-5. The talks with Russia came to a standstill, however, and Molotov 
then made this demand as described by Biddle. DBFP, Third Series, 7:155. That 
Beck was unaware of the earlier Anglo-French stance is clear from his Final Re­
port, pp. 192-94. 
6. The Potemkin-Beck meeting took place on May 10, not in August. Beck, 
Final Report, pp. 191-92. 
PART THREE

Diplomatic Documents


As noted in the introductory essay, Ambassador Biddle was 
particularly skilled at amassing information from widely di­
verse sources, evaluating and digesting it, and then presenting 
his conclusions to Washington in a manner that was compre­
hensible and remarkably prescient. He was a prolific producer 
of dispatches, situation reports, and analytical memoranda, all 
distinguished by insight and clarity. Moreover, because of 
his close personal relationship with President Roosevelt, Bid-
die frequently corresponded directly with the White House. 
Irrespective of form, however, all of his reports reveal the im­
pressive breadth of interest and wealth of personal contacts 
that Biddle employed in his work. In addition to such obvious 
topics as Poland's relations with Germany, the Soviet Union, 
Britain, France, and the United States, he was also concerned 
with domestic political developments, especially the problem 
of the national minorities. Biddle's sources ranged from For­
eign Minister Beck and other high-ranking Polish officials to 
American labor leaders, Nazi Party propaganda officials, and 
fellow diplomats in Warsaw. Thanks to his diligent research 
and reporting, Washington obtained a complete and, as it tran­
spired, extremely accurate picture of the Polish as well as 
the international political and economic scene. 
In selecting the documents presented below, the editors 
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were guided by a desire to demonstrate the skills in observa­
tion and deduction that Biddle manifested consistently. Par­
ticular care was taken to choose materials that would comple­
ment those few dispatches already published in the series 
Foreign Relations of the United States. Two items have been 
published elsewhere, in part or in their entirety, and this fact 
has been duly noted. Nonetheless, they are included herein 
either because of their direct pertinence to the events that Bid-
die was describing, or as excellent examples of his superb ana­
lytical and reportorial abilities. With these exceptions, how­
ever, all documents appear for the first time in print in this 
collection.1 
In preparing the documents for publication, the editors have 
proceeded as they did in editing the lengthy report. As a con­
venience to the reader, the involved formal introductions and 
closings of dispatches and letters have been omitted. Further­
more, all of the code ciphers and diplomatic transmittal formu­
lae have been removed from the papers; unless the document 
in question is identified specifically as a "memorandum'' or 
"telegram," or is obviously a personal letter to Roosevelt, it is 
a routine diplomatic dispatch. The editors assigned the number 
that heads each entry, and only materials not originating from 
Warsaw have the point of origin noted. Otherwise, the 
material is presented exactly as it left Biddle's office. All paren­
thetical expressions, indications of emphasis, and colloquial 
phrases are his; moreover, footnote material added by Biddle 
himself is carefully acknowledged as such. The listing of the 
documents in chronological order reveals not only the unfold­
ing panorama of European politics on the eve of World War 
II but also the evolution in perspective and interpretation of 
Biddle and the Polish government. 
1. All of the documents published below are deposited in the Franklin D. Roose­
velt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
DOCUMENT ONE 
July 26, 1937 
My dear Mr. President: 
With the passing of each day both Margaret and I are feel­
ing more at home in Poland. We were fortunate to have arrived 
at the height of the short "spring season" during which the 
President and other Government officials were in Warsaw. This 
served to accelerate arrangements for the presentation of my 
credentials. 
The occasion of my presentation was indeed a magnificent, 
picturesque, and efficiently conducted ceremony. I sensed a dis­
tinct effort on the part of the President, his Cabinet, and of 
officials all along the line to make this ceremony an especially 
impressive one, as a particularly friendly gesture to yourself 
and to our Nation. My impression has since been confirmed on 
numerous occasions by confidential remarks by leading officials 
here to the effect that they hoped I was pleased with the details 
of the ceremony, for they had been happy to carry out instruc­
tions calling for more effort in connection therewith than with 
any like ceremony in the past. In this connection, they pointed 
out that for the first time on record General Wieniawa-Dlugo­
szowski,1 formerly a close friend and aide-de-camp to the late 
Marshal Ptfsudski, had especially requested to be allowed to 
receive me on the occasion of my laying a wreath at the Tomb 
of the Unknown Soldier (this occasion immediately followed 
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the main ceremony). In brief, it was gratifying for me to learn, 
by this gesture on the part of the Government, the high esteem 
in which you and our Nation are held in Poland. 
Moreover, because of my profound affection for, and genu­
ine pride in you I was in no small measure touched by the 
personal remarks which President Moscicki, in the presence of 
Colonel Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made to me during 
my private audience. Colonel Beck, moreover, joined whole­
heartedly in support of the President's remarks. In effect, the 
President stated that you had engaged his sincere interest from 
the very moment that you took over the reins of our Govern­
ment. He had recognized the widespread difficulties with which 
you had been confronted on the very day you took office and 
had followed with the keenest interest your subsequent moves, 
the substance of your program, and the methods whereby you 
had so courageously and intelligently succeeded in arresting 
the vertical decline of prices and the panic tendency. Not only 
had it been a remarkable feat to arrest the momentum of a 
depression of such magnitude, but also an outstanding accom­
plishment to have set the wheels of industry again in motion, 
and to have restored confidence, and to have given the Nation— 
so to speak—a fresh start. Indeed, this had represented a great 
achievement—brought about by your own courageous intelli­
gence, and withal your constant sympathetic regard for and 
understanding of humanity. What you had accomplished had 
engaged the interest and study on the part of the whole world. 
Your prestige and influence had advanced so tremendously 
that your constructive moves in the direction of world peace 
were being followed with utmost interest everywhere. Presi­
dent Moscicki hoped that, in view of all the many and impor­
tant tasks with which you were daily faced, you could find time 
to rest, at least occasionally. Indeed, he stated with emphasis 
that it should be the duty of everyone close to you to see that 
you took excellent care of your health towards maintaining 
that extraordinary vitality and energy which was contributing 
so importantly to your courageous and able direction of the 
Nation's renewed forward movement. 
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At this point, Colonel Beck, with genuine sincerity, stated 
he heartily subscribed to all the President had said. 
I then had the pleasure of describing to them both my last 
visit with you at the White House. It was on the morning of 
your departure for Charleston, where you boarded the boat to 
sail for the Buenos Aires Conference.2 It was soon after the 
elections which had been preceded by a lengthy campaign in 
which you yourself had so energetically participated. I had 
never seen you in better health and spirits, despite your ardu­
ous campaigning activities. Indeed, I was at that moment more 
impressed than ever with your extraordinary combination of 
vitality, dynamic energy, and calmness. 
The President was delighted to learn this and requested me 
to convey to you his every good wish for continued happiness, 
health, and success. 
Another occasion which has afforded me a sense of real 
pleasure was that of my meeting with the Nuncio, Monsignor 
Philippe Cortesi.3 He had just arrived from Buenos Aires, 
where he had served as Nuncio for some time. He is a man 
who, from all accounts, justly gained an enviable reputation 
during his period of service there, and even during the short 
time he has been here he has come to be regarded generally 
with affection and esteem. He told me with great sincerity that 
his meeting with you and your son in Buenos Aires had been a 
source of genuine pleasure for him. He had had a talk with you 
and had observed the unparalleled welcome accorded you in 
Buenos Aires. The spirit with which this welcome was given by 
the people on the streets, as well as by the officials, the expres­
sions on the peoples' faces as they greeted you, all had made 
an indelible impression on the Nuncio's mind. Then, during his 
subsequent conversation with you, he felt that he had acquired 
a real insight into your inner self. He was profoundly im­
pressed with your humanitarian outlook, your spiritual sense, 
your courageous intelligence, and innate kindness to all with 
whom you came in contact. Indeed, you inspired the best in 
everyone. Besides, the Nuncio was thankful that there was 
such a truly beneficial influence in the world of today. He en­
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tertained the hope of going to the United States in the not 
far distant future, at which time he sincerely hoped that he 
might have the honor of an audience with you. 
1. Brigadier General Boleslaw Wieniawa-DIugoszowski, a physician by training, 
was one of Pi/sudski's most intimate collaborators. He had served the Marshal closely 
during World War I, the Russo-Polish conflict (1919-20), and the brief period when 
PiJsudski held supreme political power legally; he also played a major role in organ­
izing segments of the Polish military establishment in support of the 1926 coup 
d'etat. He then served briefly in the diplomatic service as a military attache in Paris 
and Bucharest, and later returned to the army as a ranking officer in the General In­
spectorate of the Armed Forces and the commander of the Warsaw garrison. A strong 
backer of Beck, he was appointed ambassador to Italy in 1938, and served for a brief 
period in September, 1939, as the successor to President Moscicki. For an account of 
his Rome embassy, see Marian Romeyko, Wspomnienia o Wieniawie i o Rzymskich 
Czasach (London, 1969). 
2. The Buenos Aires Conference took place in November, 1936. 
3. Cortesi was the Papal Nuncio in Poland during Biddle's tenure, 1937-39. 
DOCUMENT TWO 
July 10, 1937 
Memorandum 
Matthew Woll,1 in my conversation with him during his 
visit here, stated in effect [that] the reason Warsaw had been 
chosen as the meeting place for the Congress of International 
Federation of Trade Unions was the following: 
The British and French labor organizations, working in many 
respects along the same international political lines as their 
respective Governments, had engineered the meeting here in 
order to appeal to the laboring classes of Poland and other 
small neighboring states to bring pressure on their respective 
Governments to remain independent of the influences of the 
larger neighboring states. Both British and French delegates 
were careful not to mention the latter by name but their 
identities were obviously Germany and Italy. Britain realized 
she could no longer definitely count on her colonies as in the 
past and required some time yet before attaining her proposed 
peak in armament. The Dominions Conference2 had resulted in 
a demand for a fresh examination of Britain's position vis-a 
vis Germany. The British Air Force and Navy would be up to 
standard in eighteen months, but a continued decline in enlist­
ments would prevent the Army's being up to proposed 
strength by that time. Conscription would undoubtedly call 
for a general election. Hence, Britain's present attitude in re­
spect to Spain as well as her currently adopted means of cir­
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cumventing Germany's attempts to gain control, in one capac­
ity or another, of smaller states in this part of Europe. 
Including Sir Walter Citrine, President of the International 
Federation of Labor Unions, the various delegates to the Con­
gress had deliberately given Woll the following impression: if 
Franco won in Spain they believed Poland would become the 
scene for the next test between the two ideologies. Though 
Citrine, at the meeting on July 2nd, had already publicly 
stated he believed it would be Czechoslovakia, he subsequent­
ly confidentially told Woll he really believed it would be Po­
land. Citrine, moreover, had told Woll that, in his opinion, 
the two ideologies, Fascism and Communism, had different 
aims but applied similar methods towards obtaining their re­
spective objectives. 
Woll's discussions with various delegates had given him 
the impression that labor circles looked for a military dictator­
ship to replace Stalin, such a dictatorship to be followed by a 
gradual breaking up of the Soviet Union into autonomous 
states. Moreover, Germany was exerting no little influence 
towards this end. 
Regarding the Comintern, Woll said that when Trotsky and 
Lenin came to power, they were faced with a lack of ade­
quately armed and equipped, as well as coordinated, defense. 
Hence, among other aims, the establishment of the Comin­
tern envisaged holding at bay other nations which might wish 
to intervene in Soviet affairs during the formative stages of 
organizing the Communist State. The Comintern directed its 
efforts along the lines of an "inside job", towards internally 
weakening, if not crippling, and thus holding off the opposi­
tion. They, Lenin and Trotsky, so to speak, augmented their own 
defensive forces by subversively enlisting the support of as 
large a portion as possible of the other nations' manpower. 
Woll had gained the impression that the Comintern's efforts 
were not currently proving as effective on the Continent as in 
the past, since they had provoked a forceful resistance. Hence 
the Comintern had turned to the United States. In continuing 
to apply like methods today, the Comintern aimed to gain 
control of the merchant marine on a worldwide basis. In 
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this connection, Woll said the Comintern's efforts were now di­
rected towards gaining a strong foothold in the unions en­
gaged in our own shipping industry. He added that thus the 
Comintern aimed to control ocean transportation facilities 
eventually throughout the world with the objective of bringing 
about a paralysis of shipments of goods, food, and ammuni­
tion in the event of war. 
Regarding the internal structure of the International Feder­
ation of Labor Unions, France and Belgium actually domi­
nated the organization as a whole. French and Belgian 
delegates played up to the labor of the Latin countries, the 
British played ball with the French up to a certain point but 
avoided becoming involved in France's Communistic tie-up. 
Leon Jouhaux, President of Confederation Generate du Tra­
vail, the French delegate, though not formerly Communist-
minded, now had to play ball with the Communists for he was 
accompanied here by a Communist Committee from his own 
labor organization. Besides, Jouhaux's long-time personal 
antipathy for Mussolini led him, consciously or unconscious­
ly, to support the cause, opposed to Mussolini's doctrine. The 
British were none too sure of France's position due to these 
Communist leanings; hence there was an increasing desire on 
the British delegates' part to gain the cooperation of Ameri­
can labor organizations. The British admittedly would feel 
more secure were American labor represented at the Congress. 
Woll's own impression was that the Jews in the International 
Federation of Labor Unions were strenuously endeavoring to 
gain a foothold in the organization's control. This was becom­
ing more obvious every day. 
Various delegates, the British and French in particular, 
had, for Woll's benefit, deliberately painted a black picture 
of economic and labor conditions here. Moreover, they had 
obviously determined to discredit by inference the present 
Polish Government. 
At the same time, Woll had been told that the underlying 
situation in Poland was a volcanic condition due to following 
facts: 
(a) Poland had made a grave mistake in not having adopted 
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land reform such as the Baltic States had done. One of the 
contributing reasons for [the] peasants' difficulties here was 
that the landed nobility were allowed to retain their vast es­
tates. These properties should have been split up into farms 
and made available to the surplus peasant population.3 
(b) Peasants' sons were raised on extremely meager living 
standard until reaching military age. They were thereupon 
taken into the army where they were fed well and generally 
well cared for. At the termination of the military training pe­
riod they were released to go back to the farms and to return 
to their meager standard of living. The Government should 
establish and organize means for engaging these men after 
their training period in order to prevent discontent conse­
quent to the drastic contrast between their welfare in the army 
and their subsequent return to poor living conditions. It was 
of utmost importance for the Government to create such means 
in order to secure these men as pillars of the State. Other­
wise, they would become prey to the influences of radical or­
ganizers. 
(c) The Jews felt themselves steadily becoming the objects 
of intolerance. They were resentful, fearful, and bewildered. 
(d) In this connection, the Jews are apprehensive lest a 
continued lack of rainfall would mean a poor harvest and con­
sequent bad times this winter. They felt that this would mean 
greater pressure against their race. 
(In relation to the Jewish problem here, Woll believed the 
problem was fundamentally an economic one. However, it was 
an economic problem associated with and emphasized by the 
racial characteristics of the Jews.)4 
(e) It was generally believed here that the Fascist element 
in Government circles was behind the present drive against 
the Jews. In this connection, the labor delegates pointed out 
that three-quarters of the Government was Fascist-minded 
and only one-quarter liberal. So far the one-quarter had suc­
ceeded in tempering the otherwise more drastic actions of the 
majority. It was further felt by these delegates that the Hitler 
regime is playing for control of this Government.5 
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1. Matthew Woll, a leading figure in the Photoengravers Union, was one of the 
chief representatives of the conservative wing in the American labor movement. 
First as head of the National Civic Federation and later as a spokesman for the 
American Federation of Labor, Woll emerged as a symbol of old-guard opposition 
to the industrial unionism exemplified by the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
and led the "Red-baiting" campaign against that organization. Woll's views on 
European labor and Polish domestic conditions are quite well-founded; more im­
portant, they typify those opinions about Poland held by many Americans. Finally, 
this document is of interest as an example of the broad, diverse contacts employed 
by Biddle in shaping his own interpretations of the contemporary Polish scene. 
2. The Dominions Conference of Prime Ministers took place in May, 1937, in 
London. 
3. The state of Polish agriculture's structure was not as depressing as Woll 
presents it, although there were some serious problems. Despite well-organized 
opposition from church and landowning circles, land reform made substantial prog­
ress before the war: in the period 1919-38, a total of 2,654,800 hectares of arable 
land were distributed among Polish small and medium farmers or used to set up 
model experimental farms (1 hectare equals about 2.47 acres). In addition, over 
5,000,000 hectares of scattered holdings were consolidated into efficient agricultural 
units, and another 558,700 hectares were reclaimed for agricultural use. Despite these 
gains, however, Polish agriculture was still structurally top-heavy: although large 
estates accounted for less than 1 percent of the total number of farms, they em­
braced 43 percent of arable cropland, whereas 65 percent of all farmers owned only 
15 percent of the land. See the statistical studies, Malty Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, 
pp. 68-72, tables 1-6, and Poland in Facts and Figures, 1944-1964 (Warsaw, 1964), 
pp. 31-32, 51-52. See also Ferdynand Zweig, Poland between Two Wars (London, 
1944), pp. 130-34. However, given such serious internal problems as a steadily ex­
panding population (due to a rising birthrate and a decline in emigration to the 
United States) coupled with the slow pace of industrial development caused by the 
shortage of investment capital, it is doubtful whether a more aggressive and effec­
tive land reform would have produced any immediate improvement. 
4. Although the more than 3,000,000 Jews constituted only about 10 percent 
of the country's total population, they dominated much of the lower middle-class 
occupational levels (business, artisans) and professional groups, and were concen­
trated in the larger cities; hence, an expanding Polish population in search of in­
dustrial, commerical, or professional employment tended to view the Jews as compet­
itors for a limited prize. Moreover, the Hasidic beliefs of many Polish Jews set 
them apart from the Christian population in terms of dress, customs, and language. 
Of the substantial literature of this topic, see especially Szymon Bronsztejn, Lud­
nosc zydowska w Polsce w okresie miedzywojennej. Studium statystyczne (Wroclaw, 
1963), and Simon Segal, The New Poland and the Jews (New York, 1950). 
5. While there is no evidence that Hitler actually or directly meddled in Polish 
domestic politics, there is no doubt that Polish crypto-Fascists had a powerful voice 
in government circles during this period; moreover, close ties existed between this 
element and the Italian Fascists. For details, see Edward D. Wynot, Jr., Polish 
Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 
1935-1939 (Athens, Ga., 1974). For a discussion of the regime's Jewish policy during 
this period, see the same author's " 'A Necessary Cruelty': The Emergence of 
Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936-1939," American Historical Review 76, 4 
(October, 1971): 1035-58. 
DOCUMENT THREE 
August 28, 1937 
My dear Mr. President: 
I greatly appreciate your thoughtful letter of August 16 
which came in yesterday's diplomatic pouch. I am especially 
gratified to learn that the State Department has told you that 
my despatches have been proving of interest, for I love my 
work, and have been doing my utmost towards acquiring a 
clear picture of Poland in terms both of domestic and foreign 
policy. I am happy to say, that the attitude on the part of 
Colonel Jozef Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to­
wards me has been frank and most friendly. Indeed, this cor­
dial relationship has proven extremely helpful to me since 
my arrival here. From my own observation, Colonel Beck is 
steadily becoming the leading force in the Polish Government, 
due mainly to his initiative, his willingness to make decisions, 
and to shoulder responsibility. I find in him a man of courage 
and intelligence. 
He has frequently emphasized to me, that his determined 
objective is the maintenance of independence and peace for 
Poland. In line with this, he feels that if he succeeds in his 
aims, he will be contributing his part towards the maintenance 
of peace in this section of Europe. In this connection, I have 
noted during our frequent conversations, his increasing em­
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phasis on the importance of what he calls "voisinage"—or the 
good neighbor policy. In this connection, it is clear to me that 
he has taken a leaf from your own book. 
As regards his direction of his country's foreign affairs, he 
admits his "tight-rope walking" role is a difficult one. He en­
joys it, however, and has so far proven himself capable of deal­
ing with the various complicated phases entailed in Eastern 
European affairs. He was profoundly touched by the substance 
of a message which you transmitted to him through Ambas­
sador George [Jerzy] Potocki,1 who recently arrived here from 
Washington. The Colonel told me, in effect that it afforded him 
the sense of utmost gratification, thus to learn, that his own 
efforts to preserve peace in this part of the world had come to 
your notice. Indeed, he was frankly profoundly touched. 
In closing, may I not express to you my most profound fe­
licitations upon your grand address at Roanoke Island on Au­
gust 18.2 Both Margaret and I derived a real thrill from this 
forceful declaration. It was simply splendid! 
1. Ambassador to the United States from May, 1936, to December, 1940. Previ­
ously, he had served as Polish ambassador to Italy and Turkey. 
2. The text of the Roanoke Island address is in Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public 
Papers and Addresses, 6:326-33. 
DOCUMENT FOUR1 
[June 19, 1938] 
Streamline observations on various aspects of [the] 
complex effect of Hitlers expansion program—in terms 
of (a) Poland's short and long-term objective and (b) its 
general bearing on Eastern and Central Europe 
(from the Polish viewpoint) 
In examining the forces which have influenced, and in 
many cases determined, the course of events leading to the 
present tense situation in Europe, I have herein endeavored to 
fit together some of the pieces of the international mosaic 
which have come under my observation here. My purpose en­
visages an attempt, from Poland's viewpoint, to peer over the 
hill of European political confusion, to gain a glimpse of what 
events are leading to. 
From the Eastern and Central European, and particularly 
the Polish point of view, the potential outcome of events both 
current and the recent past, may best be evaluated by taking 
into consideration the implications and possible effect of the 
following aspects: 
(a) Hitler's reportedly envisaged synchronization of an 
eastward expansion policy with his four-year economy plan. 
(b) Mussolini's and Hitler's apparent attempts respectively 
to shake loose France and Czechoslovakia from their alliances 
with the Soviet. (According to the Polish viewpoint, Hitler 
sees in a severance of these ties a clearer pathway for his en­
visaged ultimate infiltration of the Ukraine, and Mussolini 
conceivably wishes to clear the path for Hitler's envisaged 
drive as a means of diverting his course from the Adriatic to 
the Ukraine). 
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(c) Potential effect of Austria's annexation upon econom­
ic-political outlook of Central and Eastern Europe and of 
Poland in particular. 
(d) Poland's position in respect to Hitler's plans. 
In the course of discrete inquiry as to Polish observations on 
a rumor going the rounds in diplomatic circles to the effect that 
Hitler envisaged a policy of German infiltration of certain 
states including the Ukraine, by stages, in synchronization 
with his four-year economy plan, a high ranking informed Pol­
ish official imparted to me in strictest confidence there had 
taken place informal discussions between certain Polish and 
German officials, wherein the Germans had in vague terms ac­
tually mentioned the Ukraine in the light of a German long-
range objective. In these conversations, which were only of the 
most informal character, the Germans had done all the talking. 
The Poles had listened only\ Indeed, my informant emphasized 
this point, and added that a policy envisaging a future aggres­
sion vis-a-vis the Soviet in collaboration with Germany was a 
dangerous one in terms of Poland's long-range interests. On 
the other hand, by listening, the Poles had at least to a certain 
extent gained confirmation of their suspicions as to Germany's 
long-range aims. 
As to the likelihood of Minister Beck's (or his associates') 
agreeing to collaborate with the Germans in a Ukraine-wards 
move, Beck, in my opinion would not lend himself beyond the 
point of listening to any such proposal. For, on the one hand, 
he is not in the habit of committing himself so far in advance, 
while on the other hand, he could not fail to recognize that 
such a long-range project would spell eventual vassaldom for 
Poland (even his close associate, whose observations I have 
above recited, bore out in effect my opinion in this regard). 
It is, moreover, well to bear in mind that notable among 
Beck's characteristics are his alertness and elasticity of mind; 
moreover, due perhaps to his military training, [considerations 
of] strategy discernably marks all phases of his direction of 
Poland's foreign policy. Hence for each move forward, he 
generally leaves himself two ways for retreat (see my despatch 
No. 194 of October 7, 1937).2 
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Beck's tendency to color the direction of his foreign policy 
with the effects of his former military training was also in part 
illustrated by his remark to me to the effect that according to 
Article III of the Polish cavalry and artillery regulations, once 
the command to "gallop" had been given, the direction of the 
"charge" could not be changed. Hence, it was necessary for 
the commanding officer to study every possible angle in ad­
vance, in an effort, not only to appraise his opponents' position, 
but also to make sure that the "charge" under consideration 
was properly conceived, timed, and directed. Minister Beck 
added significantly that this principle formed one of the cardi­
nal considerations which guided his direction of Poland's for­
eign policy. Indeed, he realized that before embarking on any 
positive line of policy in one direction or another, it was essen­
tial to devote undivided study to the effect and implications, 
in terms both of short and long-range outlook; for once his 
country had actually embarked upon a given positive course, 
there was no veering as to direction, nor turning back. 
It is safe to say that, if between now and the next four years, 
any feasible measure presents itself whereby Beck can avoid 
Poland's vassalage to Germany, he would take advantage of 
it. Moreover, to my mind, Beck aims to confine the German 
frontier to the minimum vis-a-vis Poland; consequently, at this 
point, I would not look for him to involve himself as a party to 
any envisaged extension of the Polish-German frontier. As to 
whether Poland might in the future become a party to such a 
scheme under certain circumstances, it is, in my opinion con­
ceivable, but only if at the time the economic-political-military 
circumstances were such as to offer Beck no alternative. In 
other words, in such a case, he might conceivably be driven to 
collaboration in the German Ukraine drive. 
In conclusion, it is well to bear in mind that one of Beck's 
guiding policies is to keep Poland in such a position as to jump 
at a moment's notice in the direction which Beck feels will 
serve Poland's interests to the best advantage. 
Strict adherence to this policy would preclude his agreement 
to such a long-range German-envisaged Ukraine project which 
in the end would only accrue to Poland's disadvantage in terms 
of peace, independence and international prestige. 
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Poland's playing into the hands of Germany would be, I be­
lieve, in conflict with Beck's policy of counter-balancing Ger­
man eastward expansion. Moreover, I do not believe that the 
acquisition of additional lands would hold any temptation for 
Poland. My observations lead me to feel that the acquisition of 
any part of the Russian Ukraine would fail to compensate 
Poland for having Germany on her East and South as well as 
her West. As a matter of fact, Poland is having none too com­
fortable a time as it is, with Germany at her West. Indeed, 
there is an undisclosed but deep-lying apprehension here over 
the potential threat of Germany vis-a-vis Upper Silesia, the 
Corridor, and Danzig. In the eyes of Polish officialdom, each 
fresh evidence of Germany's territorial appetite makes those 
three points loom more grimly as potential objects of German 
aspirations. 
Poland has gained the impression that for the moment Ger­
many welcomes a strong Poland to serve as a buffer between 
herself and the Soviet during Germany's consolidation of her 
position in Central Europe. Informed veteran observers in 
Polish inner Government circles, however, regard this merely 
as temporary comfort, for they have not forgotten their former 
Master's (PiTsudski's) warning to the effect that Poland must in 
all possible ways make friends with Germany during peace 
time, in order to allow Poland time to strengthen herself suf­
ficiently to meet an inevitable eventual German challenge. 
Of connected bearing, I take occasion to recite the follow­
ing paraphrased excerpts from my cable No. 88 of May 23:3 
Further light might be thrown on the motives underlying the 
present Polish course of action respecting Czechoslovakia by 
the following: 
1. Poland, in my opinion, may be expected more and more 
to recognize that a conflict of German and Polish interests is 
being led to by events in the making. 
2. Briefly, I am cognizant that the deep-seated desire of 
Polish officialdom, although undisclosed, is to keep Czecho­
slovakia from becoming a German arrow pointing too far east 
and running along the southern border of Poland, as a direct 
and dreaded contact between Germany and the Polish 
Ukraine minority would thereby be allowed. [This] contact, 
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Polish official circles feel, Germany would employ as a way of 
indirectly contacting the Russian Ukraine, to the end of the 
ultimate infiltration with German politico-economic hege­
mony of the Ukraine, and as an instrument of pressure 
against Poland. Official circles in Warsaw in this connection 
see a possible German encirclement of Poland in the potential 
expansion of German hegemony along the eastern borders of 
Poland, which would be a threat to Poland's peace and in­
dependence. 
3. The more positive, moreover, does the character of 
the politico-economic drive of Germany become, the more in 
my opinion, will the interests of Germany and Poland clash, 
for it is my belief that Germany's push at present has caused 
the rise of Polish hopes that a close tie-up with a Slovak 
minority, favorable both to Hungary and Poland, might 
strengthen Hungary's hand and serve to block Germany's 
infiltration of the whole of Czechoslovakia.4 It would appear 
that this is in conflict with the suspected encouragement by 
Germany of Hungary's appetite in the direction of Transyl­
vania. 
4. German-Polish interests clash again in Rumania, for 
Poland is not pleased at the prospect of German infiltration 
into her ally's territory.5 
Of further important bearing, in the course of conversation 
just previous to his departure for Stockholm, Beck imparted 
in strictest confidence what I consider to be a most enlight­
ening disclosure of his foreign policy in terms of the long-
range outlook. In effect he said he felt that some day, in the 
event that Germany might find an envisaged acquisition of 
the Ukraine impossible through Nazi-styled "peaceful pene­
tration", Poland might have to fight to prevent passage of 
German troops over her territory, which from the German 
military viewpoint would represent the most direct route to 
the Ukraine. In such event, Germany would attack Poland, 
not as the objective, but as the means of reaching Germany's 
envisaged Ukrainian objective. 
Poland would resist such an attack with every force at her 
command in order not only to eject the Germans from Po­
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land's soil, but also to prevent them from seizing the Ukraine, 
for German occupation of the Ukraine would constitute a 
menace to Poland's peace and independence. In such efforts, 
Poland might face potential defeat, but she would delay and 
"bleed" Germany to such an extent that eventually through 
Poland's resistance, together with the force of an almost 
inevitable subsequent Anglo-French-German clash on Ger­
many's Western front, Germany would be prevented from 
obtaining her objective. 
In conclusion, Beck said he would, in effect, discreetly and 
strictly confidentially impart his aforementioned views to 
certain representatives of Scandinavian and Baltic states with 
whom he intended to confer in Stockholm, pointing out to 
them that particularly the Baltic states, due to their geo­
political position, would inevitably suffer as potentially dan­
gerous an outlook as Poland, in the event of a German seizure 
of the Ukraine. Moreover, he would make clear his opinion 
that the Baltics occupied a geo-political position similar to 
that of Poland's in respect both to Germany and the Soviet. 
Even before his departure for Stockholm, he confidentially 
imparted the above line of thought to the Estonian Minister 
here, who had played so important a mediatory role during 
the Polish-Lithuanian dispute.6 At the same time, Beck ar­
ranged with the latter a forward date for a formal visit to 
Tallinn, whereby Beck would be enabled both to express his 
profound sense of gratitude to the Estonian Government for 
their important mediatory contribution during the heated 
stages of the aforementioned quarrel, and to emphasize dis­
creetly his aforecited views on the Baltics' sharing Poland's 
geo-political position. 
Since Beck's return from his Stockholm and Tallinn visits, 
I have derived an impression in my numerous conversations 
with him that he was satisfied with the results of both trips. 
In brief, from my own observations, I feel that both voyages 
might be characterized, on the one hand, by Beck's soundings 
as to Scandinavian and Baltic capacity and willingness to 
resist ideological forces through the maintenance of a firm 
"active" neutrality policy, while on the other, "diplomatic 
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shopping" on Poland's behalf. As to the effect thereof on Po­
land's position in the international political arena, my ob­
servations lead me to believe Beck made a good turn for his 
country in the light both of drawing closer to "Downing 
Street" through the medium of London-inclined Sandier,7 
and of strengthening Poland-Baltic ties. 
In response to my further inquiry, an informed high rank­
ing Polish official, and close associate of Beck's, frankly stated 
that to extend Germany's frontier vis-a-vis Poland along the 
south and east, would work a serious disadvantage for Poland. 
Indeed, the only conceivable way Poland might off-set the 
disadvantage of Germany's occupation of the Ukraine, would 
be a Polish tactical move to occupy White Russia.8 Thus, 
Poland might gain a strategic position whereby she might 
hope to prevent Germany's eventually covering Poland's 
entire eastern frontier. Moreover, Poland might thus be in a 
position to counter any possible German attempt to attack 
Polish territory elsewhere. In other words, such a move on 
Poland's part would be mainly tactical to block possible 
German encirclement of Poland which would inevitably spell 
Poland's vassaldom to Germany. 
In line with this explanation, my informant referred me to 
a book written in the Polish language by Mr. Bochenski, a 
Pole; the name of the book (translated into English) is, 
"Between Russia and Germany"9 My informant recom­
mended it as in many respects one of the most illuminating 
discussions of Polish policy vis-a-vis both Germany and 
Russia that he had ever read. While emphasizing that the 
substance of the book could be taken in no sense as illustra­
tive of official policy, still it represented, to his mind, political 
observations which were full of possibilities. In brief, the book 
had pointed out that in the event of a German seizure of the 
Ukraine by troops transported via territory south of Poland 
and by air, Poland's only alternative would be to seize the 
territory immediately north of the Ukraine. In at least this 
respect, the book corresponded with my informant's ideas as 
to what Poland's course might necessarily be in event of 
German action vis-a-vis the Soviet. 
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In further discussing Germany's Ukrainian objective, my 
competent informant stated [that] his intelligence reports 
indicated that German officialdom expected a continued 
period of weakness in the Soviet's internal structure to lead 
to an eventual break-down, whereby resistance to aggression 
would be reduced to a minimum.10 Indeed, the Germans felt 
that if present conditions lead to a military revolution, "skill­
fully" supported in advance from the outside, matters might 
even develop so that German military "specialists" would 
be called in to assist both in the restoration of order and in the 
reorganization of the military structure. My informant then 
pointed out that German policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet has for 
long been one envisaging a long-range "inside job", entail­
ing the secret enrollment of executives and officials occupying 
key positions in coup-aimed organizations, and a subsequent 
subversive propagandizing of the masses. 
Of related bearing, the Japanese Ambassador to Poland, 
[Shuichi] Sakoh, came into possession of a confidential report 
covering a meeting as of December 24, [1937,] of the Soviet 
Government Council at the Kremlin (see my cable No. 33 
March 25, 3 p.m.)11 wherein among other points, it was con­
cluded that of the two threats to Soviet security, Japan cur­
rently comprised the more immediate danger as compared 
with Germany. Moreover, it was concluded that the Soviet 
was in no position to fight on two fronts, etc. I understand 
that the substance of this report is known both to the Govern­
ment in Warsaw, and to that in Berlin. In addition to this, 
highest military circles here disclose their reports to the effect 
that the majority of Brigadier Generals presently being ap­
pointed by the Soviet are officers who were made captains as 
recently as 1936. This, among other confidential information 
dealing with the weakened condition of the Soviet military 
establishment, are known to the Governments of Warsaw, 
Ankara, and Berlin. 
In connection with the foregoing it is significant to me that 
during his recent participation in the examination at the 
Polish-Soviet border of prisoners returning home from Soviet 
prison camps, a responsible individual informed me that 
216 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 
during the past several months he found these returning 
prisoners averaged ten to fifteen per day, all Germans. My 
informant felt that the preponderance of German prisoners 
in these various camps indicated Soviet distrust and a con­
centrated campaign against the German group in the Soviet 
by the authorities thereof. Moreover, in turn, he felt that this 
might indicate a concentrated German subversive effort 
against the Soviet Government. 
In other words, this reported[ly] subversive German policy 
entailed reaching over and getting a firm grip on certain 
personalities in key positions for the purpose of using them in 
their scheme when the time was "ripe" Then, when there 
were sufficient signs of decomposition setting in, these agents 
throughout the [Soviet] political and military structure 
would operate, not only towards giving the situation the 
needed "shove" to bring on a revolution, but also to steer 
their respective departments in the direction of calling for 
German assistance. 
In commenting upon Hitler's suspected envisaged methods 
of accomplishing his Ukrainian objective by means of an 
"inside job", an informed high military authority stated that 
the German General Staff were fully aware of the difficulties 
to be encountered in guarding the extensive northern line of 
[the] Ukraine against a possible eventual attack by Soviet 
forces. As a matter of fact, few people realized how enor­
mous was the Ukraine, and amongst those who were familiar 
with that territory there was a division of opinion as to 
whether the Ukraine extended to the Don or even to the 
Caucasus. Besides the difficulty of guarding such a huge 
territory against the invasion, Hitler was aware of the risks 
entailed in a military seizure. In other words, why run a 
military risk, when there existed the possiblity of his mach­
inations bringing about the Ukraine's falling into his lap. 
It would seem from all reports that Mussolini has reverted 
to his policy of 1933: to endeavor to steer Germany into 
Russia as a means of leaving Mussolini's interest in the Bal­
kans alone. In connection with this, informed veteran ob­
servers in official circles here discern through the fog of in­
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ternational political confusion, characterized by maneuvers 
and counter maneuvers, the earmarks of at least one develop­
ment in the making: namely, an attempt both on the part of 
Rome and Berlin, but for respectively different reasons, to 
shake France and Czechoslovakia loose from their respective 
alliances with the Soviet. In this connection my informants' 
reports lead them to feel Mussolini is aware of Hitler's long-
range aim to infiltrate the Ukraine with Nazi economic and 
political hegemony, in connection with which objective 
Mussolini perceives an "out" for his own prospective intra-
axis difficulties—in other words, a means of getting Hitler "off 
his neck" in those states which Mussolini had hitherto re­
garded as lying within the sphere of Italy's economic-political 
influence and wherein Mussolini fears Hitler might even­
tually "muscle in" at the expense of Italian interest. 
An informed Polish official confidentially remarked that 
despite a potential conflict of Italo-German interests in sev­
eral domains, the Axis, in his opinion, would probably remain 
intact—if not as hitherto active—for after all, it had so far cost 
little to maintain and had proven a source of profit for both 
axis points. Indeed, so far, disadvantages were limited to 
intra-Axis differences—and in this connection just how long 
Mussolini would continue to accept the short end of the 
profits, remained the outstanding question. 
Hitler, on the other hand, according to my informants' 
observations, seeing the Ukraine a potentially valuable con­
sumers' market, as well as a source of commodities supply, 
aimed to gain economic-political domination there—not, how­
ever, by resort to arms, but by means of a typical Hitlerian 
"inside job" styled by Hitler and his Nazi associates as 
"peaceful penetration" Hitler's successes in carrying for­
ward these methods of power-politics had given him added 
encouragement to believe he could perform a similar opera­
tion on the Soviet. Indeed, his cunning and insidious mach­
inations had already been in operation throughout the Soviet 
political military structure for some time, "boring in" and 
preparing for the day when all that might be necessary to 
bring on a military revolution would be the essential shove 
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at vital points at the psychological moment. In event that 
such a day dawned, a pre-conceived Berlin-inspired "invita­
tion" might conceivably issue to Berlin, from a "newly­
formed military Government" under influence of Berlin-
planted agents in Moscow, inviting Berlin to send in 
"specialists" and "technicians" to assist in a program of 
reconstruction and reorganization. According to the observa­
tions of my competent informants, this was the scheme en­
visaged by Hitler, whereby he hoped eventually to gain 
political and economic dominance over the Ukraine. More­
over, such were the purposes respectively motivating the 
activities of Mussolini and Hitler as regards Hitler's envis­
aged control over the Ukraine. 
I have gained the impression that as the picture now 
presents itself, Polish official circles perceive the following 
courses in the making: 
(a) Germany's envisaged political-economic drive to the 
Black Sea, to Istanbul and beyond. 
(b) Britain's vigorous role as an honest peace-broker in 
her efforts to liquidate the Spanish and Czechoslovak prob­
lems. (Regarded here as the first stage potentially leading to 
an Anglo-German settlement in a subsequent stage of Brit­
ain's envisaged ambitious program for European appease­
ment and pacification.) 
Polish officialdom feels in this connection that Britain's 
concern lest France might become involved in a continental 
war and drag in Britain has led Chamberlain to press into 
force all possible measures towards preventing a continental 
eruption. Moreover, they feel that the British have been try­
ing to get the French to soft-pedal their ire in respect to the 
Czechoslovak issue, and have been giving France encourage­
ment to "put to sleep" her alliance with the Soviet, for they 
feel that Britain has come to suspect that Moscow's con­
tinued practice of her policy of irritation might conceivably 
lead to a European "jam" of major proportions. 
(c) Polish officialdom foresees also the possibility of an 
alternative course on Britain's part. Should Britain fail in an 
attempt to bring Germany into line, Britain together with 
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France might conceivably resort to a counter-policy vis-a-vis 
Germany's envisaged expansion program—hoping that even 
though Italy might refuse to support such a counter-policy, 
she might at least remain neutral. 
Of pertinent bearing, official circles here feel that Chamber­
lain is fully cognizant of the complexities entailed in an envis­
aged Anglo-German settlement. Indeed, my informants here 
are inclined to regard the prospects of such negotiations with 
considerable pessimism. This view is attributable in part to 
my informants' feeling that Chamberlain does not yet enjoy 
the full support of British public opinion, an important part 
of which is still opposed to any conciliatory deal with the 
dictators. However, my informants look for Chamberlain to 
continue in his persistent efforts to bring Hitler into a round­
table discussion looking to a settlement of grievances. Should 
such a settlement fall short of success, Chamberlain would 
be in a position at least to draw not only the world's atten­
tion, but more importantly so, his dominions' attention, to the 
fact that Britain had left no stone unturned in her efforts 
towards bettering her relations with Germany. (My in­
formants have not forgotten that at the Dominions' Con­
ference a little over a year ago, the question was put to 
Chamberlain as to whether he was sure that his Govern­
ment had left no stone unturned towards ameliorating 
Anglo-German relations. This question was put, according to 
subsequent reports, on the heels of Chamberlain's urge that 
the Dominions join Britain in rearming on an Empire scale). 
Polish officialdom sees in the possible development of a 
counter-policy a potential opportunity for Poland to play a 
key-role, possibly in the formation of Poland's long-cherished 
hope of a neutral Baltic-Black Sea or even Baltic-Aegean 
Axis, aimed at cutting across Germany's envisaged eastward 
drive. Poland would want, however, to be assured of ample 
support from Britain, France, and possibly even Italy, for 
Poland would expect at least Britain and France to share in 
any burden of responsibility which the states of Eastern and 
Central Europe might incur in provoking German ire and 
suspicion. 
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On the one hand, Polish officialdom interpreted Chamber­
lain's conception of the recently concluded Anglo-French 
military-naval-air understanding as, among others, a strategic 
move to strengthen his hand for possible eventual conversa­
tions with Germany. In this connection, Chamberlain, recog­
nizing Britain had not attained her desired measure of 
rearmament, considered the French army might fill the gap, 
Britain supplying other requisites. At the same time, Cham­
berlain felt that through such an understanding he could 
more readily exert a restraining influence over the uncertain 
political forces within France, whose machinations, he con­
sidered, might conceivably lead to a continental explosion. 
By thus gathering his forces behind him, Chamberlain felt 
he could face Hitler around the table with a "full hand" 
With this interpretation in mind, Polish officialdom is aware 
of French irritation over the French-Polish alliance, whereof 
the French are apt to emphasize the political aspect, while 
the Poles emphasize the military. The Polish Government 
are not unduly concerned over the fact that the French might 
consider a withdrawal therefrom—for Polish officialdom feels 
on the one hand that the French would not move without the 
British, while on the other hand, (though not yet the British 
Foreign Office), at least realistic "Downing Street" is gradu­
ally coming to recognize more and more the merits of Po­
land's policy of drastic realism. In further connection there­
with, officialdom here looks for Chamberlain to continue not 
only to direct Britain's foreign policy, but also importantly to 
influence that of France. As one informed official remarked, 
"France will continue to take her orders from 10 Downing 
Street and like it!" 
Of pertinent bearing, I continue to discern that under 
Beck's rather confusing "mugwump" policy,12 he keeps a 
close eye on British policy. To my mind, Beck though mute 
on the subject, harbors a distinct hope that a potential even­
tual linking of forceful Polish action with that of Britain and 
France in countering Germany's expansion ambitions might 
prove Poland's best "out" from the grim prospect of becom­
ing either a potential victim of German expansion, or the 
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potential pathway for a German aggression against the 
Ukraine, should Germany fail to acquire the latter through 
the alternative of "peaceful infiltration" In other words, I 
should look for Poland to be fighting on the side of Britain 
and France in the event they came to blows with Germany. 
Moreover, since in terms of long-term military-economic 
considerations, the combination of France and Britain might 
conceivably be expected to gain the upper hand, [for] in the 
long run, Poland's fighting on the Anglo-French side would 
be consistent with the Polish policy requisite, of "picking 
the winning horse." 
Of connected bearing, Beck sees time playing in favor of 
Britain and France in terms of military preparations, and 
favoring Germany in terms of economic-political expansion 
and consolidation of her position in newly acquired areas. 
From the standpoint of Poland's objective policy, this expan­
sion may be expected to come steadily more in conflict with 
Polish interests. Even a German-infiltrated Czechoslovakia 
would be for Poland, like one's trying to sleep peacefully 
with a strand of barbed-wire at the foot of one's bed. It is 
therefore well to bear the foregoing in mind when appraising 
Polish realistic foreign policy in terms of potential circum­
stances, over the long pull. 
Beck, moreover, is aware that the combined armies of 
Poland, her ally Rumania, possibly Yugoslavia and Hungary, 
and even Czechoslovakia, would potentially present an ef­
fective resistance to a German eastward military action, 
provided the British and French forces simultaneously en­
gaged the Germans on the German Western front. Though 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, fighting side by side might form 
incongruous military bedmates, their geo-political positions 
are at least vis-a-vis Germany similar, and an actual German 
aggression might conceivably throw them on the same side, 
particularly if Poland were assured of synchronous forceful 
action on the part of Britain and France in the West. Besides, 
in such event, Poland would march not for Czechoslovakia, 
but against Germany. 
In evaluating Beck's policy, I wish to emphasize the im­
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portance of bearing in mind not only Poland's potentially 
black outlook in the event either of continued German mili­
tary or peaceful infiltration eastwards, but also the already 
reported disclosure that Beck, according to the Belgian Min­
ister here, was bitterly disappointed over France's refusal to 
march, subsequent to Hitler's march into the Rhineland. In 
fact, Beck later told me personally that France had made a 
great tactical error. To his mind, failure to march at that time 
would prove costly in terms of the long-run, not only for 
France, but also for Poland and Britain. In other words, they 
had "missed the boat", for Germany, their common potential 
menace, had at that time been less prepared to resist the 
combined forces of France, Britain and Poland, in a lengthy 
engagement, than she would be in another year or more. 
MINISTER BECK'S VIEWS AS OF JUNE 19, 1938,

ON [THE] CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION

Beck feels that prudence and caution should guide the 
course of European statesmen just as rigidly during periods of 
"breathing spells" conducive of optimism (such as the pre­
sent one), as during volcanic periods conducive of pessimism. 
In Beck's opinion the Czechoslovak situation continues to 
be: 
(a) A vital one, at the mercy of incidents and unpredict­
able developments. 
(b) One calling for cautious observations: What might 
for the moment appear to be a "breathing spell" should not 
be translated into undue optimism. 
Moreover, the situation held three especially potential 
dangers: 
(a) An attempt by either side to prolong unduly the 
Hodza-Henlein negotiations.13 
(b) The possibility of the Czech Government's answering 
conceivable Sudeten resistance to the Government's terms, 
(characterized by self-administration) by means provocative 
of internal strife, conducive of outside intervention. 
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(c) Stalin's pursuance of a diplomatic policy aimed at 
wrecking attempts of appeasement and pacification west of 
the Russian frontier and the Comintern's reported efforts to 
keep open the Czechoslovak wound in the heart of Europe. 
In connection with the sub-division (a) in the preceeding 
paragraph, the following observation may be of interest: 
Beck, whose personal feeling towards Benes is far from 
cordial, and whose judgement of Benes should therefore be 
considered in such light, feels Benes' natural inclination is 
to stall for time, a dangerous course in the light of its con­
ceivably abusing the other side's patience.14 On the other 
hand, Beck is concerned lest Benes, in the event of wanting 
company in his "misery", might conceivably "strike out" in 
an attempt to provoke real trouble while the cards are stacked 
in his favor, namely, among other factors, the support of 
Britain and France. Moreover, Beck is inclined to question 
whether, although the French General Staff was reportedly 
ready to move, and the British were prepared to come along 
subsequently, either might be so sanguine later, if Benes 
overplayed his hand in an undue prolongation of negotiations. 
Of connected bearing, Beck is aware of France's rather em­
barrassing position in relation to bringing pressure on her 
ally, Czechoslovakia, to revise her national policy after twenty 
years of apparent approval thereof. Under such circum­
stances it was not easy for French diplomacy to point out to 
Benes" that he was now facing the necessity of adjusting the 
balance of political mistakes which his Government had 
made during the last twenty years. Hence, it was only natural 
that the Quai d'Orsay was unloading as much of this burden 
as possible on British shoulders. 
MY OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF

CURRENT TREND OF GERMAN EASTWARD EXPANSION

Chafe at her fetters as she might, it was becoming steadily 
more apparent that unless "pulled out" by Britain and 
France, Italy might be expected to remain for some [time] 
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to come an economic-political prisoner of the Berlin-Rome 
Axis. Whereas the Axis had so far served as an instrument 
of profit with little or no cost to the shareholders of the in­
corporated interests, in terms of the Axis' activities a-field 
the question of comparative intra-Axis profits was steadily 
becoming a matter of grave consideration for Italian in­
terests. The startling fact was that Italy was not only reaping 
the short end of the profits, but also faced the struggle to 
sustain her economic and political position in the Balkans 
against a German effort to elbow Italian interests out of that 
area. Indeed, statistics each month show that the position of 
Italian interests in that sphere is becoming steadily less 
tenable. 
The German export surplus in trade with Italy may be 
expected to increase as a result of the recently concluded 
Italo-German trade agreement. Economists here are inclined 
to feel that recent speeches by prominent Italian statesmen 
proclaiming confidence that the already demonstrated Rome-
Berlin solidarity would be operative in the Balkans, was 
simply another way of "whistling in the dark" Not only 
were the Balkans becoming more dependent upon Germany 
in terms of trade, but, according to statistics, even Italy 
herself was becoming more so. 
Statistics as of 1937, moreover, show that about 24 percent 
of Italy's total imports come from Germany and Austria 
combined, and that about 23 percent of Italy's total exports go 
to Germany and Austria combined, which means that almost 
25 percent of Italy's total foreign trade is with Greater Ger­
many. 
The fact that a cardinal point in Italy's foreign policy was 
the maintenance of Italian interests in the Balkans indicated 
a growing clash of Rome-Berlin interests within that area. 
For example, a review of 1937 statistics disclosed that Italy's 
exports to Yugoslavia dwindled from 23 percent of Yugosla­
via's total trade to 9 percent thereof. Moreover, imports from 
Yugoslavia to Italy dwindled from 13 percent to 8 percent. 
On the other hand, glancing at the Axis picture from the 
Berlin end, statistics show that exports from Yugoslavia to 
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Germany had increased to 35 percent, and German exports to 
Yugoslavia had increased to 45 percent. In comparing Ger­
many's and Italy's respective shares in Hungarian trade, avail­
able figures show that of Hungary's total exports, 53 percent 
went to Greater Germany against 15 percent to Italy. Accord­
ing to my informant, Hungarian economists held that a 50 
percent rise in the cost of living within Hungary was mainly 
attributable to the straight-jacketing effect of German trade.15 
About twenty percent of Greater Germany's total foreign 
trade is now tied up with southeastern and central Europe. 
Statistics indicate that Greater Germany's economic infil­
tration of southeastern and central Europe has taken on the 
form of a drive for a self-sufficient southeastern and central area 
under Greater Germany's political and economic domination. 
Moreover, statistics indicate that Italy is about five times more 
dependent economically upon Greater Germany than the latter 
is dependent upon Italy. 
Nazi designs on gaining control of the Danubian trade, and 
Nazi hopes of turning the Danube into part of a Nazi-fied wa­
ter route from the North to the Black Sea, have not escaped the 
long-range concern of far-seeing statesmen and economists in 
this part of Europe. Indeed, they are aware that through Ger­
many's annexation of Austria, Germany had gained control 
over more than 50 percent of the Danube's trade. According to 
these economists, Germany placed great importance upon this 
river's aiding German infiltration in the regions throughout 
which it flowed. Cheap water freight rates, in addition to the 
"clearings" and other restrictive factors of the German 
"closed" economic trading system, comprised a combination 
which was expected to serve Germany as an effective aid to her 
eastward drive. 
Germany's restricted economic system has penetrated into 
Central and Southeastern Europe with almost unbelievable 
speed, during the past three or four years, economically sub­
jugating a number of countries in these areas—a condition 
wherefrom they are increasingly finding it difficult to shake 
themselves loose. Moreover, Germany's system is tending to 
elbow-out trade with these powers which practice a liberal 
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trade policy. It is only a question of time, therefore, until Ger­
many's competition in those areas may be expected to reflect 
itself unfavorably in the economic and industrial structure of 
such countries as Britain, Holland, France, Switzerland, and 
Scandinavia. 
A review of trade returns brings to light the fact that a 
sizable increase in the German share of the imports of Yugo­
slavia, Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey has taken place 
over the past four years. In fact, Germany's and Austria's com­
bined share in the imports of these countries shows a more 
rapid increase than their share in her exports—due in the main— 
to these countries' inability to liquidate their "frozen" ac­
counts in Germany. 
Exports to Imports from 
Country Germany, Germany, 
percentage of percentage of 
total exports total imports 
Hungary 41 44.2 
Rumania 26.9 38 
Yugoslavia 35.2 42.7 
Bulgaria 47.1 58.2 
Greece 29.6 32.2 
As for Poland, Germany's relative position remained some­
what similar in the period 1934-36 in terms of Germany's per­
centage of total imports.16 For the year 1937, statistics show 
Germany as the foremost supplier to these [Balkan] countries 
and that Germany's share in the exports of these countries is 
greater than any other nation. 
It is interesting to note the decline of trade between Czecho­
slovakia and Greater Germany. Between the years 1929-37, 
Germany's share in Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was about 
halved. Trade returns show that although the shares of Brit­
ain, France, and the United States in Czechoslovakia's foreign 
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trade increased, their increase did not balance the losses which 
Czechoslovakia suffered in her trade with Greater Germany. 
Having in mind that Gdynia's share of Czech export traffic 
this year amounted to about 2,000,000 tons, or an increase 
over last year of about 75 percent, I enquired of my informant 
whether he thought Poland might conceivably see her way 
clear to grant further traffic concessions on increased volume, 
to the ultimate mutual benefit of Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
In response, he stated that Poland would naturally welcome an 
increase in the flow of Czech traffic Gdynia-wards, and added 
that Poland would be willing to go far in terms of concessions 
to meet competition over the German rails and waterways. 
However, until the Czechs became fully conscious of a German 
attempt not to gain a strangle-hold over, but even to stifle 
Czech exports through increased tariffs, Poland could not take 
the surveys of Czech tariff delegations more seriously than as a 
gesture, on the one hand characterized by pressure on Germany 
for liberal tariff treatment, and on the other, an effort to ameli­
orate Polish-Czech relations by "caressing the Polish pocket 
nerve" Poland, indeed, was aware of the motives behind 
Czechoslovakia's recent gesture on this score, and before be­
coming excited over such a tempting prospect, Poland would 
await concrete evidence of Czech intentions.17 
I am aware that Poland has been able to meet the competi­
tion of German tariffs to the extent of 2,000,000 tons of Czech 
export business over the past year. However, in the event that 
Poland showed signs of trying to swing much more Czech traf­
fic from the German routing to Gdynia, I believe Germany's 
recognition thereof would give rise to another aspect; that is to 
say, the question would cease to be one between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, and would inevitably become a conflict of 
interest between Germany and Poland. In this light, I should 
be inclined to look for German pressure against Poland all 
along the line. 
1. The following three documents are situation analyses written by Biddle on June 
19, 1938. They deal separately with German policy aims and their implications for 
Poland and East Central Europe; Polish-Czech relations; and Biddle's own assessment 
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of the general situation. They all provide a very penetrating and highly accurate anal­
ysis of Polish foreign policy, and the thinking behind it. 
2. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
3. See note 2 above. 
4. Hungarian uneasiness at the prospect of total German domination, or even 
annexation, of all of Czechoslovakia is underscored by a letter from the Hungarian 
regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy, to Hitler in September, 1938. Horthy pointedly warned 
Hitler that the Hungarian government would never accept a "solution of the Czecho­
slovak question" that was not "final," i.e., which left ethnic Hungarians outside the 
borders of Hungary, and concluded with the statement that the Hungarians were 
certain their opinion on this matter "is in full harmony with that of the German Gov­
ernment, viz., that peace in Central Europe cannot be assured unless the Czechoslovak 
problem has been resolved definitely and radically." The Confidential Papers of 
Admiral Horthy, ed. M. Szinai and L. Sziics (Budapest, 1965), p. 102. Hungary had 
already served notice of her determination not to be swept up in the German whirl­
wind by somewhat hypocritically signing the "Bled Agreement" of August 23, 1938, 
with members of the Little Entente: all parties renounced the use of force against each 
other, in return for which Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia recognized Hun­
gary's right to rearm. For good, concise discussions of Hungarian foreign policy during 
this period, see the articles by Betty Jo Winchester, "Hungary and the Third Europe in 
1938," Slavic Review 32, 4(December, 1973): 741-56, and Thomas L. Sakmyster, 
"Hungary and the Munich Crisis: The Revisionist Dilemma," ibid., pp. 725-40. 
5. The defensive mutual assistance pact signed between Poland and Romania in 
March, 1921, was aimed specifically at the Soviet Union, with which Romania had a 
bitter and unresolved controversy over Bessarabia. It was mutually beneficial, giving 
both countries a degree of security along their long eastern frontiers, while for Po­
land it provided a safe and friendly relationship with the largest and potentially most 
prosperous nation of southeast Europe. Text of agreement in Arnold J. Toynbee, 
Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London, 1927), pp. 504-5. 
6. The Estonian minister to Poland was Hans Marcus. The Polish-Lithuanian dis­
pute referred to involved a long-standing diplomatic confrontation, which had smoul­
dered at varying degrees between the two neighbors since 1920, and had flared into 
a near war over a frontier incident in early 1938. For the diplomatic background, see 
Alfred Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 1920-1928 
(Leiden, 1966). See also Leonas Sabaliunas, Lithuania in Crisis: Nationalism to Com­
munism, 1939-1940 (Bloomington, Ind., 1972). 
7. Biddle here refers to Rickard Sandier, the Swedish foreign minister (1932­
39). 
8. Biddle here means the area of Belorussia, located west of Russia proper. 
9. A. Bocheiiski, Miedzy Niemcami a Rosjq (Warsaw, 1937). 
10. Reference here is to the Great Purges, which racked the Soviet Union

from 1936-38.

11. This document is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­

ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

12. The term "mugwump" is derived from a group of Republican party dissidents

who broke with their party and refused to support the GOP ticket in the 1884 elec­

tions. The term is used to denote a group or individual given to pursuing maverick or

independent actions or policies, without caring for the pressures brought on him to

conform to an orthodox line.

13. Biddle here refers to the talks between Czech Premier Milan Hodza and the

leader of the pro-Nazi Sudetendeutsche Partei among the German minority in

Czechoslovakia, Konrad Henlein, over demands made by the latter for complete polit­
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ical and administrative autonomy for the Czech Germans and their treatment as a 
separate, distinct legal entity within the Czechoslovak state. In keeping with Hitler's 
plans to use the minority issue as a provocation of sovereign East European states, 
these German demands were consistently escalated whenever the Czechs revealed 
a willingness to meet them. See Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, 2d ed. 
(New York. 1967). DP. 197-283. 
14. Eduard Benes, one of the principal architects of the Czechoslovak state 
before and during World War I, was a key figure in that nation's politics, first as for­
eign minister and then, from 1935 on, as Tomas G. Masaryk's successor to the 
presidency. 
15. The eminent historian C. A. Macartney, whose two-volume study October 
Fifteenth: A History of Hungary, 1929-1945 (New York, 1956) is generally regarded 
as the definitive work on the topic, offers a somewhat different version of the German-
Hungarian relationship. In 1937, Hungarian purchases from Germany accounted for 
26.2 percent of her total imports, whereas she sent 24.1 percent of all her exports to 
Germany; these official statistics do not include expenditures on armaments, which 
were highly classified. Moreover, until 1938 the Magyars eagerly sought expanded 
trade with the Germans, who offered a ready market for their agricultural produce and 
bauxite while providing Hungary with finished industrial products (especially ma­
chinery, machine tools, and spare parts) and such raw materials as coke, coal, and 
petrochemicals. The primary motivation for this Hungarian zeal was a desire to in­
dustrialize and modernize their land as quickly as possible. However, this desire 
blinded them to the dangers that ultimately become reality: the two economies be­
came interlocked in such a manner that virtually the entire Hungarian economy would 
have ground to a halt had Germany suddenly suspended trade relations. Macartney, 
October Fifteenth, 1:140-42. See also Antonin Basch, The Danube Basin and the Ger­
man Economic Sphere (London, 1944). 
16. According to official Polish statistics, the Polish trade balance with Germany 
had revealed a healthy surplus of exports over imports until 1937, when the advantage 
shifted to Germany. Nonetheless, total Polish-German trade continued to play a minor 
role in the overall foreign commerce of each country: in 1938, Germany obtained only 
2.1 percent of all its imports from Poland, to which it sent 2.2 percent of its exports. 
Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, pp. 166-68, tables 4-8. The German-Polish econom­
ic relationship is considered in more detail in Document 5 below. 
17. In late April, 1938, Dr. Juraj Slavik, Czech minister to Poland, visited the 
deputy premier and minister of finance, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, who was known for 
his differences of opinion with Beck on foreign policy. Kwiatkowski was openly inter­
ested in developing closer relations with Czechoslovakia, and envisioned an expansion 
of trade between the two countries as the best start to this end. Slavik proposed that 
commercial relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia be broadened at once, and 
also offered to redirect the Czech export trade from Hamburg to Gdynia, and to con­
clude an air-agreement with the Poles. In concluding, the Czech minister proposed 
that a Czech trade delegation be sent to Poland at once. Polish diplomats were miffed 
that the Czechs elected to approach a member of the government directly on these 
issues, instead of proceeding through the normal diplomatic avenues set up to handle 
foreign trade questions. Szembek, Diariusz i teki, 4:139^0. 
DOCUMENT FIVE 
[June-July, 1938]1 
Observations of economic advisor to Foreign Office and those 
of a veteran observer of affairs in this part of Europe on the 
economic block resulting from Germany's annexation of Austria 
Of almost inescapable connection with the political aspect, 
and with reference to the Department's Instruction No. 20, I 
take occasion herein to transmit the following results of my 
examination of the potential effect of Germany's annexation 
of Austria upon the economic outlook for this part of Europe 
and for Poland in particular. 
Accordingly, I believe that the substance of observations 
disclosed in my several discussions with Mr. Jan Wszelaki, 
Economic Advisor of the Foreign Office, might prove illumi­
nating. He possesses a liberal attitude towards trade in gen­
eral and his intelligence and sound views are coming more 
and more to the fore in terms of influence on inner Govern­
ment circles. His influence upon Poland's trade policy is 
consequently becoming steadily more effective. 
In substance, he said that in 1935 there had arisen a 
vigorous argument in Government circles as to what extent 
Poland should be permitted to trade with Germany without 
eventually endangering, through potential German economic 
pressure, Poland's independence. In fact, the heated contro­
versy which grew out of the issue as to whether Poland should 
be permitted to trade with Germany to the extent of 15 or 
16 percent of her total trade had almost led to a cabinet crisis. 
(At this point he explained that 17 percent represented, so­
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to-speak, the "'classical maximum" which Polish trade au­
thorities set on the extent of Poland's trade with Germany). 
Finally, however, the majority, who, despite their desire to 
go even further, (since it had seemed to them a real sacrifice 
to limit their trade with Germany) compromised on 16 per­
cent. Indeed, in their opinion, Poland might have temporarily 
at least, been economically benefited. However, according 
to my informant, by its decision to limit Polish-German trade, 
the Polish Government as a whole had manifested its fore­
sight as to the possibilities of German domination through 
economic strategy, such as had since proved to be the case in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser 
degree, Czechoslovakia. 
About that same time, [German Minister of Finance] Dr. 
Hjalmar Schacht had made a tour of the Eastern and Central 
European areas, offering German markets for a large portion 
of the trade thereof. The prices he had offered for the various 
products under discussion were tempting to all the countries 
except Poland and Turkey, who had foreseen the potential 
outcome in the form of a German economic-political domina­
tion, and they had eagerly accepted Dr. Schacht's terms. 
These countries had been accustomed to dealing with9 
France and Britain and other liberal trading countries on a 
basis of cash payments, and they did not realize until too 
late that Germany had no intention of paying cash—in fact 
was completely incapable of doing so. Later Dr. Schacht 
announced his regret to learn of these countries' disappoint­
ment over Germany's inability to pay cash, and thereupon 
explained the restricted formula of Germany's "closed" 
economic system, which has governed their trade relations 
with Germany ever since. 
In my informant's opinion, the economic outlook for these 
countries was now far from rosy, in view of their having fallen 
victims of Germany's economic "straight-jacketing" system. 
Poland so far had fortunately avoided this pitfall by restricting 
her trade with Germany, and intended to continue this policy. 
In fact, my informant believed this was the only way to pre­
vent Poland's falling prey to German economic and, in con­
sequence, potential political domination. 
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He was, moreover, aware of an overhanging cloud of Ger­
man potential penetration of the whole of Eastern and Central 
Europe. In such case, lacking Western aid, even Poland might 
conceivably be forced to accommodate her economic-political 
scheme to the German line of policy. In such eventuality, 
and from Poland's standpoint, it would be a case of trying to 
compromise with danger in an effort to hold on to her in­
dependence. Moreover, potential collaboration between Po­
land and Germany would prove a serious danger for the rest 
of the world. 
On the other hand, Poland was at the moment endeavoring 
to find means of effecting an increase in her trade with those 
countries which were now being economically pressed by 
Germany, as Poland's contribution (infinitesimal though it 
might be) towards keeping this part of the world in almost a 
vain hope from falling completely into German economic 
clutches. Accordingly, Poland and Hungary were at the 
moment endeavoring to find some way whereby they might 
increase their trade with each other; unfortunately, however, 
their respective representatives had found it a difficult task, 
due mainly to the similarity of their respective exports.2 
Moreover, my informant added that he felt I was aware 
that in addition to Hungary, Poland would like to be in a 
position to contribute towards keeping Rumania, Yugoslavia, and 
Bulgaria out of Germany's envisaged political-economic 
strangle-hold. Beckys policy (as I have previously pointed out 
in former dispatches) had already favored closer bilateral 
relations, both politically and economically, between Poland 
and each of the aforementioned states. In fact, Beck was now 
proceeding with renewed vigor in an effort to bring about an 
amelioration of Rumanian-Hungarian relations, and to bring 
Bulgaria into closer relations with Rumania. Moreover, Beck 
had considerable respect for the Yugoslav people—their 
courage and their ideals; and he felt that they had sufficient 
courage of their convictions to resist an attempt on Germany's 
part to draw them completely politically into the Nazi orbit. 
Besides, he felt that the Yugoslavs were strong enough to 
hold the Bulgarians in line in a crisis. Personally, from my 
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own observations, I should be more inclined to feel that the 
Yugoslav people—aside from that uncertain political quantity, 
Stoydinowicz3—would be at this juncture a more reliable 
element to count on than the Bulgarians, whose forward-
looking policy appears to have been based to a large extent 
upon the political success of Nazi policy. Nevertheless, my 
informants in Polish official circles are inclined to believe that 
with real evidence of an active Anglo-French counter-policy, 
and with pressure from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria might be ex­
pected to be brought into line against German expansion. 
My informant had frequently been asked the question as 
to whether it would not be cheaper in the long run for Britain 
and France to devote at least some of the moneys now going 
to armaments into the channels of trade, by purchasing, for 
example, commodities and products of the Danubian area, in 
an effort to prevent Germany's becoming the economic and 
political master of Eastern and Central Europe—and poten­
tially the economic dictator of that region. The answer, to 
his mind, was that Britain was prevented from taking such 
steps by her Dominions' situation, and that France, beyond 
possibly a gesture, could not be expected to take any positive 
or effective action on this score. Moreover, my informant 
doubted that France, under present-day circumstances, could 
take any steps without Britain's cooperation. 
In response to my question as to whether he thought the 
peoples of the Danubian countries were at heart pro-German, 
he said that at the moment he did not think so, for Germany's 
annexation of Austria and subsequent happenings there had 
opened their eyes, and each country now feared that it might 
become the next victim of Germany's machinations. As con­
cerns the peoples of the various German minorities in states 
contiguous to Germany, recent events in Austria had served 
as a two-sided lesson: (a) the individual's fear that he might 
not get aboard the "band wagon" in time to ride with the 
potential wave of Nazi penetration, and (b) the aftermath of 
disillusionment among the native Nazis, resulting from their 
experiencing the cold reality of Berlin's clamping down its 
iron claw. 
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The critical situation, however, was that so long as Germany 
had the preponderance of trade she would dictate to these 
countries in that, if these countries made an effort to throw 
off the yoke of German economic bondage, they might ex­
perience such acute sufferings, unemployment, etc. that the 
result might conceivably be revolutions in economic countries 
where such attempts were made. The only solution he saw 
for a happy outcome for the economic dilemma in this part of 
Europe would be the replacement by those countries now 
dominated by Germany of part of their German trade, by 
trade with liberal trade-minded and peace-loving nations. 
There was one potential danger which he feared a great 
deal and that was something which he believed Germany 
was contemplating and might be expected to put into effect 
eventually, namely: that she would attempt to force the 
Central European countries to use only German railways and 
ports for exports of their goods abroad. From the Polish 
standpoint, this prospect presented an unhappy outlook, for 
such action would bring great hardship to ports like Gdynia. 
He summed up his views of the situation by stating that 
through her economic victories Germany was steadily gaining 
political sway, and, although other countries were spending 
colossal sums for rearmament, they were doing little to 
combat the aforementioned economic victories. He was afraid 
that these other countries would be ready to take important 
steps in this line only when it would be too late to bring about 
effective action peaceably. 
In evaluating a possible turn in future events, my infor­
mant remarked that the British Government's persistent desire 
for an agreement with Germany might conceivably serve as a 
force in the cause of peace, for he was aware that the British 
Government, in return for its willingness to consider conces­
sions to Germany in the colonial domain, would necessarily 
exact certain conditions. The British Government would have 
to gain something tangible to satisfy its public opinion. Hence, 
in addition to Britain's known desire for aerial disarmament, 
particularly in terms of bombers, Britain might reasonably be 
expected to impose a condition entailing Germany's participa­
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tion in an economic conference consisting of all European 
countries at least. In such event, efforts would be made to 
shake Germany loose from her walled-in economic system 
which she was now employing so effectively as an instrument 
of penetration abroad. To his mind, success in such efforts 
would undoubtedly prove the quickest and most effective 
means of curbing Germany's economic-political penetration 
eastwards, and to release those countries now in the path of 
German envisaged expansion from the iron shackles of the 
German political-economic orbit. Whereas he was not unduly 
optimistic over the prospects of getting Germany to sit in an 
economic conference envisaging Germany's dislodgment 
from her present system, Britain's conception and envisaged 
effort along these lines was constructive and admirable, and 
if and when put into motion, would justify the support of all 
countries practicing a liberal trade policy. After all, perhaps 
in terms of the long-pull, this might prove a more effective 
first stage approach towards reducing the Danubian States' 
dependence upon Germany than a temporary measure pro­
posed and discussed during the recent Anglo-French con­
versations in London, i.e. an emergency scheme entailing the 
purchase of Danubian products and commodities. 
In scanning the objectives on both sides of the gap sepa­
rating Germany's "closed" economic system and the liberal 
trade policy of the Western world, I feel that the following 
forms, in effect, the basis of resistance which Berlin may be 
expected to offer in the event of a British invitation to sit 
around the European economic conference table. Accord­
ingly, as I see it, Germany is fighting for a policy which to 
date she cannot support by reason of the lack of adequate raw 
material and food sources. Germany is therefore faced with 
the following two alternatives: 
(a) To make a deal with Britain and France which would 
entail shaking the Nazi Government loose from its "closed" 
economic system. The liquidation of this system would in 
turn spell the loosening of the Nazi Government's grip on 
the people, not only within the Reich, but also in those 
countries which the Nazi Government has already succeeded 
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in bringing under the clutches of her economic penetration, 
or, 
(b) To gain control of the raw material and food sources 
of Eastern and Central Europe in order to strengthen Ger­
many's hand towards meeting Britain and France on a more 
equal footing. 
Of connected bearing, in my recent coversations with a 
veteran observer of affairs in this part of Europe (whom 1 
have usually found to be objective in his point of view) he 
made in effect the following observation. 
Regarding the Central European situation he remarked 
that neither he nor anyone else in this part of Europe who 
was willing to judge the reality of events had any serious 
belief in the scheme which the Quai d'Orsay had reportedly 
suggested for the opening up of new markets for the Danubian 
powers in Western Europe, in order to lessen the latter's 
economic dependence upon Germany. For such markets as 
could be perhaps artificially established for the benefit of 
those powers—except in regard to a few essential commodities 
such as oil—could not compete whether in volume or in matters 
of long-term credits, or again in the domain of barter, with 
the facilities that Germany was offering and would continue 
to offer them. My informant described this "rehash" of old-
time projects as a "pill for an earthquake" Not even Italy 
could compete with Germany in that field. The doubtful 
prospect of any genuine competitor with Germany down the 
Danubian Valley would go a long way to persuade the 
Germans how mistaken would be a policy which might incur 
ultimate war risks for the sake of an objective envisaging 
economic penetration and political hegemony, when that 
penetration could be realized by economic and diplomatic 
means without such risks. My informants' information 
through various channels was to the effect that Italian 
diplomacy was not setting to mobilize, against German pene­
tration, every element of resistance in the various Danubian 
states, notably in Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and 
Albania. But according to my informant, Italian diplomacy 
was doomed to failure in this respect, because it could not 
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offer to the countries in question the advantages which 
Germany could offer. As a matter of fact, my informant took 
the view that not only would all these Italian activities fail to 
make any deep and lasting impression, but that, wriggle as 
he might, Mussolini remained the prisoner of the Rome-
Berlin Axis. He fancied, therefore, a second Axis to play with; 
hence, the Anglo-Italo Agreement.4 
My informant then went on to say that he had serious 
doubts as to the permanent effectiveness of any attempt on 
the part of either Britain or France, or both, to step into the 
economic breach in Central Europe, and more particularly 
the Balkans; in the first place, Germany was historically the 
chief market for the products of that region. Germany took 
commodities and goods from the States of that Region which 
were not required by Britain and France, for in many cases 
the latter had other markets to which for economic-political 
reasons they had to reserve their purchasing power; for 
example, Britain had her dominions markets and France her 
colonies. In addition they both had their regular-line outlets 
which they had in effect to compensate with purchases. In 
other words, the flow of commodities and manufactured 
goods between Germany, and especially the Balkans, was a 
natural and historical movement. 
I suggested that the reopening of international trade chan­
nels which were profitable to all parties would seem the only 
practical and fundamentally sound means whereby the inter­
national community could stiffen its front against the ex­
traordinary social-economic conditions now confronting it. 
In this direction, I felt that my country had gone a long way 
toward blazing the trail, and leading the way along the path 
of sound treatment of the world-wide problem. Accordingly, 
the world would do well to devote a serious and objective 
study to the principles underlying our trade liberation policy, 
which represented in my opinion a constructive contribution 
toward the alleviation of the world's social-economic-political 
tension. 
He agreed that this policy represented the one ray of hope, 
emerging from the present state of politico-economic confu­
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sion. He only hoped that our trade agreements program 
might be pressed forward with renewed vigor. 
1. There is no date on this document. However, judging from its position among 
Biddle's other dispatches and from the information contained therein, it was probably 
written in early summer (June-July) 1938. It contains an excellent analysis of the 
economic factors underlying Polish policy toward Germany. 
2. Official Polish statistics support this observation. In the years following the 
Depression, Poland's trade balance with Hungary was exactly in equilibrium, with 
imports matching exports, until 1937, when Poland imported goods worth 
1,000,000 z/oly more than she exported to Hungary. In 1938, as a result of the in­
creased attention of both countries to mutual commercial interaction, the balance 
swung to Poland's favor by over 500,000 z/oty. Yet this trade claimed an insignificant 
portion of each country's total foreign trade program: in 1938 Polish goods accounted 
for only 1.5 percent of all Hungarian imports, while Hungary sold only 1 percent 
of her goods to Poland. In that year Poland purchased fruits and vegetables, certain 
cereals, machinery and electrical equipment, and wine from Hungary, to whom she 
sold raw and finished wood products, zinc, unfinished hides, and flax. Maty Rocznik 
Statystyczny 1939, pp. 166-82, tables 7-19. 
3. Biddle here refers to Milan StoyadinoviS, the flamboyant Serbian radical

politician who became premier of Yugoslavia in June, 1935, and kept Central Europe

in constant suspense with his unpredictable political moves.

4. The Anglo-Italian agreement, signed April 16, 1938, in Rome, cleared up a 
number of nagging problems that had been disturbing relations between the two 
states. From the Italian point of view, it was particularly important as a vehicle for 
obtaining British recognition of Italian conquests and colonial predominance in 
Ethiopia. For the Italian viewpoint of the agreement's importance for them, see the 
memoirs of Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europa verso la cataslrofe 
(Verona, 1947), pp. 280-300. Although the text had not been printed at this writing, 
the agreement is summarized and analyzed from the British perspective in DBFP, 
Third Series, vol. 3, Doc. 326. 
DOCUMENT SIX 
July 28, 1938 
MEMORANDUM 
Memorandum of substance of my recent conversation with a 
high ranking Polish official wherein (a) he disclosed 
Polish and other European statesmen's interest in the 
question as to whether the United States might be expected 
to supply Germany with war supplies in event of a European 
conflict, and (b) he questioned me as to American public 
opinion's reported increasing antipathy for Nazi policy 
The following is the substance of my informal and confiden­
tial conversation with a high ranking Polish official. In connec­
tion with my response to his question, he assured me upon my 
request that he would treat the information informally, unof­
ficially, and in strictest confidence. Needless to say, I was 
guarded in my statement but owing to our close and frank 
relations, and to the fact that he has steadily proven an exceed­
ingly helpful source of interesting information for me, I con­
cluded to comply with his request in general terms. 
In response to his remark that a vital question currently 
engaging the interest of European statesmen, in considering 
the possibility of a European conflict, was whether the United 
States might be expected to supply Germany either directly or 
indirectly with war materials and supplies, I drew his atten­
tion to the substance of our neutrality law, and recalled to 
him my previous remarks (imparted upon my return from the 
United States in March) to the effect that I had observed (a) 
that American public opinion in general was characterized by 
opposition to any entangling alliances, and (b) a rigid insis­
tence on the part of public opinion that the United States 
guard its rights to independent and uncommitted judgment on 
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all aspects of each and every foreign crisis as it developed; 
in other words, an unwillingness to make advance commit­
ments. I added that, in effect, the foregoing reactions reflected 
the principles which had long formed an integral part of our 
foreign policy. 
I emphasized that the majority of my countrymen mani­
fested a strong will to "steer clear" of war, believing at the 
same time that war was not inevitable. However, it would, to 
my mind, be dangerous for opinion abroad to interpret this 
as an unwillingness to fight under any circumstances, aside 
from invasion. At the same time, it would be equally mis­
leading for opinion abroad to assume that the United States 
might be unable to retain its neutral status in the event of a 
major European conflict. As a matter of fact, there WPS no 
barometric device whereby we might gauge what position our 
country might assume under unforeseen circumstances. 
In response to the Polish official's further inquiry as to the 
correctness of reports he had recently received regarding 
American public opinion's growing antipathy for Nazidom's 
policies, I stated that in further examining American public 
opinion in general, I had personally discerned a growing anti­
pathy for the principles and practice of Nazidom's policies; 
they were for the most part in direct conflict with the princi­
ples underlying democracy. 
In clarification of this point I remarked that in appraising 
the full value of this antipathy, it was well to bear in mind 
(a) my Government's profound respect of the rule of law in 
international affairs, (b) Berlin's alleged implications in the 
recently-detected "spy-ring",1 (c) the clash of our principles 
of tolerance and equal opportunity for all, regardless of race, 
creed or color, with Nazidom's neo-pagan policy of extreme 
anti-Semitism. Indeed, the effect of barbaric measures entailed 
therein upon the sensibilities of my liberal-minded country­
men was unfavorable, to say the least. 
He then remarked that my observations as to my country­
men's continued belief that war was not inevitable, had espe­
cially engaged his interest. I thereupon offered my personal 
opinion that present European tension might be expected to 
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be liquidated within the next year and a half, either through 
war or through statesmanship and diplomacy. Moreover, I 
personally believed that this current war-conducive tension 
could be liquidated by means of the latter provided there was 
sufficient will towards that end on part of Governments di­
rectly interested. 
Throughout our conversation, I discerned his undisguised 
and lively interest in my remarks. In fact, he observed in con­
clusion that he was particularly interested, in that in substance 
nearly all phases of my observations had corresponded in ef­
fect with verbal reports on the part of recently returned Am­
bassador Count Potocki. Moreover, my remarks as to my coun­
trymen's attitude in relation to the persecution of Jews in 
Germany had corresponded with observations recently and 
confidentially imparted to him by an important German diplo­
mat to the effect that his Government had become seriously 
concerned over [German] Ambassador Dieckhoff s alarming re­
ports of a frenzied wave of anti-German feeling throughout 
the United States due (a) to the "spy scare'', (b) to repudia­
tion of liability for the Austrian external loans, and (c) to 
Jewish persecution. 
1. Biddle here refers to the FBI action taken against German spies in spring 
1938, which resulted in the arrest and conviction of six Nazi agents in New York 
and other East Coast points. The episode, which received wide publicity in various 
newspapers, focused the attention of the American public upon this danger, and led 
to increased internal vigilance and an outburst of popular anti-German sentiment. 
See A. B. Magil and Henry Stevens, The Perils of Fascism: The Crisis of American 
Democracy (New York, 1938), pp. 228-29. 
DOCUMENT SEVEN 
August 12, 1938 
Subject: Further observations on secret, "flooding 
system" aimed at serving as a defense line from Pinsk 
Marshes to Dniester River; Further observations 
on roads and terrain in southeastern frontier 
I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 1941 of 
October 7, 1937, regarding construction of a flooding system in 
Southeastern Poland aimed at serving as a line of defense 
into Polish territory and to report that my recent tour of in­
spection in that particular area brought to light the following 
information. 
Along the two rivers, Styrpa and Seret, which run parallel 
southward to, and emptying into the Dniester River, have been 
constructed a series of dams which, when and if opened, would 
be capable of flooding an intervening area averaging about 20 
kilometers in width for a distance of about 200 kilometers, 
within a period of several hours. This obstruction, combined 
with the quality of pasty clay-like soil which lies between the 
two rivers would seriously impede, if not completely hinder the 
passage of any motorized equipment. 
In traversing this southeastern area I was careful to observe 
the roads and the terrain in the light of their bearing on po­
tential military operations. The road which brought me to the 
border runs due east from Lwow, and is constructed and 
maintained as a main military artery. Hence, up to a point with­
in about 20 kilometers from the border, it is broad enough for 
two lines of heavy motorized equipment, and the surface up 
to the aforementioned point is macadamized. East of the afore­
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mentioned point, however, as in the case of all roads running 
eastward to the frontier, the highway became very narrow and 
ceased to have a macadamized surface. At this point (which as 
I pointed out is about 20 kilometers from the frontier) there 
is a very broad belt of forest running north to south, main­
tained as a shield for tactical purposes. 
In surveying the rolling plains which characterize south­
eastern Poland, and continue for several hundred miles into 
the Russian Ukraine, I gained the impression that the terrain 
is far better suited to cavalry rather than to motorized oper­
ations. Indeed, the undulating nature of this part of the coun­
try would lend itself admirably to the movement or deploy­
ment of cavalry or infantry. As to its lending itself to the 
operations of tanks and other motorized equipment, the black 
silt which characterizes the land over this area, reaches depth 
on the Polish side of about 18 inches, and in the wet season is 
practically impassable except on foot or horseback. Having 
reached these conclusions, I can now more readily understand 
why the Polish military authorities have maintained an excep­
tionally large cavalry establishment, and so much horse-
drawn artillery.2 
Examination of the map moreover, discloses that such an ob­
struction on Polish territory would throw the main burden of 
responsibility on Rumanian shoulders for the passage of Rus­
sian troops into Czechoslovakia. 
As near as I could estimate upon careful examination, the 
main part of the work on this project has already been com­
pleted. In fact, I believe that outside of the present work, 
which is mainly devoted to the digging of sluices to connect 
up one river bed with the other in order to expedite the inunda­
tion, the system as a whole could be made to function effec­
tively even now in an emergency. 
During my tour of this district I was interested to find that 
the community inhabiting the area adjacent to a large estate 
belonging to Count Siemienski (whereon one of the large 
dams of the Styrpa river had been constructed) had become 
greatly excited over some incident which had just occurred. 
Upon inquiry, I was confidentially informed that on the day 
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previous the Soviet military attache had appeared near by i in 
civilian clothes, motoring in a small car and was stopped by 
the military authorities and discretely informed that this par­
ticular area was under military control and advised to conduct 
his tour elsewhere. He had departed in the opposite direction 
without remonstration. Later I found that his departure from 
Warsaw had been marked by the secret police and though his 
trail had been lost during one night, he was picked up again 
the next day by the local police near Slbczow. I cite this to 
show how careful the military authorities are to guard the 
"flooding area" from inquisitive eyes—especially those of of­
ficials of the Soviet. 
I was interested, moreover, in observing conditions in vari­
ous frontier posts along the Polish-Russian border, from 
Podwofoczyska southward. At this particular point, I noted an 
exception in that there was the absence of the usual three 
strands of barbed-wire entanglements. Here there is a small 
river dividing the two center posts. Instead of the wires being 
visible as in the case of most frontier points, the wire is sub­
merged in the stream. The Russian village opposite Podwol­
czyska has undergone a major change in terms of population 
during the past year. All inhabitants except the Jewish popu­
lation evacuated the town and were replaced by immigrants 
from the interior of Russia. 
Southward along the frontier I found that at all bridges and 
points of military concentration on either side, there were 
two Soviet soldiers on guard vis-a-vis one Pole. Inquiry on 
my part revealed that in Polish military opinion the reason for 
these two guards at each Soviet post was for the purpose of 
having one watch the other. An interesting sidelight on Polish 
frontier etiquette was that the Polish soldier on guard never 
takes his eyes off his opposite number on the other side. Thus 
when the officer whom I accompanied approached his guard, 
the latter backed to join us, advanced along side, and saluted 
the captain and myself without ever looking at us. The captain 
explained that this is a cardinal principle strictly adhered to 
by the Polish frontier troops on guard. 
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Having at the same time the flooding system in mind, I 
noted that the terrain southward to the Dniester offered itself 
advantageously for the operation of that defense scheme. 
1. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. Although Biddle's perception of Polish domestic as well as international 
policies was, on the whole, surprisingly astute, he shared the misconception of 
foreign and Polish military strategists alike that the eastern regions of Poland were 
suited to cavalry use alone, and not mechanized warfare. This feeling was especially 
strong among British military observers, even such as Edmund Ironside; see Bethell, 
Vie War Hitler Won, pp. 98-99. It should be pointed out, however, that most of 
the Polish cavalry was designed to be used as a mobile fighting force, whose troops 
rode by horseback to their assigned positions, but then dismounted and fought on 
foot; each cavalry brigade was equipped with light artillery and machine guns. 
See Leszek Moczulski's controversial study, Wojna Polska 1939 (Warsaw, 1972). 
DOCUMENT EIGHT 
November 5, 1938 
My dear Mr. President: 
Many signs point to the Munich Conference and its im­
mediate sequel's having already had far reaching repercus­
sions throughout the whole extent of the European continent. 
As in effect pointed out in my previous letter, in view of the 
apparent check suffered by the western powers, the smaller 
countries, such as those of the Oslo group, which had already 
decided upon neutrality and upon repudiation of the compul­
sory sanctions clauses of the League Covenant, are already 
congratulating themselves on their foresight and wisdom. 
Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavians are 
more than ever determined not to be drawn into any conflict 
between the major powers. 
States east and southeast of Berlin, though rapidly falling 
in line with Berlin's orientation in an economic sense, are in 
many cases, still groping for some "out" (a) from eventual 
German political hegemony, and (b) from becoming the po­
tential victims of "peaceful settlements" between the major 
powers. Poland is in this category. 
The Chanceries of eastern and central Europe are now 
apparently practicing a "balancing policy", characterized by 
a search for the orientation whereby they may be the safest 
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(at least temporarily so) and wherefrom they may acquire 
the most benefits. 
Having interpreted recent events to mean Britain's and 
France's "evacuation" of eastern and central Europe, certain 
states, such as Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary, have re­
cently been evidencing an inclination to look to Rome in 
their pursuance of a post-Munich course of "balance di­
plomacy" between Berlin and Rome. Due to Italy's politico-
economic position in central Europe, these smaller states 
looked for Italy to adopt measures towards preventing Ger­
man penetration and domination in a region which Italy had 
hitherto regarded as her natural and legitimate sphere of 
interest. Moreover, the smaller states felt Italy might be 
tempted by the prospect of acquiring for herself in these parts 
the leadership which France had apparently abandoned. 
For the second time however, since the Anschluss, and, in 
this instance, at the recent Italo-German arbitration confer­
ence in Vienna, Mussolini succumbed to Hitler, and this 
blasted the hopes of statesmen of the smaller countries to 
Berlin's east for Italian support.1 
Though Italy may desire to resist the German drive down 
the Danube valley by diplomatic and economic means, and 
by domestic intrigues, she would not at this date, in my 
opinion, dare to challenge Germany by force of arms. Indeed, 
I find it difficult to believe either in the will or ability of Italy 
(unbacked by the western powers) to stand up to Germany. 
I find it equally difficult at this writing to foresee any de­
velopment which in final resort will not imply a variable 
degree of German hegemony over the various individual 
states east and southeast of Berlin—a hegemony which certain 
economic and political arrangements between these states 
may mitigate, but not prevent. Moreover, as Germany's trade 
offensive effectively advances, the states in its path can hardly 
afford to quarrel with their best customer, from a trade stand­
point. 
As regards Germany's post-Munich position, it is interesting 
to note that as Germany emerges from the "have not" to 
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the "have" category, Nazi inner circles are manifesting con­
cern over the renewed vigor with which the western powers 
are arming. 
Signs at the moment point to Germany's planning, on the 
one hand, a period of territorial reconsolidation and diges­
tion, and continuance of her eastward trade offensive, on the 
other. Funks recent southeastern tour brought to light Ger­
many's new form of approach to the various trade goals 
envisaged in Berlin's program. In brief, these bilateral nego­
tiations may be characterized as an approach to meet the 
special circumstances prevailing in each country with which 
Berlin aims to do business. In cases where states are under-
industrialized and thus unable to participate in the exchange 
of items of the character suitable to German requirements, 
Germany proposes to take in hand the organizing of an in­
dustrial structure within such states, providing them with 
technicians and materials—receiving in return food commodi­
ties and other products. 
In connection with this eastward drive, Berlin's present 
mood was characterized in effect, by the following statement 
recently imparted to me by an experienced observer who 
enjoys close contact with inner Nazi circles: Germany was 
not building a ramshackle road, such as that which Napoleon 
built. The road which present-day Germany was constructing 
would not tumble. While Napoleon was a great General, he 
had lacked the opportunity to learn many things present-day 
Germany had learned, and which only the modern world 
understood—such as, economics and the regularized expansion 
of population. I interpret this to mean that an almost "power 
drunk" and super-confident Germany intends to have no un­
sympathetic or undigested portions along the way towards 
its eastward goal. 
My informant furthermore stated that inner Nazi circles 
were now looking to Mr. Chamberlain to see what he would 
propose. Accordingly, they expect great efforts to bring about 
European appeasement and understandings to characterize 
the next three to six months. Moreover, these circles did not 
anticipate at the moment a Four-Power Pact, rather they 
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looked for conferences of several or more powers directly 
interested in any particular settlement. 
As for Poland's current position in light of Germany's 
eastward politico-economic ascendency, I am aware that while 
Poland has already given evidence of "playing ball" with 
Germany economically, as a temporary expedient, she realizes 
it is a risky game at the best, and is seriously apprehensive 
in terms of the long-range political outlook. Indeed, Warsaw 
deeply regrets increasing evidences of Britain's and France's 
eastern and central European evacuation—for, although War­
saw has for long ceased to expect British and French military 
intervention in affairs of this section of Europe, nevertheless, 
Warsaw regarded evidences of their active interest in the 
light of a healthy balance. 
As regards near future policies of the present British and 
French Governments, current signs indicate that France, 
like Britain, will exert efforts towards making peace with the 
dictators, and that France will try to secure from Hitler a 
statement of peaceful intentions somewhat along the line of 
that which he made to Mr. Chamberlain. 
Just how far the demands of Hitler and his Nazi "colony­
mongers" will impede understandings of durable character 
between Germany, Britain and France respectively, remains 
to be seen. 
I. The hopes that Biddle mentions were embodied in Beck's project for the 
creation of a "Third Europe," stretching from the Black to Baltic seas as a bloc of 
neutral states to form a barrier to either German or Russian expansion into East 
Central Europe. An integral part of the plan was the establishment of a common 
Polish-Hungarian frontier through cession of territory by Slovakia to both countries 
in the Carpathian-Tatra region. Hence, when the Vienna Award of November 1, 
1938, denied most Hungarian claims against Slovakia and totally ignored all the 
Polish demands, thereby preventing the establishment of this border, the plan 
seemed doomed. The best discussion of this topic is in Cienciala, Poland and the 
Western Powers, pp. 149-76, and the two articles by Winchester and Sakmyster 
cited above in Document 4, note 4. 
DOCUMENT NINE 
November 10, 1938 
My dear Mr. President: 
The plight of the Jewish populations as a whole in Europe 
is steadily becoming so untenable, and their hopes for some 
way out from their present and increasing dilemma becoming 
so dim with the passage of time, that I take the liberty of 
sending you this confidential outline of my recent observa­
tions. 
First of all, it is steadily becoming clearer that you per­
sonally are the one to whom they all look more and more to 
take the lead in finding a solution for their unhappy situation. 
My impression on this score is daily corroborated by requests 
on the part of various Jewish factions here that I ask you to 
receive their representatives, should they proceed to Washing­
ton in the near future. Chief amongst those who have pressed 
me along these lines is one V. [Vladimir] Jabotinski,1 leader 
of the Zionist Revisionists. He is now in the course of at­
tempting to organize a Congress of Jews of this part of 
Europe, the total amount whereof he puts at about 7,000,000. 
In fact, he looks upon the Jews of this section of Europe as 
constituting the object of concern on the part of the Jews in 
the rest of the world—particularly in the United States. 
You may recall that from time to time I have written and 
cabled regarding my conversations with Jabotinski. He has a 
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brilliant mind, and an engaging personality, and has at his 
disposal a "grapevine" system for the gathering of informa­
tion—hence, he is extremely well-informed. Moreover, he is 
diametrically opposed to the policies of Mr. Weisemann2 and 
at heart extremely anti-British. 
He correctly predicted (a) the British Government's scrap­
ping the idea of partition in Palestine, and (b) a general 
disapproval amongst the Jews of the world to the idea of the 
Jews of Palestine assuming a minority position within the 
framework of an Arab State. He now informs me that as 
regards Palestine he felt the blackest of the menacing clouds 
of a month ago had been removed; it seemed now that the 
Jews were no longer faced with the prospect of a drastic and 
radical liquidation of the Balfour pledge. He felt that this 
intention had been frustrated and averted owing to your 
intervention. He believed that what is now likely to follow is 
a return to the status quo ante—meaning "ante the Peel 
reports"3—only perhaps veiled by a display of "a few well 
chosen words" intended to save everybody's face. According 
to his opinion, most people in Britain would feel thankful in 
that event and would "rest"—and the moment for the big move 
would be lost; while the only thing that would not rest would 
be the "disease" Hence, he took another occasion to state 
his fears that there was only one factor left, one man who 
could prevent this half-way stagnation, and this was President 
Roosevelt. 
Naturally, in reply to his repeated question whether there 
was any chance that you might be willing to receive him, I 
stated that you had never lost sight of the problem, and that 
you and your associates were constantly engaged in a search 
for a solution. I did not think this was the time to request an 
audience with you—in fact, the committee which you had ap­
pointed to study the problem was in London and diligently 
at work. 
I am aware that Mr. Jabotinski, like many of his confreres, 
is concentrating his thoughts and energies in an effort (a) to 
engage your good offices in calling another world conference 
to consider territorial outlets for Jewish immigration and (b) 
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to enlist your influence and pressure upon a "Britain, desir­
ous of American cooperation", towards making a generous 
settlement in Palestine. 
Of importantly pertinent interest, usually well-informed 
circles here impart to me that their reports from London indi­
cate that Chamberlain, or perhaps a member of his Cabinet, 
might possibly accompany the King and Queen to the United 
States for, among other purposes, discussing the Palestine 
question along the following lines: To retain Palestine as a 
Jewish homeland would be impossible, if immigration were 
increased. Hence, the British Government might be willing 
to consider favorably offering territory at one or more points 
in their colonies for the purpose of setting up a Jewish State— 
and, provided the United States joined Britain in the guarantee 
of such a state. This proposal, according to my informants, 
might be expected to be a part of an envisaged plan for a 
colonial settlement within the framework of a general Euro­
pean settlement. 
At the present moment the following are highlights on 
developments in connection with the current European Jewish 
problem: (a) violent repercussions against the Jews through­
out Germany as a result of the Jewish boy, Herschel Gruns­
pan, murdering [Ernst] vom Rath, Secretary of the German 
Embassy in Paris;4 (b) signs of an approaching storm over 
the community of Jews in Rumania;5 and (c) difficulties en­
countered by the Polish official representatives in their nego­
tiations in Berlin regarding the individual rights and proper­
ties of the Polish Jews recently ordered out of Germany to 
Poland (15,000 Jews recently crossed into Poland under 24 
hours' notice from the German Government. From all ac­
counts, German treatment of these unfortunate people was 
nothing short of brutal. On the other hand, the Polish Gov­
ernment went to great lengths in an effort to extend humane 
treatment under trying circumstances).6 
1. A Polish Jew, Jabotinski gained an international reputation with his elo­
quent pleas for the creation of a Palestinian Jewish state having the "historic 
borders" of the ancient Israeli kingdom. 
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2. Biddle probably meant Dr. Chaim Weizmann, like Jabotinski originally a 
Jew from Poland. However, he settled in England, where he headed the British 
Zionist movement. He had considerably more moderate views regarding the ter­
ritorial outlines of the Jewish state than did Jabotinski. 
3. The reports of the "Peel Commission," the Royal Commission set up to 
study the Middle East situation and the impact the establishment of a Jewish state 
would have on the area, took note of the deep, emotional hostility among Arab 
leaders to the award of the entire Palestinian area to Israel. In order to counter this 
animosity, and head off what would be certain conflict and bloodshed, the Peel Com­
mission recommended that Palestine be divided into two separate states—an Arab 
and Jewish—and that the key cities, such as Jerusalem, be placed under British 
control in the form of a mandate. Needless to say, this recommendation pleased no 
one, and the report was ignored by both Arab and Jewish parties. An excerpt of 
the report is in Walter Laqueur, ed., The Israel-Arab Reader, 6th ed. (New York, 
1970), pp. 56-58. 
4. Hershel Grynszpan, a young Polish Jew living in Paris, assassinated vom 
Rath on November 7 as retribution for the deportation of his parents from Ger­
many. His action touched off the most vicious Nazi anti-Semitic pogrom yet— 
the infamous Kristallnacht, or "Night of the Broken Glass." 
5. Biddle doubtless refers to the sudden arrest, and subsequent murder, of 
Romanian Fascist chief Corneliu Codreanu by the Romanian authorities in Novem­
ber, 1938. Given the mood of Romania's radical Right, there was ample reason for 
expecting that mass outrage at this deed could easily take the form of another 
Kristallnacht, this one directed against Romanian Jews. 
6. This is a somewhat simplified and incomplete presentation of the problem. 
The Polish government announced that, starting on October 29, within a two-week 
period all passports held by Polish citizens living abroad would have to be verified 
by Polish diplomatic outposts; penalty for failure to have a passport validated was 
the loss of Polish citizenship. For the numerous Jews living in Germany as resident 
aliens on Polish passports this could mean loss of the right to return to Poland 
freely, and the consequent necessity of remaining in Germany permanently—a 
situation obviously distasteful to Berlin. Hence, the German Foreign Office protested 
strongly to Warsaw; when it received no satisfaction at once, Berlin announced 
that it would begin expelling all Polish Jews immediately. By October 29, 17,000 
Jews of Polish citizenship had been forced to leave Germany for Poland; in most 
cases, they were prohibited from taking any but their most essential possessions. 
When the Polish government threatened to retaliate with a wholesale expulsion of 
German citizens in Poland, the two countries commenced negotiations on Novem­
ber 2 that culminated in a January 24, 1939, agreement allowing those Jews ex­
pelled in the previous October to return to Germany for a stay sufficiently long to 
settle their financial affairs. Details of the controversy are in DGFP, D, Vol. 5, 
docs. 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95, 107, and 127. 
DOCUMENT TEN1 
December 7, 1938 
Subject: Minister Beck's confidentially imparted observations 
(a) on his "balance diplomacy"; (b) Poland's and France's 
respective relations with Soviet; (c) French-German declaration 
of December 6 and 1/ its estimated effect upon Poland's pacts 
with France and Germany, and 2/ value of France's and Britain's 
declarations with Germany as a long-range basis for foreign 
policy; (d) Polish-French relations, and Beck's discernible 
desire for improved understanding and closer relations; Beck's 
clarification of Poland's pre-Munich and post-Munich position 
In conversation with Minister Beck on various aspects of 
Polish foreign policy, he emphasized that, from Poland's an­
gle, maintenance of the delicate balance between Moscow and 
Berlin was more difficult and even more important than main­
tenance of the balance between Berlin and Paris. Equilibrium 
in Polish policy between her two major neighbors was par­
ticularly difficult, mainly due to Berlin's inherent misunder­
standing and mistrust of Moscow. On the other hand, how­
ever, Poland found it measurably easier to balance her rela­
tions between Berlin and Paris, in that the passage of time 
had served to mitigate Paris' first flush of resentment over the 
Polish-German Non-Aggression Agreement; in fact, in recent 
years Warsaw had found that fundamentally the Polish-Ger­
man Non-Aggression Agreement had ceased to have an unfa­
vorable bearing upon the Polish-French Alliance. On the other 
hand, Berlin had accepted the Polish-French Alliance as rep­
resenting no hindrance to the Polish-German Non-Aggression 
Agreement. 
Turning to Poland's and France's respective relations with 
the Soviets, and more particularly their comparative apprais­
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als of the Soviets' potential military strength, Minister Beck 
remarked that in 1922, when he, as Military Attache at the 
Polish Embassy in Paris, had remarked to General Foch that 
the Soviet Army (then in the course of reorganizing) would 
bear watching in terms of potential strength and European 
balance, Foch had manifested distinct annoyance with Beck's 
remark, adding that such an idea was illusory and preposter­
ous. At that time, and subsequently, Poland, always in a bet­
ter position than France to watch closely and appraise realis­
tically Soviet internal developments, was aware of the Soviet's 
mounting military strength. Minister Beck then remarked that 
it had been with a combined sense of amusement and inter­
est that years later General Gamelin had loudly acclaimed 
the Soviet Army as an outstanding force and as a potential 
balance in the European politico-military arena. The Minister 
then stated his opinion that, while Poland had kept abreast of 
military developments in the Soviet [Union] during past years, 
hence realizing its mounting strength, Poland had taken full 
account of the immediate and long-range bearing of certain 
weaknesses in the structure resultant from a series of "purges" 
over past years. Therefore, Beck felt Poland was apt to evalu­
ate the Soviet Army's potential strength more realistically 
than France, which was apparently inclined to over-rate the 
Soviet's strength. 
Turning then to the subject of the French-German declar­
ation signed December 6, Minister Beck remarked with a sense 
of satisfaction that M. Bonnet had advised Polish Ambassa­
dor [Juliusz] Lukasiewicz well in advance of France's under­
taking and had kept him abreast of negotiations. At the same 
time Bonnet had pointed out that his Government considered 
the French-German declaration would work no hindrance 
either to the Polish-German Alliance or the Polish-German 
Non-Aggression Agreement. 
About the same time, Chancellor Hitler had advised Polish 
Ambassador [Jozef] Lipski that Germany intended to join in 
a declaration with France and that he likewise considered 
that this declaration would have no unfavorable bearing upon 
the Polish-French Alliance and the Polish-German Non-Ag­
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gression Agreement. It was significant to me that Hitler failed 
to mention the possible effect of the then forthcoming French-
German declaration upon the French-Soviet Alliance. In fact, 
I interpret this to mean that Hitler deliberately eliminated 
mention of the latter pact as a means of evidencing his non­
acceptance thereof. 
In response to Bonnet's aforementioned message to Beck 
through the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Beck had replied he 
was in accord with M. Bonnet's opinion that the French-Ger­
man declaration would not affect the Polish-French Alliance 
nor Poland's Non-Aggression Agreement with Germany. In 
fact, he added his belief that France's action now removed 
any existent differences of views between Poland and France. 
In other words, the German-French declaration in effect had 
placed Poland's and France's respective relations vis-a-vis 
Germany on the same level. 
Though Beck has not expressed it in so many words, I gain 
the impression he is not inclined to look for either France or 
Britain, in terms of the long-range outlook to base with any 
degree of permanency their respective foreign policies on the 
declarations with Germany. Minister Beck imparted his high 
esteem both for M. Daladier and M. Bonnet. He felt that of 
the two M. Bonnet had a clearer grasp of the fundamentals 
governing Polish policy. On the other hand, he felt that M. 
Daladier's political activities had been so confined to the in­
ternal affairs of France that he had had little time to keep 
abreast of problems confronting Polish policy. Beck had 
learned with sincere regret that, due to a combination of rapid 
post-Munich events, M. Daladier was inclined to be annoyed with 
Poland—especially in connection with Poland's action vis-a-vis 
Prague.2 Beck particularly regretted this in view of his belief 
that M. Daladier had perhaps failed to grasp the whole pic­
ture from Poland's own objective standpoint. 
By way of further clarification of Poland's position, the 
Minister pointed out that at no time during the past year had 
he or his close collaborators believed that either France or 
England would march for Czechoslovakia or that Czechoslo­
vakia would fight Germany single-handed. (My conversations 
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with Minister Beck, Marshal Smigfy-Rydz, and Chief of Staff 
General [Wacfaw] Stachiewicz over the past year bear out 
Beck on this point). Beck continued that meanwhile both Lon­
don and Paris had vigorously pressed Warsaw to commit Po­
land to a line-up with France and Britain vis-a-vis Germany. 
During the period leading up to the Munich Conference, 
and in response to London's request that Warsaw suppress 
its violent press attack on Prague, Beck had stated that he 
would rather be criticized for acting tactlessly at that moment 
than to be accused three months hence of having "let down" 
Czechoslovakia. 
Here Beck emphasized that, with the convictionjn the back of 
his mind that Paris and London would seek to negotiate 
rather than fight over Czechoslovakia, he had interpreted 
London's pressure for his commitment in the light of an at­
tempt to use Poland's desired declaration of alignment in the 
nature of a "big stick" vis-a-vis Berlin. In other words, he 
foresaw that: 
(a) London's immediate objective envisaged possibly try­
ing to bring Berlin to terms by pointing out that, with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia in the East and Britain and France in the 
West, Germany faced a conflict on two fronts; 
(b) London's possible longer-range objective envisaged, 
in event of bringing Germany to terms, calling a four-power 
conference to the exclusion of Poland. Moreover, Beck had 
foreseen that a four-power conference entailed potential dan­
gers for the smaller powers; in other words, that the latter 
might possibly become the victims of "peaceful settlements" 
between the major powers. Moreover, he reiterated with em­
phasis his former statements to effect that Poland, whose claims 
for the Teschen district had pre-dated and were more justifi­
able than Germany's claims for the Sudetenland, had from 
the very outset consistently voiced her insistence upon equal 
and non-discriminatory treatment of Polish claims—and had so 
notified the capitals of the four major powers. Hence the 
London-Paris agreement to advance the scope of treatment of 
Germany's claims for the Sudeten territory from autonomy to 
cession, in which deliberation Poland had had no part, had 
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placed Poland in a position whereat there was no alternative 
other than to settle her claims in her own way. (I am aware 
that Beck and his collaborators were faced not only with a 
question of prestige in the light of their internal political arena 
but also with what they considered the necessity of "showing" 
Germany they were willing to fight for what they considered 
their rightful objectives.)3 
(c) the recent French-German declaration would undoubt­
edly have the effect of "putting to sleep" the French-Soviet 
Alliance. Moreover, Beck felt this declaration placed Poland's 
and France's respective relations with Germany on the same 
level. Hence, there should be little if any difference of views 
now between France and Poland. 
From the foregoing and other conversations with Minister 
Beck, I gain the distinct impression that he has a sincere 
desire of clarifying Poland's position with Messrs. Daladier 
and Bonnet towards a better understanding and amelioration 
in relations between Poland and France. 
1. This document has been published in the series Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1938 (Washington, 1953), 1:108-11. It is included herein to preserve 
the continuity of Biddle's running narrative and analysis of Polish diplomacy, as 
well as to illustrate the evolution of his perception of both the Polish and general 
European diplomatic scenes. In addition, this document is an excellent presenta­
tion of Beck's thinking on the entire Munich question. 
2. Reference here is to the Polish ultimatum to Prague on Teschen and the 
subsequent territorial changes involving that area. 
3. Reference here is to the Polish-German dispute over the strategically impor­
tant town of Bohumin (Bogumin) in Teschen; see Document no. 16 below. 
DOCUMENT ELEVEN 
December 22, 1938 
Subject: Opinion of Turkish Ambassador1 and discussions with 
passing Nazi agents bearing on schemes envisaged by the war 
lords and political dreamers of the Nazi extremist element; 
Observations on various aspects of Poland's position 
Judging from my discussions with passing Nazi propaganda 
bureau agents, the Turkish Ambassador, and other informed 
individuals here, it is steadily becoming clearer that Hitler's 
ultimate objective entails Germany's eventually becoming 
the dominating power on this side of the Atlantic, and that 
the course envisaged, at least by the Nazi extremists now in 
the "saddle", toward that end is somewhat along the following 
lines: While the establishment of an independent Ukrainian 
state, or a "Greater Ukraine", as the project is now labeled 
by the revolutionary organization now operating under Berlin 
influence in Prague,2 figures as Berlin's major objective, I 
do not look for Hitler to risk measuring his military strength 
with that of the Soviet until he might have accomplished the 
following envisaged program: 
(a) Complete ascendency over the area between Ger­
many's eastern and the Soviet's western frontier. In this con­
nection, I understand he envisages the creation of a chain of 
small subjugated states to serve as a "buffer" between Ger­
many and the Soviet until such time as Hitler is prepared for a 
thrust at the Soviet. (My informants added that when the time 
came to "go after" the Soviet Hitler would have organized an 
army of White Russians to go forward as the advance guard, 
and that Hitler would approach his object not only from the 
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south, but also through a friendly Finland and an envisagedly 
amenable Estonia. They added that Estonia had already shifted 
her arms purchases from Britain to Finland, which was acting 
as agent for sales of German equipment.) 
In line with this scheme he plans to divide Poland into sev­
eral parts through (1) annexation of the Corridor, Danzig, 
and Upper Silesia to the Reich, (2) incitement of a rebellion 
in the Ukrainian minority with an aim to joining it up with 
Ruthenia, and (3) promise of delivery of Vilno to Lithuania 
as part compensation for Lithuania's envisaged adherence to 
a Berlin policy. (In this connection I understand that Berlin, 
well aware of the Slavs' historic recalcitrance and resistance 
vis-a-vis Germany and former Austria in their respective for­
ward-looking programs, plans materially to disarm the Polish 
forces after Poland's envisaged dismemberment.) 
I am aware that until recently Hitler has "soft-pedalled" 
the Danzig Nazis in their desire to "break out" beyond the 
limits set by Hitler into a bolder than hitherto offensive atti­
tude. I believe, however, that the hour is fast approaching 
when Hitler might give them instructions to go on the "at­
tack" Moreover, my afore-cited conversations prompt me to 
feel this may be timed with an even more vigorous agitation 
among the Ukrainian and German minorities. 
Meanwhile the picture taking form on the northern and 
southern frontiers of Poland may be described by stating that 
what were previously two detached arms of the Soviet, name­
ly Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, are rapidly becoming the 
attached arms of Germany. 
In Prague, falling in line with Berlin policy with surprising 
rapidity, we find already a going organization of revolutionary 
character boldly supporting the Polish Ukrainian minority's 
bid for autonomy, and playing a leading role in a vigorous 
campaign envisaging the setting up of a "Greater Ukraine." 
I understand, moreover, that the efforts of this organization are 
coordinated with the propaganda broadcasts of Vienna and 
Leipzig, as well as a secret broadcasting station on Czech soil 
close to the Czech-Polish border in Trans-Olzan Silesia, dis­
seminating anti-Polish propaganda. Furthermore, Ruthenia is 
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rapidly being rigged up, under Berlin's direction, as a center 
for anti-Polish, anti-Rumania, and anti-Soviet activities. 
I understand through usually reliable channels that in 
Kaunas there is evidence of a growing tendency to "play ball" 
with Berlin. Already large student bodies have demonstrated 
for the return of Valdemaras, for the adoption not only of a 
pro-German but an anti-Polish policy as well.3 These demon­
strations, I understand, are attributable to Berlin influence. 
According to the Turkish Ambassador and the aforemen­
tioned Nazi agents who passed through here, Hitler's atten­
tion to Memel represents mainly a "play" to bring Lithuania 
into line—and eventually he aims either to buy off Smetona or 
support Valdemaras in a coup d'etat with a view to setting 
up a Government in Kaunas which might definitively bring 
Lithuania into Berlin's orbit. 
As regards Hitler's identification with machinations vis-a­
vis the Ukraine, it is well to bear in mind that at the time 
Pilsudski and Hitler accomplished the Polish-German Non-
Aggression Agreement, it was secretly agreed that Hitler 
should leave the Polish Ukrainian minority alone.4 Until re­
cently, mention of the Ukraine project was notably absent in 
the Nazi press. It is significant, however, that on December 14 
the Schlesiche Zeitung of Breslau, a paper with conservative 
and military tradition dating from 1742, carried an article 
clearly disclosing Germany's interest in the establishment of 
an independent Ukrainian state, mainly at the expense of Po­
land and the Soviet. Besides, the article concluded by stating 
it was advisable that Europe follow events in this area, if it 
did not wish one day to be surprised. One thing was certain: 
"The Ukrainian race will live." This then marks a significant 
departure from Hitler's hitherto apparent desire to withhold 
Berlin's identification with a Ukrainian project, and a deliber­
ate breach of his secret agreement with Pilsudski. As a matter 
of fact, Warsaw has on several occasions in the recent past 
discreetly complained to Berlin about the aforementioned 
Viennese and Leipzig broadcasts. 
In other words, I discern increasing signs that Hitler is fast 
closing in on Poland, and I believe he means to press with 
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intensified effort on all points, both internally and externally 
to bring Warsaw to terms. It now appears he is deliberately 
"sicking" Czechoslovakia on Poland (such as he is now re­
portedly "sicking" Hungary on the Transylvanian area 6f 
Rumania). In fact it is even conceivable he might carry this 
to the point of provoking an open conflict with view to tak­
ing advantage of any pretext (such as protection of the Ger­
man minority from possible harm in a disturbed area, etc.) 
to intervene actively. 
Meanwhile, unless the Polish Government comes to terms, 
or succeeds in stalling for time through diplomatic tactics, 
I look for Hitler to stir up in every way possible internal 
restiveness in Poland, especially amongst the German minority, 
even perhaps with view eventually to creating a pretext for 
an open row. For I believe Hitler and his "extremist" asso­
ciates, provided they felt sufficiently confident France had been 
neutralized by the recent Paris-Berlin declaration and that 
neither France nor the Soviet were in the mood nor of the 
capacity to come to Poland's aid, would welcome an oppor­
tunity "to try out" their Army in an envisagedly victorious 
war of short duration, in order to build up confidence amongst 
their armed forces and to offset what Hitler reportedly inter­
prets as a lingering spirit of defeatism and pacifism amongst 
the German masses. Moreover, according to my aforemen­
tioned informants, the Turkish Ambassador and the Nazi 
agents, Hitler would like to accomplish this provided he thought 
he could "localize" it before France and Great Britain might 
have attained any further appreciable improvement in their 
respective armaments. 
As regards the other links in Hitler's envisaged chain of 
smaller units between the German and Soviet areas, my afore­
mentioned informants were of the opinion (a) Hitler counts 
upon Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as "friends" and counts upon 
their "sitting tight"; moreover, that Hungary will completely 
"board the band wagon" at an early date; (b) as regards Ru­
mania, Hitler is already setting the scene for the amputation: 
Bukovina to line up with Ruthenia, and possibly even part 
or all of Bessarabia (The "extremist" element in Berlin figures 
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on there being three million Ukrainians in Rumania. This, 
they hold, includes Bessarabia.); (c) Hitler aims that Bucharest 
should henceforth have its hands full with Berlin-inspired 
Hungarian pressure vis-a-vis Transylvania. 
In discussing King Carol, the Turkish Ambassador unhesi­
tatingly and bluntly labeled him a voleur, adding that if any­
thing in the form of financial benefits were to come Bucha­
rest's way Carol was always sure to get his usually important 
share of the "soap." The reason he had "bumped off' Co­
dreanu and "Iron Guard" associates was not only to fortify 
his own political position, but also to clear the Rumanian arena 
of forces which might insist upon sharing the spoils with him. 
Carol had always had a price, took it from where he could 
get it, and the Berlin of today knew it. Carol, like his com­
patriots, suffered from sensitivity of the "pocket nerve" and 
would not be difficult to line up eventually when Berlin was 
prepared to assure itself of the Rumanian Government's align­
ment with Berlin policy. 
Ascendency over the area between Germany and the Soviet 
in general, and over Poland in particular, is of paramount 
importance in terms of the immediate aspect of Hitler's pro­
gram. In connection therewith, Hitler feels he must eliminate 
Poland as a force of potential resistance from the picture as 
speedily as possible, in order to make a thrust at France be­
fore she will have effectively prepared to meet a combined 
German and Italian attack. Hitler, according to the Turkish 
Ambassador, does not dare risk coming to grips with France 
until Poland may have been put down, for Hitler is convinced 
that Poland would jump on his back the instant the French, 
and perhaps the British, forces might have engaged the Ger­
man forces in the field.5 His plan envisages a joint German 
and Italian campaign vis-a-vis France, entailing the immediate 
closing of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to all British 
and French shipping. The attack would be one of lightning 
and destructive character. Ribbentrop, who is today in the 
"saddle", in terms of direction of foreign policy, continues to 
maintain that Britain is still in such a state of unprepared ness 
that she will have her hands full merely taking care of "home 
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defense" and protection of her merchant fleet; that Germany 
may, in collaboration with Italy, consequently proceed against 
France without much worry of effective resistance from Brit­
ain. Of pertinent bearing, I am reliably informed that Ribben­
trop (still Britain's "Public Enemy No. 1") is now frequently 
referred to by Hitler in his informal conversation as "my man 
Ribbentrop". 
In fact, reports reaching the British Ambassador here from 
Berlin concur with the substance of my recent conversation 
with an agent of the Press Bureau of the Nazi Party (who re­
cently passed through Warsaw) to the effect that Hitler had re­
marked, in the presence of several of his Ministers, that if he 
had only listened to "his man Ribbentrop" (instead of Goer­
ing and Neurath) he could have launched a victorious attack 
of short duration against Prague without effective interference 
from abroad. In this connection, the Turkish Ambassador 
stated that, through an envisaged victory over France, Hitler 
plans his "pay-off' to Mussolini by leaving him North Africa, 
retaining the right to exercise full sway over the European 
continent. The Ambassador, moreover, emphasized that upper 
Nazi circles are anxious to bring about their envisaged attack 
on France as soon as possible in order to strike before France 
and Britain will have become better prepared. 
Of pertinent bearing, my inquiries during discussions 
with my aforementioned informants disclose that the funda­
mental explanation for Rome's outburst regarding Tunis, 
Corsica and Nice during Ribbentrop's visit in Paris was a tac­
tical move previously agreed upon by Berlin and Rome. 
Ribbentrop was anxious to neutralize France during Berlin's 
period of "consolidation" in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Hence he had felt it would be tactically helpful, from a psy­
chological standpoint, if Rome, the other axis partner, shouted 
for French possessions while Ribbentrop would be talking to 
Bonnet. Ribbentrop had felt that during the conversation 
Bonnet's mind might thus be divided between Ribbentrop's 
offer to sign a declaration along limited lines and the dis­
turbing outburst of the other axis partner. Threatened by one 
end of the axis, and seeing the outstretched hand of the other 
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end, Bonnet might thus the more readily be brought to grasp 
the outstretched hand, and to be content with Berlin's refusal 
to extend the scope of the declaration beyond the frontiers 
common to Germany and France. In other words, it might 
have been a preconceived "ploy", aimed primarily at bring­
ing Bonnet to terms on Berlin's conditions, and secondarily 
as an opportunity for Rome to acquire whatever profits might 
eventually accrue to Italy as a result. 
Now it seems that Ribbentrop is satisfied that he obtained 
Paris' signature and Rome is gratified over the prospect of 
(a) France's raising the status of the Italian population in 
Tunis (possibly to the point of extending agricultural loans to 
the Italian as well as to the French inhabitants), (b) coming 
to terms on the Djibouti railway, and (c) both France's and 
Britain's coming to terms on the Suez Canal. These disclo­
sures, in response to my inquiries, are to the following extent 
borne out by the fact that the Polish Ambassador to Rome 
was told several days ago by [Italian] Foreign Minister Ciano 
that the latter did not expect the Tunis claims to give rise to 
serious consequences; the issue involved more a social than a 
territorial aspect and Ciano believed that in that light the mat­
ter would be settled satisfactorily. Moreover, Ciano expected 
France eventually to meet Rome's Djibouti claims satisfactor­
ily and France and Britain to adjust the Suez issue. 
In evaluating the substance of (a) the above-cited opinion of 
the Turkish Ambassador upon certain phases of Berlin's for­
ward-looking program; and (b) the above-cited information 
imparted to me by Nazi secret agents who have recently 
passed through here in various guises, I do not lose sight of the 
fact that the Turkish Ambassador is an Italophobe almost to the 
point of fanaticism, and that though generally exceptionally 
well informed, "a professional pessimist" Besides, I do not fail 
to take into consideration that if and when Germany might 
have gained complete ascendency over whatever states still 
represent resistance points, such as Poland and Rumania, it 
might spell the approach of an early show-down between the 
Axis and Turkey. In line with this, I do not exclude the possibil­
ity that his expressed opinion might have been motivated by 
266 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 
the tactical conception that by planting the thought that the 
"silencing" of Poland might presage a subsequent attack on 
France, he might serve to stir up more vigorous French interest 
in the Polish-French Alliance. After all Turkey, like all other 
countries in Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe, is 
seeking to divert Berlin's drive from all their own necks. 
In evaluating the information imparted to me by the afore­
mentioned Nazi agents, while I am inclined to mark it down 
partly (a) to the scare- and confusion-inspiring technique of 
Nazidom's formula of gangster diplomacy, and (b) to the 
speculative dreams of the "extremist" element of Nazi inner 
circles, I am aware that at the moment the "extremist" ele­
ment is in the saddle. Moreover, it is well to bear in mind that 
previous to the Anschluss, and again in the period leading up 
to the Sudeten, the Propaganda Bureau in Berlin characteris­
tically made an "open secret" of Hitler's intentions vis-a-vis 
both projects; as these rumored intentions gained widespread 
attention, they were generally received as the fantastic mach­
inations of the war lords and radical political dreamers of Ber­
lin. Therefore, in view of these recollections, the aforemen­
tioned opinion of the Turkish Ambassador and the Nazi 
agents' information, a large portion of which I am inclined to 
attribute to Nazi Propaganda Bureau inspiration, might con­
ceivably serve in the light, at least from time to time, of watch­
ing the course of Berlin's diplomacy and other political ma­
neuvers during the next few months. 
Insofar as Poland is concerned, Beck is well aware (a) of 
Berlin's intensified pressure at all points above described, and 
(b) of the destructive designs of the Nazi "extremists". He is, 
moreover, alive to the necessity of coming to a decision at an 
early date as to what course to pursue henceforth vis-a-vis Ber­
lin, and as he faces the problem I believe the two answers he 
awaits are: (a) Bonnet's reply to Polish Ambassador Lukasie­
wicz's soundings as to how far Poland might count on France 
in the event of a conflict with Germany (I am aware that until 
today, December 22, Paris has, to the disappointment of War­
saw, not made itself clear.);6 and (b) Polish Ambassador to 
Moscow [Waclaw] Grzybowski's impression as to Moscow s 
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mood and capacity to support Poland's continued resistance to 
German pressure. In my opinion, the answers to these ques­
tions may be expected to prove the determining factors in 
Beck's forward-looking program. 
At this point it is pertinent to recall that some time ago I 
discovered there was a school of thought in official circles here 
which had long envisaged Poland's collaboration with Ger­
many in an envisaged establishment of an independent 
Ukrainian state, wherein this group pictures Poland's receiv­
ing her proportionate rewards for "services rendered" and 
territory contributed.7 I am aware, however, that this school of 
thought received a shock when Hitler refused to permit the 
establishment of Poland's envisaged common frontier with 
Hungary. Indeed, their rude awakening to the realization that 
Berlin's "political engineers" were setting up Ruthenia as a 
"propaganda fortress", turned against Poland as well as the 
Soviet, dampened their enthusiasm for collaboration with Ger­
many in connection with the Ukraine. Moreover, their pride 
was deeply offended—and for a Pole this is an almost unforgiv­
able sin. 
Moreover, my own observations of Nazi mentality convince 
me the aforementioned group's hope of Germany's willingness 
to collaborate with Poland in and after the establishment of 
any potentially fruitful scheme is nothing short of a "pipe 
dream" Indeed, to my mind, Berlin's idea of collaboration 
with a smaller state is decidedly foreign to the ideas of col­
laboration entertained by the aforementioned Polish group. 
Poland would do all the collaborating, and Germany all the 
profit-taking. Poland would be like a vehicle used by a person 
to reach some place on an important mission—after reaching his 
destination he would strip the car of all detachable parts and 
cast the rest on the "dump heap" 
In that I realize Beck possesses a keen insight into the Ger­
man mentality, I feel he entertains no illusions as to Poland's 
potential benefits from collaboration with Germany. Hence it 
would seem that his best "out" is the possibility of a French-
and/or Soviet-supported Polish resistance to German pres­
sure—or perhaps even a lightning thrust at Czechoslovakia (a) 
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in a hope of "silencing" Ruthenia, a thorn of increasing dis­
comfort in Poland's side, without intervention of a third power 
and (b) in a hope that Germany's potential intervention might 
bring other powers to Poland's side. 
As regards the likelihood of Paris' committing itself to force­
ful action in connection with the Polish-French Alliance,see 
Memorandum A attached hereto. As regards Moscow's poten­
tial capacity and mood to support Warsaw's continued resis­
tance to Berlin pressure, see Memorandum B attached hereto. 
As regards the possibility of Poland's striking out suddenly 
against Czechoslovakia, see Memorandum C attached hereto. 
In endeavoring to estimate Beck's future attitude vis-a-vis 
Berlin, it is pertinent to mention that at the conclusion of a 
conference of the inner Government circle with the President 
on December 14 at the Zamek? Beck was requested to press 
Berlin for a clarification of its intentions in Eastern Europe in 
general and vis-a-vis Poland in particular. Beck later conferred 
with German Ambassador [Hans Adolf] von Moltke. In con­
nection therewith, Under Secretary of State Count [Jan] Szem­
bek imparted that Beck had been forceful in his conversation, 
emphasizing that Poland, "one of the Great Powers", insisted 
upon Berlin's explanation of its recent actions vis-a-vis Poland 
and insisted upon a clarification as to what Berlin intended to 
do vis-a-vis Memel, where Poland had interests, and vis-a-vis 
the Soviet. Moltke had replied that Berlin intended no annexa­
tion of Memel and was merely interested in seeing that it en­
joyed full rights under the Statute. As regards the Soviet, 
Moltke would leave the explanation of Berlin's interest for 
some official of the German Government to clarify. 
Moltke subsequently arranged for Ribbentrop to come here "on 
the Polish Government's invitation" about mid-January. Molt­
ke yesterday imparted to the Rumanian Ambassador that he 
hoped Warsaw would alter its recently adopted recalcitrant 
attitude towards Berlin before Ribbentrop arrived, adding that 
Berlin was seriously annoyed over Beck's declaration with 
Moscow. Moltke considered Beck had made a great mistake. 
Beck departed from Warsaw December 21 for Monaco. Be­
fore his departure he sent me a confidential message, request­
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ing me to guard it with secrecy, that he intended to go to Mon­
aco for about ten days in order to have time to think out his 
various problems and to gain a clear perspective before mak­
ing certain important decisions. He facetiously added he had 
chosen Monaco, since it was the only country to which he 
might go without being suspected of negotiating for an alli­
ance. 
It is pertinent to state that the Rumanian Ambassador, 
characterizing the opinion of several representatives of other 
nearby Central European states, has the impression that Po­
land would be willing to collaborate with Germany against the 
Soviet, provided she could be assured of generous compensa­
tion. He bases this impression (a) upon his belief that any posi­
tive action vis-a-vis Russia is of major interest to Poland—in 
fact, could not be carried out without Poland's collaboration, 
unless Germany were willing to fight both Poland and the So­
viet; (b) upon the fact that the Ambassador's own Government 
circles cannot picture Poland's marching with the Soviet 
against Germany—rather it might be the other way round. The 
Ambassador concurs in my opinion, however, that if Berlin at 
the outset refused to talk terms satisfactory to Warsaw, such 
as withdrawal of objections to a "common frontier" with 
Hungary, Berlin might force Poland over to the side of the So­
viet. 
In this connection, I do not exclude the possibility that if Berlin 
strikes recognizable resistance during the forthcoming Beck-
Ribbentrop talks, which Berlin felt might lead to widespread 
complications, Berlin might adopt the role of the "spider and 
the web"—or empty promises. 
In considering the Rumanian Ambassador's impression, I 
am inclined to feel that his attitude borders on confusion and 
defeatism in view not only of the foregoing, but also because 
of his statement that he felt there was nothing for his country 
and Poland eventually to do but to collaborate with Germany 
in her Ukraine objective—in fact, he said that he and his Gov­
ernment circles felt London and Paris would welcome Ger­
many's turning against the Soviet, that Germany could count 
upon their standing aside. Moreover, I recall having pointed 
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out in a previous despatch that, while Beck might conceivably 
and eventually agree to collaborate with Germany in a venture 
vis-a-vis the Soviet, both his insight to the German mentality 
and his foresight might prompt him to regard such a venture as 
spelling a grim prospect for Poland in terms of the long-range 
outlook and, as such, to treat it in the light of a last alternative. 
Besides, in my opinion, Beck would not likely lose sight of the 
improbability of Hitler's attempting a military venture vis-a-vis 
the Soviet until he would have either sufficiently assured him­
self of Britain's and France's neutrality during such a cam­
paign, or would have attempted to "silence" France through a 
potential campaign at the side of Italy. In connection with the 
latter, if Beck suspected that Hitler intended to strike at 
France, I am of the opinion that Beck would not commit him­
self to collaborate with Germany. 
Hence I believe that Beck, during his visit to Monaco, will 
study all angles of events in the making in order to gain a clear 
perspective of the general trend and its potential bearing on 
Poland's position. He will, moreover, undoubtedly watch for 
signs indicating the possible outcome of Chamberlain's forth­
coming meeting with Mussolini, for the outcome thereof will 
undoubtedly have an important bearing on Poland's forward-
looking policy. I look for him meanwhile to continue a "wait­
and-see" policy. 
MEMORANDUM A 
As to the likelihood of Paris' committing itself positively to 
forceful action in connection with the Polish-French alliance, it 
is interesting to note that according to information through us­
ually reliable channels, Berlin's "political engineers" estimate 
that about 60% of leading political circles in Paris would oppose 
any definite commitment at this time to military action in con­
nection with Eastern and Central Europe, and that this ele­
ment favors "putting to sleep"—if not altogether cutting loose 
from, France's alliances with Poland and the Soviet. This esti­
mate corresponds with that of political experts of the Angora 
[Ankara] Government. 
Moreover, I am aware that Poland's press in France hit a 
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"new low" for all time in the early stage of the post-Munich 
period. In fact, there has been little if any improvement in 
French feeling towards Poland since the Warsaw-Prague "set­
tlement" over the Teschen district. Besides, the Government 
here has adopted an antagonizing attitude toward France's 
economic interests in this city. As a matter of fact, French in­
vestors in the Warsaw Electric Company are now in the pro­
cess of defending their interests against an attempt to se­
quester the property. Furthermore, for Poland's part, Warsaw 
has done little to improve relations with Paris by apparently 
going out of its way to lend moral support to Rome's recent 
outburst regarding Tunis, etcetera. Moreover, to make sure 
that Paris did not miss these articles, the Warsaw Govern­
ment-controlled press agency, PAT, deliberately distributed 
the substance thereof to their Paris subscribers. In view of 
Beck's earnest desire to gain a sympathetic ear in Paris, adop­
tion of such an inconsistent attitude in the Polish press is inex­
plicable, unless it might be put down to a complete lack of 
coordination between Beck and his Press Bureau, and/or both 
acute pique over France's declaration with Germany and sub­
sequent rumors published in the foreign press that Ribbentrop 
and Bonnet have discussed the Polish-French alliance and im­
plications that France had "cooled off' on this alliance. In 
other words, with France's not having yet attained her desired 
standard of military preparedness and with an already recal­
citrant French public opinion vis-a-vis Poland (which certainly 
could not have been ameliorated by the moral support recently 
given Rome's outburst by the Warsaw Government-controlled 
press), it seems hardly likely that Paris would either be in the 
mood or of the capacity to greet with outstretched arms Beck's 
emissary when the latter seeks a definite commitment entail­
ing French military action in the event Poland came to grips 
with Germany. 
MEMORANDUM B 
As regards Moscow's potential mood and capacity to lend 
support to Warsaw's continued resistance to Berlin pressure, 
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the only indications I have so far had on this score, are the fol­
lowing: 
The Rumanian Ambassador informed me confidentially that 
his Government had received a report that Litvinov, in recent 
conversation with a foreign diplomat accredited to Moscow, 
had given the latter the impression that until he might have 
had more time to judge Warsaw's actions, he was not inclined 
to take too seriously Warsaw's sudden turn towards Moscow. 
However, the Rumanian Government's source of information 
had interpreted Litvinov's attitude as a willingness to "play 
ball' with Warsaw in the hope that improved relations might 
possibly serve Moscow profitably in the end. 
Of pertinent bearing, Minister Beck's Chief of Cabinet, 
Count Eubienski, in discussing current negotiations between 
Warsaw and Moscow looking to a trade pact, stated that while 
TAS[S]10 had recently reported that Moscow was prepared to 
offer a deal on a basis whereby Moscow would purchase goods 
here in 1939 amounting to 80 million zfotys, he was disinclined 
to be hopeful that Moscow's purchases would exceed much 
more than about 20 to 25 million ztotys. Naturally he hoped for 
considerably more but due to past experiences in commerce 
with the Soviet, figures cited in negotiations usually dwin­
dled considerably in practice. On the other hand, experience 
had shown that in many cases Moscow directed its purchases 
along political tactical lines. 
In this connection, Hubieiiski mentioned that Moscow had 
already evinced considerable interest in the possible purchase 
of Polish coal. Lubiehski interpreted this more in the light of a 
political gesture than a commercial requirement. 
He then stated signs now pointed to Moscow's continuance 
of steel orders formerly issued to the Trzyniec foundries, 
formerly in Czecho-Slovakia, now in Poland. 
MEMORANDUM C 
As regards the possibility of a Polish-Czecho-Slovak con­
flict, it is well to bear in mind the following: 
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On December 14th, the inner Government conferred with 
the President at the Zamek. At the conclusion of the confer­
ence it was decided that Beck should press Berlin for a clarifi­
cation of its intentions in Eastern Europe in general, and v«­
a-vis Poland in particular. 
Marshal Smigly-Rydz moreover, reportedly inferred that 
army circles had been disappointed by their impression that a 
"silencing" of Ruthenia as a center of anti-Polish activities 
was no longer a question. Moreover, military circles continued 
to feel that the only solution was a lightening thrust at Ruthe­
nia, which they felt would not encounter resistance from Ru­
mania, Hungary, or Yugoslavia. They felt that even in the case 
of Germany, they would not encounter German intervention, 
provided the job was accomplished speedily. 
I am, moreover, aware that high military circles here have 
been pressing for action vis-a-vis Ruthenia until several days 
ago, when there was a noticeable quieting of anti-Polish activi­
ties arising in Ruthenia, on the heels of Warsaw's vigorous 
note to Prague. I now learn, however, that due to a recent inci­
dent wherein a group of Czechs reportedly caused disorder in 
the Teschen district by hurling bombs, grenades, etc., Warsaw 
is planning to send a fresh protest to Prague. What effect this 
will have on the military hotheads is too early to forecast. It is 
safe to say, however, that their knowledge of this recent inci­
dent will not improve their mounting recalcitrance towards 
Czecho-Slovakia. 
1. M. Ferid Tek. 
2. Reference is to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which 
openly flaunted its connections with Germany and advocated the use of terrorist tac­
tics to oppose Polish rule of the Ukraine. For details, see Ryszard Torzecki, Kwestia 
ukrainska w polilyce III Rzeszy 1933-1945 (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 121 ff. 
3. Biddle here refers to domestic political developments in hostile neighboring 
Lithuania. In 1926, Augustine Voldemaras headed a Pilsudski-style coup and estab­
lished himself as a "dictator of the Right"; but after he introduced a new constitution 
greatly expanding the power of the presidency, the incumbent president, Antanas 
Smetona, ousted Voldemaras in favor of his own brother-in-law, who retained the 
authoritarian character of the regime. Voldemaras especially hated Pilsudski and all 
that he represented in Poland; hence, the Polish worries transmitted by Biddle. 
4. There is no evidence that such an agreement existed, not even in the form of a 
tacit understanding. 
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5. This observation is typical of the brilliant insight that Biddle had into the com­
plexities of Hitler's diplomatic thinking, for it agrees completely with the latter's 
views as outlined in the famous "Hossbach Memorandum" of November 5, 1937_a 
highly secret document not revealed until after the war. DGFP, D, 1, Doc. 19. 
6. See the extremely pessimistic reports sent to Beck by Kukasiewicz from Paris 
in mid-December 1938; Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris, pp. 155-60. 
7. There is no evidence that anyone in the Polish government counted on their 
country's cooperation with Germany in return for territorial compensation as a re­
ward. Of course, there were individuals outside of official circles who advocated this 
kind of relationship—headed by W/adyslaw Studnicki—but they don't appear to have 
exerted much influence over Beck or other responsible Polish leaders. 
8. The Zamek, or Royal Castle, was the official residence of the president of Poland, 
and hence the scene of particularly important ceremonial functions. 
9. Constantin Visoianu. 
10. The official Soviet News Agency. 
DOCUMENT TWELVE 
December 22, 1938 
Subject: Polish Government's rejection of 
Ukrainian Minority's demand for autonomy on 
grounds of unconstitutionality; observations 
I have the honor (a) to supplement my despatch No. 844 of 
December 10, 1938,' page 1, wherein I reported that the 
Ukrainian Deputies of the Sejm [Diet] presented on the part 
of the Ukrainian minority in Poland a demand for autonomy; 
(b) to refer to my despatch No. 848 of December 15, 1938;2 
and (c) to report the following developments in connection 
with the Ukrainian minority demands. 
As anticipated, the Polish Government dealt with the legal 
aspect of the Ukrainian demands, and in such light turned them 
down as being unconstitutional.3 Accordingly, at yesterday's 
(December 21st) session of the Sejm, Speaker of the House 
[WacTaw] Makowski replied to the spokesman of the Ukrain­
ian Deputies in the form of a private letter which in substance 
read: That in view of regulations governing Sejm debates the 
Ukrainian motion could not become the object of discussion. 
According to these regulations, the Speaker classified the 
motion as a proposal to amend the Constitution. Such pro­
posal had to bear the signatures of at least one quarter of 
the House, or 52 signatures. 
Since conditions prevailing in the House preclude the 
Ukrainian Deputies' hope of attaining no less than 52 signa­
tures, the Speaker's action marks the death knell to the Ukrain­
ian demands from a parliamentary standpoint. I now learn 
from one of the Ukrainian leaders that the Ukrainian Deputies 
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of the Sejm plan to meet in Lwow on December 28, when they 
will discuss various aspects of the outcome of their parliamen­
tary demands and will consider forward-looking action. 
During yesterday's session there were current "Lobby ru­
mors" to the effect that, as the result of the recent help of the 
Papal Nuncio, the Ukrainians had become more conciliatory 
and might be willing to "play ball" with the Government on 
terms more satisfactory to the Government standpoint. In 
conversation with one of the Ukrainian leaders, however, he 
denied that there was any truth in these rumors, contending 
that his and his associates' demands represented more of an 
effort to find a common footing for cooperation with the Poles 
than a move of anti-Polish character. The Government's an­
swer to their efforts had been decidedly in the negative and 
he felt altogether that if Polish-Ukrainian relations were worse 
than they used to be, the fault was on the Polish side. He 
therefore felt that the first move should now come from the 
Poles. 
While it is too early to forecast future developments, it is 
safe to assume that the Government will lose no time in 
taking conciliatory steps "behind the scenes'—and in these ef­
forts, I look for the Vatican to take a hand through its intelli­
gent and courageous and able Papal Nuncio here. 
1. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. See note 1 above. 
3. The Ukrainian National-Democratic Union (UNDO), the leading Ukrainian 
moderate organization which worked for the advancement of Ukrainian interests 
within the established framework of the Polish political system, had become in­
creasingly upset with Polish attempts to Polonize forcibly the Ukrainian popula­
tion. Accordingly, on May 7, 1938, it adopted a resolution demanding the "immedi­
ate recognition of the Ukrainian nation in Poland as a separate national entity, 
together with territorial autonomy for all those lands inhabited by Ukrainians which 
formed "one compact economic and geopolitical whole." The demands are Prinle(l 
in the contemporary Polish publication Sprawy Narodowosciowe 12(1938):285-88, 
and an English translation is in Stefan Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 
1919-1939 (New York, 1961), p. 169. Since the UNDO had several deputies in the 
Polish parliament, it sought to reopen the question there when the government, 
as expected, rejected outright the demands. For a discussion of the Ukrainian 
question in Poland during this period, see Edward D. Wynot, Jr., "The Ukrainians 
and the Polish Regime, 1937-1939," The Ukrainian Historian 7(1970): 44-60. 
DOCUMENT THIRTEEN 
December 22, 1938 
Subject: Observations on current developments 
concerning the so-called Jewish problem in Poland 
I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 801 of 
November 15, 1938,' wherein (a) I described various develop­
ments, both current and in the making, as regards the Jewish 
problem; (b) to refer to my previous writings on this subject 
wherein I have taken frequent occasion to point out that events 
then in the making bore the earmarks of a more drastic wave 
of anti-Semitism here; and to report the following observa­
tions upon the current turn of events in connection with the 
Jewish problem here. 
As forecast in previous writings, the position of the Jewish 
community in Poland is rapidly taking a turn for the worse. 
Preceded by a series of articles and editorials in the Polish 
press treating with the problem, and in most cases emphasiz­
ing the necessity for international treatment of the Jewish 
problem in a global rather than a limited sense, looking to a 
solution in terms of large-scale emigration, the following 
events took place during the past 24 hours. General [Stanisiaw] 
Skwarczynski, Chief of OZON and spokesman for what he 
numbered as 116 OZON Deputies, yesterday afternoon (De­
cember 21st) made an interpellation regarding the subject of 
Jewish emigration to the following effect: 
On behalf of his group he took occasion to repeat with 
emphasis that OZON condemned any acts of peril and perse­
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cution, but contended vigorously that the number of Jews was 
excessive. The economic and cultural development of Poland 
called for large-scale Jewish emigration. Hence, they addressed 
the Government to ascertain what the Government intended to 
do in the matter. Aware of the Government's arduous study of 
the problem, they now wanted to have an account of what 
work had actually been done. More precisely, they wanted to 
ascertain the Government's plan (a) for emigration; (b) what 
territorial outlets were being considered; and (c) what financial 
plan was being worked out. 
During that same evening, Colonel [Zygmunt] Wenda, 
Chief of Staff in the direction of OZON affairs, followed up 
the General's aforementioned interpellation by a radio broad­
cast to the following effect: Wenda referred to the aforemen­
tioned interpellation as having marked an occasion of great 
consequence in that it had been the first time that the Jewish 
problem had been taken up officially by Parliament. In contend­
ing that this move would cause the Government to seek ar­
rangements for mass emigration of the Jews, Wenda empha­
sized that this could not be done at the cost of the racial Poles. 
He concluded by emphasizing that it must be done, however, 
in order that the Polish towns, villages, industry and trade 
might be properly Polonized. 
Another significant event which took place on the heels of 
the parliamentary interpellation was the sticking of large 
posters on the walls in various quarters of Warsaw. These 
posters contain in effect what might be characterized as an 
"invitation" for the racial Poles to omit the Jewish shops in 
their lists of Christmas shopping. As reason therefore the 
posters point out that every ztoty spent in Jewish shops is a 
crime against the nation and the country. This part of the 
"invitation" concludes by emphasizing that the money of the 
Polish people should go to the Polish merchants. In the second 
part of the poster it is pointed out that there are 4 million Jews 
in Poland (this, of course, is in excess of the actual number). 
Then follows a list of statistics showing the predominance of 
the Jews in the trades, industry, professions, etc., and calling 
for resistance to the dominant economic position of the Jews 
in Poland. 
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Another sign of the current trend is illustrated by the ef­
forts of Sejm Deputy [Franciszek] Stoch, (non-partisan),2 
to obtain the necessary 14 signatures to enable him to present 
a bill aimed at the establishment of an anti-Semitic law along 
the following lines: (a) to classify Jews on a religious and not 
a racial basis; (b) all persons confessing to the Jewish Creed, 
or who were Jews until 1916, to be considered "temporary" 
citizens and to be deprived of all public rights. Exception in 
connection therewith to be granted in the case of those who 
have been recognized by the State for special merit; they and 
their families to be exempt. In further connection therewith, 
a limit of 50,000 families to be set as the maximum for those 
families who may be exempted from discrimination. 
In connection with this projected bill, Deputy Stoch energet­
ically endeavored for about 10 days to secure the number of 
signatures necessary to qualify his bill for presentation. Until 
yesterday afternoon he had succeeded in acquiring all but one. 
I understand that Deputies of the OZON Party are disin­
clined to support Stoch's proposal. Since OZON claims 159 
out of the total of 208 seats in the Sejm, I look for OZON to 
wish to take a lead in the matter and to work out its own bills 
on the Jewish question. 
In this connection I am inclined at the moment to look for 
the more liberal element in Government quarters, as well as 
the Church, to bring influence to bear on OZON circles to 
moderate the tone and substance of whatever bills OZON 
might eventually propose. In my various conversations I have 
gained the impression that the tendency is to model such bills 
after the Hungarian laws.3 In other words, at least the present 
move of Government circles presages an attempt to mollify 
any and all legislative measures. While the Government may 
possibly support OZON to the extent of aiding OZON towards 
the enlistment of the nationalistic and anti-Semitic elements, 
the Government may be expected to exert vigorous efforts to 
avoid provoking scorn to the same degree as did Germany. 
A factor which may possibly work in favor of the Jewish 
community is the prominence of the Socialist vote in the re­
cent municipal elections, which should somewhat strengthen 
the hand of the liberal element in Government circles. On the 
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other hand, however, the National Democrats (or ENDEK 
Party) likewise figured prominently in the results, a fact which 
might in some districts conceivably offset the Socialist gains. 
It is too early, however, to judge the full effect of these elec­
tions for the official figures will not be published until Decem­
ber 28th.4 
Meanwhile we may expect an intensification of pressure 
against the Jews. Moreover, as I anticipated a number of 
months ago, and so reported, I now discern that the present 
surge of anti-Semitism is motivated in most cases, except in 
the case of the inherently anti-Semitic ENDEK Party, more by 
a desire to force the Jewish problem here into the arena of 
international consideration than by an acute sense of reli­
gious hatred. 
On the other hand, I am aware that while Government cir­
cles frankly ascribe the so-called Jewish problem to an over­
crowded "economic room", there is a certain element in these 
circles who are inclined to play up the Jewish question for 
reasons of internal political tactics—namely to enlist the support 
of the anti-Semitic nationalistic element. I continue to be of 
the opinion that (a) repercussions of recent anti-Semitic out­
rages in Germany and (b) the earnest desire of leading politi­
cal circles here to have the so-called Jewish problem treated 
globaly rather than limitedly by inter-governmental confer­
ences seeking a solution, may be expected to work increasing 
hardships on the Jewish community of Poland. 
1. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. Although Stoch was officially listed as a "nonpartisan" member of the 1938 
Sejm, he represented the extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic movement that sought 
constantly to push the existing government to the Right. His introduction of this 
particular bill typified the tactics of the nationalists: to strive to embarrass and force 
the hand of the government in delicate areas of widespread emotional appeal, es­
pecially anti-Jewish campaigns. 
3. There were three anti-Jewish laws enacted in interwar Hungary, of which 
only one was in force at the time of this dispatch; the second had just been intro­
duced to the Hungarian Parliament in December, 1938. The "First Jewish Law 
passed under the sponsorship of Premier Kalman Daranyi in April, 1938, limited the 
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number of persons defined religiously as Jews that could be admitted to professional 
positions in the press, theatre, film industry, law, medicine, engineering, and all 
financial, commercial, or industrial enterprises of a substantial size. Disabled Jewish 
veterans were exempted from these restrictions, and no attempt was made to break 
up Jewish capital operations. The "Second Jewish Law," introduced by the govern­
ment of Bela Imredy and passed into law the following spring (1939) under the 
direction of Premier Pal Teleki, was more far-reaching in both its definition of what 
constituted a "religious Jew" and its restrictions on the rights and functions of 
the Jewish population. This time, severe limitations were placed on Jewish civil, 
legal, and political rights, and formulas were provided to insure that Jews would be 
progressively impoverished and driven out of the agrarian as well as commercial 
and industrial sectors of Hungary^ economy. For an analysis of these laws and the 
circumstances surrounding their passage, see Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1: 
218-19, 324-25. Biddle obviously had in mind only the first Jewish law when he 
made the above reference in his dispatch. 
4. According to official figures, the government-front OZON on its own ticket 
won only 21.9 per cent of the total seats at stake in the city councils across Poland, 
with merely 29 per cent of the popular vote; however, it picked up additional seats 
by posing as a united nonpartisan bloc in some areas, giving it a grand total of 
33.8 percent of all seats. The Socialists actually outpolled the OZON, with 27.3 per­
cent of total council seats; of the rest, the National Democrats (ENDEKS) gained 
17 percent, and the Jewish labor party, the BUND, accounted for 9.6 percent. 
The government's best showing came in Warsaw, where it won 40 of the 100 coun­
cil slots, with the Socialists and ENDEKS getting 27 and 11, respectively; nowhere 
did the OZON win a clear majority. Complete figures and analysis of the municipal 
elections are in W. Jakubowski, "Bilans polityczny wyborow samorzadowych," 
Swiat/o, no. 6/7(1939). 
DOCUMENT FOURTEEN 
December 23, 1938 
Subject: British Ambassador's conversations with Minister 
Beck seeking (a) Polish Government's attitude in event of 
League High Commissioner's withdrawal from Danzig, and (b) 
Polish Government's attitude in event of Danzig question's 
coming to issue between Warsaw and Berlin; 
Current Warsaw-Berlin negotiations on Danzig 
Britain's signature as one of the Big Four who approved the 
1924 Statute giving Memel autonomous status under Lith­
uanian sovereignty is discernibly proving a source of head­
ache for London in view of recent events in Memel.1 In light 
of the potential bearing of these events, moreover, upon the 
situation in Danzig, Britain's membership on the Committee of 
Three is perceptibly becoming an increasing source of worry 
for London. 
Accordingly, in anticipation of the possiblity of Hitler's re­
leasing the pent-up energy of Nazi Danzigers in the near fu­
ture, energy which he has hitherto confined to certain limits. 
London instructed its Ambassador here to sound out Minister 
Beck as to his Government's attitude in event the Danzig ques­
tion came to issue in the near future. 
In accordance with his instructions, the Ambassador took up 
the question with Minister Beck on December 21. In reply to 
the Ambassador's question as to whether the Polish Govern­
ment might object to the withdrawal of League High Commis­
sioner [Carl] Burckhardt from Danzig, Minister Beck bore out 
my belief that the Government here would be loath to have the 
High Commissioner retire in face of anticipated intensification 
of Berlin pressure concerning the Danzig question by his reply 
to the effect that his Government would be inclined to oppose 
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the High Commissioner's withdrawal if the question were to 
come to issue at the League Council meeting in Geneva on 
January 15. In this connection, I am aware that while the Gov­
ernment here regards the position of the High Commissioner 
in the light of a "ghost" of the League, they feel that his pres­
ence "eases" the increasingly difficult relations between War­
saw and Berlin in connection with the Free City. 
In response to Minister Beck's foregoing reply, the British 
Ambassador made it clear that his Government considered the 
High Commissioner's continued presence in Danzig ineffective, 
in fact little short of futile. The British Ambassador then put 
the direct question as to whether the Polish Government might 
be willing to make a deal with Berlin on the Danzig issue, add­
ing that if such a deal were made along lines satisfactory to 
both Warsaw and Berlin, London would regard the matter only 
with the friendliest interest—as a matter of fact, London had 
come to consider the problem as one mainly between Warsaw 
and Berlin. Minister Beck replied that negotiations of a sort 
had recently begun.2 However, at this early stage it was diffi­
cult to foresee the outcome. With holidays approaching, it 
would be almost impossible to accelerate the pace of these 
negotiations. However, by mid-January he should have gained 
a fairly accurate estimate as to where they were leading. 
Certainly, by early February he would be in a position to know 
whether the Polish Government could agree to a potential set­
tlement which then might conceivably be in sight. 
The British Ambassador then stated it would be difficult for 
his Government to postpone its decision in the matter much 
longer. Naturally London did not wish to do anything to em­
barrass Minister Beck during his negotiations, but after all 
both London and Geneva had to look to their own interests. 
Besides, neither London nor Geneva would welcome the 
prospect of having an arrangement accomplished without hav­
ing been apprised thereof before the arrangement might have 
become public knowledge. Indeed, London might be glad to 
grant its approval to whatever arrangement might be in sight, 
but it would insist upon being consulted before the matter be­
came a fait accompli.3 The Ambassador added that it might be 
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possible under the circumstances to make some arrangement 
whereby Commissioner Burckhardt might still serve to a cer­
tain extent as High Commissioner and yet reside in Geneva. 
Life was daily becoming more miserable for him in Danzig and 
his position was undoubtedly becoming increasingly the object 
of ridicule, at least in Nazi circles. The Ambassador was frank 
enough to point out that both the League and London would 
prefer to withdraw him before he were obliged to leave under 
even less favorable circumstances. 
Minister Beck thereupon assured the Ambassador that his 
Government would keep the British Government informed as 
to the progress in Warsaw-Berlin negotiations. In conclusion, 
the Ambassador informed Minister Beck that he would inform 
his Government as to the Polish Government's attitude and 
hoped that some formula might be worked out whereby not 
only the faces of all parties interested might be saved but also 
Beck's position during his negotiations might not be embar­
rassed. 
The Ambassador informed me subsequently that he realized 
Beck was in an extremely delicate position vis-a-vis Berlin as 
regards the Danzig issue in view, among other factors, of the 
trend in the recent [Polish] municipal elections which resulted 
in the predominance of the two parties most opposed to Ger­
many, namely the Socialists and the National Democrats 
(ENDEK) for this decided trend would undoubtedly serve 
to limit the latitude of Beck's policy vis-a-vis Berlin. 
I am aware that of two face-saving formulae the one of para­
mount desire in the views of London envisages Burckhardt's 
immediate retirement—before the Danzig Nazis, as London ap­
prehends, might force him out. The alternative formula, a 
second choice from London's standpoint, envisages the setting 
up of the Free City along Hanseatic lines, entailing: (a) a cus­
toms union with Poland; and (b) Poland's release of the right 
to represent Danzig in foreign affairs.4 
Before leaving yesterday for a trip, Beck sent me word 
through a confidential source, cautioning me to guard his se­
cret, that he intended to be out of the country for about ten days 
as he wanted a complete rest and wanted to gain a clear per­
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spective before coming to certain important decisions. He fa­
cetiously added in his message that he had chosen to spend the 
greater part of the time in Monaco with his good friend the 
Polish honorary Consul General there, for that was the only 
country wherein he dared relax without being accused of nego­
tiations for an alliance. 
1. Biddle probably meant recent "developments" rather than "events" in the key 
Lithuanian port town of Memel. Since Munich, the local German population there 
had been organizing and agitating for a return to German control in a manner reminis­
cent of the Austrian and Czechoslovak episodes. The Poles were especially uneasy 
over this situation, which they felt was a companion plan for the major German offen­
sive against Danzig along similar lines. Their fears were justified in March, 1939, 
when Memel was actually occupied by German troops after the Lithuanian government 
"invited" Berlin to assume responsibility for the city. See Sabaliunas, Lithuanian 
in Crisis, pp. 113 ff. 
2. There were no actual negotiations in progress between Poland and Germany on 
the Danzig question at this time. Beck here refers to the conversations held between 
Lipski and Ribbentrop prior to the latter's visit to Poland in January, 1939. See Jedrze­
jewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 465-81. 
3. On December 15, 1938, the British government issued an official declaration 
stating that it would take no action on Danzig without first consulting with Poland. 
DBFP, Third Series, vol. 3, Doc. 504, enclosure I. 
4. There already was a customs union between Poland and Danzig; hence, the 
change would have involved Poland's surrender of its right to represent Danzig in for­
eign affairs. 
DOCUMENT FIFTEEN 
December 28, 1938 
Subject: Increasing strain in Warsaw-Prague 
relations; reports from Prague; Polish 
officialdom's and other observations thereon 
I have the honor to refer to my despatch of December 22, 
1938 (Memorandum C), wherein I pointed out that Warsaw-
Prague relations were rapidly going from bad to worse and 
that Warsaw, on December 19 through its Minister in Prague, 
had protested against the existence of "certain" organizations 
engaged in anti-Polish activities on Czechoslovak soil, and to 
report that on the heels of this protest, in fact at six o'clock in 
the afternoon of December 22, a squad of Czech terrorists 
found its way into Dziecmorowice, Frysztat, and threw two 
grenades at two policemen leaving police headquarters, wound­
ing one in the stomach, the other in the skull. 
Moreover, at midnight on December 22 another squad of 
Czech terrorists arrived in the town of Lazy, throwing two 
grenades through the window of the house of a resident of the 
community, locally known as a pronounced Polish patriot. 
While the explosion caused damage to the house, no persons 
were injured. About the same time the house of a Polish 
peasant, known throughout the neighborhood for his Polish 
patriotic feelings, caught fire. It was suspected by the Polish 
community that this fire was started by Czech terrorists. The 
following day, December 23, Polish Minister to Prague [Kazi­
mierz] Papee made a vigorous demarche to [Czech] Foreign 
Minister [Frantisek] Chvalkovski regarding the general situation 
existent on the Polish-Czech frontier in the Teschen area. 
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These incidents and publication of the two Polish official 
protests have contributed towards a rapid rise of anti-Czech 
feeling throughout Poland and are adding to the already heavy 
strain on Polish-Czech relations. Subsequent to the second 
protest Gazeta Polska, the Government mouthpiece, played up 
the Teschen incidents prominently in a rather lengthy article, 
which in effect concluded with a statement to the effect that 
"We shall have to put an end to that." 
Again on December 27 the Polish Minister in Prague made 
a vigorous protest as result of an incident which occurred in 
Morawska Ostrava during the Christmas holiday. It seems that 
a band of Czech terrorists had removed the Polish eagle, an 
emblem which adorned the entrance to the Polish Consulate 
in that town. 
Meanwhile, however, the local police have run down the 
culprits and punished them, found the eagle and replaced it, 
thus rendering sufficient satisfaction in Polish officialdom's 
eyes to prompt their soft-pedaling P.A.T.'s (Government news 
agency) playing up the incident. As a matter of fact Illustro­
wany Kurjer Codzienny was the only Polish paper to carry 
the story—and this was due to their having had their own cor­
respondent in Morawska Ostrava. 
I now find that, in retaliation, the Polish authorities had is­
sued orders that each incident would involve the expulsion of 
one hundred Czechs from Polish territory. Thus Czech raids 
have already cost several hundred expulsions. It is worthy of 
note, moreover, that during the ten-day period previous to the 
Christmas holiday Kurjer Poranny, which frequently repre­
sents the trend of feeling in high Army circles, daily played 
up reported disorders in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Today, De­
cember 28, I note a recrudescence of this play-up—this time in 
Gazeta Polska (the Government mouthpiece). 
In connection therewith and in reply to my direct question, 
Minister Beck's Chief of Cabinet, Count Lubiehski, in the ab­
sence of the Minister, admitted his Government considered 
that the Ruthenian question was not yet closed. Of pertinent 
bearing, Mr. Burke Elbrick of this Embassy, who has been 
temporarily assigned to Prague, and who came to Warsaw 
for Christmas, informed me of the following: En route to 
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Warsaw he was accompanied by a well informed Czech, for­
merly of the Czech diplomatic corps, widely conversant with 
Czech affairs, and enjoying intimate contacts with various cate­
gories of official circles in Prague. This individual, who is mar­
ried to a Pole, does not entirely share the bitterness generally 
felt by his compatriots towards Poland. He informed Mr. El-
brick, in confidence, that one of his friends on the Czech 
General Staff had imparted that Berlin had instructed the 
Czech General Staff to be prepared to call upon the Czech 
Army to fight the Poles, perhaps in March. The General Staff 
officer had said such a campaign would necessitate a mobiliza­
tion of about one million men. 
On the one hand this information would seem to bear out 
my previously reported impression that Berlin was "sicking" 
Czechoslovakia onto Poland, perhaps even to the point of an 
open conflict. On the other hand, in an effort to evaluate fully 
this information, it is well to bear in mind the Polish Govern­
ment's point of view. In this connection, I am aware that the 
latter is cognizant that the Czech General Staff had received 
word along the foregoing lines from Berlin. Moreover, my 
informants in official circles here, in appraising the possibili­
ties of the Czechs' adoption of an offensive military role, are 
inclined to regard the situation along the following lines: 
They considered Prague was now in a process of complete 
upheaval, economically, politically and spiritually. As a re­
sult, the Army has had to be demobilized, and the chances 
were that it would not only have to be considerably dimin­
ished, but also must experience somewhat of an overhauling. 
The Czech state, as presently set up, would naturally call for 
alterations in the military structure—and current circum­
stances presaged Prague's adoption of more of a neutral than 
an offensive policy. Meanwhile, however, Berlin was trying 
in every way possible to weaken Poland preparatory to War­
saw-Berlin negotiations along various lines—primarily on the 
Danzig issue. Hence, part of Berlin's weakening technique 
was to stir up the Czechs to the prospect of a combat with 
the Poles, probably baiting them with the recovery of 
Teschen, among other factors. It was therefore pertinent to 
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take into consideration that Berlin's propaganda along the 
above lines might naturally find fertile ground amongst the 
Czech officers, who were now apprehensive lest they might 
soon be out of a job through a potential diminution of their 
military establishment. Hence, in view of their resultant 
concern they might readily seize upon a potential Polish 
danger to the Czech state as a pretext to keep the Czech 
Army intact. 
I am aware that, while my informants are inclined at the 
moment to regard the situation in the above light, they do not 
shut their eyes to the possibility that Berlin might conceivably 
employ the Czech Army in the end as a tool against Poland. 
Of connected bearing, my interest was engaged by my 
informant's remark that his current reports indicated that 
while Government circles in Rumania and even Hungary 
were dealing with the Nazi Government with apparent grace, 
there was a mounting apprehension and resentment at heart 
amongst these same circles. My informant thought even the 
Czechs might eventually experience a like change of heart. 
If such a turn took place, and Berlin ordered a Czech Army 
to make war on Poland, it was not inconceivable that either a 
rebellion amongst the Czech troops might take place or that 
an important section of the Czech Army might prefer to join 
the Poles in a potential conflict with the Germans.1 
1. A "Czechoslovak Legion" was actually formed in Krakow and fought along­
side the Poles against the Germans in September, 1939. 
DOCUMENT SIXTEEN 
January 5, 1939 
Subject: Substance of conversations with League

High Commissioner Burckhardt during his New Year's

visit to Warsaw; observations on various

aspects of Polish-German relations

High Commissioner Burckhardt, who admittedly dislikes 
the suspicion, in German as well as Polish quarters, which 
usually attends his visits to Warsaw, resorted to our New 
Year's reception as a pretext to spend several days here. The 
reception afforded him an excellent opportunity to confer 
with the British and French Ambassadors, the Swedish 
Charge d'Affaires, an officer of the German Embassy, and 
officials of the Polish Government without arousing undue 
suspicion or publicity. 
The following day Burckhardt and I had a lengthy con­
versation covering not only his impressions gained in his 
discussions with the aforementioned officials here, but also 
various aspects of Polish-German general relations. 
At the outset of our conversation, Burckhardt recalled our 
former talks in Danzig wherein he had pointed out that he 
expected to confer with Ribbentrop and associates in Berlin 
with a view to persuading the former to "soft-pedal" Nazi 
boisterousness in Danzig (though at that time he had even 
entertained the hope of persuading Ribbentrop to withdraw 
Foerster, he failed in attaining that end). He was gratified 
that his recent visit to Berlin had resulted in Danzig Senate 
President [Arthur] Greiser's and Gauleiter [Albert] Foerster's 
respectively promising to forward a letter to the "Committee 
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of Three", acknowledging the unconstitutionality of the four 
recent decrees.1 They had promised, moreover, to state in 
this letter their intention to withhold putting these decrees into 
force until they could be acted upon properly by a new 
Volkstag to be elected in April. While admitting this letter 
represented little more than a gesture in view of the damage 
already done by the declaration of the four decrees, Burck­
hardt felt that such a letter might conceivably serve in the 
nature of a face-saver for the Committee of Three in any 
event. 
In such light, I am inclined to interpret this gesture as a 
reflection of Berlin's present desire to retain Burckhardt in 
Danzig until the April elections at least. Moreover, I am in­
clined to concur with Burckhardt's expressed reaction to the 
effect that it reflected a hitherto state of uncertainty in Nazi 
high circles as to what definite line of action to adopt vis-a­
vis Poland on the Danzig question. 
Commenting upon Berlin's attitude vis-a-vis Warsaw, 
Burckhardt said that during his last Berlin visit he had 
gained the distinct impression that there were two schools of 
thought in upper Nazi circles as to what line of policy to 
pursue relative to Poland. There were the "extremists" who 
advocated weakening Poland through ruthless pressure; they 
aimed thus to bring her to Berlin's terms, envisaging no doubt 
Poland's collaboration in Berlin's forward-looking expansion 
program. To the extent that the "extremists" advocated 
weakening Poland, they now enjoyed the support of the "old­
line" Prussian diplomats and politicians—for the latter envis­
aged the weakening of Poland as a preliminary step towards 
an eventual rapprochement with Moscow, in pursuance of 
the Prussian policy of former days. This was a new feature 
and had to be taken into consideration when gauging Berlin's 
potential near future attitude. 
On the other hand, the so-called "moderates", headed by 
Goering, advocated "going easy" with Poland, perhaps with a 
view to coaxing Poland, through stages, into Berlin's orbit 
with a view to Poland's proving a potentially helpful factor 
in Berlin's eastward-looking expansion program. 
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Of pertinent bearing, Gestapo Chief [Heinrich] Himmler's 
message to Burckhardt—to the effect that Himmler expected 
early important political changes in high Nazi circles—during 
his previous visit to Germany, had evidently left a deep im­
pression in Burckhardt's mind. Indeed, Burckhardt, in refer­
ring again to this message, said that during his recent visit to 
Berlin he himself had gained the impression that important 
changes were in the offing. He wondered what form of gov­
ernment might take the place of the present regime, in the 
event it failed as a result of internal "dog eat dog" conflicts. 
(My reports through other reliable channels indicate that 
while tension exists among upper Nazi circles, there is no 
likelihood of an early fall of the Nazi regime.) In response 
to his conjecture that Communism might seep in and take 
the place of Nazi-ism, I observed that, in terms of their 
relationship to the capitalist system and doctrine of democ­
racy, there was fundamentally little difference, in my private 
opinion, between the two "isms"—they were both of the same 
litter only differently striped, but headed in the same direc­
tion. He could hardly gainsay this and concurred with my 
feeling that a military dictatorship would probably "take 
over" in event of a fall of the present regime in Berlin. This 
might hold out until some other form of dictatorial govern­
ment were conceived. Indeed, I thought there was little hope 
the doctrines of democracy might be applied with any degree 
of effectiveness to present-day German mentality. The older 
generations had apparently already submitted and attuned 
themselves to the Nazi politico-economic formula: the 
"man-hours-based" economic aspect, so inseparably inter­
locked with that of the political. There were undoubtedly 
great numbers who preferred a more normal form of life 
under a more liberal form of government. There were un­
doubtedly many who distrusted its capacity to endure the 
test of time and who at heart were opposed to it. However, 
even these had shown a lack of capacity to resist the Nazi 
revolution at the outset, and had fallen in line with others, 
who had manifested a willingness to submit to the strong-
arm dictum of the Nazi minority. On the other hand, Nazi 
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youth had been raised on a Spartan formula to the exclusion 
of scarcely a trace of Athenian culture. In other words, Ger­
man mass-mentality of today, as in the case of that in former 
days, showed signs of being more attuned to forceful direction 
than capable of understanding and enjoying the full benefits 
of democracy. The difference between the German-American 
population of the United States and the Germans in the 
Reich was largely attributable to the former's having lived 
under a liberal form of -Government in an atmosphere of 
liberalism and having gradually acquired enlightenment as 
to its advantages. To bring today's German mass-mentality 
up to a point of understanding and enjoying the full value of 
democracy would require time, patience, and education.2 
Burckhardt was inclined to concur with the substance of 
my observations; he remarked that as far as Hitler was con­
cerned, the latter was regarded by the masses as a "Jehovah", 
and in such light his position was reasonably safe; it was 
merely his associates who were at sword's points with each 
other, an erruptive condition which might easily come to the 
exploding point. I remarked at this point that how much was 
conflict within certain limits, and how much was taken 
advantage of by Hitler for tactical purposes, remained to be 
seen. Burckhardt then stated Hitler kept abreast of internal 
and external affairs through daily reports presented to him 
by his closest associates. As regards foreign affairs, the first 
thing each morning he read the German-Swiss newspapers, 
subsequently receiving reports from other sections of the 
foreign press. He searched the democratic press abroad for 
political weaknesses which frequently gave rise to fresh 
ideas in carrying forward his "pin-pricking" technique. 
In this connection, Burckhardt's discussion with a compe­
tent officer of the German Embassy here disclosed that the 
latter was apprehensive lest German Ambassador von 
Moltke, now in Berlin, might soon return with instructions of 
disturbing character. He had been led to believe, confiden­
tially, that Ribbentrop had given von Moltke orders which 
might prove conducive to added tension between Warsaw 
and Berlin. Burckhardt expressed surprise at this disclosure 
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for during his last visit to Berlin he had gained the distinct 
impression that Goering's policy was gaining ground and re­
flecting itself favorably in the Berlin Foreign Office's attitude 
vis-a-vis Warsaw. In response, the officer of the German 
Embassy had pointed out that at the time of Burckhardt's 
last Berlin visit Goebbels, Goering's bete noire, had been 
taken ill. This probably accounted for the temporary as­
cendency of Goering's less drastic policy. Goebbels' recent 
recovery, however, might conceivably account for any po­
tential change in the Foreign Office's attitude. He then added 
his own impression that Berlin at this time was suffering from 
increasing strife within upper Nazi circles. Berlin was con­
sequently not pursuing a set line of policy—rather, acting from 
day to day on impulse which found its roots either in the "pet 
aversions" or "fancies" of the individuals who at a given 
moment happened to be "in the saddle". Burckhardt ad­
mitted that his aforementioned informant had given a clear 
picture of conditions presently prevailing in Berlin high cir­
cles. Burckhardt hoped, however, that Goering's influence 
would rule, at least in the matter of Danzig. 
As regards Polish-German relations in general, Burckhardt 
said Hitler was seriously annoyed with Poland, among other 
reasons, over Poland's having "swiped" Bogumin from under 
Hitler's nose, Poland's efforts to gain Italy's support towards 
accomplishing a common frontier with Hungary, and Poland's 
recent declaration with the Soviet.3 
Burckhardt went on to say that in Geneva, moreover, 
there was no lost love for Poland, nor could the Quai d'Orsay 
be expected to feel any degree of deep sympathy for Beck in 
his pending difficulties—Paris had usually manifested an un­
fortunate lack of objectivity in its regard for and dealings 
with the affairs of its Eastern and Central European allies. 
Characteristic of this cramped point of view, [French] Am­
bassador to Poland [Leon] Noel, in his recent conversation 
with Burckhardt, had failed to conceal an obvious secret 
sense of pleasure when he observed that Beck faced troubled 
waters both internally and externally. Burckhardt had both 
esteem and liking for Noel, but felt he typified French men­
tality on affairs beyond the frontiers of France. 
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While admitting that Beck's suppleness in the direction of 
Poland's foreign policy was exasperating in many cases for 
foreign observers, including at times himself, he felt Beck had 
proven himself masterful, at least up to this point, in his 
"balance-diplomacy" against great odds, inherent to Poland's 
delicate geo-political position. It was a tough job at best, 
and was eventually bound to let Beck in for "digs" from all 
sides. 
Were Beck replaced today, however, it might be either by 
someone less adept at "balance-diplomacy" and who might 
consequently fumble the ball in trying to carry on the delicate 
game, or by someone who might pursue a radically anti-
German policy. With this observation I concurred, and asked 
Burckhardt whether (a) Berlin was aware that the recent 
municipal elections in Poland had resulted in an important 
showing by the anti-German parties: ENDEK, the Socialists, 
and the Jews, and (b) whether Berlin perceived that this 
might tend to cramp Beck's latitude in his dealings with 
Berlin. Unless Berlin was looking for trouble, it might discern 
the advisibility of "going easy"—otherwise, it might con­
ceivably "torpedo" Beck's efforts to maintain friendly rela­
tions between Berlin and Warsaw. Burckhardt replied that 
due to confusion in upper Nazi circles and the fact that 
Ribbentrop was in the "saddle" he did not look for Berlin to 
appraise these aspects with any degree of astuteness. Ribben­
trop was a "fool", drunk with power, [who] not only wanted 
but felt home conditions required Germany to "go places" 
at top speed. Anyway Ribbentrop did not believe the Poles 
would offer any more resistance than the Czechs in the event 
of a show-down. Upon Ribbentrop's questioning him as to the 
mood and capacity of the Poles to fight, Burckhardt had 
told Ribbentrop that one could not compare the Poles with 
the Czechs on this score. The Poles were romantic, inflam­
mable, proud, and entertained fighting proclivities. More­
over, they had less to lose and more to gain economically 
speaking than had the Czechs before their early October 
amputation. The Czechs were more docile and through their 
former comparatively comfortable economic status had over 
a period of years become more economic- than fight-minded; 
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they preferred to trade out a situation than to fight it out 
hoping to hold on to whatever they could. Moreover, one 
had to take into consideration that Poland had served as a 
battle-field at frequent intervals not only during her period of 
partition, but even as recently as 1920. The men who had 
fought then were still comparatively young, fit, and better 
trained and equipped. It would be dangerous to push them 
too far. 
Reverting to the Danzig question, Burckhardt was aware 
that while Britain and France preferred his withdrawal they 
did not want to weaken or embarrass Poland's trading posi­
tion during continued negotiations with Berlin and were, 
therefore, inclined to grant Beck a reasonable amount of 
latitude in terms oi time, provided he kept them informed as 
to progress. On the other hand, Burckhardt was aware that 
Berlin, Warsaw, and now Danzig Senator-President Greiser 
and even Gauleiter Foerster (perhaps for different reasons— 
Greiser because he feared his position might be liquidated 
in event of Danzig's annexation to Reich, and Foerster per­
haps reflecting Goering's "soft-pedalling" influence) 
favored Burckhardt's retention in Danzig at least until April. 
Moreover, Swedish Foreign Minister Sandier, a member 
of the "Committee of Three", might be inclined to favor 
particularly Berlin's desire in that he would like to find a 
means of relieving the strain recently placed on Stockholm's 
relations with Berlin. 
I am aware that, while Burckhardt believes his role in Dan­
zig, though cramped by recent events, in terms of potential 
effectiveness, serves the interests of peace, he has also his 
personal interests at stake. He gave up a professorship to 
take on the Danzig job, and the fact he is devoting part-time 
to writing a book, in addition to the fact that his salary is a 
matter not to be overlooked, may reasonably be expected to 
figure in his considerations. I should not be surprised, there­
fore, if for the above combination of reasons he welcomed 
the possibility of Sandlefs support of Warsaw's and Berlin's 
desire to retain him in Danzig at least until April. 
As regards Warsaw-Berlin negotiations on Danzig, what 
 297 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
in the early stage might have been considered merely con­
versations suffered a lapse due to Polish objections to the 
size of Berlin's appetite and were subsequently renewed on 
the basis of negotiations. With reference thereto Burckhardt 
said that while Warsaw had hinted it might possibly consider 
a somewhat independent status for Danzig, Berlin had 
evinced an inclination to oppose any arrangement bearing 
the semblance of a definite and final settlement. Indeed, 
Berlin appeared to want an arrangement of more or less 
temporary character—to leave the question open for further 
treatment later. The negotiations rested thus for the time 
being. 
Burckhardt added that Ribbentrop was now tentatively 
planning coming to Warsaw to confer with Beck. Though 
the date was still unsettled, some rumors indicated he would 
arrive here in mid-January. Both Berlin and Danzig Nazi 
circles, however, looked for Ribbentrop to come to Warsaw 
at the termination of the Danzig negotiations in time to sign 
a potential agreement—probably about April. 
At this point I recalled to Burckhardt's mind our former 
conversation in Danzig wherein our expressed impressions 
had concurred to effect Beck would prefer to talk directly to 
Hitler. I still thought so and believed that if he felt it essential 
to talk to anyone in Berlin, he would manage to see Hitler 
despite likely attempts of Ribbentrop to prevent it—probably 
he [Beck] would arrange it through the offices of Ciano. (I 
am aware circles here close to Beck are anxious that he talk 
directly with Hitler, contending that such a conference would 
stand better chances of a favorable outcome for Poland than 
a conference with Ribbentrop, whom they dislike and dis­
trust. Moreover, while in the event Beck found his way to 
Berchtesgaden his move would undoubtedly be widely inter­
preted as spelling Poland's alignment with the Axis, I should 
be inclined to put it down, preliminarily at least, to more of a 
game than an intention to tie-in to the Axis—after all, Beck 
would prefer putting a number of essential questions directly 
to Hitler than to his Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, whom I 
am aware Beck neither likes nor trusts, and whom he suspects 
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of desiring to present Hitler with a series of ruthlessly con­
ceived schemes at frequent intervals for his own aggrandise­
ment. Accordingly, Beck would want to sound out Hitler as to 
the potential limits whereto he might be willing to trade on 
Danzig. Moreover, Beck would want to put the following ques­
tions: (a) does he intend to leave Poland in peace; (b) what 
are his intentions 1/ vis-a-vis the Ukraine question, 2/ vis­
a-vis Soviet, 3/ vis-a-vis Eastern Europe in general. In brief, 
a talk with Hitler would not necessarily require an immediate 
reply and might enlighten Poland as to what to expect. 
On the one hand, a meeting between Beck and Hitler 
would serve Beck as a means of making soundings as to what 
Poland faced in terms of continued pressure from Berlin, and 
it would serve Hitler as an opportunity to appraise Poland's 
mood and capacity to resist Germany, and thereby tend to 
guide him in his immediate course vis-a-vis Poland: whether 
to increase pressure to a ruthless degree, or whether to adopt 
tactics of cajolery and bribery to win over Poland's collabora­
tion through stages. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that with a steadily mounting anti-German sentiment among 
the masses here, Beck would not be in a position to come to 
terms with Hitler on the spot. The best he could do would be 
to put his questions, to listen, and subsequently consult his 
associates of government circles here.) I was therefore in­
terested to hear Burckhardt's remark that Hitler had a certain 
liking and esteem for Beck, and might give Poland a better 
break in direct conversations with Beck than Ribbentrop 
would be likely to give. 
Burckhardt is now going on a shooting trip in northern 
Poland, returning to Danzig for the New Year diplomatic 
ceremonies on January 8. Shortly thereafter he intends to 
leave for Switzerland, where he will remain at his home 
nearby Geneva pending the forthcoming meeting of the 
Council and of the "Committee of Three" He believes that 
shortly thereafter the "Committee of Three" will meet for 
further discussions either in London or Paris. In this connec­
tion I am aware that a meeting in London would particularly 
suit Minister Beck's book, for he would thus be afforded a 
much-desired pretext for conferring with British statesmen. 
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1 Biddle here undoubtedly refers to the series of four decrees promulgated in 
November, 1938, that introduced Nazi Germany's "Nuremburg Laws" into Danzig, 
over the objections of Britain and to the discomfort of the Poles, who felt forced to 
insist on the protection of Polish citizens in Danzig who were Jews. For a concise 
discussion of the problem, see Herbert S. Levine, Hitler's Free City: A History of 
the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-1939 (Chicago, 1973), pp. 126-47. 
2. Biddle's impression of Nazism and its reception by the German people, offered 
on the eve of war, offers an interesting contrast with those of his predecessor in 
Warsaw, John Cudahy, who in December, 1933, characterized Nazism as a harmless 
form of social-fraternal activity that appealed to the German love of things mili­
tary—an impression doubtless shared by many American and European observers at 
that time. See Cudahy to Roosevelt, December 27, 1933, FDRL-PSL, 50, "Poland." 
3. Bogumin (Bohumin, Odeberg) was a town in the Czech portion of Teschen 
Silesia that possessed considerable economic, strategic, and demographic signifi­
cance as a major railway junction. Despite Polish claims to it well before the 
Munich agreement, the Germans had tried to include it in their zone of control out 
of fear that the Poles would use Bogumin as a launching pad for a push into the 
vital industrial center of Moravska Ostrava. But the firmness of Beck in the face of 
Nazi threats and bluster, not to mention the methodical military occupation of the 
town by Polish military forces while Berlin raged, resulted in Poland's acquisition 
of Bogumin, although at the expense of worsened relations with Germany. The 
entire incident appears to have been the work of Goring and his cohorts in the 
German Foreign Ministry, for an October 5 declaration by Hitler stated that he 
was not at all interested in the issue and would not quarrel with Poland over one 
relatively minor town; DGFP, D, 5, Doc. 62. For Polish documents on the problem, 
see Jozef Chudek, "Sprawa Bogumina w dokumentach polskich," Sprawy Miedzyna­
rodowe (Warsaw), no. 5(1960), pp. 108-14. This incident moved Beck to push his 
plan for a "Third Europe," and he pressured Italy to support the Polish efforts; 
Mussolini, however, yielded to German policy on the disputed area of East Central 
Europe, and ignored Polish exhortations for assistance. 
DOCUMENT SEVENTEEN 
January 13, 1939 
Subject: Substance of my several conversations with 
Minister Beck upon his return from conversations with 
Hitler in Berchtesgaden and Ribbentrop in Munich 
I have the honor to supplement my cables Nos. 2 and 4 of 
January 10 and 11, 1939,' respectively, and to report in greater 
detail the following substance of my several conversations 
(therein referred to) with Minister Beck upon his return from 
Berchtesgaden. 
At 9:30 p.m. Saturday, January 7, shortly after Beck and 
his Chief of Cabinet, Count Lubiehski, had reached their of­
fice from the train they together telephoned me. Beck stated 
he had been profoundly impressed by the contents of President 
Roosevelt's address.2 Moreover, he could assure me that it 
caused mental and moral "jitters" both in Berlin and Berch­
tesgaden. In fact, he was aware that Hitler was not only furi­
ous but also extremely worried. He then stated he wanted to 
see me at the earliest possible moment. While en route from 
Munich to Warsaw he had remarked to Lubienski that there 
were a number of things he wanted to talk to me about. I saw 
Beck at the New Year's diplomatic reception at the Zamek 
when he made a point of repeating he wanted to see me at 
the first moment he found himself free. 
The following morning Beck was in a great rush when I 
saw him during a short encounter. It was during my conver­
sation with his Chief of Cabinet, Count Lubiehski. He knew 
I was there and came in between his conferences with Gov­
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ernment officials. He explained he had wanted to see me at 
length that morning but had been up to his neck in conferences 
with his own Government associates. He then hurriedly out­
lined his talk with Hitler, substance whereof I transmitted to 
the Department in my cable No. 2 of January 10, 5 p.m.3 At 
the conclusion of this conversation, Minister Beck invited me 
to join him informally for dinner at his house on Tuesday 
evening, adding we could talk more at length at that time. 
Subsequently at dinner, attended by the Minister and family, 
Count Jozef Potocki, head of the Anglo-Saxon Division of the 
Foreign Office,4 and later joined by the Chief of Staff [Stachie­
wicz] the Minister and I had ample time to discuss various 
aspects of his conversations in Germany. The following morn­
ing I again had a brief talk with the Minister by way of clarify­
ing certain points discussed during the preceding evening. 
The following is a digest of my aforementioned three talks 
with Minister Beck: 
In view of all circumstances, of which I was aware, he had 
deemed it advisable to talk directly to Hitler. Indeed, as he 
had previously told me, he had wanted to talk to Hitler before 
Ribbentrop. In general the conversations with both had proven 
fairly satisfactory in that Hitler had given him the definite 
impression that Poland might expect no "surprises"—that all 
matters bearing on Polish-German relations were negotiable 
—and that Poland might take these negotiations in her stride. 
I am aware that in his own evaluation of the foregoing Beck 
regards the potential course of such negotiations with cau­
tious optimism. By nature not credulous, he is ever on guard, 
particularly as concerns Germany. He will accordingly no doubt 
endeavor to insure against eventualities. 
Beck had for some time gone on [the] hypothesis that the re­
cent Ukrainian "play-up" was not so much the work of Hitler 
—it had not borne the traces of Hitler's hand—rather it had 
smacked more of the machinations of his "extremist" subordi­
nates—all the more reason for his desire to talk with Hitler 
directly, not with Ribbentrop first. Without his (Beck's) hav­
ing broached the subject, Hitler brought up the Ukraine and 
Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and bore out Beck's hypothesis by 
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disclaiming an immediate interest to any measurable degree in 
the Ukrainian question. Moreover, he gave Beck an impres­
sion that whatever interest he did have in the Ukrainian situ­
ation was mainly a question of distant consideration and in­
volved the Soviet in general. Indeed, Hitler made it clear he 
was distinctly anti-Russian, not merely anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist, and that the Ukraine figured merely as a part of 
Hitler's envisaged future treatment of Russia as a whole. 
Moreover, his interest in the Ukraine was more economic than 
political. Beck told me he now believed, as he had felt before 
his talk with Hitler, that while the latter had a long-range 
interest in the Ukraine, it had thus far been greatly exagger­
ated. Even von Moltke and Ribbentrop had been obviously 
taken aback when Hitler disclaimed categorically an immedi­
ate interest in the Ukraine in general and in Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia in particular. 
In response to my inquiry as to how Hitler could reconcile 
his denial with the fact that his representative, Ribbentrop, 
at the Vienna Conference had gone so far as to prevent Hun­
gary's annexing Ruthenia, Beck amusedly stated that Hitler had 
gone to considerable lengths to allay Beck's suspicions and 
misgivings on this score. Hitler had accordingly pointed out 
that when Budapest had demanded the right of a plebiscite 
in Ruthenia, Hitler and his associates had assumed the posi­
tion that the entire matter should be settled along ethnographi­
cal lines. Subsequently, when he had learned Budapest 
planned attacking Czecho-Slovakia about November 21 he 
had sent word he did not want an open conflict to further 
complicate the situation in Central Europe. At this point Beck 
had to admit to me he was aware that the Nazis had envinced 
more than common interest in "rigging up" the mechanics in 
Ruthenia, reiterating that Hitler went to considerable pains to 
allay Beck's suspicions that Hitler's immediate plans en­
visaged Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as a strategic base of activ­
ities. Moreover, Beck had been led to look for Hitler hence­
forth to "lay off" Poland's Ukrainian minority in the course 
of his forward-aimed program. 
Beck added [that] Hitler had obviously been down at his 
 303 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
mountain haunt alone for some time, with a few exceptions 
uninterrupted by his "group", resting after the fatigue of his 
Austrian and Czechoslovak coups—and examining the trend in 
an effort to gain a perspective as to the future turn of events. 
Of this Beck had gained a distinct impression. When Hitler 
had greeted him, he was philosophical and pensive in de­
meanor—and only during his oration wherein he reviewed his 
accomplishments over the past year did he evince a spirit of 
boastfulness. 
At this point Beck reiterated his impression that as far as 
Hitler was concerned—and he was the deciding factor—Sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia did not figure in his immediate con­
siderations. In fact, Beck believed Hitler's interest in the 
Ukraine up to this point had been exaggerated. Though the 
"stories" regarding it were not devoid of foundation, they had 
been exaggerated. Beck then added with emphasis that if 
that region continued to prove a menace for Poland, Poland 
would liquidate the situation in short order. 
Of pertinent bearing, Beck stated that in recent representa­
tions to Prague Beck had asked whether Prague had complete 
control over Ruthenia or not; or whether Ruthenia had become 
a disorderly center subject to the influence of a third party 
with designs opposed to Poland's interest. In response, Prague, 
through its Minister Slavik here and even the Prime Minister 
of Ruthenia, had gone to great lengths to apologize and as­
sure Beck that no third-party influence prevailed in that re­
gion. 
Beck would wait and see. Moreover, Poland was prepared 
to deal in Poland's own way with the situation, should it re­
quire action. As I have previously pointed out in connection 
with Ruthenia, both high military and Government circles here 
have not considered the projected common frontier with Hun­
gary a closed question. However, Hungary's having backed off 
when she had a pretext to come to grips with the Czechs at 
Munkacs recently has given rise to considerable discernible 
but not generally expressed skepticism here as to the mood 
and capacity of the Hungarians to come through. Hence I 
feel the Poles are in [such] a mood that, in the event potential 
304 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 
anti-Polish activities in Ruthenia reached an acute stage, the 
Poles might conceivably move in and clean up the disorder 
without waiting on the Hungarians. 
Whether the Germans, in the final analysis, would toler­
ate this is still doubtful in my mind. Besides, insufficient time 
has passed for me to judge as to how far to ascribe Beck's 
statement on this score to talk for "home consumption'' or 
full intention to act forcefully in event of further disorders. 
At the moment I am inclined to believe he means to act. 
Moreover, the Rumanian Ambassador imparted his surprise, 
if not concern, over his impression gained in conversation 
with Beck, who had spoken to him along lines similar to those 
he adopted with me regarding Ruthenia. The Ambassador re­
marked that the more he saw of the Poles, the more he real­
ized they were a "determined lot" 
In summing up his impression of Hitler's attitude both as 
to the Danzig and the Ukrainian issues, Beck stated Hitler 
was more conciliatory than aggressive. It was apparent that he 
desired Poland's friendship. As to the negotiations now going 
forward regarding Danzig, while Hitler had discussed the sub­
ject, his remarks had been more general than specific. More­
over, the negotiations were still in a formative stage. Beck 
was vague and guarded with me in discussing them, stating 
that Hitler had not clearly defined his position with respect 
thereto.5 The British Ambassador subsequently imparted that 
during his conversation with Beck the latter had adopted a 
similar line regarding Danzig. In response to the Ambassador's 
reminder that Beck had promised to keep him advised as to 
progress and that he was under instructions from his Govern­
ment to keep them posted, Beck said he was fully aware there­
of and would not fail to let the Ambassador know as soon as 
the negotiations assumed sufficiently definite character to per­
mit a clearer than hitherto appraisal as to their outcome. I dis­
cern that the Ambassador is nettled over a lack of more in­
formation to transmit at this point to the "Committee of 
Three" shortly scheduled to meet. 
Pending more definite clarification of Danzig negotiations, 
I am still disinclined to exclude the possibility of the Germans' 
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pressing for the inclusion of a right of way across the Corri­
dor as part of a Danzig settlement—the right of way to assume 
somewhat the following form: combined rail and motor way 
within a mutually recognized neutral zone; elimination of cus­
toms and passport control. 
Reverting to my conversation with Beck, while he felt that 
Hitler's quick successes over Austria and Czechoslovakia com­
plicated matters for Europe, Beck believed that these successes 
had not diminished Hitler's respect for Poland; Beck was of the 
opinion that this was extremely important. 
The two questions which were now engaging Hitler's im­
mediate attention were the Jews and colonies. On every topic 
other than the Jews, Hitler had evinced a calm attitude, but 
when he spoke of the Jews he manifested rage, pounded the 
table and breathed hard. He shouted that he was absolutely 
determined to rid Germany of every single Jew within the 
current year. Beck said the subject was positively an obsession 
with Hitler, adding his own opinion that Hitler, realizing that 
internally all matters were not running smoothly and that a 
conflict of personalities within his regime was in course, un­
doubtedly made the Jews bear the brunt, laying the fault for 
everything at their door. As for colonies, Beck looked for this 
question to become Hitler's paramount interest in near future. 
Regarding the axis, Hitler was obvious in his efforts to 
give the impression that the axis was more secure than ever 
and that he and Mussolini were pals. In response to my ques­
tion as to what effect on this "paldom" Hitler's potential in­
sistence upon assuming Austria's rights in Trieste might even­
tually have, Beck admitted that if proved an eventuality, it 
probably would not sit so well with the Italian public. 
As regards Italo-French friction, Rome was using Tunis 
(more of a social than a territorial issue) and Corsica and 
Nice as a "smoke screen" for the serious questions of Djibouti 
and Suez. Whether the Italo-French controversy would break 
into an open conflict was not yet clear. Ciano had told the 
Polish Ambassador in Rome about a month ago he did not 
expect the dispute to come to an open conflict—as reported 
in a previous dispatch. However, Ciano, realizing Poland was 
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France's ally, might conceivably have made this remark for 
tactical reasons. Hitler, during the talk, had spoken rather 
sympathetically of France. 
The waiters in the hotels at Menton, all Italian, were 
boasting that it would not be long now before their brethren 
took the place over. Beck admitted in response to my con­
jecture that it was perhaps mainly for the Italians' part a 
confusion- and fear-inspiring campaign. Nevertheless, the 
French in that region were convinced that they were in for a 
fight. Moreover, the French people along the Riveria were 
convinced there would be a war between France and Italy, 
were accordingly living in their valises prepared to evacuate 
the area, and were fully confident of a victorious conflict of 
short duration. How far, in final analysis, the French politi­
cians might go was another matter and had not yet crystal­
lized. The only nation to profit by an Italo-French conflict 
would be Germany, who would undoubtedly swoop down on 
the Danube area, taking advantage of Italy's being tied up at 
the front. Poland would continue to devote efforts as a peace 
broker between the French and the Italians, for such a con­
flict would do neither any good. 
Hitler would like to have given the impression that he was 
prepared to go "all out" in support of the Italians. When I 
ventured the conjecture that the Germans might avoid going 
beyond the point of diplomatic support, Beck said that it 
was so difficult to gauge that point and so easy to ride beyond 
it into an explosion that it would be a delicate game at best, 
and was pregnant with danger in a jittery Continent—a diplo­
matic offensive of severity was risky business nowadays. 
Moreover, it was well to bear in mind that the axis was still 
in vigor. However, I do not think Beck believes Germany 
would deliberately risk war with the West and thus weaken 
herself in advance of an eastern venture, her major strategic 
objective. 
Beck then emphasized there must be a meeting between 
France and Poland. They must face the realities and under­
stand them. Their respective positions vis-a-vis Germany 
today, more than ever before, were similar in character. Ap­
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praising their respective positions, it would seem today that 
Poland enjoyed friendship of closer character than France 
with Germany, while on the other hand France being involved 
with Italy offered little chance of France's offering effective 
assistance to Poland. Yes, they must sit down at an early 
date and clarify their positions vis-a-vis one another and 
vis-a-vis Germany. 
At the outset of Italo-French friction, Polish official circles' 
reports from London had indicated the British Government 
were assuming the attitude that the course of European 
events depended mainly on Chamberlain and Hitler; that while 
Hitler had the bark of a wolf, Mussolini had the bark of a 
fox; and that at most current Italo-French friction might be 
put down to a diversion to keep France busy. Subsequently, 
French Ambassador Noel remarked to me the other night 
that France had no worry as to whether she might enjoy 
Britain's active support if she required it in the event of a 
conflict over Tunis, for the fact that the Tunis issue brought 
Bizerta into the picture made it more of a British than a 
French problem. Evidently Noel had made a similar remark to 
Beck, for the latter gave me the impression that the French 
entertained ideas along somewhat similar lines. 
Personally I am of the opinion that if France and Italy 
came to grips, and if Paris and London felt Britain's poten­
tial neutrality might mean Germany's neutrality, both Paris 
and particularly London might favor this course—provided, 
of course, France felt capable of handling Italy alone, and 
provided France could be reasonably sure Germany would 
not suddenly jump in against her. 
Beck went on to say that up to the point of a potential 
ultimatum London might conceivably continue to influence 
French foreign policy—but a decision for a war could be made 
only in Paris today. Britain was augmenting her air and naval 
strengths but not her army to any effective degree. This 
meant she could not take a lead in determining the issues of 
the Continent. While France had hitherto appeared to be 
turning more towards her colonial domain then maintaining 
her interest in the Continent, this move had served the 
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politicians more than it represented the characteristic interest 
of the Frenchman. Beck now felt that the Frenchman's natural 
interest in the Continent would re-express itself. 
Commenting upon Chamberlain's and Halifax's approach­
ing visit to Rome, Beck did not look for the British statesmen 
to accomplish much. The latter, due to public opinion both 
at home and in France, would be limited in terms of potential 
"hand-outs", and would have to "tread easy" during the talks. 
Mussolini, who had already assumed a position of positive 
character vis-a-vis particularly belligerent rights in Spain, 
Djibouti and the Suez, might not be expected, in view of his 
own public opinion, to give much ground. Moreover, Beck 
doubted whether the Rome meeting would go far towards 
immediately bringing about new four-power talks—anyway, 
the latter would only prove costly to other powers in terms 
of "peaceful settlements" 
Up until about three or four days after the New Year dis­
cussions on the European political arena could have covered 
little beyond a review of past events, events which could be 
left to the historians. Only shortly after the turn of the year 
did there appear any indications of what might be in the offing. 
After all, since the Czechoslovak event, statesmen and diplo­
matists had been suffering from shock—dismay. Then came the 
Christmas holidays, affording much needed relaxation, then 
New Year's, then fresh thought and now we begin to discern 
signs of what we may expect. 
Beck added in conclusion that Ribbentrop would come 
here January 26, and that Hitler had remarked during the 
conversation that he regretted that his progress on his archi­
tectural projects had been retarded by the necessity of sending 
so many men to the Siegfried Line. However, in case he 
were not able to finish it during his own lifetime, Goering 
was well versed in his objectives and could carry on readily. 
Beck added this had been the first time Hitler had ever 
frankly intimated he expected Goering eventually to succeed 
him. 
My impression of the Beck-Hitler conversation was that 
Hitler made a tour d'horizon of about three hours, thinking 
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out loud in a conciliatory rather than aggressive tone. Beck 
seemed fairly well satisfied and under no apparent tension as 
a result of Hitler and Ribbentrop conversations. Beck has so 
far avoided receiving the British and French Ambassadors, 
who evidently under instructions from their Governments, 
are making constant efforts to see him. 
1. These dispatches are not reproduced in this volume but are deposited in the 
Department of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. Biddle here refers to Roosevelt's speech of January 4 to the Congress, in 
which he asserted that he would do everything short of war to halt German ag­
gression. See the Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939 
(New York, 1941), pp. 1-2. 
3. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
4. Potocki headed the "Western Division" of the Polish Foreign Ministry; there 
was no "Anglo-Saxon" department. 
5. Hitler had actually proposed the return of Danzig to Germany but assured 
Beck there would be no faits accomplis; Beck responded that he could see no 
"equivalent" that Poland could accept in return for Danzig. Beck was correct in so 
far that Hitler did not press the point, having raised it apparently only to sound 
Beck's reaction. See Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 482-85, and DGFP, D, 5, nos. 
119, 120, 121. 
DOCUMENT EIGHTEEN 
February 15, 1939 
Subject: Beck's further disclosures regarding

Ribbentrop's Warsaw visit; observations

I have the honor to supplement despatch No. 950 dated 
February 3, 19391 regarding the aftermath of Herr Ribben­
trop's visit to Warsaw, and to report the following additional 
observations. 
Beck informed me that he was satisfied with the outcome of 
Ribbentrop's conversations during the latter's visit here.2 
In effect, these talks had "boiled down" to a "re-hash" of 
Beck's former conversations with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. 
He was pleased to have had Ribbentrop confirm his 
[Beck's] impression previously gained during his talk with 
Hitler to the effect that Ruthenia did not figure in Hitler's 
immediate forward-looking program. Moreover, he had gained 
the impression from Ribbentrop that if Ruthenia continued 
to represent a center of activities threatening the security of 
the Polish state, Hitler would not be opposed to Poland's 
adopting military measures to restore order in that quarter. 
Hence, the Polish Government continued to regard Ruthenia 
as an "open" question. (In important connection with this 
statement, I shall report later on an interesting disclosure 
made by the Rumanian Ambassador to Poland.) Beck then 
stated in effect that his recent reports indicated that German 
direct interest in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was already on 
the wane and that a number of German agents hitherto 
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assigned to activities in Ruthenia had already been with­
drawn. Recently, moreover, conditions had taken a turn for the 
better in Ruthenia. Prague was taking a stronger hand in 
terms of efforts to restore order in that quarter and had 
adopted forceful measures against the influx of Ukrainians 
across Ruthenian frontiers.3 Beck hoped this would continue 
to prove the case. 
Beck had moreover gained an impression from his discus­
sions with Ribbentrop that in the eyes of Berlin the position of 
Czechoslovakia was still far from settled, the boundaries not 
definitely determined, the status of internal policy not yet 
clearly and satisfactorily defined from the standpoint of Nazi 
policy. 
Beck then stated that, as regards the general outlook from 
Germany's angle, the impression he had gained in his talk 
with Hitler had been subsequently confirmed in his talk with 
Ribbentrop to the following effect: (a) January and February 
were the months wherein Hitler would come to a decision as 
to a definite line of action; (b) Hitler would turn his main 
attention from the pursuance of his reportedly major objec­
tives in the East to the West; (c) Hitler would concentrate 
in the West upon his colonial claims. In connection with these 
claims, and in response to my inquiry, Beck said in effect the 
following: he looked for Hitler's campaign in the West to 
develop into a major play for colonies, and Beck had the 
distinct impression there was a decided disinclination on 
part of Hitler's close associates, as well as Hitler himself, 
either to bargain or to consider the imposition of conditions, 
such as arms limitation or treatment of the claims within 
framework of a general agreement, in connection with Hitler's 
colonial claims. In fact, Beck's impression was that Hitler 
would flatly refuse to consider any such condition as dis­
armament. Moreover, Hitler felt that the colonial aspect 
represented the last important unrectified injustice of the 
Versailles Treaty, and in such light Hitler would undoubtedly 
assume that the return of colonies constituted Germany's 
right. Moreover, his extremist associates were urging him to 
adopt this line of policy. In other words, Hitler might be 
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expected to shy off from any attempt either to impose condi­
tions to potential colonial concessions or to treat the ques­
tion within the framework of a general European agreement. 
(Of further interesting and pertinent bearing on this question 
were (a) the remarks of an unofficial but prominent figure in 
Central European affairs, Prince Max Hohenlohe, and (b) 
substance of Beck's reports regarding Berlin's views of 
colonies as recently conveyed to London, which I shall re­
count in separate supplementary dispatches.) 
Beck told me he had the impression that Hitler still did 
not want war. He stated that so far reports he had received 
since his talk with Hitler at Berchtesgaden had borne out his 
impression that Hitler would not deliberately wage war this 
year, as Beck felt that Germany, from the standpoint of 
military training, adequate fuel supplies, and raw material 
reserves, was not yet up to a major conflict of lengthy dura­
tion. He added, however, that if the present grave state of 
affairs between France and Italy went from bad to worse, 
there was always a possibility that Mussolini might strike 
out against France in a conflict wherein Hitler might conceiv­
ably become involved. Indeed, a conflict between Italy and 
France would be most unfortunate—the differences at stake 
should be liquidated bilaterally through statesmanship and 
diplomacy rather than war; it was only Germany which might 
conceivably profit by such a conflict. 
As regards Danzig, Beck said that, while Hitler had in 
broad terms discussed the question of Danzig and the transit 
of German rail and motorized traffic across the Corridor to 
East Prussia and Danzig, and while Ribbentrop had subse­
quently, during his visit here, touched upon these questions, 
Ribbentrop had confirmed Hitler's previously expressed will­
ingness to agree that these issues should be negotiated quietly 
in a neighborly spirit, and not be allowed to disrupt good 
Polish-German relations. Beck added in strictest confidence, 
however, that in the Warsaw-Berlin negotiations regarding 
Danzig, the position assumed by the German negotiators was 
still unsatisfactory to the Polish Government. From the 
Polish standpoint, the Germans were still seeking too much. 
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In other words, the terms Germany had thus far pressed 
went beyond the capacity of Polish public opinion to stomach 
them. The matter was therefore still in the course of negotia­
tions and, if continued at the present rate, would probably 
consume some little time yet before coming to a head. As 
regards the "Committee of Three", it continued in its course 
of consideration of the Danzig question, and the status of 
the League High Commissioner in connection therewith, in 
the light of the confidential Warsaw-Berlin negotiations. Thus 
far the Committee had shown a disposition to grant Warsaw 
and Berlin latitude in terms of time. 
Beck was aware that both the Foreign Office in London 
and the Quai d'Orsay were concerned lest the already en­
feebled status of the League might be further burdened by a 
fait accompli in terms of an agreement between Warsaw and 
Berlin over Danzig. However, Beck had given his assurances 
to the British Ambassador to keep him posted as to the 
progress of these negotiations. 
In concluding our conversation, Beck reminded me of his 
prediction before my departure for "leave" from Warsaw on 
January 18 to the effect that Ribbentrop's visit here would 
amount to little more than the creation of "atmosphere" 
and stated that such, in effect, proved to be the case. 
As a result of my inquiries in various conversations with 
Beck, his closest associates, and other competent individuals 
here, I have gained the impression that during Ribbentrop's 
conversations with Beck, the former had on several occasions 
actually touched on issues outstanding between Warsaw and 
Berlin; in only the most delicate manner he had tested out 
Beck, and the instant he had detected Beck's stiffening, he 
had dropped the question in point. This, according to my 
impression, occurred in connection with the question of a right 
of way over the Corridor, as well as other questions of po­
tential dispute between the two countries. In thus having 
retreated from a preliminary delicate approach on these 
touchy points, he at least learned Beck's reaction, and I 
believe he was accordingly carrying out Hitler's willingness 
to let these issues "ride" as a means toward the main objec­
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tive, namely, the creation of an atmosphere of friendly 
German-Polish relations, with an aim of giving the western 
powers the impression that Germany might possibly enjoy 
Poland's friendly neutrality during Hitler's course of action 
vis-a-vis the West. 
1. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. January 25-27, 1939. 
3. These were Ukrainians coming from eastern Poland. 
DOCUMENT NINETEEN 
February 17, 1939 
Subject: Minister Beck's observations on current French 
mass and official attitude; his comments on Bonnet's recent 
declaration regarding the French-Polish alliance 
I have the honor to report that in recent conversation with 
Beck, he stated that his reports tallied with my expressed im­
pression that France was consolidated to a greater degree 
than it had been for some time, and that Daladier's forceful 
declaration of recent date enjoyed the support of the country 
at large.1 
Commenting then upon the attitude of the French Govern­
ment as a whole, Beck intimated his doubts as to whether 
Daladier and Bonnet saw eye to eye on all issues at stake. 
Beck considered Bonnet likeable, but felt he lacked a compre­
hensive grasp of his present job. He then repeated what he had 
stated to me on a previous occasion—that Bonnet was given to 
an unfortunate weakness of occasionally divulging indiscre­
tions which some times proved embarrassing to capitals whose 
affairs were entailed in his disclosures. Beck still believed, 
however, that such indiscretions were due to a weakness in 
terms of desire to please the press during comparatively dull 
periods, rather than to a deliberate intention to embarrass 
anyone. 
Commenting then upon Bonnet's recent declaration before 
the Chamber of Deputies regarding the Polish-French Alli­
ance, Beck stated that, while on the face of it the declaration 
appeared to be satisfactory, still a careful examination of the 
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text of Bonnet's reference to Poland had led official circles 
here to greet it with less enthusiasm than if it had been 
otherwise worded. Instead of having treated the French Alli­
ances with Poland and the Soviet separately, Bonnet had cov­
ered them both in the same statement. Warsaw could hardly 
be expected to evince any great degree of satisfaction over 
Paris' having put the French-Polish and French-Soviet Alli­
ances in the same "casserole", since the Polish Government 
was well aware that Paris placed little, if any, confidence in 
the Soviet Alliance. In other words, this treatment had not 
proven very convincing for the Poles. 
In response to my suggestion that perhaps Bonnet had not 
deliberately meant to give that impression, and that his hav­
ing so coupled the two Alliances in the same statement might 
have been an oversight, Beck said he believed my observa­
tion was correct on this score, but that such an oversight was 
all the more lamentable, for it showed a distinct lack of grasp 
of the situation on either Bonnet's or Quai d'Orsay's part, or 
both. 
1. French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet on January 25 denied to the Cham­
ber of Deputies that French policy signaled the virtual abandonment of alliances 
with Poland and the Soviet Union, and Premier Edouard Daladier followed this up 
with a declaration stressing that all existing agreements would be maintained. 
Apparently, however, the French government had made these affimations of faith un­
der considerable domestic political pressure; Bonnet later told the German ambas­
sador to France that they had both spoken "for internal consumption." DGFP, D, 
4:497. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY 
February 17, 1939 
Subject: Minister Beck's observations on Ciano's forthcoming 
visit; Polish Chief of Staff's observations on military capacity 
of Axis in event it came to grips with the London-Paris axis; 
Polish Government's recent reports from Rome; observations 
I have the honor to report that in recent conversation with 
Minister Beck he expressed his sense of real satisfaction over 
a letter which he had just received from Italian Foreign Min­
ister Ciano regarding the latter's forthcoming visit to Warsaw, 
scheduled for February 25. Beck was pleased to note from 
Ciano's personal communication that the latter would bring 
his wife with him, marking the first time that he would have 
done so on an official visit. Moreover, Ciano would be accom­
panied by a formidable group of Italian journalists, headed 
by Signor Gayda.' 
In view of what Beck considered the gravity of the situation 
in connection with strained Italo-French relations, Beck would 
welcome the opportunity to discuss with Ciano all aspects of 
the dispute. Indeed, Beck would do what he could in a concili­
atory role. Though he did not know how much his own efforts 
might count on this score, still he was willing to have a go at it. 
Of significance and at least indirect bearing in light of its 
potential effect on Polish Government's attitude is today's 
strictly confidential disclosure by Polish Chief of Staff, Gen­
eral [Wac/aw] Stachiewicz, to effect that the Polish General 
Staff estimated that in event the two axes came to grips, the 
French and British would for the first two months find "rough 
going"—thereafter, however, the tide would undoubtedly turn in 
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their favor. Moreover, the Staff excluded the possibility of a 
victory of the Rome-Berlin Axis in a lengthy conflict. Further­
more, in a conflict between Italy and France, Italy would be 
defeated. The General went on to say Mussolini was said to 
have changed the Italians' soul—maybe to a certain extent, 
but not sufficiently to meet the crisis now staring them in the 
face—it would take more than the past fifteen years, at least 
fifty, and probably twice that. 
Moreover, the officer corps of the Italian Army was not up 
to that of the French. Neither, in terms of quantity, was the 
German. Besides, in terms of trained reserves, the Germans 
trailed the French to a marked degree. Moreover, Germany 
was definitely not yet prepared in terms of raw materials or 
fuel reserves. Besides, Britain and France had both effectively 
stepped up their plane production—and the availability of 
American planes was an enormous factor, and should be taken 
into important consideration. The Chief of Staff, with whom the 
Marshal is in accord, had so informed the Government here 
during the past twenty-four hours. It is moreover pertinent to 
add that today's reports from the Polish Embassy in Rome, 
to effect that political circles there were discernibly increas­
ingly nervous lest Mussolini make some unexpected bold move, 
have made a marked impression in official circles here. 
In consideration of the foregoing, I feel the Government 
now looks forward to Ciano's visit with mixed feelings. On 
the one hand, Poland, since its regeneration, has developed 
a natural sympathy for Italy which, due to a lack of conflict 
in Italo-Polish interest, Poland can afford—and Ciano's visit 
will mark an occasion permitting Poland an opportunity to 
express its friendly feelings. On the other hand, in view of 
mounting tension between Italy and France, the Polish Gov­
ernment does not welcome an occasion at the moment which 
might afford Ciano an opportunity to put questions—the Gov­
ernment here will want to steer clear of commitments; be­
sides, it is reasonable to suppose that Beck will wish to avoid 
offending France at this time. 
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1. Virginio Gayda, editor of the influential newspaper // Giornale d'Italia 
(Rome) from 1926 to 1943, was considered the semiofficial spokesman for Italian 
Fascism in matters of foreign policy. His editorials were closely read by diplomats, 
and his presence in Ciano's party was therefore justifiably interpreted by the Poles 
as an indication of the importance Mussolini attached to the visit. Ciano was re­
turning Beck's visit to Rome in March, 1938. Ciano's impressions of the visit to 
Warsaw between February 24 and March 2 are in The Ciano Diaries, pp. 33-35. 
For a discussion of Italian-Polish relations see Philip V. Cannistraro and Edward 
D. Wynot, Jr., "Polish Foreign Policy in 1934: An Unpublished Document from the 
Italian Archives," East Central Europe 1 (1974): 71-81. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-ONE 
March 4, 1939 
My dear Mr. President: 
Permit me to assure you, in all sincerity, that I am pro­
foundly impressed by your realistic appraisal of the current 
developments in Europe and their potential bearing upon 
events apparently in the making, as well as your combined 
foresight and courageous intelligence, which prompted your 
sound and far-reaching policy, aimed at averting war in 
Europe. 
Your firmness of attitude, your armament program, and 
your decision to afford the French and British opportunity to 
purchase planes from us, have been greeted by official circles 
here with a genuine sense of satisfaction. While leading 
Government and military authorities in Poland are frank in 
expressing this to me, they are careful to treat the matter 
confidentially, for, due to Poland's delicate geo-political situa­
tion during this period of mounting tension, they are careful 
not to say or do anything which might provoke Germany's 
suspicion and ire. 
Moreover, my numerous conversations with diplomatic 
and Government circles here, reveal in effect, the following: 
The firm attitude you have manifested, and the effective 
steps you have taken, have served (a) as a "stop, look and 
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listen" sign to the dictators; they have driven them to cover, 
and forced them to reexamine their respective and joint 
positions vis-a-vis the West; (b) to stiffen Paris and London; 
(c) as an important contribution towards consolidating the 
British dominions behind a firmer attitude in London; (d) to 
"ginger up" the French, whose leading political circles had 
previously been given somewhat to a spirit of defeatism; 
(e) to curb the tendency of the Italian press to minimize 
Chamberlain's statements in reference to the binding char­
acter of Britain's alliance with France; Rome is reportedly 
no longer indifferent to Chamberlain's assurances on this 
point; (f) to dampen Rome's war-mongering boisterousness, 
at least up to this point; Polish official circles- confidentially 
inform me, that during Ciano's visit here, his close associates 
imparted that the attitude of the United States had now be­
come a consideration of major importance in the minds of 
the ruling circles of Rome. 
It is, moreover, interesting to note that competent ob­
servers here hold that, mainly attributable to your reported 
attitude, [there] are traces of a desire in Berlin for a four-
power conference, traces first brought to light in a leading 
article in the Frankfurter Zeitung of February 5. The gist 
of the article may be characterized as a ballon d'essai for a 
four-power conference. Competent observers here interpreted 
this as an attempt on the part of Berlin to keep the United 
States out of the European picture, and to circumvent the 
potential influences of our attitude upon the Western Euro­
pean capitals, as regards the demands of "gangster diplo­
macy" 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-TWO 
March 11, 1939 
MEMORANDUM 
Minister Beck's views on general European situation, in terms 
of near-range outlook; substance and potential bearing of 
Polish Government reports from abroad; observations 
In discussing with Beck various aspects of the current 
European political trend and their potential bearing on the 
period immediately ahead of us, he stated his opinion: (a) 
that Spain still constituted a potential source of worry; it was 
still too early to forecast the outcome of the current play of 
forces in connection therewith; in other words, Spain still 
bore watching in terms of a potential breeder of interna­
tional complications; (b) as long as Czecho-Slovakia remained 
an unsettled question—and it was still far from settled—the 
consequent uncertainty thus created, and the potential con­
fusion which might arise from disturbing developments in 
that country, might be expected to work an unsettling effect 
on Central Europe; (c) otherwise, although diplomatic circles, 
still suffering from the shock of last autumn's events, were 
tense, the chances of war in the near future were less than 
last fall, when the situation growing out of mobilizations in 
various quarters and attendant acute tension had failed to 
lead to war. 
Moreover, and of pertinent bearing, in the opinion of 
official circles here, their persistent reports of "behind-[the-] 
scenes" conversations between the capitals of Western Europe 
and those of the Axis afford grounds for a greater than hitherto 
degree of composure in estimating events of the immediate 
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future. In this connection, it may be recalled that I formerly 
drew attention to the persistence of reports reaching here to 
the effect that, on the one hand, Monsieur Bonnet was in­
clined to attempt to avert a show-down with Rome by sound­
ings on the possibilities for a potential compromise settle­
ment, while on the other hand, Mr. Chamberlain was pre­
paring for a "second major peace effort." 
While my informants' reports are not sufficiently definite 
in character to gain a specific grasp of the aforementioned 
"behind-[the-]scenes" negotiations, nevertheless, the persis­
tence of these reports from important quarters both in the 
West and in Central Europe point, in my opinion, to a con­
ceivable postponement of what until recently threatened to be 
the commencement of a tense crisis period on the heels of 
the Pope's [Pius XII] coronation. 
Considered in broad relief, it may be said that the past year 
has been characterized by a contest between Western and 
Eastern Europe to divert the course of the Axis cyclone in 
the other's direction. Until about six weeks ago, the West had 
succeeded in diverting the Nazi cyclone in an eastwardly 
direction. Thereupon, each state in the area northeast, east, 
and southeast of Berlin struggled to divert the course of Nazi 
attention from its own to another state's home front. Then, 
about six weeks ago, the main force of Axis diplomatic atten­
tion swung around towards the West, in turn reflecting itself 
in an evident sense of relief amongst the statesmen of those 
Eastern and Central European powers which had hitherto 
escaped subjugation to Nazi expansion. How long Axis 
attention will continue concentrating on the West depends 
upon the turn of nearby events. 
Moreover, in my opinion, (a) the firmness of attitude 
manifested by President Roosevelt and other members of our 
Government, together with our armament program, and (b) 
the "gingering" effect thereof upon the official attitude of 
London and Paris, combined with Britain's subsequent arma­
ment program, served as a "stop-look-and-listen" sign to the 
dictators and drove them to cover to re-examine their respec­
tive and joint positions. They are now in a quandary, both as 
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to their immediate objectives and as to the methods of ap­
proach thereto. 
Past events indicate that, in preparing the ground for his 
expansion program, Hitler has made a scientific study of 
the potential weak spots in the European political arena. 
This indeed is an important factor in the technique of his 
political engineering. Considering, then, the situation of today 
with a view to estimating Hitler's next move, it may be said 
that he has already in the back of his mind an inventory of 
potential politico-economic-military weaknesses all along the 
line. He now faces the immediate future like the quarterback 
of a football team, who puts his play through the first open­
ing he discerns. Moreover, such as in the case of the quarter­
back who has his team trained to the mechanics of each play 
applicable to a given potential opening, so Hitler has up his 
sleeve his formulae applicable to each potential opening in the 
international field. Hence, I believe we may look for him to 
approach his immediate objectives as a quarterback, ready to 
direct his play through whatever opening in the line he dis­
cerns. 
As regards Mussolini's attitude, in terms of its bearing on 
France and the Mediterranean problem generally, it appears 
for the moment to be confused and often characterized by 
perplexing contradictions. On the one hand, he is manifesting 
an unusual self-restraint, vocally speaking; on the other hand, 
it is being stated in important quarters in Berlin that he is 
preparing to approach France, or to hint that he would like 
to be approached by her through discreet diplomatic channels 
for purpose of negotiations not conducted from councils [of 
the League of Nations] nor under the pressure of the extremist 
Fascist press. 
One might perhaps ascribe Mussolini's self-restraint in 
part to his concern lest the formulation of Italy's demands 
in the open might land him in an awkward dilemma, since 
France would be certain to reject those demands, both in form 
and substance. Thus he would find it impossible to square 
any potentially "reasonable" demands which France might 
conceivably treat as a basis for negotiation with the shrill 
and impossible program of his extremists. Whatever form 
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Mussolini's next move in connection with Italy's claims might 
take, it is reasonable to look for the question of "timing" to 
play an important part; he will undoubtedly seek a moment 
which he considers psychologically favorable to his interests. 
(Beck has gained the impression that Rome, believing that 
Paris is already cognizant of Italy's claims, is now awaiting 
some form of response from Paris; moreover, Beck has gained 
the impression that important elements in Paris official circles 
are apprehensive lest Mussolini formulate an impossible list 
of claims deliberately aimed as a pretext for coming to grips 
with France. On the other hand, however, Beck gained the 
impression in his talks with Ciano that his attitude was non-
aggressive vis-a-vis France when discussing Italian claims; 
furthermore, Ciano had implied Italy was not eager to go to 
war with France and hoped to settle Italo-French differences 
peacefully.) 
In light of the foregoing, and in view of persistent reports 
from the Western and Axis capitals to effect that "behind­
[the-]scenes" negotiations are in progress, I am now prompted 
to look for the immediate future to entail a period wherein 
Hitler and Mussolini will feel their way and will conduct 
soundings looking to potential negotiations. During the early 
stage of these soundings we may conceivably enjoy com­
parative quiet. In event, however, the Dictators gained an 
impression at any stage of these soundings [that] either the 
Western capitals were playing for time, or that little could be 
gained by potential negotiations, it would be reasonable to 
expect an immediate recrudescence of boisterousness and 
acute tension. It is, moreover, conceivable to my mind that 
if (a) an agreement to expunge the "guilt clause", and a 
recognition of Germany's right to colonies; and if (b) Italy's 
realization of the so-called "reasonable" items of her list of 
claims were to grow out of any possible negotiations, this 
might mark a prelude to boisterous chantages by both ends 
of the Axis, aimed at attaining the more substantial objec­
tives of their respective and joint appetites, for I do not be­
lieve the Axis chiefs have abandoned hope of prying further 
concessions from the Western European powers, before the 
latter may have attained a higher degree of armament. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-THREE 
April 4, 1939 
Subject: Observations on (a) Nazi-inspired campaign 
of destructive propaganda in Poland, (b) Berlin's and 
German minority's attitude, (c) Polish precautions 
to protect German minority 
I have the honor1 to report that German machinations within 
Poland aimed at spreading confusion and weakening the inter­
nal political-economic structure of the state, assumed a grave 
aspect last week. 
In part, Berlin's campaign consisted (a) of inspired tenden­
cious rumors regarding an acute conflict of opinions in Gov­
ernment circles, and (b) false telephone messages to the var­
ious Foreign missions, including our own. For example, one 
German-inspired report which gained swift and wide-spread 
circulation amongst the Polish population of Warsaw, as well as 
diplomatic circles, was to the effect that due to disagreement 
in policy, Marshal Smigly-Rydz had shot Foreign Minister 
Beck. On another occasion, our Embassy was telephoned at 
9 P.M., Friday, March 24th, that pursuant a German ulti­
matum, Beck had refused to agree with his associates that 
Poland surrender Bogumin to the Germans, and that Beck was 
consequently resigning within two hours of the time of the 
telephone call. Though I placed little if any credence in the 
substance of this telephone message, I went immediately to 
the Foreign Office for the purpose of making discreet observa­
tions for myself. As I expected, I found Beck and his Cabinet 
members together with General Staff representatives, infor­
mally gathered, discussing various aspects of the "black out" 
 327 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
which at that time was in progress.2 Upon their invitation, 
I "sat in" the conference for several hours, and having as­
sured myself that all was in order, and that the telephone mes­
sage was only another mendacious effort to create confusion, 
I returned home. 
On a subsequent occasion, the telephone operator at our 
chancery telephoned me at 8:40 on the morning of March 27, 
stating that some one purporting to represent the Foreign Of­
fice had telephoned to announce that Polish troops had entered 
Danzig at 8:30 a.m. I immediately suspected a trick, charac­
teristic of Nazi technic [sicl], and requested our operator to 
check back on the Foreign Office to verify the source and sub­
stance of the message. I was therefore not surprised when our 
operator telephoned me five minutes later to say that having 
conformed with my request, he ascertained that the Foreign 
Office knew nothing of the aforementioned message. Major Col­
bern, our Military Attache, thereupon immediately notified 
the Second Bureau of the General Staff, while I apprised Beck, 
the Vice Premier, the Governor of Warsaw, and the Chief 
of Police, suggesting that some appropriate measures be 
adopted swiftly to curb what we considered a campaign deliber­
ately aimed at causing confusion and general disturbance. 
That same day, the Government adopted emergency precau­
tions aimed at arresting this wave of harmful propaganda. 
As regards continued reports emanating from the Berlin 
broadcast stations and the German press accusing Poland of 
maltreating the German minority, I am aware that in antici­
pation of Polish mass anti-German feeling and in a determined 
effort to prevent acts which might provoke Germany, the Pol­
ish Government issued strict orders to the local police au­
thorities throughout Poland to adopt strict measures to protect 
the German minority.3 However, before these measures came 
into effect, there had taken place, according to my information 
from usually reliable sources, a few cases of "rough housing", 
mainly on part of exuberant Polish youths, expressing their 
feelings against the Germans, who, particularly in Bydgoszcz, 
had become overbearing and provocative in their attitude to­
wards the local Poles. As an illustration of the extent of afore­
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mentioned police precaution, the Belgian Minister informed me 
that in the area industrialized by Belgian invested capital, 
the Polish police authorities had forbidden the German em­
ployees to leave the town without police visas. Moreover, 
the police were careful to point out that since they were re­
sponsible for the welfare and protection of each German in 
that area, the police could not afford to allow the Germans to 
"go wandering out of sight" 
My further examination of subsequently reported incidents 
gives me more than an impression that the German minority 
has been deliberately attempting to provoke incidents. For 
example, a report came to my notice this morning to the effect 
that at Chorzow, a town of about 125,000 inhabitants and a 
nitrate industrial center in Upper Silesia, the Polish police 
apprehended a number of young German students deliberate­
ly in the act of smashing the windows of the German high 
school of which they were students. Under subsequent police 
examination the boys confessed their fathers had instructed 
them to commit these disorders. 
The apparent determination both of Berlin and the German 
minority in Poland to keep Polish-German minority differ­
ences an almost daily "headline" issue, suggests that they 
aim to keep this an open question whereon to build a case for 
potential forceful intervention. 
1. This report was prepared after Hitler had occupied Prague (March 12) and 
after Poland had accepted the British guarantee (March 31). 
2. There was a partial mobilization in Poland at the time that Germany seized 
Memel, March 23-24. 
3. The German minority in Poland had been a persistent thorn in the govern­
ment's side throughout the interwar period, but had become especially virulent in 
its anti-Polish sentiments after Hitler's attainment of power in 1933. For a study of 
this problem, see Edward D. Wynot, Jr., "The Polish Germans, 1919-1939: Na­
tional Minority in a Multinational State," The Polish Review 17, no. 1 (Winter, 
1972): 23-64. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-FOUR 
May 12, 1939 
Subject: Potemkin's conversation with Beck 
in Warsaw; further observations thereon 
With reference to my cable No. 107 of May 10, 2 p.m.,1 I 
have the honor to report that, after a lengthy talk with Beck 
and just before his departure from Warsaw, Potemkin2 im­
parted the following to the Turkish Ambassador: 
He was highly satisfied with his talk with Beck. Beck had 
been very friendly and had manifested marked comprehension 
in connection with all aspects covered in the discussion. 
While maintaining the characteristic Polish reserve in respect 
to a potential alliance with Russia, Beck had stressed Poland's 
desire for a mutual re-invigoration of all aspects of the Non-
Aggression Agreement and emphasized Poland's desire for a 
broadening of the scope of the Commercial Agreement between 
Warsaw and Moscow. Moreover, Beck had assured Potemkin 
of the Polish Government's desire for friendly Polish-Russian 
relations. 
Potemkin had assured Beck in turn that Moscow recipro­
cated Warsaw's desires on all points mentioned. Moreover, 
Potemkin explained to my informant that he clearly under­
stood Poland's position vis-a-vis a potential alliance with 
Russia as characterized by Beck's reserve on the subject. 
Furthermore, Potemkin had assured Beck that Litvinov's re­
placement by Molotov did not entail a change in Moscow's 
foreign policy. 
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Judging from the above disclosures and from Beck's remarks 
subsequent to his conversation with Potemkin, the substance 
of which I reported in my cable under reference, I am inclined 
to believe that for Poland's part Poland desires: (a) mutual 
re-invigoration of Non-Aggression Agreement; (b) friendly rela­
tions along commercial but not political lines; (c) broadening 
of scope of existent Commercial Agreement to meet 1/ 
Poland's requirements of war materiel and supplies, and 2/ to 
provide Russian outlets for coal and industrial production of 
the Teschen district; (d) to avoid committing herself to an alli­
ance with Russia whereby Poland, due to her strict principle 
of refusing to accept unilateral guarantees, might in turn find 
it necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity of Russia. 
For Russia's part, Russia (a) desires to meet Poland's 
wishes regarding a non-aggression agreement, (b) understands 
and is willing to meet Poland's desires for friendly relations 
along commercial but not political lines, (c) is apparently 
willing to 1/ meet Poland's desire to broaden the scope of 
the existent Commercial Agreement to meet Poland's require­
ments of war materiel and supplies, and 2/ meet within rea­
son Poland's requirement for a Russian outlet for coal and in­
dustrial production of the Teschen district. 
Moreover, I perceive that Moscow not only understands 
Poland's position regarding a potential alliance with Russia, 
but perhaps welcomes [it], thus avoiding a closer tie-in to poten­
tial conflict whereby Russian troops might be involved be­
yond the Russian frontier. 
1. This dispatch is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the Depart­
ment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. Vladimir Potemkin (1878-1944), was the deputy commissar for foreign af­
fairs of the Soviet Union. For Potemkin's report on this conversation, see Dokumenty 
i Materialy (Warsaw, 1973), 7:107-8. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-FIVE 
May 20, 1939 
Memorandum 
Today's conversations with official circles here reveal they 
are aware of the following report: Berlin plans stirring up 
trouble in Upper Silesia over a period of the next six weeks. 
This is to serve partly as a diversion activity and partly as a 
smoke screen for further machinations vis-a-vis Danzig,1 
which are to be brought to a head at the end of the six-weeks 
period. At that time, Berlin plans a bold stroke involving 
Gdynia as well as Danzig. The German fleet is to take station 
at a point vis-a-vis the two ports, and within gun range 
thereof, while East Prussian troops are to enter the city by 
the bridge at Marienburg and by the canal leading into the 
city from the Vistula (This canal was deepened about one 
and a half years ago with the idea of affording access to light 
draught boats). Leading up to this point, a gradual accumula­
tion of German East Prussian troops will have taken place in 
the city—under the guise, perhaps, of tourists. Already some 
twenty truck loads of ammunition have been smuggled into 
Danzig with a view to German occupation of some central 
point within the confines of the city. (Polish authorities are 
now in process of verifying this report and in ascertaining 
the point whereat this ammunition is now allegedly stored.) 
The plan, moreover, envisages an ultimatum stating that, if 
the Poles did not surrender Danzig intact, the German fleet 
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would lay the port of Gdynia in ashes and the German troops 
(then envisagedly in the city) would synchronize their action 
with that of the fleet. 
This plan has evidently been conceived as a means of 
circumventing the Polish plan to take over the city, in the 
event of a German threat thereto, before the East Prussian 
troops might have had time to cross the Vistula into Danzig. 
In this connection, it is well to bear in mind that there is but 
one bridge across the Vistula from East Prussia; while the 
Poles are afforded a comparatively speedy approach through 
a number of highways and several railways leading into 
Danzig. Moreover, the Polish batteries at Hel command the 
city. Furthermore, I am aware that the military authorities 
here, typifying the feelings of the Government and public 
opinion, would sooner lay Danzig in ashes than to permit 
its seizure and militarization by Germany. As several of the 
Polish High Command remarked to me: To lay Danzig in 
ashes would be exceedingly painful for the Poles but, after all, 
every Pole realizes that German militarization thereof would 
spell the eventual end of Poland's access to the Baltic. Ger­
man artillery mounted in Danzig would be within easy range 
of Gdynia and would serve the Nazi agents as a threat to 
Polish interests and as a constant instrument of pressure on 
Polish shippers and shipping interests. 
In discussing the aforementioned report of Berlin's plan to 
force the surrender of Danzig, I am aware that, while my 
informants are disinclined to attach a too great importance 
thereto, they are aware that such reports call for added 
calm consideration and vigilance. In fact, they are inclined to 
put these reports down to a Berlin-inspired "open secret", 
characteristic of Berlin's jitters-inspiring technique, and such 
might be aimed not only at racking Polish nerves but also at 
causing sufficient anxiety in foreign quarters as to draw further 
offers of mediation. Moreover, one official, at the conclusion 
of reading aloud to me the details of the envisaged plan as 
reported by a Polish Intelligence officer, calmly remarked, 
"So what?" He then went on to say that this scheme should 
not be considered in the light of action which could be 
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localized, for a military conflict which would ensue from 
such action would rapidly spread to the proportions of a 
general conflagration. Berlin knew this only too well and 
realized that the putting into operation of such a scheme 
would spell nothing short of a European war. Of course, if 
Hitler wanted war, that was one thing; but my informant did 
not think Hitler was willing actually to risk war over Danzig 
within the next six weeks. 
1. It should be noted that shortly before this document was written, the Danzig 
Nazis had cancelled the elections promised for the spring of 1939, and tension was 
mounting in Danzig. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-SIX 
June 9, 1939 
Subject: Reactions of Polish Official 
circles to Berlin's current attitude 
I have the honor to report that my recent conversations with 
informed officials here reveal that their reactions to Berlin's 
current attitude assume in effect the following line: 
Notwithstanding (A) a noticeable detente in general tone 
of German press vis-a-vis Poland; (B) Berlin officialdom's 
suggestion that Warsaw and Berlin agree to soft-pedal their 
respective press campaigns; and (C) Wilhelmstrasse's having 
recently "taken to sending word" to Warsaw, 1/ indirectly 
through League High Commissioner Burckhardt and others, 
and 2/ through German Ambassador to Poland von Moltke, 
that Berlin would welcome re-opening of Warsaw-Berlin 
negotiations when times were quieter; Berlin (a) continues 
to "hack away" at the Danzig problem both in press and 
through other forms of propaganda, as well as through 
inspiration of provocative activities in Danzig; and (b) appears 
to be deliberately heaping coals on smoldering fires by further 
irritating Warsaw with attempt to deport to Poland Jews of 
Polish origin living in Germany.* 
From the foregoing disclosures, I gained the impression 
my informants feel that the discrepancy between Berlin's 
words and actions cautions against attaching too much cre­
dence to Berlin's "smiles" Moreover, they are frank to admit 
that the aforementioned discrepancy serves further to di­
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minish confidence in any expression of intention or policy on 
part either of Hitler or his associates. 
* In this connection, Jewish leaders here inform me that during the past three 
days 80 Jews have been chased from Germany over the German-Polish border. 
Although most of them had no papers, the Polish authorities at Zbaszyn took 
pity and permitted them to enter Poland. According to my aforementioned in­
formants, about 4,000 Jews of Polish origin living in Germany recently re­
ceived orders to evacuate Germany. My informants understood that the Polish 
Government had warned Berlin that it would have recourse to retaliatory 
measures should mass expulsion of Jews of Polish origin take place in Germany. 
My informants added their estimate that there were about 20,000 Jews of Polish 
origin currently inhabiting Germany. Some of these had passports in order; 
others had no papers. [Biddle's own footnote—Eds.] 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-SEVEN 
June 9, 1939 
Subject: Current propaganda campaign of German 
Ambassador and his staff amongst their colleagues, 
aimed at weakening anti-aggression front 
I have the honor to report the following observations upon 
current propaganda activities of the German Ambassador and 
his staff: They have for the past several weeks been actively 
engaged in propagandizing among the Chiefs and staffs of 
Missions representing a number of the links in the chain of 
anti-aggression forces.* The Ambassador's program has 
thus far entailed a series of luncheons and dinners whereat 
he arranges that the particular colleague whom he wishes to 
impress joins him in after-luncheon or after-dinner conversa­
tion in a salon apart from the other guests. During the past 
two weeks he has thus conducted lengthy talks with the 
Rumanian Ambassador, the Yugoslav Minister, the Greek 
Minister, the Swiss Minister, the Swedish Minister, the 
Finnish Minister, and the Netherlands Minister. 
I learn that Moltke usually adopts the following "line": 
Both the moral and armed strength of the Axis is far superior 
to that of the democracies. He thereupon cites statistics on 
comparative air strengths and motorized equipment, heavy 
artillery, etc. Moreover, he makes it a point to emphasize 
that, in case of war, the anti-aggression forces east of the Axis 
would have to look for aid from Russia, for neither Britain 
nor France could help them directly either in terms of troops 
or equipment. This would mean that the anti-aggression 
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forces of the aforementioned category would be forced to run 
the risk of encountering eventual Russian pressure. Realiz­
ing the dependence of certain states upon her aid, Russia 
might thus be in position to impose conditions to the disad­
vantage of states concerned. 
Moltke, moreover, points out that, should London and Paris 
come to terms with Berlin, the other anti-aggression forces, 
having served London and Paris usefully as "scenery in a big 
show", would be left to shift for themselves. They should 
therefore be mindful of their potential subsequent position 
vis-a-vis a Berlin which had a limit to its patience (This is 
clearly a warning that, in event Britain, France, and Germany 
came to terms, the "little fellows" had better be careful lest 
they be left at the mercy of Germany's potential vindictive­
ness). 
Regarding Poland, Moltke points out that now, given an 
opportunity to count Poland among the anti-aggression forces, 
Britain and France had thus far given little, if any, tangible 
evidence of their confidence and serious intention. Indeed, 
their combined attitude had been characterized by delay in 
extending Poland accommodation in terms of equipment 
and finance. This example could hardly prove encouraging 
for other links in the anti-aggression chain (This remark 
indicates Berlin is keeping close watch over London-Warsaw 
negotiations).1 
In further attempt to engage his listeners' concern over 
London and Paris, and particularly London, Moltke signifi­
cantly intimates that reports reaching Berlin indicate that 
certain important elements in both capitals are only awaiting 
a psychological moment to invite the Axis powers to a peace 
conference. In this connection, Moltke intimates in effect that, 
for purposes of home consumption, London might conceivably 
resort to a pretext that, in terms of peace gestures, it was 
necessary to leave no stone unturned, in order to place the 
blame for a possible conflict at Hitler's door. Judging, how­
ever, from current delays in implementing the present form 
of the Anglo-Polish Pact with moves of practical value, it 
would appear London was hesitating, and giving serious 
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consideration to the risk of involvement in a war over such 
questions as Danzig and a Corridor passageway. 
In cases where Moltke's listeners have subsequently im­
parted in confidence the substance of his remarks, I have been 
careful to study my informants' reactions. Accordingly, I 
discerned that, with but few exception, they were greatly 
impressed and concerned—in some cases obviously dismayed. 
As I have pointed out in previous writings, Moltke is intelli­
gent and possesses a charming, convincing manner. 
* The newly appointed Soviet Ambassador here [Nicholas Sharonov] confiden­
tially volunteered the information that Moscow was aware that the German Mission 
Chiefs in all capitals throughout Europe were, pursuant [to the] Wilhelmstrasse's 
instructions, conducting a propaganda campaign among their colleagues with a view 
to weakening, if not breaking up, the anti-aggression front. [Biddle's own footnote-
Eds.] 
1. On the London-Warsaw negotiations, see Raczynski, In Allied London, pp. 
17-18, and Szembek, Diariusz i Teki, vol. 4, passim. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-EIGHT 
June 27, 1939 
Memorandum 
In a recent informal but confidential conversation with a 
group of informed, high-ranking Government officials and 
military authorities, I enjoyed the opportunity of "listening 
in" to their "thinking out loud" in a several hours' tour 
d'horizon. I thus gained an insight to their trend of thought 
in relation to the chances of current European developments' 
coming to a war.1 
The following in effect represents the substance of my 
informants' discussion: 
To their minds, it would be difficult to liquidate the current 
conflict of forces in Europe through statesmanship and 
diplomacy in that the differences at stake did not wholly 
constitute material problems. Indeed, underlying the conflict 
were two discernible, basically different conceptions. The 
Nazi regime of Germany were determined to impose their 
will upon states which they envisaged as a part of an eventual 
pan-Germanic area under Hitler's sovereignty. Moreover, 
Berlin wanted no outside interference, either with its methods 
of acquiring control over that area or with the form of control 
it might wish subsequently to exercise thereover. In this 
connection, the matter of recognized principles governing 
international relationships counted for naught in Berlin's view. 
Ethical principles had little to do with the conception of the 
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power politicians of current-day Germany. Their mentality 
was attuned to the conception of ruthless, strong-armed 
methods to gain and subsequently maintain control over their 
objectives. 
On the other hand, the forces in conflict with this concep­
tion based their international relations upon the principles of 
ethics and justice. It might even be said that they looked 
upon disputes arising out of international differences as a 
business man looked upon problems arising out of differences 
in the business field, and in this light upheld the method of 
conference and negotiation as a means of settlement of dis­
putes. Hitler might be expected to participate in a conference 
only if he were amply assured in advance that the "cards 
were stacked" in his favor. 
Moreover, acceptance of the thought that the conflict 
between the totalitarian and democratic states found its roots 
in the fundamental difference between two divergent con­
ceptions led one in turn to consider the question as to whether 
these two conceptions could live alongside of each other in 
the same world. Did it not, therefore, boil down to a question 
as to whether the democracies were willing and capable of 
tolerating the existence of the totalitarian regimes, and all 
they implied, and whether the democracies, in the interests 
of humanity, international law and order, and "good busi­
ness", might eventually decide to put an end to them. 
In line with this thought, and in attempting to estimate 
in what direction Europe was heading, it seemed that one of 
the following three eventualities might be expected to prove 
the case: either appeasement (of the "Munich" type), or 
revolution in Germany (envisaging the downfall of the Nazi 
regime), or war, or prevention of war by no relaxation in the 
anti-aggression front, and principally in a three-cornered 
nucleus thereof, London, Paris, and Warsaw. 
So far as appeasement was concerned, the results of 
"Munich" had shown the flaws in such a course, and the 
disastrous results served as a warning against returning to 
such a means of settlement. 
 341 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
As regards a revolution in Germany, there were important 
elements, particularly in the "City" of London (some con­
nected with no less an institution than the Bank of England), 
whose "wish-thinking" gave rise to political dreams devoid 
of realism, and envisaging the Nazi regime's downfall in 
consequence of mounting internal economic discomfort. Too 
much importance was apt to be attached to this possibility by 
these "stay-at-home" British elements. They were over-
inclined, moreover, to think of Europe in terms of pre-War 
considerations, and were unfortunately given to "ostriching" 
their way through the "sunset years" of their lives. They 
failed to realize, however, that while Hitler's star went into 
a tailspin after the pogroms, and again immediately after 
Germany's occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, nevertheless his 
star later regained ascendency when the German masses 
awoke to a realization that their Fuehrer had "gotten away" 
with a major coup without spilling German blood. It gained 
added ascendent momentum, moreover, when Hitler, feeling 
around for some slogan to rally mass support again, seized 
upon "encirclement" as a "battle cry." 
Meanwhile Hitler's having "gotten away" with his Czech 
coup strengthened his hand with the General Staff. More­
over, it should not be overlooked that during the interval 
between the end of the Great War and the Nazi regime, the 
Army played a minor role, and that Hitler's advent to power 
marked the commencement of an era characterized by the 
re-establishment of the German Army as a formidable factor 
—indeed, in German eyes, the Army's re-glorification. The 
officers' corps were aware of this fact. In other words, it was 
useless to allow wish-thinking to overcome a necessarily 
realistic consideration of Hitler's current position. There were 
sufficient stores of food-stuffs to cover at least the requirements 
of the coming year; there was also the present harvest, which 
should cover about 90 per cent of Germany's next eleven 
months' requirements—besides, the masses were capable of 
further tightening their belts. Moreover, the internal political 
forces opposed to Hitler were not organized and lacked leader­
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ship. Hence, in terms of the next year at least, revolution in 
Germany was more likely after than before the commence­
ment of a war. 
If, therefore, one were to admit the impracticability of 
appeasement in the "Munich" sense, and that a pre-war 
revolution in Germany were unlikely, then one was con­
fronted with the questions as to whether war might be the 
only solution and whether war might be prevented and by 
what means. 
In this connection, my informants remarked that Hitler, 
whose political power depended on employment, bread and 
circuses, could hardly be expected to stop now—for to draw 
back at this point would spell industrial shutdowns resulting 
in unemployment, which would eventually prove a monkey 
wrench in the machinery propelling the momentum of Nazi 
policy. Indeed, employment formed one of the chief planks 
in Hitler's platform. The fact that employment in the Greater 
Reich was based mainly on the armament industry and con­
struction of fortifications meant that Hitler would necessarily 
encounter serious social and economic problems were he to 
agree to participate in a program of disarmament. This was a 
picture wherefrom Hitler and, even to no less degree, the 
extremists constituting the "Mafia" (currently surrounding 
him) would be apt to recoil. Rather than face such a prospect, 
the extremists might press Hitler to gamble "the works" 
for "big stakes"—this crowd still believed they could win in a 
campaign of lightning destruction. From the standpoint of 
logic, Hitler might be expected to recognize that the forces 
were mounting against him with the passing of each month, 
and in the same light one might expect that if Europe "got 
by" early November without war the chances of war during 
this generation would be almost nil. However, it was difficult 
to appraise the situation from the standpoint of logic when 
the situation rested solely upon the whims of a cyclothymic, 
Austrian mentality such as Hitler's. Meanwhile Hitler must 
go on providing his public with employment, bread and 
circuses. 
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At this point my informants emphasized their unanimous 
opinion that the only way to prevent war would be constant 
vigilance of a strong London-Paris-Warsaw front, which after 
all represented the nucleus of what had subsequently become 
known as the anti-aggression front. Accordingly, London and 
Paris must avoid giving Berlin the slightest impression of 
doubt as to their determination to support Poland in rela­
tion to Danzig. My informants then pointed out that Poland 
stood as the cornerstone of strength in Eastern Europe, and, 
if anything happened to Poland, Eastern and Central Europe 
would undoubtedly collapse. Up to this point, Hitler had been 
halted and might possibly be prevented from bursting out, 
provided the anti-aggression front were maintained in vigor. 
The strengthening and maintenance of the anti-aggression 
front might prove an expensive operation, but if it succeeded, 
as was its cardinal policy in preventing war, it would prove 
far cheaper than a conflagration. Besides, it should be borne 
in mind that since Hitler alone would decide the issue of war 
or peace, Hitler had an Austrian mentality, traditionally 
formidable vis-a-vis weakness but inclined to confusion and 
even retreat in the face of strength. 
1. This memorandum is especially important because of the accurate picture it 
presents of the way the international situation was then seen in Warsaw. Indeed, 
it shows how well informed Biddle's informants—high government officials—were about 
the thinking going on in London and how well they understood Berlin. 
DOCUMENT TWENTY-NINE 
July 26, 1939 
Subject: Substance of Marshal Smigfy-Rydz's additional 
confidential observations on: (a) the pace and extent of 
Polish and German mobilization vis-a-vis one another; 
(b) time necessary for Germany to mobilize for conflict 
with Poland; (c) dates in connection with German maneuvers; 
(d) general aspects of military-political picture in making; 
(e) estimate as to chances of war—60%; (f) clarification

thereof (supplementing his former observations);

(g) best means of war prevention

I have the honor to supplement my cable No. 139 of July 6, 
1 p.m., and my despatches Nos. 1104 of June 20 and 1115 of 
June 24, 1939,' and to report in the following paragraphs the 
substance of Marshal Smigly-Rydz's additional confidential 
observations. 
Several days ago Marshal Smigly-Rydz confidentially char­
acterized the course of military activities on both sides of the 
Polish-German fence between March and the present as suc­
cessive efforts on the part of each side to match the other 
in terms of mobilized strength; for example, when Poland 
had concentrated two divisions in vicinity of the Polish-Ger­
man frontier, the Germans thereupon concentrated three on 
their side; immediately following this Poland increased her 
strength to five; shortly thereafter the Germans replied by 
equalling this amount in their side; thus each side had suc­
cessively stepped up its strength gradually over a period of 
four months. However, the amount of German force now in 
the field vis-a-vis the Polish frontier could not as yet be re­
garded as an intensive mobilization. German troops were now 
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gradually concentrating in the area vis-a-vis Poznan—but to 
date not to an alarming degree. Moreover, very recent reports 
indicated a slight increase in troop movement in the Breslau-
Oppeln area—but not to an alarming extent thus far. 
The Marshal then imparted that according to his own and 
his military experts' estimate it would take the Germans two 
weeks to mobilize forces sufficient to come to grips with Po­
land.* He then stated that his intelligence reports indicated 
that: (a) all leaves of absence granted on large scale to Ger­
man officers corps during this month would terminate July 28 
and (b) that the student corps now engaged in harvesting 
would have returned to their respective home centers by Au­
gust 10 and, as these students were reservists, they would be 
ready thereupon to engage in maneuvers. 
Commenting then upon the more general aspects of the 
military-political picture in the making, the Marshal estimated 
that chances were 60% in favor of war and 40% in favor of 
the prevention of war this year. By way of clarification he 
pointed out that this represented Germany's strategic year; 
at the moment it was only reasonable to admit that despite 
declarations of firmness and public utterances regarding 
mounting strength of the anti-aggression front, the Axis still 
had the edge. Time, however, was working against Germany 
and a year hence would have found the military strength of 
the anti-aggression forces pretty well in balance with Axis 
strength; two years hence it would undoubtedly have sur­
passed Axis strength. 
I am aware, moreover, that the Marshal is in accord with 
Beck's conviction that solidity on part of the anti-aggression 
front in a firm stand would prove the most effective anti­
dote to Germany's expansion aspirations. They both share the 
belief that this is the only language which might succeed in 
halting Hitler, who had thus far employed his armed force 
more as a blackmailing instrument than as a factor intended 
to come actually to grips with formidable strength. However, 
they both feel that Hitler, alert for openings, would seize 
immediate advantage of any sign of weakness at any point 
along the anti-aggression front. 
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1. These dispatches are not reproduced in this volume but are deposited in the 
Department of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
* According to information from other competent sources, however, the German 
air force is in constant readiness for action either to the west or east, a considera­
tion which, to my mind, might have important bearing, for example, in [the] event 
Berlin might suddenly decide to present Warsaw with an ultimatum. [Biddle's own 
footnote—Eds.] 
DOCUMENT THIRTY1 
[ Washington] 
August 9, 1939 
Memorandum of Conversation 
Subject: General European situation 
Participants: Count Jerzy Potocki, Polish Ambassador; 
the Under Secretary [Sumner Welles] 
The Polish Ambassador called to see me this afternoon upon 
his return to the United States after a month's stay in Poland. 
The Ambassador stated, first of all, that he was gratified to 
be able to tell me that the morale in Poland was admirable, and 
that he had not detected the slightest sign of hysteria nor of 
nervousness in any section of public opinion. He said that the 
attitude unanimously assumed by the Polish people was that if 
Germany forced a war upon them by threatening the autonomy 
and independence of Poland by the taking over of Danzig or by 
jeopardizing the integrity of the Corridor, the Poles would 
fight to the last ditch to preserve their independence. He 
stated that this feeling was eminently strengthened by the inti­
mate knowledge which the Poles had, through their familiarity 
with what was going on within Bohemia and Moravia, of the 
treatment being accorded to the Czechs by the German author­
ities. He said that it was notorious in Poland that the Czech 
male population had been classified by the Germans accord­
ing to categories, and that many of these categories of Czechs 
had already been removed from the occupied provinces and 
had been taken to Germany, where they were being subjected 
to forced labor in the construction of fortifications, roads, etc. 
The Ambassador stated that he had been equally impressed 
in the visits which he had made to England and France with 
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the great change which had taken place within those two 
countries since last year. He said that in England particularly 
the morale was now magnificent and the rearmament pro­
gram had reached a point of the greatest efficiency. 
The Ambassador stated that the Germans were pursuing a 
policy along the Polish frontier of attempting to break down 
Polish nerves by continued concentrations of German divi­
sions. He said on one day German divisions would be concen­
trated at one point on the frontier and a couple of days later 
there would be a similar concentration on another point of the 
frontier, but he said that the significant thing about this was 
that they were practically always the same German divisions. 
The Ambassador said that his Government was aware that in 
Slovakia the Germans were exceedingly active in the way of 
military preparations. These preparations, he said, consisted 
primarily of the widening of existing roads, strengthening of 
bridges, and the construction of new feeder roads leading to­
wards the Polish frontier. Within Poland itself, he said there 
was little evidence of military activity to the average ob­
server. He said that most of the maneuvers were carried out at 
night, and that these operations were conducted with complete 
efficiency. He said that in the event of war the Polish General 
Staff had determined that they would not limit themselves to a 
defensive war, but would undertake an offensive campaign in 
order to penetrate into Germany, and that, with their highly 
mobilized forces, particularly the cavalry, the Polish General 
Staff believed that they had a reasonable prospect for success 
in such an endeavor.2 
With regard to the prospects during the next few weeks, the 
Ambassador said that Colonel Beck was inclined to believe 
that war would not break out. He said it was Beck's impression 
that Hitler was becoming gradually convinced that the risks of 
a general war were too great for Germany to force the issue 
and that, while Ribbentrop was still continually telling Hitler 
that England and France would not fight over Danzig, the Pol­
ish Government knew that the German generals had informed 
Hitler two weeks ago that, while if the war could be limited to 
a war between Poland and Germany Germany would win eas­
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ily, if the war involved England and France the German generals 
could give no assurances of any kind to Hitler as to the out­
come. He said that Hitler was beginning to get information 
from sources other than Ribbentrop which was leading him to 
feel that England and France would fight with Poland should 
Poland fight on the Danzig issue. 
Beck believed that Germany would probably not risk war 
over Danzig but would continue for an indefinite period its 
present policy of constant provocation of Poland without going 
to the extreme limit. Beck believed it was far more likely 
that Hitler before the middle of September would bring about 
the downfall of the Hungarian Government, replacing it 
with a government completely subservient to Germany, and 
then spend the next six months in amalgamating the position 
so obtained in order to make it easier for Germany to attack 
Poland when the time came through Hungary and Slovakia 
and in the same manner obtain a more preponderant position 
in southeastern Europe. 
I asked the Ambassador what solution his Government 
saw to the present situation since it would clearly seem 
incredible that mobilization and military preparations could 
continue at the existing rate and that the entire world be kept 
at its present state of extreme uncertainty and of anxiety for 
any protracted period. To this the Ambassador made the 
singularly unconvincing reply that he thought that if no war 
broke out this autumn, the internal situation in Germany 
would become so serious by midwinter that Hitler would be 
overthrown by the spring and some more reasonable regime 
would come into power in Germany before next summer. I 
asked him if he had any reason to think that public opinion 
in Germany showed any signs of extreme dissatisfaction with 
the present regime, and he stated that he had no specific 
information to that effect but that he knew the internal econ­
omy of Germany was so precarious that the utmost measure 
of dissatisfaction was inevitable before many months had 
passed. 
The Ambassador stated that on his return to the United 
States he had stopped off for a few hours in Berlin to talk 
350 DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 
with his colleague the Polish Ambassador, [Jozef] Lipski. He 
said that Lipski had told him that the refusal of the American 
Congress to revise the neutrality legislation had had an emi­
nently encouraging effect upon the German authorities, both 
civil and military, but that fortunately this had been counter­
acted completely by the announcement made by the Gov­
ernment of the United States of its termination of the com­
mercial treaty with Japan. Ambassador Lipski had said that 
no one could exaggerate the consternation which this step 
by the United States had created in Berlin. 
I asked the Ambassador if he had any information, or 
what the opinion of his Government might be, with regard 
to the success of the negotiations now in progress in Moscow 
between the British and French and the Soviets for a political 
and military agreement. The Ambassador replied that Colonel 
Beck believed that a political agreement was improbable, 
but that he thought a military agreement would be concluded. 
In reply to a further inquiry from me, the Ambassador said 
that the Polish Government was informed that the Italian 
Government was continually counseling moderation on the 
German Government, but that no representations of any kind 
had been made to Poland by Italy with regard to the Polish-
German situation. 
The Ambassador told me explicitly that there had been no 
conversations and no negotiations of any character whatever 
between Germany and Poland with regard to the Danzig is­
sue. He said that the Polish Government had deliberately 
refrained from making any approach at all to Germany be­
cause of its conviction that if any such approach were made, 
Germany would construe it as a sign of fear and of weakness 
and would adopt a far more vigorous attitude. 
The Ambassador stated in conclusion that Poland expected 
to get a cash loan from Great Britain and France in addi­
tion to the credits already arranged. He said that Poland's 
great need at this time was pursuit planes and raw materials, 
particularly cotton and copper. He said that a certain amount 
of the latter commodities could be obtained from Russia 
but that Russia was not in a position to supply very much, 
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and that it was the most earnest hope of the Polish Govern­
ment that some arrangements could be made in the United 
States for obtaining these raw materials. He said that his 
Government fully understood its situation in this country on 
account of the Johnson Act,3 but it hoped, nevertheless, that 
some way could be found whereby credits might be obtained 
for the purchase of these supplies. I told the Ambassador 
that if he had any definite suggestions to make, I should 
be glad to consider them. He told me that he would talk with 
me again about this matter. 
In general the Ambassador seemed to feel that war was not 
imminent and that, while undoubtedly a very serious crisis 
would arise before the end of August, it would probably pass 
off for the time being. 
1. This document has been partially published in Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1939 (Washington, D.C., 1956), 1:206-8. 
2. This information was incorrect. The Polish plan was a defensive one, aimed 
at holding up the German forces as much as possible, until the French army 
launched the great offensive against Germany promised in the Polish-French mili­
tary agreement of May, 1939. See above, Part 2, footnote 9, for details of the defense 
plan. Potocki probably did not know of this plan, since it was known only to the 
commander in chief and the chief of staff. He may have been thinking of terms of 
the old Foch plan of 1923, whereby if France were attacked, Poland was to penetrate 
into Germany. 
3. The Johnson Act of April 13, 1934, initiated by Congress, forbade Americans 
to make loans to nations that had not paid their war debts. The Federal government 
could, however, grant credits in certain cases through the Export-Import Bank. 
DOCUMENT THIRTY-ONE 
Warsaw

August 25, 1939

Telegram 
Supplementing my number 191, August 24, 3 p.m.1 Further 
conversation with Beck and associates discloses that while it is 
difficult for them to stomach Danzig Senate's decree neverthe­
less after careful consideration all aspects Government there­
upon decided to exercise further restraint.2 
Accordingly Government adopted an official attitude along 
following lines: while substance of decree represented open 
violation of Danzig statutes its bearing was mainly internal 
and in such light a matter of consideration and action of Com­
mittee of Three and League of Nations. For Poland, Danzig's in­
ternal structure was of secondary importance. Poland was 
mainly interested in full respect of Polish rights in Free City, 
accordingly Poland would interpret any one of following ac­
tions as violation of these rights: (a) attempt to annex Danzig 
to Reich; (b) exclusion of Danzig from Polish customs zone; (c) 
subjection of Polish rights in Danzig to control of third state; 
(d) withdrawal of Polish rights covering national development 
of Poles in Danzig. Moreover Polish Government would care­
fully observe development of conditions in Danzig inasmuch as 
Danzig had failed to manifest good will in the matter of cus­
toms inspectors. 
In connection with foregoing Beck confidentially imparted 
his Government would declare its attitude toward Danzig gov­
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ernmental alteration when the real aims of the revision become 
clear. 
Meanwhile 24 railway men arrested in Danzig yesterday 
were released and Polish courier detained early yesterday in 
Breslau was released and diplomatic pouch restored to him. 
Schoolship SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN came to anchor as 
per schedule 7:40 this morning Danzig harbor.3 Early morning 
atmosphere in Danzig increasingly electric as evidenced 
among other factors by (a) overnight augmentation of military 
cars and trucks (b) yesterday's evacuation of many school chil­
dren and (c) today's closing of schools. 
Either Hitler has decided to act and not talk or else the ab­
sence of some statement after his last night's conference with 
Nazi bigwigs (for which all press wires had been kept open 
until dawn) indicates Hitler is still undecided as to definite 
plan of action. 
1. This document is not reproduced in this volume but is deposited in the De­
partment of State Files of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
2. Biddle's reference here to a "decree" is unclear. The Danzig Senate issued no 
major decrees immediately preceding this telegram, except for the proclamation rec­
ognizing the installment of Forster as chief (Stadloberhaupt) of the Free City on Au­
gust 23, in express violation of its statutes. But the Senate and the Polish government 
had been waging an undeclared war since March, 1939, when the Senate arbitrarily 
decreed that elections to it would not be held as scheduled that Spring, but instead 
would be postponed four years; since Polish and anti-Nazi candidates expected to gain 
considerably in the elections, this unconstitutional act upset Warsaw. Moreover, when 
Polish customs officers tried to perform their assigned tasks in July and August in the 
face of a new high of illegal weapons smuggling from Germany into Danzig, local of­
ficials applied every imaginable device to obstruct them, even resorting to violence. 
3. Biddle's use of the term "schoolship" to describe the German vessel Schleswig 
Holstein is misleading. In reality, it was a modern warship used for practical training 
in the arts of advanced naval warfare provided to German line naval personnel, and 
possessed a full complement of the latest naval weaponry. When the Nazi forces as­
saulted Poland on September 1, the Schleswig Holstein played a key role in subduing 
Danzig with the firepower from its cannon, situated so advantageously in the 
harbor. 
4. Hitler originally had set August 26 as the date for the opening campaign against 
Poland, but the signing of a formal Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Pact on the Au­
gust 25 forced him to postpone his plans for nearly a week. This accounts for the unex­
plained absence of activity that so puzzled Biddle. 
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(Continued from front flap) 
Ambassador Biddle had an astonishing abil­
ity to amass vast amounts of information from 
widely diversified sources, to comprehend and 
evaluate it, and to draw extremely trenchant 
conclusions about existing conditions. His in­
tuitive analytical ability enabled him to predict 
the future course of events with an acuity close 
to prescience. Throughout his prewar tenure 
in Warsaw, Biddle regularly supplied Washing­
ton with detailed and highly perceptive reports 
analyzing conditions and developments. Later, 
while serving with the exiled government in 
France, he wrote a sustained account of the 
final days of peace and the advent of war, 
drawing upon his notes, his recollections, and 
his private papers, as well as upon his dis­
patches to Washington and other official docu­
ments. These materials, now housed in the 
Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, 
are published here for the first time. They 
reveal a man able to quickly grasp complex 
situations and to move efficiently in difficult 
circumstances, and whose powers of recall and 
gifts for lucid exposition and dramatic nar­
rative were most impressive. Together, these 
documents constitute a thoroughly fascinating 
account of the nature, intent, scope, tactics, 
and, ultimately, tragic impact of the beginnings 
of Nazi aggression in Europe. 
Philip V. Cannistraro and Edward D. Wynot, 
Jr., are associate professors of history at Florida 
State University. Theodore P. Kovaleff is assis­
tant professor of history at Barnard College, 
Columbia University. 
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